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## SMOKING AND THE HALAKHAH

In recent years numerous investigations and tests carried out in America, Britain, and other countries have confirmed that cigarette smoking represents a serious hazard to health, causing cancer of the lungs, coronary diseases and other fatal illnesses.

Since the facts are hardly in dispute, one would have expected Halakhic authorities to have taken a clear and decisive stand on the issue. Judaism has always been a faith of life embracing all facets of our daily activities, and where *Pikuach Nefesh* is involved, all other considerations are usually set aside. Primary *mitzvot* such as Sabbath observance, dietary laws and fasting on Yom Kippur *must* (not just *may*) be suspended where there is any possibility of danger to human life.<sup>1</sup> Even such marginal discomfort as a burning light which may prevent a dangerously sick person from falling asleep may be removed by putting out the light on the Sabbath.<sup>2</sup> "There is nothing that can stand before [the duty of] saving life, except where it involves committing idolatry, incest or bloodshed," (and to avoid one must be prepared to sacrifice one's life).<sup>3</sup> Only in times of *Shemad* (forcible conversions) would even a minor *mitzvah* assume such exceptional significance that every Jew was expected to risk his life to observe it and, if necessary, die for *Kiddush Hashem* (Sanctification of God's name).

It is therefore evident that, on general principles, smoking should be prohibited on the grounds that it may endanger life. However, since Halakhah inevitably relies on precedent, we must investigate similar cases for the purpose of comparison. The most obvious parallel is the case of *mayim megullim* (water left uncovered) — as well as wine and milk — which are prohibited because they may have been poisoned by a snake.<sup>5</sup> Even where

the uncovering of the liquid was doubtful, it is still prohibited on the grounds that "[rules concerning] danger to life are more stringent than ritual prohibitions."<sup>6</sup> Some authorities went still further and extended these regulations to include a number of liquids which are not normally imbibed by snakes and reptiles.<sup>7</sup> Significantly, Maimonides, who was a distinguished physician and a more qualified judge of health dangers than most of his predecessors and contemporaries, adjudicated in a more stringent sense, including in the prohibition any liquids which conceivably may have been touched by poisonous reptiles.<sup>8</sup>

The rabbis, furthermore, prohibited drinking from a water pipe, rivers or pools directly with one's mouth or even by drawing the water with one hand because one might swallow an insect or a leech.<sup>9</sup> Probably for the same reason one was not to drink from rivers or lakes at night.<sup>10</sup>

Other restrictions relating to water left uncovered were added by the rabbis and fully confirmed by later authorities. Such water was not to be poured out on public ground nor was it to be used for sprinkling the floor of a house, for kneading clay, for washing plates, cups, clothes or one's face, hands or feet. It was, moreover, not to be given to animals to drink.<sup>11</sup>

The rabbis did not relent even where there was only a remote risk. Thus, "If a jar was uncovered, even though nine persons drank of its contents without any fatal consequences, the tenth person is still forbidden to drink from it." A case like this actually occurred and seems to have influenced the rabbis in their halakhic precautions.<sup>12</sup>

It is, however, noteworthy that the actual danger of blood poisoning if one should drink a snake's venom is minimal, and only if there are wounds in the mouth, gullet, or digestive organs would such poison enter the blood stream with possibly fatal consequences. Normally, however, the venom is rendered harmless in the stomach, and the customary emergency treatment of snake bites through suction by mouth, which rarely if ever has any harmful effects, proves that the fear of the rabbis concerning uncovered liquids was in all probability considerably exaggerated. They were nevertheless right in refusing to take chances. Only in the later Middle Ages, when the overwhelming

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majority of Jews were living in densely populated areas where snakes would never be seen, was the prohibition of *mayim megullim* relaxed.<sup>13</sup>

The same principle of avoiding potentially poisonous liquids applies also to any harmful food as well as to unwholesome, dirty, or grossly unappetizing food and liquids.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, anything hazardous to life and limb or detrimental to health is strictly forbidden by rabbinic law. For example, the rabbis prohibited putting coins into one's mouth or placing one's (presumably unwashed) hand under the armpit — because of the risk of infection.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, it is forbidden to stick a knife into certain fruits or vegetables and leave it there because the sharp edge of the knife could cause injury or death.<sup>16</sup>

