

Although the Editors of *TRADITION* regard the State of Israel as a pivotal instrumentality for the survival of Judaism in the modern world, they deem it important to open the pages of this journal for the discussion of controversial positions. Professor Epstein is a member of the Department of English at the University of Iowa.

## COULD JUDAISM SURVIVE ISRAEL?

And I will turn the captivity of my people Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit of them. And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be plucked up out of their land which I have given them, said the Lord thy God.

Amos 9:14-15.

Then will I cause to cease from the cities of Judah, and from the streets of Jerusalem, the voice of mirth and the voice of gladness, the voice of the bridegroom and the voice of the bride; for the land shall be desolate.

Jeremiah 7:34.

Given the current political situation and a number of quite conceivable, though horrific, eventualities, the State of Israel could be destroyed and its people massacred. Among the many facts made devastatingly clear by the Yom Kippur War and events subsequent, this one has been systematically disregarded, almost as a matter of faith, by major Jewish publications and spokesmen. Even the Arabs, formerly so vocal in their call for the annihilation of the State of Israel, have, now that that possibility is quite real, ceased their apocalyptic clamor. Our refusal to consider the possibility is quite understandable, given our psychological dependence on Israel; it is also quite shortsighted. In light of the trauma the destruction of the State would cause, it is imperative that every contingency be examined, imperative that a realistic evaluation be undertaken, if for no other reason than to objectify the importance of Israel in our minds.

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Many factors now make the destruction of the State of Israel as a political entity a distinct possibility: the emergence of the Arab countries as political sophisticates with modern and mature fighting forces; the introduction of weapons with nuclear capability into the Arab armed forces; the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to go to any lengths to avoid a military embarrassment; the weakened American Presidency which has staked all on *détente* and is no longer capable of standing alone against an increasingly hostile world; the clear demonstration that the United Nations, when it is not totally ineffectual, is a force inimical to the survival of the State of Israel; the not altogether surprising, though certainly discouraging, fact that the European countries, motivated by ancient rivalries and threatened by economic disasters, can be bought relatively cheaply.

But it is not only the dire possibility that makes a discussion of it vitally important. It is the recent tendency to identify the State of Israel with the whole of Judaism. This identification has only become a universal postulate since the Six-Day War. As late as 1957, after the victorious Sinai campaign, Nathan Glazer, one of our more astute social scientists, could write, "Israel has meant almost nothing for American Judaism specifically . . . the idea that Israel, now that it is established, could in any serious way affect Judaism in America, or Judaism in general, is recognized as largely illusory."<sup>1</sup> And Howard Morley Sachar, though he saw the American Jewish community "continuously strengthened by close and intimate ties with the State of Israel," which he described as "doughty and courageous," nevertheless viewed Israel as a great source of inspiration, not as a *sine qua non* of Jewish existence.<sup>2</sup> But now, writers make no effort to hide their apparent belief that American Jews and Judaism are merely supporting characters in a future history which will center on Israel. More, we are told that the only reason for enriching the quality of Jewish life in America is to provide a more capable supporting cast. "Educational reform and spiritual renaissance are not egotistical slogans pertaining only to American Jewry; they are aims which are directly related to a general Jewish salvation and the survival of Israel."<sup>3</sup>

Since the 1967 War, the fate of all Jews has been forcibly con-

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nected in our minds with that of Israel. "If Israel perishes, so will world Jewry. What else can inspire Russian Jews in their struggle and what other framework can absorb them when they are finally liberated? Israel is also the focus of Western Jewry. After the Holocaust, and with the secularization of most of the Jewish people, it is the dream of Israel which provides the spiritual inspiration and practical outlet necessary for continued Jewish survival."<sup>4</sup> "Zionism and Judaism are one, and the effort to destroy the one is the effort to destroy the other. It is futile to use two separate terms where one entity or disposition or character or conduct is pointed to. That entity is Judaeo-Zionism . . . The Land Israel is the core element of Judaism which identifies the whole . . . Separation of one from the other is catastrophe, union of all is essential for salvation."<sup>5</sup>

Even the fund-raising and sermonizing that surrounded the Yom Kippur War were, in type, relatively recent and unique phenomena; money and support were solicited by appealing not only to loyalty or pride or community, but by raising the spectre that Judaism would cease to exist if Israel did. The threat of a world-wide resurgence of anti-Semitism was invoked. Indeed, for the first time since the creation of the State of Israel, Jews were asked to contribute not only to help their embattled brethren, but to save themselves. That this was effective financially is undeniable; whether it is true is quite another matter. The Land Israel is certainly a "core element of Judaism which identifies the whole" and certainly union of the Land Israel and the Jews is essential for salvation—but these have been basic tenets of Judaism for 2,000 years, not 28, and the connection between the Land Israel and the State of Israel is questionable. One hesitates at using an analogy which might be misconstrued, but traditional Judaism has always balked at the ready acceptance of Messiahs, on the correct assumption that skepticism is less likely to lead to disastrous trauma.

