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The enormous contributions of Dr. Eliezer Berkovits to Jewish philosophical literature are well-known and highly-respected. Dr. Steven T. Katz, Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College, offers a different view of Berkovits's work in this critical essay. Dr. Katz has written extensively on Jewish philosophical topics and is the author of *Jewish Philosophers, Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis,* and *Jewish Concepts,* as well as numerous articles. He is a member of the editorial team of the forthcoming *Cambridge History of Judaism.*

ELIEZER BERKOVITS AND MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

Modern Jewish philosophy has, on the whole, been a relatively neglected area of study.[1] What interest has been shown in it has been directed primarily to historical studies which chronicle or exposit the lives and thought of the major thinkers of the modern age, while eschewing rigorous, reflective, analysis of ideas.[2] The result of this historical emphasis is that philosophically interesting contributions of creative and substantive criticism are almost totally absent from the contemporary Jewish intellectual landscape.[3] This critical neglect of modern Jewish philosophy is, at least in one sense, the legitimate consequence of the nature of much that passes for "modern Jewish philosophy" — whole regions of which manifest maximum pretension and minimum philosophical igenuity. Yet the view that all modern Jewish philosophy is a confused philosophical aberration is unfounded. There is a substantial positive reservoir of genuinely interesting philosophical ideas in the corpus of modern Jewish

philosophy which is instructive. But there is a pressing need to separate the philosophical ingenuity from the philosophical pretension. However, this sorting process is only one aspect of the larger investigation of the cognitive conditions necessary for the execution of a positive program aimed at constructing a satisfactory account of the nature of Jewish man in the midst of a coherent "Jewish Weltanschauung." It is to these critical, as well as constructive, philosophical areas that Jewish thinkers must turn with increasing skill and, hopefully, in increasing numbers.

It is against this background that one must appreciate the work of Eliezer Berkovits. For Berkovits is one of the few who has seen that the discussion of modern Jewish philosophy must be more than the history of ideas, that it must become at one and the same time more philosophical, more critical, more vital. It is this recognition that has brought Berkovits to prominence and has made his book on *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* something out of the ordinary and deserving of detailed study. Though this essay largely deals with the serious weaknesses in Berkovits's presentation, the importance of his attempt to engage in serious, relevant philosophical debate with the leading modern Jewish thinkers should not be obscured. This last point needs to be emphasized because what follows is a considerably rigorous, mostly negative, evaluation of the details of Berkovits's procedure which might leave the reader with the impression that there is nothing of value in his work. This would certainly be an erroneous conclusion. However, Berkovits's study has been praised enough in other quarters to establish its importance, e.g., he was awarded the "Jewish Book Award" for philosophy in 1975. Moreover, most of the essays reprinted in *Modern Philosophies* are well known from their original publication as is the debate they aroused and the praise received. These are adequate grounds for assuming that this essay's severely critical stance is justified at the present juncture. Based on this assumption I have dismissed an introductory exegetical review of Berkovits's exposition, except where necessary to the argument, in favor of detailed critical engagement with Berkovits's conclusions, and especially the arguments and methods used to reach these conclu-

sions. In addition, in order to clarify the essential nature of the issues raised I have also tried to show how modern Jewish philosophy has to be done and how modern thinkers have to be approached, in a way which goes beyond the mere critical discussion of Berkovits's handling of this material.

