Unpacking the Iggerot: Patriotism, Pragmatism and Particularism

Patriotism, Pragmatism and Particularism: R. Feinstein’s Different Hats for Navigating the American Landscape / Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 2, #29

Read more about “Unpacking the Iggerot” and see the archive of all past columns.

 Summarizing the Iggerot

There was a concerning rumor that many yeshivot and Jewish institutions were taking advantage of United States government funding in ways that were either borderline or flagrantly illegal. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein initially framed his response to this development by highlighting the gratitude we owe to such a government that is benevolent enough to fund our schools in the first place:

Behold, regarding the matters of kindness that our government, the United States, has bestowed upon us—which God in His abundant mercy on the remnant of Jews from the countries of Europe, and the remnant of the Torah giants and their disciples which He has brought here to reestablished both the old institutions of Europe as well as new ones—and through this kingdom of kindness (malkhut shel hesed), whose entire goal is to benefit the residents of the country, it has provided many programs to assist students in all the schools of the country that they may be able to learn and grow in their studies (even the Torah institutions receive great assistance for their students) certainly all of the Rashei Yeshivot, deans, and students recognize all of the goodness of the country and pray for the nation’s peace and for blessings to all its leaders.

He begins by taking stock of the unique nature of the United States and how it exists to serve all of its citizens. It is a “kingdom of kindness” that is deserving of recognition and gratitude. However, even if one were not persuaded on that basis alone, R. Feinstein invokes a litany of formal Torah violations for anyone who would seek to defraud the government for undeserved funding, such as by inflating the number of students attending the school:

• (A) Theft.
• (B) Speaking Falsehood.
• (C) Geneivat Da’at (Deceptive Practices).
• (D) Hillul Hashem (Desecration of God’s Name).
• (E) Tarnishing the reputation of the Torah and those who study it.
• (F) Rodef (he appears to condemn the harm that will come to Torah observant Jews as a result of these unethical practices. Doing so does not merely harm the violator but the entire community).
• (G) Dina de-Malkhuta Dina (The imperative to obey the standard laws of the land).

R. Feinstein concludes with further words of exhortation and encouragement. He notes matter-of-factly that “it is well known and publicized that the yeshiva students are the highest quality, Barukh Hashem, in comparison to other citizens—both vis-a-vis their character traits and good deeds.”

There are several elements to this brief responsum that we will analyze. First, R. Feinstein’s affinity, and, at times, misunderstood relationship with America. We will also explore his pragmatic concerns for Jewish public relations vis-a-vis the rest of American and gentile society. And finally, we will explore how his unabashed Jewish exceptionalism alludes to a metaphysical rift between Jews and Gentiles that would seem to underlie much of his rulings.

(In an upcoming column, we will address the subsequent responsum about cheating on the New York State Regents exams and what it tells us about R. Feinstein’s approach to secular studies and culture; Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 2, #30)

Connecting the Iggerot

There is a flowery, and well-founded, perception of how R. Feinstein related to the United States of America. While the Mishnah instructs us to pray for the welfare of the government of the land lest anarchy ensue (Avot 3:2), R. Feinstein proposed that in addition to this formal obligation there was an ethical imperative to pray for America which actually deserves our prayers (Masoret Moshe, vol. 3, p. 516). Shortly following John F. Kennedy’s assassination, R. Feinstein authorized a Jewish community to participate in funding a statue to commemorate the slain president, not just for the utilitarian preservation of the “ways of peace” but also “to honor the government” (Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., vol 2, #54).

R. Moshe Feinstein (1943)

What was so special about America that it had earned this elevated status in R. Feinstein’s eyes? A sermon delivered in 1939, roughly two years after he escaped Communist Russia, articulated what he believed set America apart (Darash Moshe, Mili de-Hespeda, #10, pp. 415-416). The job of government is to protect its citizens and prevent them from harming one another. However, the government’s job is not to impose its preferred religion and ideology on its constituents: “every individual should be free to do as he wishes.” If the government limits its mandate to the mere prevention of crime and anarchy then “behold, they are fulfilling the will of God, blessed be He…and we are obligated to pray on their behalf.”