The emotional satisfaction of having a homeland with which to identify is certainly not the essence of Judaism, though some would have us so believe. The religion, or civilization, is, to a certain degree at least, a constant, not dependent on historical

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accidents or fortuitous battlefield occurrences. Had the Yom Kippur War been an unqualified victory for the Israelis, Judaism might not have been strengthened, though Israel most certainly would have been; conversely, the confused situation resulting from the inconclusive 1973 war might not have been all that disastrous in terms of the faith. One thing is clear: if we cannot separate the fates of Israel and Judaism, or if we decide that we do not choose to separate them, we must with open eyes reconcile ourselves to the idea that our survival is contingent on Israel's. Before we can reasonably do that we must clarify the position Israel occupies in our lives.

The establishment of the State of Israel was undeniably the most significant event in Jewish history since the destruction of the second Temple. So were the Nazi Holocaust, the Emancipation, the medieval expulsions, the Inquisition, the Chmelnitzki massacres, the Sabbataian heresy, and any number of others, as they occurred. To suggest now that Judaism could not survive the loss of this latest institution without taking a long, hard look at Israel or, more precisely, the State of Israel as it has existed for the past twenty-eight years and as it exists today, is simple demagoguery. Perhaps now is the proper time to evaluate the role the State has played in Judaism and Jewish life, what it has and what it has not been for us, which horrible consequences would result from a new holocaust in the Middle East and which would not. Certainly it is moot whether such an event would prove terminal. Again, this is not to suggest that we consider the possible decimation of Israel or Israeli Jewry with equanimity, but it is to say that we must consider it, if only to realize how central Israel is to our religion, and how resilient American Judaism is.

My suggestion is that a holocaust in Israel would result in responses similar to those provoked by the Nazi holocaust. Fackenheim's famous dictum that "Jews are forbidden to grant posthumous victories to Hitler—they are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish" could probably be adapted to suit any disaster. Certainly it does not differ in effect from those commandments which must have been issued following the Crusades, and the Spanish Expulsion, *etc.* Given Jewish history,

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this assertion that we are “forbidden to despair of man and his world, and to escape into either cynicism and otherworldliness” and that we are “forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish,” is hardly extraordinary.<sup>6</sup> Our history and our recent experience tell us that some would abandon all faith. Others would become even more confirmed in their beliefs, seeing any destruction as the result of a variety of provocations, all predictable and foretold (after the fact, probably). Without the State of Israel, certain of our American Jewish institutions, forced to stand on their own, would undoubtedly, after a period of introspection, analysis, and consolidation, have to adapt to a new reality. Some would cease to exist. Judaism would survive.

I am no political analyst. I am a committed Jew, to whom Israel is extraordinarily important. I hope eventually to live there with my family. Indeed, I have great difficulty envisioning any of the contingencies I postulate. Yet, I consider it vital that priorities be discussed; perhaps this brief excursion into hypotheses focusing on religion, but also touching on communal, political, and psychological effects will encourage specialists in these fields to consider what has formerly been unthinkable. This is a matter to concern all Jews, and all eventualities and hypotheses must be advanced, if only graphically to illustrate to us how important it is to avoid certain of the eventualities, and to render all the unacceptable hypotheses unrealistic.

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### A. RELIGION

In the minds and hearts of many American Jews, Israel has taken the place of ritual and religious observance. Supporting Israel made one feel Jewish—at times even made one feel Israeli, the proprietary attitudes of American tourists in Israel being legendary. There can be no denying that the vicarious satisfaction of pioneered wastelands and military conquests swelled both the pride and munificence of American Jews. But the role of Israel in heightening religious commitment, as opposed to Jewish identification, is not conclusive. Marshall Sklare reports

that solidarity with Israel is expressed by highly marginal Jews.<sup>7</sup> Though one became "a Jew, and proud of it" partially as a result of the successful State, religious observance may have been heightened only insofar as support for Israel may be seen as a doctrinal imperative. And so it has been seen, with the various Jewish denominations committing themselves almost totally to the survival of Israel. Israel then having become a vital part of American religion, the question to be considered here concerns the varying role Israel has played in the various denominations, and which of these, lacking Israel, could best survive.

