

COMMUNICATIONS

ARE THERE AUTHORITATIVE BELIEFS?

TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

I am much honored by the detailed comments on my *Judaism, A Portrait*, in your issue of Spring 1962; and if I advert to some of them, it is not in order to exculpate the author who is only too conscious of his shortcomings but to bring the issues involved into a fuller light. They seem to me to be of such importance as to demand the attention of all students.

In the eyes of the reviewer, the author of the book is, on many central points, "evasive." He certainly is. He gives no directives. He does not tell his readers whether or not they are to "believe" this or that. He seems to delight in leading them to one conclusion and then offering reasons which suggest another. He blurs differences; highlights one thinker; omits even a reference to others. He does not explain clearly his view of revelation.

I agree; but is not this precisely the very nature and prerogative of Aggadah, and is it not in this that

part of the great strength of Judaism has always lain? Is not the distinction between Aggadah and Halakhah fundamental? The reviewer is surely asking for a *Pesak Din* (and a *Posek*) in regions where there is and can be no such thing. Aggadah can suggest, can try to persuade; it can ridicule, divert, dismiss; but it cannot compel. True, it may pass into Halakhah as Professor Jacob Katz's recent books have shown with an abundance of happy illustration. But for decision to be exercised or invoked, Aggadah must have *already passed into* Halakhah. While *not yet* Halakhah, it offers decision no place.

The reviewer thinks it "likely that one going to his death in Sanctification of the Name might wish to have something 'authoritative' on the Jewish concept of immortality." It is indeed likely (although the idea of purely disinterested action does, *pace* the reviewer, exist: what else could Antigonos of Socho have meant?); and so we find it in the saga of Maccabean martyrdom. But "authoritative"? What can one tell an enquirer but that most Jew-

ish thinkers since the medieval period have accepted the doctrine? Is this "authority"; or are we to bolster ourselves up with the names of Ducasse or Salter (Aristotle and Kant being out of date) and say that some of the moderns allow it (or rather, do not disallow it) if "faith" so demands? But suppose I (for the sake of argument) take my stand on the "thirteen articles" and say: "Thus far and no farther." Where does the doctrine of immortality stand then? Dr. Kaddushin has shown decisively that (as was already noted by Maimonides) the consensus of talmudic opinion was in favor of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and it is this doctrine which has imprinted itself on the Prayerbook. By what "authority" dare I, or even your reviewer, pass over Talmud and Prayerbook (and Bible!) in favor of what is commonly held to be a loan from the Greeks? As a fact we do, but not as a point of Halakhah, i.e., as a rigid and unquestionable decision; and I should be surprised if even the strictest rabbi of our day would, if appealed to, excommunicate me if I denied the immortality of the soul. (I doubt whether he would, even if I denied the resurrection of the body, although perhaps he ought to.) And this is not only because excommunication is out of fashion in most Jewish communities today. It is because, as Ravad said on a famous occasion: "The doctrine may be true, but many great and learned men have believed the contrary."

May I suggest that it is vital

to distinguish between implicit belief and overt dogma. A logician might show that this, that or the other doctrine is "pre-supposed" in the actions and statements of (say) Abraham. It does not follow that Abraham would have agreed. When faced with them he might have denied them, or said that if such were the case, he regretted what he had said or done. For example, if he had read what Kierkegaard said about him, I think he would have torn his garments! But even assuming the alleged pre-suppositions to be sound, is it really true that Judaism could not exist without the conscious acceptance of (e.g.) Albo's three principles? It may be that they are "implicit" in Judaism (incidentally, I think myself that Abarbanel's treatment of the subject in his *Rosh Amanah* is much more intelligent than Albo's); but has not historical Judaism managed to escape the snare of dragging them into the light and insisting on them *totidem verbis*? Is not the reviewer (again!) confusing Aggadah with Halakhah and asking for halakhic decision in the field of Aggadah? Akiba at the stake proclaimed the unity of God, not a belief in immortality and reward and punishment. He may well have believed in these as well; but his well-known hedging on the topic of free-will, a hedging which I have always looked upon as characteristically Jewish, would suggest that he might have hedged here too.