In the present volume, Berkovits selectively and critically reviews the five most influential Jewish thinkers of this century: Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Mordecai Kaplan and Abraham Joshua Heschel. Before examining in detail the specifics of Berkovits's account four general features must be noted. The first is that Berkovits, much to his abiding credit, attempts to be critical, i.e., to pay the thinkers surveyed the compliment of taking their thought seriously enough to ask whether it is true or false. That Berkovits's judgments regarding his subjects are almost universally negative and not always as well argued as they ought to be need not detract from the importance of his attempt to engage his interlocutors in serious, philosophically important debate. Second, is Berkovits's constant tendency to use sources and arguments in philosophically unacceptable ways. As to texts, he commits several errors: he often seems to cite a text out of context; or one that is marginal; or one that serves his purpose while being out of character for the thinker concerned. As to method and philosophical analysis, again, he falls into several difficulties with unfortunate regularity: he does not seem to know fully the difference between (and the force of the difference between) comments and arguments — and what he gives us are not always even clear and precise comments at that; he occasionally misrepresents the thought of his subjects on specific issues either in whole or in part; he does not always completely understand the position he is criticizing, thus providing unsupportable accusation where tightly reasoned theses are demanded; he does not always (perhaps never?) completely master the totality of the thought of his subjects and so his exegesis and criticism always give the impression of being slightly off center and somewhat beside the point; he makes simple errors of fact; he is often self-contra-

dictory, and guilty of a variety of logical confusions.* Third, it must be noted that Berkovits speaks from a normative-rabbinic point of view — a viewpoint for which he is, on the whole, a most articulate spokesman. This perspective has both virtues and vices. On the positive side Berkovits's perspective is in close touch with Jewish tradition and classical Jewish sources, and Halakhah is his standard of "Jewishness," which helps him overcome the excesses of subjectivism prevalent in many, especially existentialist, quarters. The negative side of this perspective is that it lacks the sense of uncertainty and ambiguity which has been a cornerstone of modernity and the modern Jewish post-emancipation experience. As a corollary of this, it lacks the modern, critical perspective on the classical authorities which is at the very heart of the crisis of "authority" which plays such a central role in the modern debate. And again, in its concern to be Orthodoxly correct, no less than in its desire to be "critical," it sometimes doesn't *listen* closely enough to the voices of the non-Orthodox, thereby turning their positions into something approaching caricature, and all five figures studied here belong in various ways under the non-Orthodox rubric. Fourth, by way of prolegomena, it must also be asked quite independently of Berkovits, but obviously of importance to his success, whether what can broadly be called a normative-rabbinic point of view can ever fully engage philosophy with the degree of intellectual autonomy necessary for the encounter to be more than negative or at best apologetic. I am not as certain as many about the answer to this primary methodological question—either *pro* or *contra*—though I am certain that its resolution has not yet been decided definitely either way. Moreover, I suspect that attempted resolutions of this difficulty cannot proceed in an *a priori* fashion wherein it becomes only stipulative and a matter of merely drawing the implications of one's presupposed analytic premises.

II

The opening study in the present volume deals with the

* (Lest I be accused of similar confusions and errors I will substantiate these serious criticisms with specific examples in the body of the present article.)

thought of Hermann Cohen, the great German neo-Kantian philosopher. This study clearly reflects the virtues and vices just sketched, and reveals many of Berkovits's failings. After paying Cohen the customary philosophical plaudits, Berkovits succinctly states what he takes to be the major themes in Cohen's work. One is immediately (on the first page) put on guard as to Berkovits's reliability, for his exposition presents erroneous facts as to Cohen's relationship to Judaism. He states that Cohen,

> after a life of estrangement from Judaism, the grand old man of German idealism . . . returned to the faith of his fathers, the faith of his youth.[4]

