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Adam the First

Harold Bloom once wrote that Falstaff is Shakespeare's greatest creation. Falstaff was not the most moral, loyal, or the purest, of Shakespeare's characters. Judged along any single scale of value, Falstaff would most assuredly fall short. What Harold Bloom meant was that Falstaff was full of vitality, the embodiment of all that is natural and free, containing within himself multitudes, venturing beyond good and evil, an overwhelming life force who demands center-stage every time he makes an appearance.[1] In this spirit, I suggest that Adam the first is Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik's greatest creation. He is surely not the most moral of archetypes; in fact, at first, he is not even an ethical being. Nor is he the *highest* ideal type, reserved for the prophet in *Halakhic Man*,[2] nor is he the purest of types. Yet despite his shortcomings, Adam the first, majestic and dignified, strides onto the world stage demanding attention,[3] containing within him many of the peaks – and valleys – of Western civilization. Rapacious in his material and spiritual appetites, Adam the first is full of vitality, appropriating utilitarianism, hedonism, social contract theory, technology, science, the arts, the quest for *eudemonia*, and the Kantian moral will within his unquenchable and expansive soul. Given his appetites, it is no wonder that the danger of the demonic is also ever-present. In the figure of Adam the first, the Rav has created an archetype like no other - the embodiment of both the highest movements – and severe limitations – of Western culture.[4]

[1] See Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998).

[2] See Joseph Soloveitchik, *Halakhic Man* (trans. Lawrence Kaplan, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 101.

[3] See Joseph Soloveitchik, *The Lonely Man of Faith* (New Milford, CT: OU Press and Maggid Books, 2012 Rev. Edition), 18. [hereinafter *LMF*; page numbers in text above refer to this edition of *LMF*]

[4] There may be something jarring in the comparison between Adam the first and Falstaff, a buffoon, a joker, perhaps the *anti*-dignified man. But despite the surface opposition, there is a deeper connection, as I hope will emerge in this essay. Falstaff is, at bottom, an *aesthete*, and so is Adam the first, at least initially, whose dignity, and

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I. The Aesthetic Stage

In *The Lonely Man of Faith*, the Rav notes, as Rashi had before him, that the opening chapters of the Bible contain two contrasting stories of the creation of human beings. In the first creation story, Adam is commanded to subdue the earth, while in the second, Adam is told to cultivate the Garden of Eden. In the first story, God created male and female together, while in the second, Eve is created from Adam's limbs. From these and several other textual contrasts, and moving far beyond them, the Rav constructs an elaborate theory of human nature based on the dialectic of the two Adams, and the construction of which exemplifies the activities of Adam the first, who, according to the Rav, "is concerned with a philosophy of nature and man, of matter and mind, of things and ideas."[5] The writing of the book *The Lonely Man of Faith* then, is an undertaking of Adam the first, who desires to build a "philosophy of nature and man."

The portrait that emerges of Adam the first is complex, and developmental. Initially, Adam the first is portrayed as driven by utility and beauty. He is also characterized as outer-directed, without depth, and shallow. All of this is subsumed under the concept of 'dignity.'

The Rav begins his description of Adam the First by noting that:

> Adam the first is overwhelmed by one quest, namely, to harness and dominate the elemental forces and to put them at his disposal…He is completely utilitarian as far as motivation…(9)

Driven by what is useful, Adam the first develops technological marvels of the highest order, without, as of yet, taking into account the demands of duty, the call of ethics. In this, the Rav is siding with Kant and against the other dominant theory of ethics in contemporary thought: that of utilitarianism, which asserted that precisely that which is most useful, or that which provides for the greatest overall utility, should be considered the most moral course of action. For the utilitarians, ethics was utility. But for the Rav, calculations of utility can never replace morality proper, which is categorized as that which must respond to absolute norms, independent

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the responsibility that comes with it, is a choice, not a burden, a free act of the will, not an unconditional obligation. Falstaff is the paradigm of the aesthetic personality, for whom the sole source of authority is the will itself. R. Shalom Carmy has suggested that the description of Adam the first in this essay resembles that of *Faust* and his ceaseless striving. See *Halakhic Man*, 141, n. 4, where the Rav mentions Faust.