I am afraid my partiality for Maimonides has deceived my reviewer. I find Maimonides the

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clearest head (indeed, at times, the only clear head) among our theorists of Judaism. But I do not hold him infallible. His principal importance for us is surely that he gave us something reasoned out. But we are not bound to accept his reasoning, any more than we are bound to accept that of the late Mr. G. E. Moore whom your reviewer seems (to my mind, somewhat strangely) to consider an "authority" on ethics. Maimonides may not have helped us out of "interest moralities" but he went a long way towards it. Yet we must remember, too, that "interest moralities" may in the end prove to be sound. Why turn fruitful ideas into incontrovertible dogmas? Perhaps Job was right when he said he didn't know.

I always have to apologize for my attitude to the Kabbalah. As your reviewer perceived, and as I stated, I do not like it. I have studied and much admire the writings of Professor Scholem. As scientific investigations in a comparatively untouched field they have my highest respect. Professor Scholem has helped us all to understand what the Zohar *said*. But that does not mean that we have to accept it as Judaism. For myself, the more I understand it, the less I like it. Professor Scholem has shown that much of the Kabbalah is a resuscitation, through hitherto untraced channels, of gnostic mythology, and any reader of the XI-XIIth century literature of the "Courts of Loun" and the Albigensian and kindred heresies knows that they present sim-

ilar puzzles both as to content and to origin. But let the channels be what they may, is gnostic mythology to be our Bible? Candidly, I prefer the old one! My personal view is that of Maimonides and Hermann Cohen that the aim (and partial achievement) of Judaism was precisely the destruction of mythology. If this view is sound (and we have to remember that the destruction of mythology is a continuing process and should be looked upon, in Kantian phraseology, as a *regulative* and not a constitutive idea, that is, a hope and object of striving rather than a fact), then Kabbalism is a step backwards. It is a relapse, a *degeneration*. Your reviewer may disagree and consider the Zohar (in Professor Scholem's words as quoted by W. T. Stace) a "source of doctrine and revelation equal in authority to the Bible and the Talmud"; but this matter is one of Aggadah, not of Halakhah, and in matters of Aggadah there is no *Din*.

As for the "place of the land of Israel in the scheme of Judaism," I gave my views at sufficient length in my chapter on the "Community of Holiness." I fancy that the reviewer has fallen into the conventional confusion between the "*Land of Israel*" and the "*State of Israel*." The State of Israel has worries which neither I nor your reviewer can, or has the right to try to, solve; but are they, all or in part, connected with *Judaism*? In any case would it not be wiser for us to try and make up our minds first what Judaism is and

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only afterwards (and at this stage, I should have thought, each for himself) what our attitude to the new State is to be.

I confess that, even after reading my *Portrait*, I do not know. But as I said in my Preface, my concern is to promote fresh thinking on the subject, and I am grateful to your reviewer for having set the ball rolling and to you, Sir, for having let it roll. I suggest that as a next step you invite some of your learned contributors to turn their attention to the problem of Authority in matters which do not fall under the rubric of Halakhah. I know it is an old problem but it is no less important for that; and it is peculiarly pressing today. Is there any approach possible other than the historical one, and does Aggadah in these matters ever crystallize into Halakhah, and if so, when and how?

LEON ROTH

Brighton, England

RABBI SPERO REPLIES:

The generally objective tenor of Professor Roth's letter deserves not the usual polemical "reply," but an attempt at earnest dialogue. I shall, therefore, address myself to the issue (although some of our correspondent's parenthetical thrusts tempt me sorely) in an attempt to "roll the ball" a bit further.