He then goes on to note that in these late years spent at the Hochschule in Berlin (1912-18), Cohen wrote the numerous and well-known essays collected in his *Judische Schriften.*[5] This historical picture of Cohen's relation to Judaism—on which Berkovits will place much weight in formulating his criticism of Cohen—is false. It is true that Cohen kept Judaism out of his technical philosophical works[6] written between 1866 when he published his first substantial article on "Die Platonische Ideenlehre" in the *Zeitschrift fur Voelkerpsychologie,* and through the publication of such works on Kant as *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung* (1871) and *Kant's Begrundung der Ethik* (1877) which established his reputation. However, the absence of a discussion of Judaism in these works must not be misinterpreted as it is by Berkovits because from 1879 onwards Cohen was in the forefront of discussions of Jewish issues. Thus in 1879-80 when a vicious anti-semitic attack on the loyalty of Germany's Jews was made by the historian Treitschke (in his *Ein Wort uber unser Judentum* (1879), Cohen replied with an article entitled *"Ein Bekenntnis zur Judenfrage"* (1880). Later he testified publicly at the slander trial of an anti-semitic school teacher,[6a] spoke out on the infamous Dreyfus trial,[6b] and in 1902 he attacked German university anti-Semitism.[6c] All these works, which are included in the *Judische Schriften,* Berkovits seems to attribute to the post 1912 period. Moreover, a simple perusal of the chronological "Table of Contents" provided on p. IX of the *Judische Schriften* quickly shows that Cohen's very first writing

on a Jewish theme is found as early as 1867 in a lengthy article on "Heine und das Judentum" and continues thereafter uninterruptedly totalling 33 essays (as republished in this collection) during his Marburg period (up to and including 1911). Franz Rosenzweig in his "Introduction" to the collected Jewish essays, retells the now famous tale that in 1914, at a banquet in his honor, Cohen was referred to, no doubt well meaningly, as a "recent *Baal Teshuvah,*" Cohen indignantly replied: *"Ich bin ja ein Baal t'schuwoh schon vierunddreissig Jahr"* ("I have been a *Baal Teshuvah* for 34 years") i.e., from 1880 the year of his reply to Treitschke.[7] The Judaism that Cohen defended in this period (or even in the Hochschule Period) may not be acceptable to everyone, but it points out that any study of Cohen's thought will have to be more careful—both about the primary data and its interpretation—than Berkovits's promises to be. This historical element is stressed because it illustrates in a straightforward way the lack of precision that characterizes too much of Berkovits's work and because much of Berkovits's thinking about Cohen seems to be related in a variety of ways to issues flowing from this historical misunderstanding.

This casual use of texts becomes still more critical when Berkovits begins his substantive exegesis and critique. He notes[8] that his attention will focus on Cohen's two most mature works, *Der Begriff der Religion im System dre Philosophie* (1915) and his last, classic, and most extended statement on Judaism, *Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums,* published posthumously in 1919.[9] Berkovits then makes the gratuitous assumption, which rests on no grounds other than its assertion, that in working with these two texts it must be appreciated that "the latter (*Die Religion*) is contained in the former (*Der Begriff*),"[10] the reason for this duplication being that the former is intended "for the philosophically schooled gentile reader" while the latter is "for believing Jewish intellectuals."[11] This unfounded and undefended hermeneutical presupposition colors Berkovits's entire picture of Cohen and his mature relation to and reflections on Judaism, and, of course, distorts the careful distinctions that have to be made in philosophical exegesis. Though the two words have profound similarities — indeed, it would be strange if they did

not given Cohen's lifelong pre-occupation with systematic philosophy, they are very different from each other (and certainly very different from his earlier Marburg neo-Kantian works, viz. the prominence given the term "Religion" in both titles which underscores the new Cohenian emphasis). One cannot legitimately coalesce the two works and then treat them quite randomly, picking and choosing from both at will (as well as from earlier texts) for one's own eisegetical purposes, and reach a serious and sustainable understanding of Cohen's mature position on things Jewish. These hermeneutical procedures do not encourage confidence in Berkovits's handling of the relevant sources.

Berkovits's actual exegesis of Cohen's thought is then divided into and treated under the following two categories:

(a) Ethics and Religion;
(b) The Religion of Reason,

with (b) breaking down into the following subtopics:

"Being and Becoming";
"Creation and Revelation";
"Ethics and Messianism."

