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BECAUSE OF OUR SINS?

Since the destruction of the Temple nearly two thousand years ago, the daily prayers of the pious Jew reflect a sense of collective guilt for the exile of our people. "Lord of the universe," the ancient morning prayer implores, "Thou hast enjoined upon us the daily offering at its appointed time, with the priests officiating, the levites at their station, all Israel represented. Now, because of our sins, the Temple is laid waste, the daily offerings are abolished, and we have no priests officiating, no levites at their station, not one Israelite attending . . ."

"Because of our sins were we exiled from our land . . ." This is the basic theme of the *Musaf* (Additional) Service of the High Holy Days, Festivals, and New Months, when we recall the special festival sacrifices offered in the Temple of old, constantly reminding ourselves that we lost our beloved and ancient Sanctuary because of our failings as a people. There is no other people who usurp so much human guilt for their shortcomings, who blame themselves on their days of celebration for a catastrophe of long ago that the objective historian would attribute simply to the brutal expansionism of the most avaracious and pugnacious Imperium of all time.

Perhaps the most dramatic statement of this ancient Jewish "guilt complex" may be found in the penitential prayer uttered just before *Rosh Hashanah*:

> We are ashamed to raise our head, for we have polluted our fair name. We have corrupted thy justice, we have distorted thy precepts, therefore we press our face to the ground in shame.
>
> Trouble and anguish seize us from every direction; we are like sheep cast adrift without shelter. On the right the axe cuts us down, on the left we fall prey to the hunter.

> May thy farseeing eyes ever be open to our distress and untold sufferings. May our lamentations be changed into song, our punishment into atonement, as we return to thy straight paths.
>
> Because of our sins we have been subjected to captivity and [to] pillage; we, our kings and our priests, have been brought into contempt. Thy dearly beloved thou didst hurl down to the ground, desolate.
>
> We have failed to implore thee, to consider thy truth, because of rising evil. We should have been destroyed like Sodom, when the sound of the mill was low, hadst thou not shown us grace for a brief moment.
>
> Thou didst mercifully spare the remnant, giving us support and fencing us in. Again we were cast adrift for the three sins which thou dost loath,[1] and thou didst trample under foot thy glorious Temple . . .[2]

Were our ancestors *that* wicked? One of the founders of the Young Israel movement declared of the harsh condemnation of Israel in Biblical times: "I do not for a moment believe that the inhabitants of Jerusalem were worse than the population of any civilized city of today. If anything they were probably much better."[3]

I

There are those who, dazzled by the epiphanies of certain psychological schools, condemn those prayers which we have cited as evidence of maladjustment. Richard Rubenstein goes so far as to condemn the Liturgy for abetting the most inhuman barbarism of our century:

> When all political and military explanations of the inevitability of Jewish compliance with the Nazis in their own undoing are exhausted, psychological explanation is still needed. It would be wrong to overstress Jewish self-blame while ignoring the very real horror of the Jewish situation in wartime Europe. Nevertheless, guilt and self-blame were present. Both were constantly reinforced by the Jewish liturgy . . . Jewish religious practice constantly reinforced the conviction of [that?] Jewish life since the exile was punitive.[4]

Yet Rubenstein's notion of Jewish "compliance" does not at all seem to correspond with the traditional attitude to the Liturgy. More often than not the most pious would shout with Reb Yis-

roel of Rizhin: "It is written that *it is because of our sins that we were chased from our lands;* and I say that is false. Exile preceded our sins. Just bring us back and You shall see that not one Jew will feel like sinning." And the Rebbe would add in even stronger terms: "You must put an end to exile because exile itself is a sin; the most dangerous of all."[5] In a moving sermon, Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, after the Holocaust, declared that we must re-interpret somewhat the meaning of the prayers wherein we chastise ourselves for our sins: "The endless suffering of our people is the measure of the immaturity of the world . . . We suffer because of the sins of the world; we are not redeemed by some miracle because of our own sins. This is the key to Jewish history since the fall of Jerusalem."[6]

