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Never Go Against the Family / Iggerot Moshe, Y.D. vol. 1, #54
Summarizing the Iggerot
Before R. Moshe Feinstein made major waves upon the shores of America, he served for sixteen years as the rabbi of Lyuban in present-day Belarus. During a trip to Moscow in the year 5694 (1933-34) he was asked to guide an elderly couple who had to rely on their non-observant children for sustenance. Ostensibly, a person who does not adhere to the laws of kashrut has no halakhic credibility (ne’emanut) to attest to the kosher status of their own food or utensils. This halakhic reality left the two elderly parents in an untenable position which would likely impact not only their physical needs but their emotional relationship with their children as well.
R. Feinstein initially preempts a suggestion that they could rely on stam keilim einam bnei yoman, that we assume that the typical utensil has not been used within the past twenty-four hours. According to this principle, even if non-kosher food was previously cooked in these pots, the kosher ingredients would remain permissible—and here is the key word—post facto. Or, in halakhic parlance: bediavad. R. Feinstein rejects this leniency on the basis that regularly eating at their children’s table would require halakhic forethought to guarantee kosher utensils ab initio (lekhathila). Though, not all hope is lost. R. Feinstein instead proffers a leniency based on a separate Talmudic principle called kim li be-gavei/be-gava:
On [another] occasion, Rav Pappa and Rav Adda bar Mattana were sitting before [Rava]. A certain document was brought before Rava to be examined in court. Rav Pappa said to [Rava]: I know about this document, that it [records a debt that has already been] paid. [Rava] said to him: Is there another person [who can testify] with [the] Master [about the document]? He said to him: No, [I am the only one who knows]. [Rava] said to him: Although there is the Master [here who attests that the document has been paid], one witness is nothing. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to [Rava]: And should Rav Pappa not be [trusted] like Rav Hisda’s daughter [who as a woman is disqualified from testimony]? Rava replied: I relied on Rav Ḥisda’s daughter [because] I know with certainty about her [that she is always truthful (kim li be-gava). However, I cannot rely on the Master [because] I do not know with [the same degree of] certainty about him [that he is always truthful, and I cannot rule on the basis of one witness unless I have complete certainty] (Ketuvot 85a).
Rava could rely upon the testimony of Rav Hisda’s daughter and Rav Papa could rely upon the testimony of his own son, since each respective arbiter personally knew that the sole witness was credible. This does not operate upon the conventional standards of judicial credibility but emerges from what to the judge is a glaringly obvious reality that is based on such individuals demonstrating their reliability time and time again.
R. Feinstein proceeds to extrapolate the principle of kim li be-gavei from the courtroom to the context of the dining room and kitchen. While in financial matters, halakha would require the testimony of two witnesses to extract property from a litigant’s possession, in the realm of issur ve-heter (ritual laws such as kashrut) one witness is generally sufficient. Therefore, he ruled that if the elderly parents trust their children to use and provide only that which is kosher, they may rely upon them due to their intimate familiarity. Moreover, R. Feinstein adds that their trust in their children is so potent that it would suffice to enable non-family members to join the same meal, based on the parents’ trust in their children’s integrity.
Connecting the Iggerot
While the scenario R. Feinstein was confronted with at the beginning of his career in 1930s Russia was about a younger generation not following in the religious footsteps of their parents, at the end of his life (in 1985 America) he was confronted with the opposite trend of a younger generation becoming more observant than their parents. R. Feinstein advised (Y.D., vol. 4, #24) that while it might be commendable for one to aspire to the level of a ba’al nefesh (one who elects to lead an enhanced religious lifestyle) and adopt stringent halakhic practices, such measures were not intended for the general populace. Indeed, the young man about whom R. Feinstein was questioned was particularly passionate about his newfound level of stringency was advised not to seek to impose his lifestyle on his parents. Moreover, so long as his parents are practicing a minimally acceptable halakhic lifestyle, their son should not hesitate to dine with them (provided he did not take any formal vows that would preclude his partaking in their food). The key takeaway for our topic is that R. Feinstein explicitly incorporates the need for family cohesion as a factor in his analysis. (This is also a significant responsum in the sense that he clarifies the term ba’al nefesh. We will, God willing, explore this in another essay.)
The extent that R. Feinstein was willing to find a way to make things work for the aforementioned Russian family can further be appreciated when contrasted with a later responsum (E.H., vol. 4, #32) in which he unequivocally rules that a tinok shenishba, one who was not raised observant, is disqualified to provide testimony, even by no fault of his own. This is in line with another ruling (Y.D., vol. 2, #43) that a non-observant Jewish store-owner would require an independent mashgiah to ensure that proper kashrut standards are adhered to. Unlike immediate family members who share a consistent and intimate awareness of each other’s disposition and true nature, a claim of kim li elsewhere would be far-fetched even if such an individual’s reputation is otherwise beyond reproach.
Challenges to the Iggerot
However, R. Asher Weiss (Responsa Minhat Asher, vol. 2, #43) is troubled by R. Feinstein’s apparent distinction of applying kim li exclusively to family members versus non-family. Many people have stronger relationships with their closest friends than with some of their immediate family members. (Though one could argue with R. Weiss’ characterization, R. Feinstein may very well be using the category of family as a rule of thumb, rather than an absolute classification.)