The purpose of Berkovits's discussion is, to summarize it drastically, to present Cohen's mature thought as a form of Jewish neo-Kantianism which never moves beyond the limits of Kantian thought. As to the details of Berkovits's exegesis, several points need to be commented upon. First, rather than doing what he stated he would do, i.e., concentrating on Cohen's last two works, Berkovits introduces into his review of Cohen's position, especially regarding his concept of God and his understanding of the systematic relation of ethics and religion, a great deal of material drawn neither from *Der Begriff* nor from *Die Religion* but from the earlier much different and universally acknowledged thoroughly Kantian study, *Die Ethiks des reinen Willens* (1904). Six of the first ten citations are from this earlier monograph. Thus from the outset, with the illegitimate aid of these quotations from Cohen's earlier labors, Berkovits tries unfairly to create a mood and conjure an image (largely Kantian in character) of Cohen's

views as presented in his last two works which is not faithful to the works themselves. A coherent, fair criticism of the late material must be based on a reasoned reading of the late works. The procedure adopted by Berkovits makes this impossible. Of necessity it obfuscates the distinctiveness and the change in outlook in certain basic concerns which these last two works of Cohen represent in comparison to the earlier corpus. Of course, Berkovits follows this procedure precisely to obscure this change.

In addition, Berkovits's basic exposition of the central aspects of Cohen's "Religion of Reason" is not without its difficulties. His attempt (pp. 13-16), for example, to clarify the meaning of the central concept "Idea" as used by Cohen, does not seem to fully capture Cohen's meaning. Perhaps the simplest way to suggest the failure is to note Berkovits's phrase regarding the possibility that Cohen's God in *Die Religion* "is a *mere* idea" (p. 14, my underlining). For Cohen there is no such thing as a *mere* idea. Even if Rosenzweig's interpretation of Cohen's position regarding God in *Die Religion* were wrong (which it at least partly is), there would still remain intact his instructive warning "That for Cohen an Idea is not a mere idea."[12] Steeped as he was in both Platonic and Idealist thought, Cohen's definition of an *idea* was different from and more significant than what the ordinary English term "idea" suggests. To appreciate Cohen's discussion, one has to take full cognizance of the Idealist milieu of meaning which generated it.

Again, Berkovits's particular exegesis of specific Cohenian doctrines is suspect. Consider, for example, the doctrine of "correlation," together with its related doctrine of God as Being, which, as Berkovits correctly notes, is the most imporant concept in both (late) works. His treatment of this notion is suspect because Cohen's discussion of correlation, creation, and especially the relation of God to nature[14] and of God to ethics, in both *Der Begriff* and *Die Religion,* cannot be reduced to a replay of the God-Idea of the earlier Cohenian system. For whatever the final judgment on the meaning and validity of the theology of "correlation" and the "reality of God" in Cohen's late work one has to *wrestle* with the following:

A. The radical departure from the earlier Kantian system regarding the relation of morality and religion which it represents, and Cohen's new recognition that religion is *sui Generis* and not merely an extension of ethics.[15]

B. The significant variety of new elements in *Die Religion* relating to the discussion of creation, revelation and messianism which move it beyond anything presented in Cohen's earlier reflections; and

C. The major significance of Cohen's constant referral to and introduction of the notion that God is both the only true Being, the only reality that truly is, as well as being a God that redeems men from sin.