It seems to me, however, that the issue is neither theological nor psychological, although these perspectives are not to be dismissed. In order to confront the Liturgy which emphasizes our responsibility for the catastrophes which have befallen us as a people, we must attempt to comprehend the uniquely Jewish view of what de Unamuno describes as the "tragic sense of life." Modern Judaism is characterized by a refusal to confront the idea of tragedy. Reform Judaism eliminated the idea of exile altogether, proclaiming instead that God dispersed Israel not as a punishment, but as an extended mission to the Gentiles. George Steiner is certainly correct when he observes, employing Ibsen as an example, that modern times and modern dramas know nothing of tragedy. For while classic tragedy discusses a situation that is "irreparable, . . . saner economic relations or better plumbing *can* resolve some of the grave crises in the dramas of Ibsen."[7]

Even if the modern Jew would search his tradition in light of tragic literature, he would find little to explain the peculiar perspective of a Liturgy which attributes exile to sin, which constantly reaffirms responsibility for the errors of a past generation. George Steiner cogently observes that there is no Jewish concept of tragedy — at least not as commonly understood — because the "Judaic spirit is vehement in its conviction that the order of the universe and of man's estate is accessible to reason." He then contrasts the Judaic understanding of the fall of Jerus-

alem with the Hellenic interpretation of the fall of Troy:

> . . . Where a city is destroyed because it has defied God, its destruction is a passing instant in the rational design of God's purpose. Its walls shall rise again, on earth or in the kingdom of heaven, when the souls of men are restored to grace. The burning of Troy is final because it is brought about by the fierce sport of human hatreds and the wanton, mysterious choice of destiny.[8]

II

Judaic tradition is not devoid of a sense of tragedy, even hough our perspective on the subject must be clearly contrasted with the Christian and pagan (or Greek) conceptions. The classical or pagan tragedy establishes the rule, articulated by Walter Kaufmann, that tragedy "requires no reverence for the gods . . ."[9] Classical tragedy declares the gods to be jealous of man. They can be as wicked and as vindictive as we are. If man violates the gods, they may violate him. The gods are just only to the extent that they wait for man's flaw to erupt into wrongdoing before they send the furies to sweep down upon him. The worst human sin is not murder but *hubris,* insulting the gods.

Ethically speaking, the classical form of tragedy leaves much to be desired because, as in the case of King Oedipus, the wrongdoing that condemns man can be unpremeditated, totally innocent. Man does not even have to be wantonly disobedient to irk the gods who judge him. Since the human being is the gods' plaything, his feelings do not really matter as long as his actions fit into the game being played in the heavens. The moral of the great tragedies of ancient Greece is, in the last analysis, *not* the condemnation of murder or incest per se, but that no matter how one acts, he must beware not to compete with the gods; he must not annoy them. Now it is true that the ancient Greeks by no means condoned incest and murder, but their theology demanded above all else submission to the capricious gods whose only interest in human morality was that man must ever know his place. Plato revealed more than Zeus ever did, and Zeus, as the Greeks envisioned him, would have had it no other way.

The Christian view of tragedy is established firmly upon the

Greek, and cannot be understood otherwise. It states that we are all so innately perverse because of Adam's original defiance of God's Word that He, as the All-Holy, had to vicariously assume some flesh in order to show vicariously that all bearers of flesh can be saved. If we sin, it is simply because we are uncontrollably sinful. But we can repent by believing in God's fleshy stay on earth, and by deriving grace from that belief through our impulse to imitate the god-man.