The rabbis also warned against walking near a leaning wall or on a ramshackle bridge or entering a ruined building because of the danger of collapse.<sup>17</sup> Placing cooked dishes or drinks under the bed was forbidden, originally because of fear of evil spirits; but according to Maimonides, because “a harmful object might fall into it without its being noticed.”<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, basing themselves on the Biblical command that a parapet must be built on the roof, “so that you do not bring bloodguilt on your house if anyone were to fall from it,”<sup>19</sup> rabbinic law interpreted this precept to include cisterns, pits, trenches and so on — which must either be covered or fenced round — as well as keeping vicious dogs or unsafe ladders in one's house.<sup>20</sup>

The only argument against this considerable weight of evidence would be the fact that smoking represents a long-term danger and, when practised in moderation, only a marginal risk. Such an argument is, however, quite unsound. The length of time required for a poison or some other fatal act to take effect is quite irrelevant in judging the nature of the offense. Thus, in cases of murder, a blow or injury inflicted on anyone — except one's own “Canaanite” slave<sup>21</sup> — is punishable by the extreme penalty if it resulted in death; and there is no time limit set on the assailant's liability, as long as the victim's death was directly due to the blow or injury inflicted by the assailant.<sup>22</sup> The same principle must undoubtedly apply in the case of suicide, which, in Jewish

law and tradition, is considered a crime no less serious than murder. The Noachide law, "For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning,"<sup>23</sup> was interpreted by the Midrash as a reference to suicide, including, in particular, self-strangulation,<sup>24</sup> which is analogous to the potential effect of smoking to one's lungs. In both cases, one's ability to breathe is irreparably destroyed, except that smoking is a very slow form of self-strangulation. Significantly, both Rashi<sup>25</sup> and Maimonides<sup>26</sup> accept this Midrashic interpretation, and Maimonides adds that a person who has killed himself, though obviously not accountable to a human tribunal, will be judged by the Almighty. If suicide is committed by a sane person without any extenuating circumstances, he is denied the customary burial rites, and no mourning customs are observed by his relatives.<sup>27</sup>

The frequently heard argument that, when practised in moderation, smoking is only a minor risk, is equally untenable. Only deliberate self-delusion can persuade one that there are "safe" limits in smoking. Even the use of filters does no more than reduce the intake of nicotine poison; nothing can entirely stop it. Moreover, cigarettes as well as other less dangerous forms of smoking are habit-forming and are essentially obnoxious drugs difficult to control in times of stress and tension. Even if it could be proved conclusively that up to a given point there is no risk whatsoever in smoking, the peril of addiction and gradual increase beyond the "safe" level would still remain.

As a matter of fact, there is absolutely no safety in moderation, since even a limited intake of cigarette poison can seriously aggravate an existing condition of heart or lung disease. In other words, a person's health may be affected without the victim's even being aware of it and under circumstances which have nothing to do with smoking. Yet, while such a disease may still be controlled in the case of non-smokers, it could very well prove fatal to smokers, including those of the "moderate" variety.

It has been estimated that every minute of cigarette smoking reduces one's life expectancy by that much. Even if this were a gross exaggeration, it would still be warning which every religious Jew should heed; for every moment of life is valuable, and any act liable to hasten death is reprehensible and strictly

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prohibited. Thus the Mishnah prohibits closing the eyes of a dying person in case his death be slightly speeded up: "He that closes the eyes at the time when the soul departs is accounted as one who sheds blood."<sup>28</sup> This view is shared by all the Codes.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, according to *Semachot*, no one may move or even touch a dying person<sup>29a</sup> — and this, too, is fully concurred in by the Codes.<sup>30</sup> Most authorities go even further, claiming that a person deliberately killing a dying person incurs the death penalty,<sup>31</sup> although it could easily be argued that the act in question was virtually the murder of a "dead" person.