Clearly, Professor Roth favors the historical view in accounting for the theological principles of Judaism, while I would press for the primacy of the logical approach. I would hesitate, however, to accept Professor Roth's formu-

lation of the issue, i.e., "does Aggadah in these matters ever crystallize into Halakhah"? The nomenclature is too vague and cumbersome and imposes upon him who would answer in the affirmative, the alchemical task of transforming one thing into something else — a truly dubious undertaking. Aggadah is not a primitive term denoting a specific type of subject matter. Aggadah includes all material that is not Halakhah. However, materials may be non-halakhic for different reasons and their relationship to Halakhah, therefore, may vary. Consider historical material — a narrative with a moral lesson. Now the narrative as such does not ever pass over into Halakhah for the same reason that history is not law. The moral value exhibited in the narrative, however, may very well have long been a moral imperative reflected in the Halakhah. Hence, aggadic material of a historic character, because of its nature, can never become Halakhah; on the other hand, aggadic material of a moral character probably always was rooted in the Halakhah. Aggadic material of a philosophic character, however, can, and has become Halakhah under certain conditions. For Halakhah is primarily a method whose end product is, indeed, "positive, prescriptive law," but which can be applied to theoretical material as well as to practical matters, to concepts as well as to deeds, to duties of the heart as well as to duties of the limbs. Aggadah may only be "theory" but surely there is a right theory and

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a wrong theory. And if, as Professor Roth has admitted, theories have practical consequences, then these too are subject to the "pressure of the need for action." Hence, the Mishnah asserts authoritatively that he who denies the Torah is of Divine Origin, or that Resurrection of the dead is to be found in the Torah, or the Apikorus (see Maimonides' definition), has no share in the world-to-come and ceases to be a part of the community of Israel. This teaching has many echoes in the Halakhah, amongst which are *Yoreh Deah*, 119:7, 158:2, and 2:9. Reflected here is the realization that belief in certain basic theoretical principles, such as the existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment, are necessary conditions for a commitment to Judaism. These are the "implicit beliefs" that are thus made explicit and have become part of Halakhah.

But what are Professor Roth's objections? He asserts that even if we should admit that implicit beliefs can be rendered explicit, as, for example, in the case of an Abraham, yet, "it does not follow that Abraham would have agreed." Indeed, it does not. All I can say, however, is that if, in point of fact, logicians show a particular doctrine to be "pre-supposed" in someone's statement, and when confronted with same, the individual denies it, then, so much the worse for the individual. All that such a condition proves is that a certain individual is either unperceptive or inconsistent, facts I

would not wish to believe about Abraham.

It is not that Professor Roth fails to *see* this, but that he *fears* this. He fears what he feels are the inevitable consequences of a Judaism possessed of a systematic theology. For why else should he look upon "dragging implicit beliefs into the light" as a "snare." The danger is expressed thus in his Portrait: "If Maimonides had truth, then every other view was false. He thrust many men out of Judaism by laying down a boundary . . ." This may be so, but the remedy is not to cease laying down boundaries, but to lay down the right boundaries. As indicated, Judaism already has boundaries of belief. Awareness of these extreme limits help us to realize, for example, that Kaplan's god is not God, and Petuchowsky's revelation is not Revelation, and Silver's torah is not Torah. Beyond this point is the ongoing task of Jewish theology — to make explicit what is implicit, to determine what are precisely the pre-suppositions of our faith and to raise to the level of reflective consciousness the rational underpinnings of Judaism. Indeed, the objection of the Ravad was not directed at this process, but against the raising of a certain theory by Maimonides without apparent warrant from the Mishnah, to the position wherein all who denied it have no share in the community of Israel. Also clearly distinguishes between doctrines denial of which would cause the collapse of the entire structure of Judaism, (God, Revelation, and Reward

and Punishment) and doctrines which are implicit in Judaism, denial of which would be considered erroneous and sinful yet would not thrust one out of the community of Israel (Messiah, Freedom of Will, Creation, Incorporeality).