This form of tragedy is also ethically unsatisfactory. True, man ought to feel guilty and repent before God. He must be aware of his misdeed, and his belief can save him from it. But in Christian teaching, man is *defined* more in terms of his guilt than in deference to his role as God's image on earth. And since guilt is his mark and sin his burden, man does not really change after his repentance. The reservoir of sinfulness and guilt which gushes forth deep within the human soul, spewing their pollutants into every cell and vessel of Adam's seed, will ever nurture more and more sinful thoughts and deeds, which are but the fruit of the human nature.[10]

It would seem that from an ethical standpoint both classical and Christian tragedy fall short of truly *moral* tragedy. In Christianity, only Adam is tragic, for only he had the *initiative* to fall.[11] Everybody else merely stumbles over him. But *loss of innocence is the essence of any moral tragedy*. Just as Christian teaching limits such loss to Eden, so does Greek tragedy — the paradigm of tragedy itself — lack ethical tragic significance because it insists that innocence or lack of innocence is *not* as important as the degree to which one's acts or attitude provoke the gods. And only fate decrees whether or not the gods ought to have reason to be jealous of us.

III

Bearing in mind the moral limitations of Christian and pagan tragedy, we can attempt to isolate the traditional Jewish view by studying the teachings of our heritage, including our Liturgy, in the light of modern assessments of tragedy. "Tragedy," writes Karl Jaspers, describing the pagan view, "becomes self-conscious

by understanding the fate of its characters as the consequence of guilt, and as the inner working out of guilt itself. Destruction is the atonement of guilt."[12] It is true that an awareness of guilt does come to the Greek tragic hero — but long after his fate is sealed. His guilt or repentance has no effect in alleviating his cruel destiny. Destruction is, indeed, his only atonement. But in the Judaic tradition it is the consequence of a refusal to atone oneself with God. The wicked are to be cut down, but much to the chagrin of the Almighty. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" (Ezekiel 33:11). Or, as the High Holy Day Liturgy expresses it: "Unto the day of man's death Thou dost wait for him to repent, that he may incline toward life."

For all the "guilt complexes" supposedly fostered by the Liturgy, there is no sign of advocacy of self-destruction. Paul Ricoeur, the distinguished Catholic theologian, has perceived the value of associating guilt and exile far better than have many Jews, and articulates it eloquently. "The Jew," he writes,

> repents not only for his actions, but for the root of his actions . . . Furthermore, at the same time as his piety discovers the personal dimension of sin, it also discovers its communal dimension; the evil "heart" of *each* is also the evil "heart" of *all;* a specific *we*, namely, "we sinners," unites all mankind in an undivided guilt. Thus the spirit of repentance discovered something beyond our acts, an evil root that is both individual and collective, such as the choice that each would make for all and all for each.[13]

In declaring that we were exiled because of *our* sins, in emphasizing *our* own guilt and inadequacy, we invoke not a destructive guilt, nor a sense of "original sin," but seek out the *human* source of guilt. We do not torture ourselves needlessly. We perceive that unless we confront the substratum of human failure, we shall never truly be able to possess ourselves as human beings. There can be no *mitzvah* without a sense of *averah;* no sense of *teshuvah* without a notion of *chet*. The Torah defines both holiness and impurity. If, then, as Jaspers adds, the Greek view is that existence and action *are* guilt,[14] then the Jewish view

is that guilt *results from* existence and action. Guilt does not underly human being and activity, nor is it identical with them (as in the Christian view of original sin), but it is a natural and controllable by-product of them.

The sense of guilt that we engender from the Liturgy is not the destructive guilt that Freud attributes to the "super-ego." We do not experience what the Master Psychoanalyst described as the ego's "suffering under the attacks of the super-ego or perhaps even succumbing to them," when the repressed ego meets with "a fate like that of the protozoa which are destroyed by the products of disintegration that they themselves have created."[15] We invoke no "super-ego" to startle us like a Jack-in-Pandora's-box, paralyzing us with the shadow of our most tortuous feelings of inadequacy.