It was because of the extreme value set on human life by the rabbis that even euthanasia was prohibited — a concept heroically enunciated by the martyred R. Hanina ben Teradion who, while he was being slowly burned to death, refused to heed the advice of his disciples to let the fire enter his body through his mouth, thus putting an end to his agony: "It is better that He who gave me (my soul) should take it away, but let no one do harm to himself."<sup>32</sup>

Not only is active causation of death strictly interdicted, but even passive refusal to render medical aid is considered equivalent to bloodshed.<sup>33</sup> Since prevention is better than cure, it follows that both the medical profession and the religious leadership should strictly warn the public against a habit and addiction which has already caused many thousands of deaths. This is precisely stated by Maimonides: "Likewise, it is a positive commandment to remove any stumbling-block involving danger to life, to take heed and to be extremely careful with it, as it says, 'Only take heed, and guard yourself scrupulously.'<sup>34</sup> And if one does not remove any stumbling-blocks liable to cause danger, one has thereby failed to carry out a positive precept as well as transgressed the [negative] commandment, 'You shall not bring blood guilt.'<sup>35</sup>

Maimonides also anticipates the argument that where one risks only his own life, it is to be regarded as a private affair and strangers may not intervene: "Many things have been forbidden by our Sages because they may endanger life. Now, if anyone transgresses these prohibitions, saying, 'I am placing *myself* in danger, and what right have others to interfere?' or 'I do not

care about this' — such a person is punished by flogging inflicted for disobedience."<sup>36</sup>

It is thus evident that strict rabbinic law, confirmed by the *Shulkhan Arukh*, does not regard acts imperilling one's life as matters to be left to individual discretion. On the contrary, if rabbinic courts were endowed with civil authority, they would legally be bound to punish a person guilty of dangerous practices.

Even if, for argument's sake, it could be proven that smoking is not a decisive factor in causing fatal diseases, it would still remain true that it is an obnoxious, unwholesome habit, and very likely to cause or aggravate respiratory diseases such as bronchitis, chronic cough, and catarrh colds. At the very least, therefore, smoking is a form of self-injury, which is overwhelmingly condemned and forbidden by rabbinic law.<sup>37</sup>

Since these facts have been common knowledge for some years, it is astonishing that authoritative *Gedolim* have not yet made any pronouncement on the question of smoking; that, on the contrary, strictly Orthodox Jews, including major rabbinic leaders, continue to indulge in cigarette smoking, without apparently giving any thought to the *Issur* involved. In the course of private talks with rabbis whom I consulted on this problem I have come across three different replies — none of them satisfactory.

1) Since smoking is universally practised, one must put one's trust in the Almighty who "guards the simple."<sup>38</sup> In support of this argument several Talmudic passages are cited where this pious hope is invoked, especially in cases where "the multitude is accustomed to it." However, a closer look at the passages in question would seem to indicate that in each case special circumstances apply, so that none of them could logically be used as a precedent.

Thus in T. B. Shab. 129b, we are informed that, although on Friday the planet Mars rules at even-numbered hours of the day when blood-letting was considered dangerous, "since the multitude are accustomed to it, 'the Lord guards the simple.'" Here we are dealing with purely astrological perils, and although most rabbis believed in the validity of this pseudo-science, some

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of the foremost Talmudic authorities, such as R. Akiba, Rab, Samuel, R. Jochanan b. Nappaha and R. Nahman b. Isaac, basing themselves on Jeremiah 10:2, categorically stated that "Israel does not come under planetary influence."<sup>39</sup> Maimonides denounced astrology as a superstition.<sup>40</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that the rabbis were unwilling to prohibit a practice which was dangerous only if one believed in the deterministic power of the planets.

Another case of a similar nature is the indirect approval of the common practice to perform blood-letting or circumcision even on cloudy days or "on a day when the South wind blows" — again because "the Lord guards the simple."<sup>41</sup> Although the rabbis thought such days of unwholesome weather might have an unfavorable effect on people who had just suffered loss of blood, there was presumably little concrete evidence of any serious danger — hence rabbinic leniency. Another example that could be cited in this connection is the permission to engage in sexual intercourse on the ninetieth day of pregnancy (which was supposed to be dangerous, but could not, as a rule, be ascertained), because "the Lord guards the simple."<sup>42</sup> Since, however, the perils involved were evidently unconfirmed by definite medical evidence, there were no grounds for an extended period of prohibition, which would have been necessary to render abstinence fully effective.