But there is a third class of doctrines wherein it appears that one may have an option between alternative beliefs, an area where the discussion still continues and should continue as to what Judaism implies — for example: does Judaism require a belief in *creatio ex nihilo* or is some belief in a pre-existent matter possible? (See I. Epstein in his "Faith of Judaism" for an analysis of Maimonides' position on this and its application to the question of whether the Theory of Evolution is compatible with the Genesis account.) Can a Jew believe that God may reveal another Torah? What reflects the more ultimate eschatological state — resurrection or immortality of the soul? Is salvation in Judaism dependent primarily upon intellectual attainments or the cultivation of attitudes? What does Judaism involve in terms of psychological theory?

This is the task of Jewish theology today — to analyze and delineate by direct recourse to the text of Scripture and by logical analysis of its fundamental beliefs and practices the theoretical principles of Judaism.

In truth, I ask neither for a *Pesak Din*, nor do I seek to excommunicate anybody. I simply address myself to a rational individual who presumably has made

the commitment and ask:

1. Does not the concept of God's justice, promise of Reward and Punishment contained in the Bible, and inequity of the distribution of goods in this world point to a transworldly existence of the soul?
2. Does not the divine origin of the soul ("and He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life") suggest a more spiritual destiny than mere dissolution with the body?
3. Does not the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead itself imply some concept of an immortal soul?
4. Do not such references in the Torah as, "then Abraham . . . died in a good old age . . . and was gathered to his people" which occurs before his burial imply a belief in a life after death?

Thus, in questioning Professor Roth about immortality of the soul, I do not point to "authority," but rather to implication, entailment and coherence.

(Rabbi) SHUBERT SPERO

"RED OR DEAD?"

TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

Rabbi Maurice Lamm's article "Red or Dead?" is a most interesting and thought-provoking one. It was indeed a pleasure to note the reasoning he develops and the methods he employs in reaching his tentative conclusions.

However, I wish to point out certain weak points in the argu-

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mentation, as a result of which his conclusions might not be warranted.

1. The comparison between Socrates and Rabbi Akiva is only superficially sound. Basically there is a great difference. If Socrates would have escaped, he would have saved his physical existence, though corrupted his concept of the good life. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, stated that the physical existence of the Jew would also be endangered by lack of Torah study. "For it is thy life and the length of thy days." The parable of the fox and the fishes refers to physical survival as well as the spiritual. I point this out because this type of superficial comparison is found in much of present-day religious writing.

2. Similarly, the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Patura doesn't revolve on the question of martyrdom for the ideals of "the good life." For as the Maharsha points out, if the water flask belonged to both, Rabbi Akiva would admit to Ben Patura that both should drink and die. This is based on the principle that your blood is no more red than your friend's. This is certainly an altruistic principle. You can't save your life at your friend's expense, even where he is certain of death regardless of your action.

3. The consequence which Rabbi Lamm draws for the individual, that if living under Communist domination will cause violation only of the High Moral Life, then he must not risk his life by rebel-

ling, is questionable. This might be true in isolated instances of individual peril. But where the person is in a situation of constant spiritual deprivation in all regards for all his lifetime and that of his children, then his rebellion may be preferable to submission.

4. Rabbi Lamm's observation, that in Russia Jews are not coerced to kill or commit immoral acts and therefore: better Red than Dead, isn't relevant to the situation of the Western world which isn't under Soviet domination. The crucial question here is what can we do to prevent this domination? The Russian Jew has no real alternative. We do. One may also ask whether Communism isn't a religion. Obedience to its dictates might be a form of idolatry which even the Russian Jew is required to rebel against.

5. En passant, the criticism of Fromm's view isn't sound. Fromm's position appears to be that a *national* decision to risk death loses its ethical significance, not that of the *individual*. Rabbi Lamm's strictures on this point are not relevant.

6. Some of my other points are already covered in the fine analysis by Rabbi Jakobovits and Prof. Wyschogrod.

In conclusion, none of my criticisms should in any way be considered as diminishing the value of Rabbi Lamm's excellent paper.