In the Jewish view — to cite Ricoeur again — "the promotion of guilt marks the entry of man into the circle of condemnation; the meaning of that condemnation appears only after the event to be "justified" conscience; *it is granted to that conscience to understand its past condemnation as a sort of pedagogy;* but, to the conscience still kept under the guard of the law, its real meaning is unknown."[16] We never truly understand the extent of our failure to uphold the Torah of the Living God. But this should challenge us rather than discourage us; it should contribute to our freedom under the yoke of the Kingdom of God and not weigh us down under the harness of remorse. As Shubert Spero declares, echoing Joseph Albo, author of the medieval treatise, *Sefer Ha-Ikkarim*: "Judaism as a metaphysical system is optimistic, yet it recognizes fully the tragic character of human existence. On the existential level, it fosters sobriety and shifts the locus of anxieties to the areas that count — concern for the state of one's soul and one's worship of God. Those who repress their thirst for the spirit expose themselves to futile frustrations and suffer the unmitigated consequences of man's naturally anxious condition. The mature religious personality who fixes his gaze on the infinite can, however, regain the finite in tempered joy."[17] If we, as human beings, are prone to anxieties, it is more uplifting and even more liberating that they be anxieties of Heaven.

I dread the thought of a Jewish people with no sense of inadequacy, with no capacity to affirm, *as a people,* that we have failed before God. The Torah seeks to inculcate within us a sense of communal failure to foster reverence for life in the stipulations concerning the dead body found between two cities (see Deut. 21:1-9). It is better to regard disaster as recompense for the failings of human beings than to shrug it off as "bum luck." Those martyrs who died confessing their sins while cut down by the most barbarous forces are to be respected for regarding the Jewish people as the "heart of mankind" (Yehudah Ha-Levi). They affirmed that as the bearers of quintessential humanity, the Jewish people will ever bleed first when God's image is dulled. The Prophets regailed the Jews as *covenanted human beings* for the slightest ritual and ethical infractions of God's Word. Yet there were no Prophets to condemn the Nazis, for they had ceased to act as human beings and were unworthy of Divine chastisement. Those who died in the gas chambers affirming the coming of the Messiah believed that it is better to repent before a God Who maintains their humanity than to vilify Him before the inhuman oppressors whose barbarity dispelled the Presence of the Omnipresent Himself.

Our people have searched for their sins when struck down by evil because they have refused to succumb to the inclination — constantly exploited in modern philosophy — to dismiss the world as meaningless and absurd. We have exalted ourselves in our sense of guilt not by reducing tragedy to an entity in the storehouse of life, but by *utilizing* it as an opportunity for examining our moral state. What the Rabbis hoped to inculcate was a sense of "pedagogical" guilt. Hence, they attributed the destruction of the Temple to these flaws against which our people must constantly guard: ruthless adherence to the letter of the Law despite the moral circumstances; failure to support instruction in the holy way of the Torah; motiveless hatred (*sin'at chinam*) of one's fellow Jew.[18] The Sages never failed to remind us that the Diaspora must ever be a source of pedagogical guilt. So, too, with our personal catastrophes. As the Rabbis teach: "If evil befall a man, let him first examine his deeds."[19]

IV

If, as W. H. Auden observes, the "Christian tragedy is the tragedy of possibility, 'What a pity it was this way when it might have been otherwise,' "[20] we must declare that Judaism thinks in terms of a tragedy of *responsibility*. We declare: "What a pity it was this way when it *should* have been otherwise." In a world governed by a just God, and dominated by man conceived as a creature of free will, untainted by original sin, catastrophes *should* be averted. We Jews do not glorify tragedy as *necessity*, but lament it as *waste*. Yet given the *Dayan Ha-Emet*, the True Judge, how could anyone be "wasted"? The only answer can be that in guiding the world, God takes into consideration not only our sense of injustice, but employs His own standard of "cosmic appropriateness" (Berkovits) which transcends but does not nullify His concern for human welfare.[21]

Yet the Sages do not allow us to resign ourselves to God's plan of "cosmic appropriateness" by attributing to it all disasters that befall us. Because we are covenanted to Him, because we are a party in a sacred bond with Him, we must first search *ourselves* whenever we suspect that He has shortchanged us. No bond can remain just and mutually fulfilling if one partner resigns himself passively to the inconsiderate acts of the other. No fellowship — even that between man and God — can endure if those involved accuse the others without taking the essential first step of examining themselves.