On first glance, the Reform and Conservative movements might seem most adaptable to change, and thus most resilient. The Reform movement especially, having been doctrinally opposed to Zionism and the idea of a Jewish State until the Columbus Convention of 1934, and having been repeatedly spurned and antagonized by the established Orthodox Rabbinate in Israel, which refused to grant it even minimal recognition, might be expected to weather the shock quite easily. And yet, it seems that the Reform movement, despite having only recently espoused Zionism as a legitimate expression of Judaism, stands to suffer most should Israel perish.

The simple fact is that a modern Jewish religion cannot be strictly rationalistic and hope to survive. Reform leaders have recognized this and have attempted to wrest the movement from the stranglehold its rationalistic formulation demanded. Beginning with the Columbus Convention, which recognized the legitimacy of the demands of the heart as well as those of the mind, the Reform movement has sought to develop some sort of commitment in its youth. Reform educational systems emphasize the study and use of Hebrew, the Jewish language of the heart. Increased observance of formerly discredited ritual has crept into the programs of many Reform communities. For the most part, however, identification of Judaism and the modern Israel has been the cornerstone of the attempt to mold a committed membership. And the cause has been espoused with the zeal that may be expected of converts. Rabbinical students at Hebrew Union College must study in Israel, Sunday school curricula are replete with Zionist-oriented education, and the theology has been suit-

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ably adapted to allow for *Aliyah*. The recent push to have Israeli religious authorities recognize the validity of marriages performed by Reform clergy points up the significant role Israel occupies in the future plans of the movement. And Reform Rabbis have been quick to underline the importance of Israel to the survival of Reform Judaism: "Whatever Israel's universal mission might be, it requires the preservation of the Jewish people. In this post-Holocaust age, the State of Israel is crucial in the preservation of the Jewish people, without which Judaism would vanish."<sup>8</sup> This despite the religious establishment's response to Reform, expressed by former Chief Rabbi Untermann, that it is "a new interpretation which misrepresents Judaism which started in Germany 150 years ago . . . in America a century ago and . . . has never reached Israel, where there is no place for it."<sup>9</sup>

My conclusion, and I readily admit its subjectivity, is that Reform Judaism, feeling itself empty of meaningful internal experience, has turned outward for support. There is little in Reform Judaism with which a young Jew can identify—reference to a once-glorious past, observances that are labeled obscure, or meaningful only in an antiquarian way, the Union Prayer Book (surely one of the most uninspiring religious documents ever compiled), Jewish discussion groups—all these will not wash. In a decidedly bleak portrait of Reform Judaism and a future beset by intermarriage and assimilation, Sefton D. Temkin pinpoints the ideological vacuum: "Hebrew Union College has been careful to avoid theological commitments . . . The attempt [to find ultimate religious truth and make one religious system delimit the whole] has never succeeded, and if the movement cannot be defined in intellectual terms, its institutions tend to attain paramount importance and their promotion becomes a substitute religion."<sup>9a</sup> Painfully devoid of substance, the Reform movement could not afford to lose its most substantial component—Israel. Only the Israeli buttress sustains the survival of Reform Judaism as currently constituted; if she perishes, the ranks of the Reform would be decimated. Some perhaps would seek solace in more traditional modes of Judaism; perhaps Reform practices would move much closer to tradition. But the overwhelming majority of the youth, one fears, would abandon the faith, or at least religious

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observance of the faith, if not all ethnic identification.

Conservatism mediates between the demands of Jewish tradition and a secularized society. As occupant of a middle ground, it too might be expected to withstand the shock of an Israeli disaster. Freed of rigid adherence to any unchangeable ritual and doctrinally located at some unclear position between Orthodox and Reform (actually unhampered by any theology at all), the Conservative movement might be in the strongest position to analyze the wreckage and subjectively decide what aspects of Judaic tradition were still relevant and meaningful. Such latitude would, it would seem, insure survival and perhaps even growth. But that assumption will not bear a close scrutiny based upon the realities of Conservative Judaism, as it affects the lives of Conservative Jews.