In contrast with the severity of Communist Russia, which sought to indoctrinate its citizens, R. Feinstein praised America for providing freedom for all and not legislating a state religion, as he expressed in his responsum on public school prayers: “The authorities in our country are men of kindness who do not desire to force their faith on the rest of the citizenry” (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 2, #25).

His family reports that he also believed that voting in the United States constituted a civic as well as a halakhic obligation rooted in the principle of Dina de-Malkhuta Dina. Moreover, he believed that voting accomplished an important goal of “identification with the government” (Man Malki Rabbanan, pp. 26-27). Apparently he not only promoted appreciation for the United States but went a step further by advocating a patriotic affiliation with its nationhood.

In terms of who R. Feinstein thought one should vote for he replied “in general, I do not know if there is really a big difference between the Democrats and Republicans—I do not know who is better” or worse (Masoret Moshe, vol. 1, p. 550). However, his son, R. Reuven Feinstein (Pirkei Shalom, p. 86) reports that when it came to more local matters, R. Feinstein did indeed promote particular members of Congress and mayoral candidates, but likely did so based on what he considered to be in the civic and Jewish best interests, without fealty to one political party over the other.

While R. Feinstein was very appreciative of America, and, like most immigrants, had patriotic feelings, it did not prevent him from criticizing it at times. He compared America to “Sodom and Gomorrah” for allowing free speech to go so far as to allow for Nazi-sympathizers to publicly justify the murder of Jews (Masoret Moshe, vol. 1, p. 503). Moreover, he questioned the sensibility of the American legal system which accepted testimony from thieves and wrongdoers in plea deals—individuals who should categorically be barred from testifying against their adversaries (ibid., vol. 2, p. 429). He further condemned anyone who would seek to repeal the death penalty as absurd and pointed to that attitude as “being merciful to the wicked” (ibid, vol. 1, p. 541).

In truth, R. Feinstein’s skepticism of non-Jewish legal systems likely began during his youth in Czarist Russia. He went to great lengths to exempt himself from the military draft, even receiving a blessing from R. Yisrael Meir Kagan (the Hafetz Hayyim) and eventually bribing an official to change his age on legal documentation so that he would no longer be eligible for the draft (Man Malki Rabanan, p. 11).

We should note that in his later years in America, he would regularly send a letter to the government, attempting to inform them that he was not yet eligible to receive social security (ibid, p. 27). As we referenced earlier, he was scrupulous about adhering to the principle of Dina de-Malkhuta Dina, emphasizing the religious nature of it. For instance, in a responsum to someone who had evaded subway and telephone costs, he instructed that they are required to repent for their sins (Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 1, # 88).

Returning to the topic of capital punishment, he maintained that the Jewish community should not involve itself in public political demonstrations out of deference and respect to the American government (ibid, vol. 4, #5). Nonetheless, as we have already observed earlier, R. Feinstein did not place his full trust in American institutions. This can be observed in his opposition to handing over a Jewish thief to the police (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., #9:11) and also in his insistence that Jews should not aid the New York City municipality with creating low-income housing units in the Jewish community of Forest Hills (Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 2, #22). However, he advised Jews in England to refrain from overtly challenging the British government out of concern for the resultant derision (eiva) and violence pursued against the Jews: “One needs to know that the hatred toward the Jewish people from the nations is very great, even from the governments which operate [generally] in a positive manner” (Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 2, #77).

Consistent with his libertarian approach to freedom of religion in America, R. Feinstein believed that in exile it was not the job of the Jews to educate the non-Jews, even the Seven Noahide Laws. “[R. Feinstein] emphasized that all religions will remain until the Messiah. Even the Hippies will remain until the coming of the Messiah!” (Masoret Moshe, vol. 1, p. 504). So while he was particularly protective against other religious ideologies, he also believed in refraining from imposing even the basic Noahide commandments on the gentile world. He was comfortable with a co-existence of the faiths, provided each remained in its own lane and did not attempt to impose on others.