The Sages taught that even God examines Himself, praying to Himself that He may ever be compassionate with Israel: "May it be My will that My compassion might overcome Mine anger and prevail over My justice, that I may deal with My children according to the attribute of compassion."[22] The Rabbis were so bold as to envision God's "guilt feeling" for enabling the Temple to be destroyed — the same Temple which we declare to have been destroyed "because of our sins." I cite at length one of the most unusual *midrashim* of the Rabbis:

> In the hour when God determined to destroy the Temple, He said, "So long as I was in its midst, the nations could not touch it; now I will hide my eyes from it, and I will swear that I will not connect my-

self with it until the end; then the enemy can come and destroy it." At once God swore with His right hand, and drew it back, as it is said, "He drew back His right hand on account of the enemy (Lam. 2:3). Then the enemy entered the Temple and burnt it. When it was burnt, God said, "Now I have no dwelling-place in the land; I will withdraw my Shechinah from it, and ascend to my former place, as it is said, "I will go and return to my place till they acknowledge their sins" . . . (Hos. 5:15). Then the Lord wept, and said, "Woe is me, what have I done? I caused my Shechinah to descend because of Israel, and now that they have sinned, I have returned to my former place. Far be it from me that I should be a laughing stock to the nations and a scorn to men." Then Metatron[23] came, and fell on his face, and said, "I will work, but thou must not weep." Then God said, "If thou sufferest me not to weep, I will go to a place where thou hast no power to enter, and I will weep there, as it is said. "My soul shall weep in secret places" (Jer. 13:17). Then God said to the angels of the service, "Come, we will go, you and I, and we will see what the enemy has done to my house." So God and the angels of the service sent forth, and Jeremiah went in front of them. When God saw the Temple, He said, "Assuredly, that is my house, and that is the place of my rest, into which the enemy has come and worked his will." Then God wept and said, "Woe is me for my house. Where are you, my sons? Where are you, my priests? Where are you, my friends? What can I do to you? I warned you, but you did not repent." Then God said to Jeremiah, "I am to-day like a man who had an only son, and he set up for him the marriage canopy, and he died under it. Do you not grieve for me and my sons? Go, call Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and Moses from their graves, for they know how to weep" . . . [Finally] Jeremiah went . . and cried, "Son of Amram, arise, the time has come that you are summoned before God." He said, "Why is it to-day more than on other days that I am summoned before God?" Jeremiah replied, "I do not know." Then Moses left Jeremiah, and went to the angels of the service, for he knew them ever since the giving of the Law. He said to them, "You ministers of God on high, do you know at all why I am summoned before God?" They said, "Do you not know that the Temple is laid waste, and Israel driven into exile?" Then Moses cried and wept until he came to the Patriarchs. Then they, too, rent their clothes, and they laid their hands upon their heads, and they wept and cried till they came to the gates of the Temple. When God saw them, He "called to weeping and to mourning and to baldness and to girding with sackcloth" (Isa. 12:12). If this verse were not written, one could not dare to say it [to be so anthropomorphically explicit] . . . Then they all went weeping from one gate of the Temple to another, as a man whose dead lies before him. And God mourned and said, "Woe to the King who prospers in His youth, and not in His old age."[24]

Some of the Hasidic masters, on the basis of such Rabbinic legends, went so far as to rebuke God by reminding Him of His guilt. In Leviticus it is written: "This is the law of the guilt offering. It is most holy" (7:1). Said the Kotsker Rebbe: *"Where* is the guilt to be found? In the Most Holy."