Somewhat more significant is R. Eliezer's statement that "a man may eat figs and grapes at night without fearing any harm (in case snakes may have injected poison into the fruit); for it says, 'The Lord guards the simple.'"<sup>43</sup> However, the actual risk involved must have been minimal, and long observation evidently convinced R. Eliezer, whose views are not contradicted by anyone, that there was no real danger involved, so long as the fruit had not been damaged, exposing it to reptiles. In such a case it was indeed forbidden.<sup>44</sup>

Relatively the most cogent argument may be derived from the rabbinic ruling that contraceptive devices should not be used, even in cases where pregnancy might endanger the mother's life, because "mercy will be vouchsafed from Heaven, for it is said, 'The Lord guards the simple.'"<sup>45</sup> Here, it would seem, the pos-

sibility of a fatal pregnancy is dismissed by what at first sight must seem as no more than a pious hope. On further consideration, however, the matter will appear in a different light.

In the first place, although this is the view of the "Sages" — i.e., of the majority — it is by no means unanimous. R. Meir, one of the greatest Tannaim, is opposed to taking any risks and, accordingly, permits contraceptive devices.<sup>46</sup> Secondly, the majority view may well have been inspired by considerations which were ultimately designed to promote life as well as a higher sexual morality, which could all too easily be undermined by the use of contraceptives. But above all, at a time when the Jewish population of *Eretz Yisrael* had been decimated because of the Roman wars, and was constantly declining owing to growing economic and political difficulties and widespread emigration — at such a time — the first precept of the Torah, "be fruitful and multiply,"<sup>47</sup> assumed overriding importance, putting aside every other consideration. Anything liable to diminish procreation, either directly or indirectly, was to be scrupulously avoided. Contraceptives, once used or practiced in special circumstances, could in time become institutionalized even when quite unnecessary, causing thousands of potential births to be effectively prevented. Even if some lives were exposed to undue risks — and not every such pregnancy was necessarily fatal —, this had to be weighed in the balance against the saving of numerous unborn children for the Jewish people, who would be assured birth and life by avoiding practices tending to restrict normal sexual intercourse and thus reduce the birth-rate.

It is, therefore, evident that none of the cases mentioned in the Talmud of risky acts which are nevertheless permitted because they are widely practiced and "the Lord guards the simple" — none of them can be used as precedents where smoking is concerned — a wilful act which cannot possibly do any good to anybody. The Lord may indeed guard the simple where the risks are genuinely minor, but hardly in cases of serious exposure to health hazards. Moreover, the "simple" are those who are lacking in knowledge and experience, not those who have been warned scores of times against certain hazards and deliberately ignore the warnings, hoping that somehow they

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will be spared. Furthermore, we are expressly told that one must not rely on miracles, which in any case do not occur with clockwork regularity.<sup>48</sup> Finally, if miracles were indeed vouchsafed to us, why all those numerous prohibitions of dangerous practices? Only irresponsible foolhardiness would induce one to hope for Divine aid while acting contrary to reason and common sense. Just as one who immerses himself in a *Mikveh* while holding a dead reptile in his hand will not become ritually clean, so one who recklessly endangers his health has no right to expect Divine intervention on his behalf.

2) The prohibition of smoking would constitute a restriction to which the vast majority of Jewry would be unable or unwilling to submit; and according to an oft-repeated Talmudic adage, "we must not impose a restrictive decree upon the community unless the majority of the community will be able to endure it."<sup>49</sup>

While this is a respectable argument, it is not nearly as formidable as it may seem. Where human life is at stake, the ability or willingness of the public to submit to a rabbinic restriction is quite irrelevant. There are, alas, far too many rabbinic rules which are being honored in the breach rather than in the observance. Nobody would suggest that in a matter of serious import a public opinion poll should be taken before any halakhic pronouncement is made. The maxim cited above is in fact applicable only in marginal cases where a rabbinic regulation is not absolutely indispensable, but not in cases where *Pikuach Nefesh* is involved.

3) The most powerful argument against a rabbinic prohibition of smoking is to be found in the Talmudic principle that where the public response is certain to be negative it is advisable to leave well alone; for "it is better that they should transgress inadvertently rather than be deliberate sinners."<sup>50</sup> Since, according to the Talmud, this is applicable even when laws of the Torah are widely broken, one could argue that a rabbinic prohibition which is certain to be ignored by the vast majority should not be made nowadays.