[5] *LMF*, 65.

of their utility value.[6] The Rav here pits utility *against* ethics. This does not mean that Adam the first does not engage in ethical acts. He builds hospitals, and saves lives. These are instances of what the Rav calls "ethical performances," which are, nevertheless, not rooted in ethical values. That is, the acts themselves are ethical, but the motives are aesthetic:

> Adam the first is always an aesthete, whether engaged in an intellectual or an ethical performance. His conscience is energized not by the idea of the good, but by that of the beautiful. (12)

The Rav here seems to be adopting a Kantian postulate, where, when it comes to morality, motive is all. What is clear is that the Rav is attempting to capture a certain contemporary and prevailing mindset that sees no value in what is not useful or functional or pragmatic.

The Rav in the quote above introduces yet another dimension of Adam the first - he is an aesthete, driven by beauty. As the Rav continues:

> Adam the first is not only a creative theoretician. He is also a creative aesthete. He fashions ideas with his mind, and beauty with his heart. Adam the first is always an aesthete…(12)

This drive for beauty seems, at first blush, to be *opposed* to his pragmatic, functional bent, for it is often the case that beauty is pitted against utility, as one may desire beauty for its own sake, and not because it is useful. The Rav is aware of this potential conflict, and attempts to circumvent it by noting that: "His mind is questing, not for the true, but for the pleasant and functional, which are rooted in the aesthetic."[7] For the Rav, utility and the 'functional' are somehow "rooted in" the aesthetic, but the Rav does not spell out the connection between the functional and the beautiful. What then, is the link between the functional and aesthetic, which are often opposed to one another?

In his claim that the pleasant and the functional are rooted in the aesthetic, the Rav's view of aesthetics bears a similarity to the views of the early Nietzsche, who had claimed that art exists to cover up the harshness of reality. In this view, the pleasant and the functional are also attempts at bettering, softening, or covering up, the horrors of life, which is why human beings create art, as the early Nietzsche understood it. The pleasant

[6] Utilitarians can often demand ascetic, saintly, altruistic behavior, since they should be supremely motivated to reduce aggregate pain. Nevertheless, the Rav's assumption in *LMF* that ethics requires absolute, unconditioned norms would still preclude him from labeling utilitarianism a properly 'moral' theory.

[7] *LMF,* 12.

and the functional are rooted in the aesthetic because the aesthetic drive is essentially the drive to rise above one's nasty, brutish existence by bettering, or more accurately, covering up, reality.[8]

Yet Adam the first is not only driven by utility and beauty. He is also a political creature, driven by the desire for community: "The whole theory of the social contract…reflects the thinking of Adam the first."[9] The Rav here focuses on the functional nature of the community of Adam the first, who can best meet his needs through the formation of cooperative communities. Adam the first realizes that his survival and the provisions of his needs are best obtained in a community of interests, the natural work community. But the Rav does not mention the other manner in which social contract theory and its offshoot- democratic rule, increase the dignity of human beings by enabling self-rule. Consensual forms of government that provide for people to rule themselves and therefore control their destinies reflects on the dignity and majesty of human beings. The Rav only focuses on the functional character of the community created by the social contract, without also pointing to its enabling of the capacity for self-rule that lends to human beings more dignity and majesty than in previous eras.[10]

Driven by utility, beauty, and the desire for cooperative communities, Adam the first also displays one dominant, psychological characteristic - he is outer-directed, which means that he is shallow, demands public attention, behavioral, and lacking authenticity or a meaningful inner life:

> Dignity is a social and behavioral category, expressing not an intrinsic existential quality but a technique of living, a way of impressing society... Hence dignity is measured not by the inner worth of the in-depth personality, but by the accomplishments of the surface personality…Dignity is linked with fame. There is no dignity in anonymity. (18)

Utility, beauty, functional community, and outer-directness are but some of the ultimate desires and characteristics of Adam the First, and what

[8] See Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 25-58.

[9] *LMF*, 22.