The religious man is not alone in his guilt, to the extent that God, too, is, as it were, momentarily "guilty." While the world is unredeemed, He has not fully vindicated the creation that He called "very good." The tragedies of the world are as much — if not more — His burden than ours. "In all their affliction was He afflicted" (Isaiah 62:9). As long as evil triumphs, our intimation, in the Torah, of the power of holiness accuses the Holy One Who seems not to employ *His* full power. But since our freedom to sanctify the world would be superfluous without the world's imperfection, we must become sensitive to imperfection within ourselves, lest it impede our ability to "perfect the world under the Kingdom of the Almighty" (*Aleynu* Prayer). We ought to learn the sanctifying power of guilt. As Jews, we must continue to be the first people to admit that we could have sinned, and the first to recognize that we need not have done so.

That God transcends "guilt feelings" is, of course, beyond discussion, for He is God. But that our tradition can speak of Him as feeling guilt testifies to our freedom from the error of assuming more than *human* responsibility for the catastrophes that befall us. The most destructive, pathological guilt is that which plagues us for what is, in reality, beyond our control. Because we are covenanted to the God of the universe, we perceive that redemption is as much — and even more — His concern as ours. Yet unlike the pagans, we cannot cast all of the blame for our ordeals upon His whims. "Guilt," Alan Mintz observes, "is the inevitable result of the awareness of wrong-doing. Prayer is not the safety-valve which catharitically lessens this anxiety when it becomes too painful, but an apparatus for moral reassessment and recommitment."[25] To recognize the *Divine* commitment is not to diminish any of the valid human guilt. We declare with the Rabbis, "Woe is me because of Who my Creator (*Yotzri*) is, and because of what my [evil] inclination (*yitzri*) demands."[26]

V

If we have scrutinized our deeds and found that the punishment does not fit the crime or, as in the case of the Nazi Holocaust, that the punishment itself is the most heinous crime, then we must realize, as Eliezer Berkovits asserts, that ours is an imperfect world because only the Creator can be perfect.[27] The important thing is that we carefully examine our deeds before accusing ourselves — or God. Ours must be a *constructive guilt.* We must sanctify our feelings of guilt without deifying them. We must not allow them to rule over us, blinding us to justice — for ourselves, for our people, and for humanity. Those who feel exaggerated guilt before God have no time to think of Him, and less of an opportunity to understand themselves — their rights as human beings to failure and, above all, to repentance. Without a sense of failure, we deify ourselves through our exaggerated vigilance against any guilt feelings. And through excessive remorse, we also deify ourselves by regarding life as a realm of personal tragedy, ruled by a sense of almighty inadequacy.

The modern age has affirmed a view of tragedy startlingly close to the Judaic view. The bad plumbing or saner economic relations that could save an Ibsen character from tragedy are not too unlike the prayer, acts of righteousness, and repentance that can avert God's evil decree during the Days of Awe. We must not attempt to root out our sense of guilt, but to master and to utilize it. This is the challenge of our time. Contemporary men and women do *not* require false prophets of doom like Herbert Marcuse to "liberate" mankind from guilt by unbridling human libido from the yoke of sanctity.

We are not obligated to affirm that, from a purely *historical* standpoint, sin is the sole cause of Israel's sufferings. History is, of course, too much of a plurality of causes to be interpreted in such monolithic terms. What is essential is that we affirm the *midrash* on history which characterizes Biblical or Rabbinic thought: namely, that when God smites Israel, or withdraws to enable others to do so, the people of the Covenant must seek some reason, some lesson, behind His refusal to spare the rod.

Historically, then, we can explain Israel's sufferings as Berko-

vits does: The nations of the world have simply not yet achieved the necessary level of humanity in the deepest sense. Religiously, however, we would deprive ourselves of a profound spiritual opportunity if we exulted in our sufferings by indicting all but ourselves. It is *not* masochistic to attempt to scrutinize ourselves as the result of our sufferings; it *is* masochistic to gloat over our guiltlessness in the midst of our sufferings, as if torture were our special diversion from the boredom of perfect innocence.

Given the Liturgy's emphasis on sin as the cause of exile, what attitude *should* we take regarding our failure as Jews? We must never feel guilty *because* we are Jews, but must ever deal as Jews with our guilt. Blessed is the people whose sense of purpose and duty are such that guilt humbles them enough to recall that God is their glory, but does not overwhelm them enough to cause them to grow apprehensive in the task that He has assigned them. As Jews, we must employ every opportunity for self-scrutiny, but never forfeit a second for self-denigration!