But here again there is no getting away from the principle of *Pikuach Nefesh* which, as we have seen, sets every other consideration aside. Nobody, in fact, can tell how many religious

Jews would react positively to a rabbinic injunction against smoking. But even if only one person were to give it up or reduce it, thereby lengthening his life, the prohibition would have served a good purpose. "Whoever preserves a single Jewish life Scripture accounts it to him as though he had preserved a whole world."<sup>51</sup> As a matter of fact, there is every reason to hope that gradually an ever-increasing number of Jews will heed a general prohibition against smoking, at least to the extent of cutting down on the habit. Moreover, the younger generation which is not yet addicted may be saved in large numbers from ever getting into the habit. The total number of lives thus saved or lengthened may well run into thousands or even tens of thousands. In view of this overriding consideration, the deliberate non-observance of rabbinic injunctions by the majority is quite irrelevant.

In summation, the medical and statistical evidence demonstrates that smoking is hazardous to health, and can lead to fatal diseases. The idea that smoking is liable to shorten a person's life is virtually undisputed. It follows, therefore, that the numerous halakhic rules prohibiting dangerous activities should be extended to include smoking. This extension should be enacted by the leading rabbinic authorities of our times, preferably acting jointly, and with due publicity. A general rabbinic injunction against smoking has every chance of being gradually accepted, at least in strictly Orthodox circles. Thus, many Jewish lives would be saved, and the health of our people would substantially improve. Finally, not the least fringe benefit would be a demonstration of the relevance of Judaism — and especially halakhic Judaism — to our own times.

NOTES

1. *Mekhilta, Ki Tissa* 1; *T. B. Shab.* 129a; 132a; 151b; *T. Y. Shab.* XIX, 3, 17a; *Tosefta Shab.* XV (XVI), 16-17; *Mishnah Yoma* VIII, 5-7; *T. B. Yoma* 82a-85b; *T. Y. Yoma* VIII, 4-5, 45b; *Yad, Hil. Yesodey HaTorah* V, 1; *Hil. Shab.*, chap. 2; *Hil. Shevitat Asor* II, 8-9; *Tur Orach Chayyim, Hil. Shab.* 328; *Hil. Yom Ha-Kippurim* 617-618; *Shul. Ar., Hil. Shab.* 328, 2-15; *Hil. Yom Ha-Kippurim* 617, 2-4; 618, 2-9.

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2. *Mishnah Shab.* II, 5; *T. B. Shab.* 30a; *Tur, Orach Chayyim, Hil, Shab.* 278; *Shul. Ar., Orach Chayyim, Hil. Shab.* 278, 1.
3. *Tos. Shab.* XV (XVI), 17; *T. B. Yoma* 82a; *Yad, Hil. Yesodey Ha-Torah* V, 2; *Tur Yoreh Deah* 157; *Shul. Ar., Hil. Av. Zar.* 157, 1.
4. *Tos. Shab. ibid.*; cf. *T. B. Git.* 57a, *Gen. R.* 34, 13; *Yad ibid.*; *Tur, ibid.*; *Shul. Ar., ibid.*
5. *Mishnah Terum.* VIII, 4; *T. Y. Terum.* VIII, 5, 45 c-d; *Tos. Terum.* VIII, 13ff.; *T. B. Bava Kama* 115b; *A. Z.* 30b; *Chullin* 10a.
6. *T. B. Chullin* 10a; *Tur Yoreh Deah* 116; *Shul. Ar., Yoreh Deah* 116, 5.
7. *Tos. Terum.* VII, 12; *T. B. Chullin* 49b.
8. *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XI, 6-7; cf. also *Tur Yoreh Deah*, 116.
9. *A. Z.* 12a-b; *Yad, ibid.* XI, 6; *Shul. Ar., Chosh. Mish., Hil. Shemirat Ha-Nefesh* 427, 12.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *A. Z.* 30b; cf. *B. K.* 116b; *Tos. Ter.* VII, 14; *T. Y. Ter.* VIII, 5, 45; *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XI, 15; *Tur. Yoreh Deah* 116.
12. *A. Z.* 30b; *T. Y. Terum., ibid.*; *Yad, ibid.* XI, 14.
13. *Tur Yoreh Deah* 116; *Shul. Ar., Yoreh Deah* 116. But even afterwards some authorities tended to keep the *Issur* intact (see *P'ri Chadash* and *Pitchei Te-shuvah, ad loc.*).
14. *Mishnah Chullin* III, 5; *Tosefta ibid.* III (IV), 19; *T. B. ibid.* 58b-59a; *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XII, 1 ff.; *Tur, loc. cit.*; *Shul. Ar., op. cit.* 116, 6-7.
15. *T. Y. Terum.,* VIII, 5, 45d; *A. Z.* II, 3, 41a; *Yad, op. cit.* XII, 4-5; *Tur, ibid.*; *Shul. Ar., op. cit.* 116, 5.
16. *T. Y. Terum., ibid.*; *A. Z. ibid.*; *Yad, op. cit.* XII, 6; *Tur, ibid.*; *Shul. Ar., ibid.*
17. *T. B. Ber.* 3a; *R. H.* 16b; *Yad, ibid.*; *Tur, ibid.*; *Shul. Ar., ibid.*
18. *T. B. Pes.* 112a; *T. Y. ibid.*; *Pes. ibid.*; cf. *RABAD to Yad, ibid.* XII, 5; *Shul. Ar., ibid.*; *Yad, ibid.,* XII, 5.
19. *Deut.* 22:8.
20. *Sifre, Deut.* 229; *T. B. Bava Kama* 15b; *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XI, 3-4; *Tur Chosh. Mish., Hil. Nizkei Mammon* 409; *Shul. Ar., Chosh. Mish.* 409, 3; *Hil. Shemirat Ha-Nefesh* 427, 6-8.
21. Cf. *Exod.* 21:20-21.
22. Cf. *Mekhilta Mispatim, Nezikin* 7; *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* II, 13.
23. *Gen.* 9:5.
24. *Gen. R.* 34:13.
25. *Gen.* 9:5.
26. *Yad, ibid.* II, 3.
27. *Semachot* II, 1-2; *Yad, Hil. Avel* I, 11; *Tur, Yoreh Deah, Hil. Onan*, 345; *Shul. Ar., Yoreh Deah, Hil. Avelut*, 345, 1-2.
28. *M. Shab.* XXIII, 5; cf. *T. B. Shab.* 151b; *Semachot* I, 4.
29. *Yad, Hil. Avel* IV, 5; *Tur Yoreh Deah, Hil. Bik. Chol.* 339, *Shul. Ar., Hil. Bik. Chol.* 339, 1.
- 29a. *Sem. I*, 3-4.