Of all the Jewish denominations, Conservatism has placed most stress on Israel. Here, it argued, was a classic example of the tenet that *halakhah* and Jewish life could be revitalized and made meaningful to a modern age. Also, though this was clearly not the intention or desire of the Conservative leadership, Zionism moved into the void created by a general failure of parishioners to observe Jewish law, even as construed by the Conservative Rabbinate, and make it the central object of commitment. Sklare notes, "There has been a steady erosion of observance among Conservative Jews. And despite a strong desire to encourage observance, Conservatism has not succeeded in arresting the decline in observance among its adherents, much less in increasing their level of conformity to the Jewish sacred system. The belief among Conservative leaders that the movement's approach to *halakhah* had the power to maintain observance, as well as to inspire its renewal, has proved illusory."<sup>10</sup> Pointing out that the majority of Conservative Jews do not follow even the most basic Sabbath observances, Sklare calls the Conservative attempt to encourage the observance of *mitzvot* "an abysmal failure." If it is true then, as often stated in jest, that the only observant Conservative Jews are Conservative Rabbis, whose parishioners are ignorant in almost all matters regarding *halakhah*, the only significant connection between the clergy and the laity, between the doctrine and the practice, is devotion to Israel.

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And this devotion has been paramount. Indeed, the great success of the Conservative movement has depended upon the ignorance of the laity encouraged by a poor educational system, fantastic prosperity, and the ability of the movement to generate commitment to a cause more compelling than actual observance—the State of Israel. Abandoning the intolerable burden of the commandments did not necessarily mean abandoning the faith, as long as the commitment to Israel could replace the sense of community and identity formerly conferred by the adherence to a communal set of commandments. Conservatism, with its emphasis on social activities and esthetics, allowed the Jew to avoid the embarrassment of dietary restrictions, the inconvenience of Sabbath observance, the variety of social limitations imposed by traditional observances—as long as Israel certified his Judaism. The faith remained intact.

The absolute dependence of Conservative Judaism on external matters is illustrated by the concern evidenced by its leaders over the continuing failure to develop a positive theology. Rabbi Max Routtenberg has said, “We are in danger of not having anything to say to our congregants, to the best of our youth, to all those who are seeking a dynamic adventurous faith that can elicit sacrifice and that can transform lives.”<sup>11</sup> The existence of Israel masked the deficiencies and failures of Conservatism. “Jewish nationalism did serve to fill the ideological void created by the absence of a specifically Conservative system of ideas.”<sup>12</sup> As long as that void continues to be felt, Israel will continue to be at the center of Conservative affiliation, and the loss of the center would undoubtedly prove irreparable.

This leaves us with Orthodox Judaism, whose anachronistic survival and ambivalent attitudes toward Israel would, I suspect, enable it to prove itself the most resistant of all three branches of Judaism to the despair attendant on any holocaust in Israel. The tendency of Orthodoxy to survive has been illustrated time and again throughout history. For example, Jacob Neusner, in his essay on Judaism at the time of the fall of the second Temple, when it was threatened by an encroaching religion and split, as now, into sects, quotes an anecdote recounted in *Avot de Rabbi Natan* and adds an illuminating comment:

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Once, as Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai was coming forth from Jerusalem, Rabbi Joshua followed after him and beheld the Temple in ruins. "Woe unto us," Rabbi Joshua cried, "that this, the place where the iniquities of Israel were atoned for, is laid waste!" "My son," Rabban Yohanan said to him, "be not grieved. We have another atonement as effective as this. And what is it? It is acts of lovingkindness, as it is said, 'For I desire mercy and not sacrifice' " (Hosea 6:6).

Preserving the Temple was not an end in itself. He taught that there was another means of reconciliation between God and Israel, so that the Temple and its cult was not decisive. What really counted in the life of the Jewish people? Torah, piety.<sup>13</sup>

History teaches that any movement which adheres to those values and is able to separate them from perishable institutions, will survive, not necessarily because of the inherent strength or validity of those values, but because of the refuge they provide.