NOTES

1. The reference here, of course, is to the three cardinal sins of idolatry, unchastity, and bloodshed (*Sanhedrin* 74a).

2. Translated by Philip Birnbaum, in *Selihoth* (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 25-26. See also the prayer: "We have incurred more guilt than any other people, more shame than any other generation. Mirth has departed from us, our heart has become faint because of our sins. What we cherished has been devastated, our glory has been demolished; our holy temple has been destroyed through our iniquities, our mansion has been laid bare; our beautiful land belongs to strangers, our wealth to aliens" (tr. Birnbaum, p. 41).

3. Israel Friedlaender, *Past and Present: Selected Essays* (New York: The Burning Bush Press, 1961), p. 86.

4. Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Religious Imagination* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 128-129.

5. Cited by Elie Wiesel, in *Souls on Fire: Portraits and Legends of Hasidic Masters* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 158.

6. Eliezer Berkovits, *Between Past and Present* (Oxford: The East and West Library, 1945), p. 82.

7. George Steiner, *The Death of Tragedy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 8. I am grateful to Professor David W. Silverman for this source.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

9. Walter Kaufmann, *Tragedy and Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 192. For Kaufmann's argument that the Hebrew Bible admits no concept of tragedy, see his *Critique of Religion and Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 342 ff. It does seem, however, that Kaufmann overemphasizes the role of guilt in Greek tragedy, for, as we have asserted, the tragic hero is rarely "guilty" in the sense of being aware of and afflicted by guilt feelings from the moment he offends the gods. He is not even sure of his guilt until the gods choose to inform him of it. Indeed, according to Greek theology, the gods often choose to remain so aloof from human affairs that they do not even stipulate all of the things that offend them.

10. Milton Steinberg captures the stagnancy of the Christian view of man in *A Believing Jew,* ed. Edith Steinberg (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950), p. 221.

11. See Jacques Maritain, *St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942), pp. 35-39.

12. Karl Jaspers, "Basic Characteristics of The Tragic," in Robert W. Corrigan, ed., *Tragedy: Vision and Form* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965), p. 49.

13. Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 240-241.

14. Jaspers, in Corrigan, pp. 50-51.

15. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), p. 84.

16. Ricoeur, p. 150.

17. Shubert Spero, "Is Judaism an Optimistic Religion?", in *Treasury of Tradition,* ed. Norman Lamm and Walter Wurzburger (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 214-215.

18. See *Baba Metzia* 88a, and Louis Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews,* vol. VI, pp. 103, 244, 388-389.

19. See *Berakhoth* 5a. The passage goes on to say that if, after scrutinizing his deeds, one still does not discover any guilt on his part, he ought first to attribute his sufferings to neglect of Torah or, if he constantly studies Torah, to God's chastenings of love *(yissurey ahavah).*

20. W. H. Auden, "The Christian Tragic Hero: Contrasting Captain Ahab's Doom and Its Classic Greek Prototype," in Corrigan, p. 143.

21. See Eliezer Berkovits' explanation of the concept of *mishpat* (Divine "cosmic appropriateness") in *Man and God* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969), p. 251.

22. B. *Berakhot* 7a.

23. Metatron, according to Talmudic legend, is the archangel of the heavenly hosts which serve God in the sphere of Wisdom.

24. *Lamentations Rabbah,* Introduction 24, 6b. I have cited the fine translation of Montefiore and Loewe in *A Rabbinic Anthology* (New York: Schocken, 1974), pp. 67-68.

25. In *The New Jews,* ed. Mintz and Sleeper (New York: Vantage Books, 1971), p. 116.

26. See *Berakhot* 61a and *Eruvin* 18a.

27. On the Divine commitment to history, see "God in History," in Eliezer Berkovits, *God, Man and History* (New York: Jonathan David, 1959).