[10] In his desire for political freedom and self-rule, Adam the first asserts his dignity, for only people who deem themselves worthy will assert their right to rule themselves. Those who are not dignified, those who lack a sense of triumphant self-worth, will not press for political self-rule and will rest content to be ruled by others. See also *LMF*, 22, n. 2, where the Rav focuses only on the functional nature of the state, and not on political self-rule.

unites them all is the concept of dignity, or *kavod*. We might define dignity, as used here, as an unreflective attitude towards oneself that one is a worthy being and that how others act towards you should reflect that self-worth.[11] This kind of self-worth results from power, strength and the ability to impose one's will on a recalcitrant nature. This is opposed to Adam the second, who, at least initially, acutely feels his *lack* of self-worth, and longs for *redemption*. To be redeemed for the Rav here means to ground one's worth in a source of eternal validity, in the source of all value.[12] 'Dignity' is self-worth through mastery over nature, through the imposition of one's will on nature; while Adam the second's self-worth is anchored in God.

The evident shortcomings of the grounding of dignity and self-worth on mastery over nature, on power, is acutely noted by the Rav:

> Majestic Adam has developed a demonic quality: laying claim to unlimited power…his pride is almost boundless…he aspires to complete and absolute control of everything. Indeed, like the men of old, he is engaged in constructing a tower whose apex should pierce Heaven. (70)

[11] This notion of value is aesthetic, not moral. "Dignity' used by the Rav is not synonymous with common uses of the term 'human dignity,' as all humans equally share in the latter, but some people and eras have or exhibit more of the former than others. But the split is not so clear. The Rav bases his understanding of dignity on the Hebrew word, *kavod*, and on *kavod ha-briot*. See *LMF*, 10, n. 4, and *kavod ha-briot* is surely in part a moral concept. Moreover, there is another layer of meaning to the Rav's use of the term dignity. In the same note that he cites *kavod ha-briot*, the Rav also mentions *kavod malkhuto*, a term that expresses more than aesthetic value. 'Dignity' is not only aesthetic, even during this first stage. Or perhaps the concept of the aesthetic needs to be broadened.

In this vein, does Adam 1 have religious worth because he moves to the ethical stage or even in the aesthetic stage? The Rav seems ambivalent about this. From the perspective of motivations, "pure" Adam 1 is not religious, until he moves out of the aesthetic stage and seeks a transcendent source of value at the ethical stage and then the religious stage. But from the perspective of inherent worth, even pure Adam 1 can be religious- two considerations point to this: a) as noted above, the Rav uses the term *kavod* for dignity, and connects this term to the honor of His kingdom in a note. It seems that irrespective of motive, Adam I is imitating God (in some way); and 2) God commanded majesty and dignity, as stated explicitly by the Rav, and Adam I is engaged in that project, so it seems that he is engaged in a religious project, irrespective of motive.

[12] See *LMF*, 26: "…cathartic redemptiveness expresses itself in the feeling of axiological security. The individual intuits his existence as worthwhile, legitimate and adequate, anchored in something stable and unchangeable."

Adam the first is egocentric,[13] acting beyond good and evil. And precisely because of his egocentricity, the danger of the demonic can never be eradicated. Adam the first can never be trusted. The rapacious appetites of his being, his quest for absolute power and control, always threaten to spill out and cause untold damage on the world. So the very source of his self-affirmation, his dignity, is also the source of his demonic potential, because his dignity is rooted in self-love and power, distanced from the real source of absolute value.[14]

II. The Ethical Stage

Adam the first creates, achieves and transforms the world. But to what end? If such achievements are to be of lasting value, he must move beyond the confines of his own majestic system, where utility, order and beauty reign supreme, and he must discover the realm of the absolute norm. In short, Adam the first must discover the realm of transcendence in order to lend to his projects eternal validity.[15]

And so Adam the first ventures out, and through his eventual sense of self-lack, he discovers the absolute norm, borrowed from Adam the second, the covenantal creature who surrenders completely to the will of God. While at first the Rav writes that Adam the first is not motivated by ethics, now the Rav writes: "…Adam [the first] distinguishes himself not only in the realm of scientific theory but in that of the ethico-moral and aesthetic gestures as well."[16]

Adam the first develops into a more comprehensive type by appropriating the language and categories of Adam the second, attempting to lend eternal, transcendental validity to his accomplishments. Adam the first is now interested in the fullness of human flourishing, not in any restricted, or narrow sense of selfishness or self-interest, and is no longer engaged only in surface, outer-directed activities, as he had initially described Adam the first. Now Adam the first longs for meaning:

> The idea that certain aspects of faith are translatable into pragmatic terms is not new. The Bible has already pointed out that observance of the Divine Law and obedience to God lead man to worldly happiness, to a

[13] See *LMF*, 43.