(Rabbi) BENJAMIN SHARFMAN
Brooklyn, N. Y.

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TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

The article "Red or Dead?" by Rabbi Lamm and the rejoinders are admirable attempts to formulate or at least explore a specific Jewish outlook on a major world problem. I would like to comment on an aspect of the discussion which appears crucial in the formulation of any broad Jewish view.

Rabbi Lamm very correctly assumes that the totality of Halakhah must be brought to bear on this issue. The world at large, the entire Jewish people, and the land of Israel must each be considered in its proper halakhic proportion and perspective in order to arrive at a valid conclusion. Rabbi Jakobovits appears to take the astounding position that the fate of Jews and Israel are not to be considered in arriving at a halakhic decision. He states that "We could scarcely determine such a choice by the obligation which we, as Jews, owe to our own faith or to the national interest of Israel." If this be the case there is little room indeed for a "Jewish" outlook. The pertinent halakhot deal primarily with the preservation of Jewish life and Jewish faith, not with the survival of other nations or cultures. The fate of Jewry must be a prime consideration, though certainly not the only one. If we were to thus exclude ourselves our halakhic considerations would be limited to little more than the Seven Commandments to B'nai Noach! Prof. Wyschogrod appears to arrive at essentially the same conclusion as Rabbi Jakobovits, but from a total-

ly different direction. Although Jews, individually and collectively are to be considered, he sees no precedents to the present issue of freedom or destruction. We must therefore avoid any action which may lead to destruction.

The rejoinders appear to share the view that although we must consult the Halakhah, the Halakhah has very little to tell us. This appears to me an excessively pessimistic viewpoint.

One problem bothers me. There appears to be a close historical precedent to the present dilemma which has not been mentioned. I refer to the revolt of Bar-Kochba against Rome. Rome was powerful enough at that time to virtually obliterate most of existing Jewry, and certainly not morally averse to doing so. Indeed she later did try to destroy the Jewish religion. Yet for nationalistic and non-obligatory (Jerusalem and circumcision) religious reasons, the entire Jewish nation with the support of the leading Rabbis of that generation (Mishnah Torah, *Hil. Melakhim* 11:1) revolted and fought Rome. The fact that Bar-Kochba was thought to be the Messiah does not alter the situation. Maimonides points out in the above quotation that Halakhah will not be changed in the days of the Messiah. I am not stating that herein lies the answer to the problem. I merely wonder why it was not considered.

(Rabbi) ALVIN BASCH
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MICROPHONES

TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits in his "Review of Halakhic Periodical Literature" published in Vol. 4, No. 2 of *TRADITION*, under the sub-heading "Again Microphones," reflecting his weariness with the rehash of this much belabored subject, offers a gratuitous aside that I cannot permit to pass without comment. I trust that your claim of adherence to democracy, impartiality and objectivity will not stop short of publishing this letter in your columns — in full.

He writes: "In the same issue of *Ha-Darom* Rabbi Hibner also reopens — if only finally to close — the question of microphones on the Sabbath, the use of which he had previously condemned . . ." and he abides by his condemnation.

With all due deference to Rabbi Hibner, he is not the final arbiter in halakhic decisions, nor, I am sure, would he claim that distinction which Rabbi Jakobovits so gratuitously thrusts upon him. Therefore his astounding aside "if only finally to close" glaringly emphasized by dashes, has no validity. I, for one, who have written on this subject and come to the conclusion that it is permissible to use the microphone on Shabbat, have not yet read anything that would prompt me to change that decision. On the contrary, Rabbi Hibner has strengthened my position. However, he is a qualified Rabbi who is entitled to his opinion and his parishioners are bound by his decision.

And this brings me to the very heart of the reason that impelled me to publish my *Hetter* on the use of the microphone originally and impels me now to pen this letter to you.