For the Orthodox Jew, more than for any of his coreligionists, life revolves around the synagogue and the Law. One suspects that if Israel were to perish, this Jew would go to *shul* and say *kaddish*, a religious response which would doubtless strengthen rather than lessen his commitment. The frequently unquestioning and unthinking adherence of Orthodox Jews to a systematic observance of religious code is often frustrating to both supporters and detractors of this least tractable branch of Judaism; but undoubtedly it provides solace in the face of disaster. Inquiries on what sort of mourning was *halakhically* appropriate would be channeled into the existing hierarchy; one doubts any mass defections from normative Orthodoxy.

This apparent resilience might seem odd to those who tend to conceive of Orthodox Judaism in medieval stereotypes. In an age of greater and greater liberalism, Orthodoxy has refused to assume the role of invalid, and has, instead, "transformed itself into a growing force in American Jewish life. It has reasserted its claim of being *the* authentic interpretation of Judaism."<sup>14</sup> This claim is certainly open to dispute, but if it is true that no significant weakening has taken place in the Orthodox psyche during its tenure in America, history suggests that that psyche has always had the strength to endure all sorts of tribulation. Without a Jewish State as bulwark, Orthodox Judaism, drawing its power from a universally accepted normative code, has again and again dem-

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onstrated its resilience. Even the holocaust, which decimated the cream of European Orthodoxy, while the Conservative and Reform movements watched from a distance in America, did not strike a fatal blow. In an age of secularism and doubt, Orthodoxy survives and flourishes, apparently because of its independent and inherent appeal. The simple fact is that the destruction of Israel would not alter that appeal, except perhaps to strengthen it. The fanatic fringe would take disaster as proof of Divine retribution for the State's godless ways, but the moderates would continue the Diaspora existence they have maintained for two thousand years.

Perhaps the feeling that it need not stake all on Israel explains the ambivalent attitude Orthodoxy maintains toward her. Though the bulk of American Jewish emigration to Israel has been Orthodox, Israel has never been at the center of Orthodox philosophy or action. Despite the tremendous control exercised by the religious party in Israel, the State itself has always occupied a strange limbo for the Orthodox. The land Israel exerts a strong magnetism on any committed Jew, but the *halakhic* status of the secular State of Israel remains moot. Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, summing up the attitudes of the most respected spokesman for Orthodoxy, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, illustrates this duality:

The return to Zion and the establishment of the State he views as an historical process of tremendous importance; he stresses, however, a universal strand, according to which the basic shaping factors in the life of both the individual and the contemporary community are above any specific place: spiritual peaks are attainable in Exile as in Israel, and one should strongly oppose the "mythological" identification of *Knesset Israel* with Israel to the neglect of the Diaspora existence past and present. The settlement of Israel is important as a *Mitzvah* among *Mitzvot* and as a spur towards religious-national renaissance — but, principally, as an instrument and a means. The place is a factor—but *Shekhinah* can dwell in any place. One must give full-throated thanks for the existence of the State, but with the knowledge that it is only a step on the road to the realization of the prophetic, Messianic, vision, as yet distant.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, though Israel has received full support from mainstream Orthodox Jews, it has never been established that *Aliyah* to Israel

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is a central commandment, nor that Israel itself is central to the existence of Judaism.

The Orthodox, with their peculiar talent for compartmentalizing various aspects of existence, have managed to support the current regime in Israel and simultaneously assail its secularism. Accustomed to this sort of schizophrenia, the modern Orthodox Jew requires no special dispensation to separate Israel as a state of mind from the State of Israel, which has existed for the past quarter century. He prays now as he prayed before 1948, for the reestablishment of Israel and the return to Jerusalem. That this establishment and return have taken place in a temporal sphere in no way weakens his eternal commitment. The loss of the current Zion would entail no doctrinal disaster. Certainly, the extreme right wing, which has always opposed Israel, would retain what sway it possesses. Even more, the mystical and esoteric Hassidim, who offer the least institutionalized, most personal, most consolatory branch of Judaism, might flourish. The mystical attraction of Hassidism, with its vaunted capacity for providing a source for religious communion in the midst of suffering, could only grow given the failure of yet another institution. Orthodox Judaism as a whole could survive Israel.

Historically, Judaism and Zionism are most clearly not one. Zionism early provided a political alternative to normative Judaism and the altercations between the two have continued, to some degree, right up to the present brouhaha over the legal distinctions between Israeli and Jew. One suspects that the growing religious overtones to this political movement have been necessitated not only by the Jewish emotional response to the land (which is considerable), but also by the fact that Israel needs Diaspora support, and that two branches of Judaism need to provide that support and glean substance which might compensate for internal deficiencies. Israel, then, is quite essential to the survival of the two most populous branches of American Judaism, and important to all three. Israel is probably not decisive to the survival of the Jewish religion.