While R. Feinstein did express a degree of flexibility in terms of interfaith prayers that are sufficiently neutral (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 2, #25), he took an unequivocally critical stance against interfaith dialogue. Following the Second Vatican Council, many rabbinic organizations and figures were eager to accept the Catholic Church’s invitation to engage in cordial and collegial discourse. In an intriguing piece of Jewish trivia, there are two responsa side by side, written within a month of each other in 1967, which appear in Iggerot Moshe (Y.D., vol. 3, #43) addressed to Rabbi Bernard Lander of Touro College and Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik of Yeshiva University, respectively. R. Feinstein consistently objected to engaging with the Catholic Church even on non-religious matters, as he suspected that behind their friendship was a sinister agenda of engineering the discussion toward matters of theology in an attempt to convert the Jews. He instructs R. Lander that he should renege on his commitment to participate; he separately invites R. Soloveitchik to sign on to a letter of protest against this gathering. R. Feinstein’s flowery tone observed in his responsa about a secular American-Western nation is markedly absent when he reckons with the Christian clergy, who he viewed as religious adversaries.

Challenges to the Iggerot

R. Soloveitchik declined to sign R. Feinstein’s aforementioned open letter. Instead, he attempted to articulate an intermediate position that permitted limited interfaith dialogue within the realm of secular matters, but forbade engagement on a theological level. In his iconic presentation turned essay, “Confrontation” (TRADITION Spring-Summer), he wrote the following:

First, we must state, in unequivocal terms, the following. We are a totally independent faith community. We do not revolve as a satellite in any orbit. Nor are we related to any other faith community as “brethren” even though “separated.”… Viewing the relationship between Judaism and Christianity under this aspect, it is quite legitimate to speak of a cultural Judeo- Christian tradition for two reasons: First, Judaism as a culture has influenced, indeed, molded the ethico-philosophical Christian world-formula. The basic categories and premises of the latter were evolved in the cultural Judaic orbit. Second, our Western civilization has absorbed both Judaic and Christian elements. As a matter of fact, our Western heritage was shaped by a combination of three factors, the classical, Judaic, and Christian, and we could readily speak of a Judeo-Hellenistic-Christian tradition within the framework of our Western civilization. However, when we shift the focus from the dimension of culture to that of faith – where total unconditional commitment and involvement are necessary – the whole idea of a tradition of faiths and the continuum of revealed doctrines which are by their very nature incommensurate and related to different frames of reference is utterly absurd, unless one is ready to acquiesce in the Christian theological claim that Christianity has superseded Judaism (21-23).

In formulating policy derived from the Rav’s guidance in “Confrontation,” the Rabbinical Council of America issued the following statement at its mid-Winter conference in February 1964:

We are pleased to note that in recent years there has evolved in our country as well as throughout the world a desire to seek better understanding and a mutual respect among the world’s major faiths. The current threat of secularism and materialism and the modern atheistic negation of religion and religious values makes even more imperative a harmonious relationship among the faiths. This relationship, however, can only be of value if it will not be in conflict with the uniqueness of each religious community, since each religious community is an individual entity which cannot be merged or equated with a community which is committed to a different faith. Each religious community is endowed with intrinsic dignity and metaphysical worth. Its historical experience, its present dynamics, its hopes and aspirations for the future can only be interpreted in terms of full spiritual independence of and freedom from any relatedness to another faith community. Any suggestion that the historical and meta-historical worth of a faith community be viewed against the backdrop of another faith, and the mere hint that a revision of basic historic attitudes is anticipated, are incongruous with the fundamentals of religious liberty and freedom of conscience and can only breed discord and suspicion. Such an approach is unacceptable to any self-respecting faith community that is proud of its past, vibrant and active in the present and determined to live on in the future and to continue serving God in its own individual way. Only full appreciation on the part of all of the singular role, inherent worth and basic prerogatives of each religious community will help promote the spirit of cooperation among faiths.