[14] That violent fanaticism can also spring from the exclusive longings of a perverted Adam the second's worship of sacrifice and submission is also clear. As has often been noted, blind submission is often really aggressive self-assertion. Both Adams can turn demonic.

[15] See *LMF*, 65-67.

[16] *LMF*, 65.

> respectable, pleasant and meaningful life. Religious pragmatism has a place within the perspective of the man of faith. (67, n. 2)

And for the Rav, the highest peak of Adam the first's search for meaning, transcendence and the absolute norm, that is, of Adam the first's appropriation of Adam the second, is Kant, in both his writings on the moral will[17] and on epistemology:

> No wonder that the Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophies…let the creative cultural consciousness pick out from the flow of transient impressions, abstract constructs, and ideas those bits that point toward the infinite and eternal. From these elements they tried to construct a pure, rational religious awareness in order to endow the whole creative gesture with intrinsic worth and unconditioned validity. (66)

Adam the first has traversed through his outer-directed, non-ethical desires and projects, found himself lacking, and ends up as the majestic creator of the rational, religious awareness, the loftiest attempt of Adam the first to infuse his projects with transcendental, *unconditioned* validity.[18]

[17] See *LMF*, 66, n. 1.

[18] In his extended note arguing that Adam the first is not an ethical being, and taking issue with David Shatz, Lawrence Kaplan cites mainly from the initial parts of *LMF*. See Lawrence Kaplan, "Maimonides and Soloveitchik on the Knowledge and Imitation of God" in *Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts*, ed. Gorge K. Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (Ergon Verlag, 2004), 491-523, n. 34. Kaplan also points out that nowhere does the Rav explicitly connect *Imitatio Dei* with Adam the first (although see n. 11 above on *kavod*). When he comes across passages stating that Adam the first is also engaged in ethics, Kaplan remarks that this is Adam the second's values being expressed through the complex archetype comprised of both Adams. Kaplan's description does not capture what the Rav says about Kant and the creation of the rational, religious awareness as an attempt to lend absolute transcendental worth to his projects. It is Kant, or Kantians more generally, who are doing this, because a central point here is that the Kantians are engaging in the translation of values incompletely. In other words, it is not Adam the second speaking through the complex archetype; it is Adam the first (i.e., the Kantians) incompletely translating and appropriating the transcendental values of Adam the second. That there is development in Adam the first is clear from his attitude towards prayer. Initially, Adam the first does not know of prayer (49), but later, he borrows prayer from Adam the second (69). And once again, Adam the first's prayer is not the same as Adam the second's prayer, just as Adam the first's appropriation of the absolute norm is not the same as Adam the second's understanding of the absolute norm. It is not 'qua Adam the second' that Adam the first eventually prays, or that the Kantians act morally, because Adam the second's notion of prayer and of morality get transformed in their appropriation by Adam the first. In short, while prayer and ethics originate in Adam the second, they

III. The Religious Stage – Adam the Second

And yet that is not enough. As the narrative progresses, it becomes clear that even as Adam the first appropriates the language and categories of Adam the second, something significant is missing in translation. Even the new, ethical Adam the first, who has seen the need for a transcendental source of value and has therefore appropriated the idea of an absolute norm, is still found sorely lacking. But what does he lack? Has he not completed himself? Does he not now possess both majesty and recognition of the primacy of, and therefore submission to, the norm? For the Rav, this is insufficient because even in the Kantian epistemology and moral scheme, it is human beings who are supreme, not God. We are still in the world of ethics and reason entirely constructed by humans. The new, more comprehensive Adam the first still does not recognize God as the source of all value, which is unique to Adam the second:

> [T]he magnitude of the commitment is beyond the comprehension of the *logos* and the *ethos.* The act of faith is aboriginal, exploding with elemental force as an all-consuming and all-pervading passional experience…The commitment of the man of faith is…immediately accepted before the mind is given a chance to investigate the reasonable of this unqualified commitment…The man of faith has to give in to an "absurd" commitment. The man of faith is "insanely" committed to and "madly" in love with God." (68)[19]