The history of the microphone controversy is comparatively recent. Approximately twenty years or more ago, Rabbi Simcha Levy, the then Chairman of the Halakhah Committee of the Rabbinical Council, rendered an official decision that it is permissible to use a microphone on Shabbat. This decision was based upon his own research and the concurrence of great scholars, some of whom are most vociferous today in condemning its use.

On the basis of this official verdict, many rabbis introduced microphones into their Shuls and some large Shuls were designed architecturally around the microphone. More than ten years passed without dissension. Then one fine day, the Agudas Horabbonim, without prior discussion or consultation, published a prohibition against the use of a microphone on Shabbat. Those who were most prominent in their condemnation were the same who had earlier written that it was permissible.

Regardless of motives, if these rabbis after a thorough review of the Halakhah came to the conclusion that it is not permissible to use the microphone on Shabbat they cannot permit its use in their congregations and their congregants must abide by the decision of their respective rabbis. However, by the same token, those

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rabbis who have arrived at another result, have no right to deny the use of the microphone to their congregations and other rabbis have no right to *force* them to change their opinion except through the presentation of valid halakhic objections. More important, other rabbis are obligated to *respect* halakhic decisions of their colleagues even though they thoroughly disagree with them halakhically. It is superfluous to point out that this refers to rabbis who are qualified to render a halakhic decision.

What I am saying is nothing new. All through the Mishnah, Gemorah, and rabbinic literature down to and through the *Shulchan Arukh* there have been differences not only in theory, but in *practice* among Torah-true, pious and observant Jews until our own day. The Sephardim follow a different *code* from the Ashkenazim, yet no one dare accuse the other of violating Torah law. Those who are familiar with Torah know and understand this quite well. For others, perhaps an article in TRADITION might be helpful.

I was not, and still am not, interested in convincing other rabbis to use the microphone on Shabbat but I am intensely interested in letting others know that those who do use microphones, and I am one of them, have good halakhic authority to support their position. They are not acting out of a disregard of, nor contempt for, Halakhah and I expect other rabbis to respect these decisions even though they may completely dis-

agree with them.

In addition, Rabbi Jakobovits is evidently unfamiliar with the whole controversy as are those who urged "the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists to undertake a study of the technical aspects of the microphone insofar as it has a bearing on Halakhah" because I, in association with rabbis who disagree with my decision, visited the Applied Physics Laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University where the head of the institution gave us a complete explanation of the detailed operation. The consensus was unequivocal that from a technical point of view there can be no violation whatsoever. The only problem involved is the prohibition to produce non-musical sounds by an instrument designed specifically for the purpose of producing these non-musical sounds.

Since this is not, in my opinion, the proper medium for a halakhic discourse, I will refrain from commenting upon the applicability of the above mentioned prohibition. However, without delving into a halakhic discourse, I do want to point out that the validity of this particular prohibition is not well established. I remember that in my grandfather's Shul, the late Rabbi A. N. Schwartz Z.T.L., the *Shamush* used to beat a wooden paddle on a leather pad in order to maintain decorum on Shabbas and Yom Tov. I saw the same instruments used in Shuls in Lithuanian towns and older rabbis from Eastern Europe have told me that this practice was quite widespread there. All of this is proof that this

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particular prohibition cited by the Rama was not widely accepted. Again, I don't want to delve into the Halakhah as to whether this runs counter to the decision of the Rama or that the Rama himself is interpreted to have negated this prohibition, but the fact is that it was not accepted. Therefore, those who delight in ferreting out prohibition should beware.

While I respect the scholarship of Rabbi Hibner and enjoy reading his halakhic discourses, I reiterate that I have seen nothing in them that would compel me to change my decision; on the contrary, he has strengthened my case.