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30. *Ad loc.*
31. *T. B. Sanh.* 78a; *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* II, 7.
32. *A. Z.* 18a.
33. *Tur Yoreh Deah, Hil. Bik. Chol.* 336; *Shul. Ar., Yoreh Deah, Hil. Bik. Chol.* 336, 1; cf. *Levit.* 19:16 and rabbinic comments, *Sifra, ad loc.*, *T. B. Sanh.* 73a.
34. *Deut.* 4:9.
35. *Ibid.* 22:8. *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XI, 4.
36. *Ibid.* XI, 5; so also *Shul. Ar., Chosh. Mish., Hil. Shemirat Ha-Nefesh* 427, 10.
37. *M. Bava Kama* VIII, 6; *T. B. Bava Kama* 91b; *Aboth de-R. Natan* chap. 3, edit. Schechter, p. 8a; *Yad. Hil. Chovel u-mazzik* V, 1.
38. *Ps.* 116:6.
39. *T. B. Shab.* 156 a-b.
40. Cf. *Yad, Hil. Avodat Kochavim* XI, 9; cf. *Jewish Encycl.* II, 245, sv. *Astrology.*
41. *T. B. Yeb.* 72a.
42. *T. B. Nid.* 31a.
43. *T. B. Avodah Zarah* 30b; *T. Y. Terum.* VIII, 7, 46a. See also Maimonides, *Yad, Hil. Rotzeach* XII, 3, and *Tur, Yoreh Deah*, 116.
44. *A. Z. ibid.*; *T. Y. Terum. ibid.*; *Yad, ibid.* XII, 2; *Tur, ibid.*
45. *T. B. Niddah* 45a; *Tos. ibid.* II, 6; *T. B. Yeb.* 12b; 100b; *Ket.* 39a.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Gen.* 1:28.
48. *T. B. Pes.* 50b; 64b; *Meg.* 7b.
49. *T. B. Bava Kama* 79b; *Bava Batra* 60b; *A. Z.* 36a; *Hor.* 3b.
50. *T. B. Shab.* 148b; *Betzah* 30a.
51. *M. Sanhedrin* IV, 5.