For Adam the second, the *ethos* and the *logos* are not the absolute sources of value and authority; only God is the source of all value. This contrast between the ultimate sources of authority and value parallels another well-known contrast, that between nature and revelation. In an important passage in *LMF*, the Rav claims that nature does speak to human beings, but what it says is not clear. Hence, the need for revelation:

> Do the heavens sing the glory of the Creator without troubling themselves to find out if anyone is listening to this great song, or are they really interested in man the listener? I believe that the answer to this question is obvious. If the tale of the heavens were a personal one, addressed to man, then there would be no need for another encounter with God. Since God

are (incompletely) appropriated and transformed by Adam the first, and so Adam the first, does, in fact, become an ethical being.

[19] Although see the discussion of the Rav's criticism of Kierkegaard in Reuven Ziegler, *Majesty and Humility: The Thought of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik* (Boston: Maimonides School, 2012), 168-69.

> in His infinite wisdom arranged for the apocalyptic-covenantal meeting with man, we may conclude that the message of the heavens is at best an equivocal one. (36)

In *Halakhic Man*, the Rav had also spoken of a tale told by the heavens, but what it tells is not equivocal at all, but quite clear:

> Homo Religiosus hears the echo of the norm forthcoming from every aspect of creation "The Heavens declare the glory of God and the fir- ma-ment reciteth His handiwork" (Ps. 19:2). But what is the tale of the heavens if not the declaration of the commandments? All of existence declares the glory of God—man's obligation to order his life according to the will of the Almighty.[20]

Are these two 'tales' told by the heavens incompatible? Do the heavens speak equivocally, as in *LMF*, or clearly, as in *Halakhic Man*? That is, is there a need for revelation, or can we read norms off of nature alone?

Halakhic man sees the sun and wants to know whether it is time to pray. He sees a ritual spring of water and is immediately prompted to think of the laws of ritual baths. That is how halakhic man sees norms embedded in nature, but clearly this assumes that halakhic man is working from the basic givens handed at Sinai as background. The norms to which the Rav refers in *Halakhic Man* are not only specifically or narrowly *moral* norms, but the entire value-system of the theoretical halakha. It is clear then, that halakhic man is able to read the "declaration of the commandments" off of nature *post*-revelation. Halakhic man can utilize his newfound knowledge of the norms pervading the universe and see those norms everywhere in nature.[21] But this can happen only because revelation occurred; otherwise nature alone speaks equivocally.[22] The 'heavens' speak clearly only because of revelation, even in *Halakhic Man*.

[20] *Halakhic Man*, 64. *Homo religiosus* hears an "echo" of the norm (which can still be equivocal). But it is halakhic man who understands the much more specific, and unequivocal, "declaration" of the commandments. While *homo religiosus* is mentioned in the sentence, the extended passage is about halakhic man. See also Ravitzky on how the Rav moves from contemplation of the world to contemplation of halakhic norms when he discusses the Maimonidean doctrine of studying the cosmos, in Aviezer Ravitzky, "Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Maimonidean and Neo-Kantian Philosophy," *Modern Judaism* 6:2 (May 1986), 157-188.

[21] Of course, halakhic man constructs the theoretical halakha from the basic givens at Sinai.

[22] For alternative accounts, see Shubert Spero, "The Tale Told by the Heavens," *Tradition* (1965) and Lawrence Kaplan, "Maimonides and Soloveitchik on the Knowledge and Imitation of God" in *Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His Religious,*

Adam the first, a creature of nature and of self-affirmation, must appropriate a transcendental source of value in order to infuse his creative activities with "intrinsic" worth and "absolute" validity, to escape the circle of finitude. But without revelation, without the recognition that the ultimate source of value is an infinite God, he cannot fully succeed. Adam the first can never fully appreciate that the source of all value must lie beyond nature, beyond the *ethos*, and beyond the *logos*. This insight is the exclusive provenance of the lonely man of faith.