### B. PSYCHOLOGY, COMMUNITY, POLITICS

I deal with these three aspects of Jewish life together because

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of the tremendous degree of interrelationship between them I envisage resulting from any disaster in Israel. Though the death of the Zionist state would obviously put to rest the canard concerning the genocidal policies and deeds of political Zionism, and though one could predict to the word and organization the various statements of contrition, one hastens to assure readers that new charges and a new anti-Semitism would emerge in third world, new left, and old right sectors. One may take a little pleasure in contemplating the troublesome brainwork that would accompany their jettisoning of old cliches; but one may reasonably predict that fringe anti-Semitism would remain potent. More important, in the wake of any holocaust, Jewish sensitivity to this sort of activity would probably be heightened to the level of paranoia. Thus the interrelationship: a new Jewish psychology would lead to a new alignment of resources, new communal activities, and new political direction.

It is probably the existence of the State of Israel which has so completely shaped the American Jewish community into a philanthropic entity rather than a political one. What political character has been formed has largely been directed toward lobbying for Israel. I suggest that without Israel, American Jews would find new issues and new allies, that their new sensitivity as an endangered minority would lead them to oppose such liberal causes as racial quotas and busing. In the context of the current political situation, the assumption of American Jews would undoubtedly be that America had in one way or another sacrificed Israeli interests for her own. This would shift Jewish support to the party out of power, especially if the present incumbent and his Secretary of State were still in office. Given the less liberal and more fearful attitudes, one can even envision many Jews moving toward Wallace-like positions, a horrifying thought.

The American Jewish community without Israel would tend to become more enclosed, more self-sufficient. The Community Center, now a withering institution, would probably gain new support and direction. The Jewish Day School movement would grow, as would all Jewish educational institutions, though they would certainly have to reorient their curricula, whose major component is now Hebrew language and Zionism. Indeed, I sus-

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pect that those Jewish institutions which managed to survive the original shock and quickly reorganized themselves into repositories for shaken loyalties, could very well become central. B'nai B'rith, for example, could probably reassert the significance it once had, especially in attempts to combat anti-Semitism and revivify its Hillel units on American campuses.

When one speaks of the American Jewish commitment to Israel, one is speaking not only of emotional ties, but of a yearly financial outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars. Given Israel's military budget, this sum is hardly sufficient to stem an otherwise impossible rate of inflation and economic disaster. But the prospect of that money, or even a major portion of it, being freed for use in other areas is mind-boggling. Brandeis and Yeshiva Universities, Touro College, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and many others would probably reap extraordinary bonanzas. Even Hebrew Union College and the Jewish Theological Seminary, though I suspect that their base of support would be seriously eroded, especially among the young, could probably garner magnificent sums—perhaps enough to build a viable and meaningful source of commitment, in a post-Israel era.

The destruction of Israel is not a pleasant prospect, nor, really, is it a likely one. In choosing to venture guesses on a topic as controversial and abstract as this, I am aware of the great subjectivity I have exercised. I am also aware that by dealing strictly in absolutes, I have avoided the thorny question of a less than total destruction, of survivors, of emigrants from any holocaust in Israel. Similarly, I have shied away from any discussion of the effects of a less radical change in the State of Israel, for example, its reconstitution into a bi-national state, a prospect I find more realistic than the one I have chosen. My object was to spur a rational investigation by committed Jews and Zionists into the role of the State of Israel in American Jewish life. Certainly we must endeavor to secure the safety and survival of Israel. But that is not enough. There must be an emphasis on Jewish identification independent of Zionism, or at least, so correlated to Zionism that it would not vanish if Zionism was removed from the equation.

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I do not find my venture into hypothesis all that satisfying; I may simply have demonstrated what was already known: that the State of Israel comprises an extremely, a disproportionately, large component in the philosophy, religion, and allotment of resources of the American Jewish community. Israel serves to buttress many of our religious institutions, and, perhaps, lessen our internal communal resources. It serves as a source of pride and commitment and identity. We may have come close, however, to making the State the sole source of these essential attributes. A world without Israel would be horrifying to contemplate and difficult to live in. It need not also be a world without Judaism.

### NOTES

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