There are two angles to look at R. Soloveitchik’s position. On the one hand, he adopts a relatively protectionist stance against theological conversations with the Christian faith. However, as R. Dr. David Ellenson, who went on to become the head of the American reform movement, noted, we can instead understand R. Soloveitchik’s guidance as representing a groundbreaking liberal development as well:

[A]n examination of the Soloveitchik essay indicates that there were also elements in the Jewish-Christian dialogue that R. Soloveitchik strongly endorsed. At the outset, the rabbi maintained that there was value in there being formal relations between Jews and non-Jews. In addition, he viewed Christianity as more than a source of hatred toward Jews, and he recognized that the modern world had witnessed significant transformations in the attitudes Gentiles adopted toward Jews. This meant that there were areas in which Jewish-Christian cooperation was surely desirable.

R. Feinstein and R. Soloveitchik respectively applied the same standards to interdenominational dialogue as well. In “An Interview with Rabbi Dr. Moshe D. Tendler” (by Shaul Seidler-Feller, Kol Hamevaser, August 31, 2010), we gain a glimpse into some candid details about how this difference of opinion between the two Torah giants played out:

In terms of cooperation, the Synagogue Council of America was an example of one such effort, but it was held in disdain by most of the rashei yeshivah here and by my father-in-law [R. Moshe Feinstein], zts”l, as well. This was the one area in which he disagreed with the Rav, zts”l, who was supportive of the organization, and as a result my shver (father-in-law) expelled his own cousin [the Rav] from the Agudath Harabonim, a now-defunct institution which used to be very popular and powerful because it controlled kashrus until organizational kashrus, headed by the OU and OK, took over…. The Synagogue Council died because the denominations could not cooperate at that level; the Rav’s instructions to talk about everything but religion were not followed, so the institution fell apart. Overall, I would say, there was much animosity in both directions. The non-Orthodox looked upon us as dinosaurs and we looked upon them as goyim.

It is likely that R. Feinstein would concede that R. Soloveitchik’s nuanced distinction between the religious and secular may have had merit in principle, but practically the former’s zero-tolerance had its merits on a practical level. This is indeed a quintessential illustration of the difference between the Haredi and Modern Orthodox approach to engaging with external religious entities. (We will elaborate on R. Feinstein’s approach to non-Orthodox movements in a future column.)

Reflecting on the Iggerot

We have mentioned the American Gentile, the Christian Gentile, and even the Hippie Gentile. But when we peel away all of these modifiers and are left with just “Gentiles” we arrive at what I believe to be the essence of R. Feinstein’s worldview which informs many of the rulings we have referenced above.

I want to first emphasize that there are sources that indicate R. Feinstein’s sympathy and even acknowledgment of value to the deeds of non-Jews. He sanctioned prayers on behalf of non-Jews (Masoret Moshe, vol. 1, p. 504) and he even articulated the obligation of Gentiles to pray to God, thereby recognizing the value of a non-Jew’s personal prayers (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 2, #25).

At the same time, there are instances where he views the issues with a more jaundiced eye. Unlike in the passage in Masoret Moshe cited earlier, which suggested he did not desire to influence non-Jews to observe the Noahide Laws out of a sense of religious libertarianism, in another instance he advocated that “it is better that they do not repent so that they will lose all of their merit…we want all of them to worship idols so that they will have no merit” (Masoret Moshe, vol. 1, p. 505). Moreover, he was concerned that such attempts would just engender further derision toward Jews. There are indeed several such instances across Iggerot Moshe where he operates more out of utilitarianism than genuine concern for the welfare of non-Jews. For instance, in his iconic responsum to R. Menachem Dovid Zamba outlining the protocols for Jewish medical professionals on Shabbat, he writes that they should not refuse service to Gentiles on Shabbat only due to the potential violent backlash. In another responsum, he writes that “the vast majority of non-Jews, and perhaps all of them, are haters of Israel” (Iggerot Moshe, E.H., vol. 1, #6). In a responsum to R. Ephraim Greenblatt (Y.D., vol. 1, # 184) he comments that “Gentiles are suspected of murder even without a rationale, for in their hatred they desire to kill and they endeavor somewhat to do this.” We should note that the latter was written in 1959, more than two decades after his arrival in America, so it is difficult to suggest he would only be referring to his Communist oppressors.