IV. Kierkegaard

The Lonely Man of Faith bears the traces of Kierkegaard throughout, and not only on account of its prominent existentialist themes, such as loneliness and solitude, and concerns around personal dilemmas, not theories or beliefs.[23] The Rav borrows from Kierkegaard in both structure and content, only to then conclude with a decisive rejection of the Christian existentialist.

LMF is structured in a tripartite manner that parallel the three stages in Kierkegaard. In the first pure stage, Adam the first is an aesthete, corresponding to – although, of course, not the same as –Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage in *Either/Or*. In the second stage, Adam the first incorporates Adam the second's focus on the absolute norm, which corresponds to the ethical stage in *Either/Or*.[24] To be sure, in Kierkegaard, the leap between the aesthetic and ethical stages is a mystery, based on the recesses and resources of the inner will, while for the Rav, the aesthetic is not replaced by the ethical in a leap, but combined in a relation of both tension and complementarity.[25] Finally, just as Kierkegaard moves from the ethical realm of the absolute norm to the religious mode of life, most prominently in *Fear and Trembling*, so too the Rav moves from the ethical Adam the first to Adam the second, the archetype that corresponds to the

Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts, ed. Gorge K. Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (Ergon Verlag, 2004), 491-523.

Also, Aviezer Ravitzky notes that for the Rav, nature does, *in general terms*, reveal norms (i.e., in his teleological view of nature). See Aviezer Ravitzky, "Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Maimonidean and neo-Kantian Philosophy," *Modern Judaism* 6:2 (May, 1986), 157-188.

[23] See *LMF*, 1.

[24] The Rav introduces Adam the second (the religious mode of life) prior to the introduction of the enlarged, ethical Adam the first, and this enlarged Adam the first borrows the language and categories of Adam the second.

[25] See *LMF*, 57-58.

Kierkegaardian vision of absolute surrender to the will of God, the religious mode of life.[26]

But as illuminating as the similarities might be, the contrast may be more central. The Rav decisively rejects the irrationalism lying at the heart of Kierkegaard's thought. For Kierkegaard, the absolute surrender of one's finite will to God's will necessitates the abandonment of the legitimacy and importance of the ethos and the logos, relative to God's will.[27] But for the Rav, God's will is not to obliterate human reasoning. In short, the Rav rejects Kierkegaard because Kierkegaard rejects Adam the first, who is willed and sanctioned by God Himself:

> Let us not forget that the majestic community is willed by God as much as the covenantal community. He wants man to engage in the pursuit of majesty-dignity as well as redemptiveness. (56)

Either/Or and *Fear and Trembling* are structured as a series of unfathomable leaps, first from the aesthetic to the ethical, and then from the ethical to the religious, where one mode of life is entirely replaced by, because incompatible with, the previous mode of life. No man can serve two masters. But for the Rav, the aesthetic, and the ethical are values that exist both in tension with, and as complements to, the priority of the religious mode of life, and indeed, are a central part of that life. The values of utility, beauty and freedom are religious values, and the desire to transform the physical world is rooted in God's will. Those who act on the commandment to "subdue the earth," alongside the commandment to cultivate the garden, are realizing their full humanity.

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Adam the first loves what is useful, functional, and beautiful. He travels to space, builds hospitals, saves lives. He creates communities, knowing that in cooperation he can best impose his will on nature. He longs for mastery, power, and control. Rooted in affirmation of the self on account of his power, majestic Adam can turn demonic. But he also desires *eudemonia*, worldly happiness, and meaning. He is a thinker who wants to create a philosophy of human beings and nature, questing not only for

[26] In Kierkegaard, this move is once again presented as a leap of faith, but for the Rav, both archetypes represent different aspects of the human personality.

[27] Admittedly, this is an oversimplification of Kierkegaard, who took Kantian morality very seriously.

material, but for spiritual and axiological achievements. In borrowing the values of Adam the second, he attempts to lend to his projects eternal worth and absolute validity, and creates the Kantian moral will. In short, Adam the first embodies all that is noble in Western culture. Willed by God, Adam the first has the right, and the obligation, to "become himself." But for all of his majesty, Adam the first is deaf to the protests of the lonely man of faith, refusing to acknowledge that the source of all value lies not in his reason, or in this world. While *The Lonely Man of Faith* lays bare the anguish of Rav Soloveitchik, Adam the first lays bare the noble tragedy of our culture.