R. Weiss proceeds to argue that there is a more compelling distinction to be made. R. Feinstein had suggested that in the same way the elderly parents could rely on their intimate knowledge of their children’s integrity, so too non-relatives could rely upon the parents’ assessment. He objects that since the children possess no inherent credibility, the parents can make a decision based on their personal judgment—but that is certainly insufficient for a third party who cannot claim kim li.
The Ma’aneh le-Iggerot (#107) advances several halakhic arguments against R. Feinstein, but perhaps his most compelling point is on the grounds of psychology. He argues that in a situation where it might not be easy or convenient to obtain kosher meat, a person who does not recognize the significance of halakha but genuinely loves his parents would sooner provide their parents with a non-kosher meat than deprive them of it altogether. In their minds, so long as the parents are unaware of this swap it would constitute a no-harm-no-foul. Whether the mental prediction of R. Feinstein or the Ma’aneh le-Iggerot is more accurate becomes a matter of speculation. However, the thought process suggested by the latter is certainly one that cannot be easily dismissed.
While several additional questions have been posed against R. Feinstein’s ruling (e.g., see Badei ha-Shulhan, Aveilut, Beiurim 397:1), this did not prevent more recent authorities such as R. Moshe Shternbuch from citing it to permit a more observant son or daughter to eat at their parent’s table (vol. 3, #253) as well as a husband to trust his less-observant wife vis-a-vis taharat ha-mishpaha (vol. 2, #430; cf. Iggerot Moshe Y.D., vol. 1, #105 regarding the unreliability of such woman).
Reflecting on the Iggerot
The principles of shalom bayit and kibbud av ve-em play a significant role in several additional rulings of R. Feinstein. In a remarkable responsum (Y.D., vol. 2, #130) to a convert who had severed her ties with her biological mother, he ruled that while this convert might not be technically obligated under the category of kibbud av ve-em, a Jew is supposed to demonstrate gratitude toward others. Therefore, R. Feinstein ruled that it was not only permissible, but incumbent upon this convert to let her mother meet the grandchildren and to allow them to engage in a healthy and halakhically responsible relationship with their non-Jewish biological grandparents.
In another responsum (Y.D., vol. 2, #166), R. Feinstein permitted a kohen to visit his wife’s family in the hospital by factoring in shalom bayit, and more notably, shalom mishpaha, an imperative to maintain broader familial cohesion. However, he does clarify in a later responsum that while shalom bayit is an important factor, it certainly cannot outright permit a transgression of the Torah (E.H., vol. 4, #66).
What is special about R. Moshe Feinstein’s approach is that he did not simply rule in favor of preserving family cohesion and honor for one’s parents, but he also exemplified it. In his introduction to Orah Hayyim (vol. 4), and in greater length in his introduction to Dibrot Moshe (Bava Kamma, vol. 1), he beautifully expresses gratitude to both his father and mother:
And certainly it was not my own merit which [enabled me to publish this], but rather the merit of my holy forefathers—my master, father, teacher and rebbe, may his memory be a blessing, who was a great tzaddik, pious and modest—and there is virtually no parallel to his attributes, for all of his deeds were for the sake of Heaven as well as his love for Torah, those who study it, and all of the Jewish people…and in the merit of my mother, my teacher of blessed memory, the righteous. For there is no parallel to her in terms of her reverence and love for Torah. And her entire mission was that we become great in Torah. And she endeavored [to ensure] that we would never have to squander one moment of our studies…
In addition to revereing those who came before him, R. Feinstein also placed a premium on expressing affection for his progeny. His grandchildren report that he made a point to remember and call each and every one of them on their respective birthdays (Man Malkhei Rabbanan, p. 28).
Perhaps his sense of recognition to the earlier generation is what prompted a responsum (Y.D., vol. 1, #133) about how to properly refer to one’s father. And who was the inquirer who so very much wanted to learn how to fulfill these laws with absolute precision? R. Dovid Feinstein, R. Moshe Feinstein’s very own son. Clearly, R. Feinstein not only incorporated the values of gratitude and kibbud av ve-em into his halakhic analysis but successfully exhibited it and inculcated it into his own posterity.
Endnote: See also Iggerot Moshe (Y.D., vol. 1, #255) where he rules that maintaining shalom bayit supersedes kibbud av ve-em. And also see his lengthy analysis (Y.D., vol. 1, #65) of reliance on a single witness which provides a broader theoretical backbone for his responsum on kim lei b’gavei that we discussed. For further reading on issues related to families managing different levels (or lack of) observance, see R. Elisha Aviner’s Dor Tahpukhot (Sifriyat Hava), recently reviewed by R. Gidon Rothstein in TRADITION. In addition to its content and analysis, this book provides a window into the unique manifestations found in the Israeli religious experience. For more on the topic of converts maintaining a relationship with their biological parents, see Otzar Kibbud Av ve-Em (p. 470), Peninei Halakha (Giur 8:5), and Mi-Yam ha-Halakha (#16) who all cite and rule in accordance with R. Feinstein’s position.
Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later.
Prepare ahead for our next column (August 1) on R. Feinstein’s nuanced approach and practical advice to approaching repentance: Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim, vol. 4, #114.