The preponderances of these statements lead Eliezer Reif to suspect that behind R. Feinstein’s many pragmatic concerns with Jewish-Gentile relations is an underlying metaphysical assumption at its core. In his homilies, collected in Darash Moshe, R. Feinstein articulated several occasions what he believed to be a fundamental distinction between Jews and Gentiles, one that arguably colored both his philosophical and legalistic writings. For instance in Darash Moshe (vol. 1, p. 345), he writes “that even the goods deeds [of the Gentiles] are as nothingness…for, in truth, they would love to murder, should it be possible to do so without fear of the government’s punishment.” He continues: “And therefore, even though we find that [the government] puts the murderer to death, nonetheless it emerges from their love of killing and not from their love of justice…” In another exposition (ibid, pp. 374-375), he reiterates the same thesis: “On the contrary, anarchy would be preferable to them. It is only due to the fact that a world of anarchy would not ensure each individual’s necessities for life or enable their pursuit of lust.” R. Feinstein also contrasts Abraham whose trait of kindness was cultivated by the dictates of the Torah, while the kindness of the other nations was not authentic (ibid, vol. 1, p. 13).

While many of these positions originate from his years under Communist oppression, it is telling that he expressed them, albeit in a more diplomatic fashion, in his letter on the Jewish approach to the death penalty in 1981, just a few years before his passing. In this responsum, he maintained the essence of his contrast between the Jewish religion which fundamentally values individual life and morality versus the other societies which do not (Iggerot Moshe, H.M., vol. 2, #68). While Jewish exceptionalism and particularism is hardly unique to R. Feinstein, we have adduced these sources to suggest that latent within R. Feinstein’s many rulings vis-a-vis Gentiles lies a fundamental belief in the immutable distinction between the Jew and the other. When we look at our initial responsum, we can read his concluding words that “it is well-known and publicized that the Yeshiva students are the highest quality, Barukh Hashem, in comparison to the other citizens, both vis-a-vis their character traits and good deeds” as not merely his empirical assertion, but his theological conviction.

As a bit of a postscript, I would briefly return to the legacy of R. Feinstein’s writings as they pertain to the Jewish American experience. Every election season without fail, there are social media pundits and Jewish news outlets that proudly circulate R. Feinstein’s 1984 letter on the Jewish obligation to vote. It is true that he believed there was an obligation to go to the polls, but he also firmly held that there is an obligation to go to minyan as well (O.H., vol. 2, #27). I would love to see the same parties circulate the latter ruling with similar gusto.

Endnote: As always, our aim is only to provide a non-comprehensive survey of key topics addressed in Iggerot Moshe. For some further reading, consider seeing his responsa regarding teaching Torah to non-Jews (Y.D., vol. 3, #89-90) as well as his understanding of non-Jews performing mitzvot (Y.D., vol. 2, #7; cf. Mishnat Rebi Aharon 35:6). He also elaborates on this general topic in a later volume of Iggerot Moshe (Y.D., vol. 5, #10). See also Dibberot Moshe (Kiddushin, He’arot Ketzarot, p. 528) and R. Ephraim Greenblatt’s analysis in Kovetz Kol HaTorah (vol. 54, Nissan 5763, p. 54). We also referenced R. Feinstein’s concern for incurring the ire and malice of the non-Jews (mipnei eiva); he elaborates in Iggerot Moshe (vol. 1, #71) on both the conceptual framework and modern reframing which allows for more permissive business engagement with non-Jews in contrast to Talmudic times. Finally, see Masoret Moshe (vol. 3, beginning on p. 315) which provides more variance and nuance for understanding R. Feinstein’s opposition to handing over a Jew to the non-Jewish authorities (mesira).

Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later.