To go a step further, anyone conversant with the principals of *Hora'ah* (rendering a verdict in Halakhah) knows that when communities have adopted a certain procedure on the basis of a rabbinic decision and it has become wide-spread, a succeeding rabbi will not reverse the ruling, even if he personally disagrees with it. Moreover, rabbis will go to any length to substantiate halakhically procedures that have become widespread even though they personally disagree with them and have no knowledge of how they came into existence. How far have we strayed from the true paths of *Hora'ah* when a rabbinic *organization* publicly attacks rabbis and communities that have adopted a procedure based upon the official decision of the Halakhah Commission of another Orthodox rabbinical organization!

In conclusion, the attempt by

Rabbi Jakobovits to justify the use of electrical devices outside of the Shul while condemning their use inside of the Shul makes good sermonics, but it is contrary to Halakhah. In Halakhah there is more justification for latitude inside the Shul than outside it. This is the principle of "*shevut bimkom mitzvah*."

(Rabbi) MANUEL M. POLIAKOFF
Baltimore, Md.

RABBI JAKOBOVITS REPLIES:

There is nothing "gratuitous" in my phrase "if only finally to close" placed between dashes for reasons of style, not of "glaring emphasis." My charge in this Department is to abstract current halakhic responsa *as I find them*, with the minimum of comments on my part. My treatment of Rabbi Hibner's article was no exception, and the words "if only finally to close" refer to what I found in his contribution, not to my own views.

The final paragraph of Rabbi Poliakoff's letter likewise betrays a misreading of my review as well as, I believe, a misunderstanding of a halakhic principle. Nowhere did I "attempt . . . to justify the use of electrical devices outside the Shul while condemning their use inside the Shul" on the Sabbath. Rabbi Poliakoff should remember that among the prime requisites of a wise rabbi are to quote truthfully and not to claim having heard a statement if one did not hear it (cf. *Avot*, 5:10). As for the principle of "*shevut bimkom mitzvah*," this surely refers only

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to certain modifications of rabbinic laws to enable a *mitzvah* to be performed, not to random concessions inside the synagogue. I cannot see, therefore, any warrant for applying this particular principle to a preacher using a microphone on the Sabbath.

The rest of Rabbi Poliakoff's remarks is irrelevant to my review, but if he cares to publish his arguments in a halakhic periodical, I shall be happy to abstract them with the same objectivity as I have accorded to Rabbi Hibner's views.

A CORRECTION

TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

On page 330 of *TRADITION*, Spring 1962 issue, Rabbi Forman praises Israel Friedlaender for his translation of Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed*. The translator was in fact M. Friedlander of Jews' College, the first part of whose rendition of *Moreh Nebuchim* appeared in 1881.

Israel Friedlaender, a professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary, was killed in the Ukraine in 1920 while on a mission of mercy there.

(Rabbi) ABRAHAM A. BURSTEIN
New York, N. Y.

THE HALAKHAH AND HIRSCH'S PHILOSOPHY

TO THE EDITOR OF *TRADITION*:

In Rabbi Lamm's review of "In

His Image" by Dr. Belkin, a statement pertaining to Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch is made which should be corrected. The distinguished reviewer writes as follows: "... in the eyes of Talmud-oriented Jewry, a Jewish philosophy, one that is truly indigenous or autochthonous, can be formulated only on the basis of the Halakhah. Hirsch then was right in demanding a 'within' Jewish philosophy, but in overlooking the Halakhah he failed to satisfy his own requirements." Anyone who is familiar with Hirsch's "Horeb," his commentary on the Pentateuch, and his "Gesammelte Schriften" will be amazed to learn that the great teacher "overlooked" the Halakhah. Actually Hirsch was one of the very few thinkers in the history of Judaism who built a system of thought exclusively upon the groundwork of Halakhah. His rationale of Judaism is a rationale of the Halakhah in its entirety. That Hirsch may have been influenced by Hegel and other trends current in his day is irrelevant. No human being who is familiar with what is going on in the field of human thought can remain totally uninfluenced, either positively or negatively, by what he reads and learns.

(Rabbi) DAVID S. SHAPIRO
Milwaukee, Wisc.