This last point is essential to any full understanding of the significance of Cohen's late work. In Chapter I of *Die Religion* entitled *"Die Einzigkeit Gottes"* (The Uniqueness of God") Cohen identifies the defining characteristic of monotheism in terms of God's "uniqueness" rather than unity.[16] Explicating the positive meaning of this notion later in the same chapter he boldly asserts: "Nur Gott hat Sein. Nur Gott is Sein." ("Only God has being. Only God is being").[17] Later in the same paragraph: "Nur Gott is Sein. Es gibt nur eine Art von Sein, nur ein einziges Sein: Gott ist dieses einzige Sein. Got ist der Einzige." ("Only God is being. There is only one kind of being, only one unique being: God is this unique being. God is the unique one.")[18] Berkovits knows this text[19] and explicates it in such a way so as to reduce this ontological aspect of Cohen's God to a matter of logic, i.e., God is, as in the earlier Cohenian system, only a necessity of thought analogous to Kant's theory of substance.[20] In support Berkovits argues,[21] that this idea of God as Being is only a logical necessity, entailing no ontological status. Furthermore, it is not a new thesis in Cohen's position, having been stated in the *Ethik des reinen Willens,* published in 1904. However, after all Berkovits's arguments are offered and all his "evidence" is marshalled, it is clear that he has not *wrestled* deeply enough with the issue of God in Cohen's thought and that the case is neither as obvious nor as settled as Berkovits's overly reductive analysis suggests.

What does Cohen mean when he talks of God as"true being," when he says: "Nur Gott hat Sein. Nur Gott is Sein." Admittedly the discussion of these and related topics in both *Der Begriff*

and *Die Religion* are obscure and difficult to exposit with complete clarity. Yet, despite Berkovits's assertions to the contrary, it seems that Cohen intends to strike a new chord that was absent from his neo-Kantian Marburg ontology. In defending his interpretation Berkovits quotes several brief texts. But they are quoted out of context or are misinterpreted—especially regarding the earlier neo-Kantian notion of God as *Urbild* and the new concept of God as *Sein,* Berkovits's view shows a misunderstanding of the relation which obtains between Cohen's neo-Marburg epistemology and the new ontology argued for late in life. Whereas in the earlier period God is only the fundamental idea which logically guarantees the successful completion of the work of nature and ethics, in *Die Religion* God is the ontic- not only epistemic- and logical-foundation of all this is, including both nature and ethics. Cohen tries to work out a position, not with complete satisfaction, in which God is *both* the *Urbild* of moral action as well as the ontic ground of reality. Before the success of Cohen's attempt in this new direction can be satisfactorily evaluated, what he is attempting must be understood. Berkovits, unfortunately, misunderstands this position and misses the fundamental change from logic to ontology in *Die Religion.*

This central misunderstanding is brought to the surface with especial clarity by Berkovits's exegesis of the relation of Being and Becoming in Cohen's late philosophy. Berkovits reads *Die Religion* as arguing that:

> Becoming demands for its explanation the logical ground of Being, which is identified as God . . . Being can only be used insofar as Becoming requires an origin in rest. It can, however, add nothing to the nature and character of Becoming. *It is from Becoming that Being is concluded* and it is not from Being that Becoming derives.[22]

Whereas this account might make an uneasy fit with certain aspects of Cohen's thought in the Marburg period, though, of course, in Marburg Cohen did not talk much of Being, it inverts the meaning Cohen intended in *Die Religion,* changing drastically the entire character of the later discussions. It is clear from everything that Cohen writes in this late work that God as Being is *not* logically derived from Becoming. That is, God as

Being is *not* just the *answer* to "the origin" of Becoming. Quite the reverse. In the late work Being is not inductively arrived at as a result of the need to provide an explanation, reason or justification of things; rather it is the ground from which all else flows.[23] Note that Cohen argues for this view of God in the very first chapter of *Die Religion,* i.e., at the beginning of his systematic structure. God as Being (*Sein*) is the only truly real entity; Becoming (*dasein*) is inferior and of only secondary importance.

In arguing for God as *Being,* Cohen intends that God should *not* be reduced to a concept as He had been in the earlier system when He was seen only in terms of and in relation to "Becoming." Again, God as Being is intended, in contradistinction to the Kantian-Marburg thesis that everything has its source in human consciousness, to assert the autonomous origin and character of God's reality independently of human consciousness, i.e., to transcend the theoretical demand that God is *only* an Idea. Moreover, Berkovits misunderstands Cohen's related remarks about *Being* as a problem for logic, religion and ethics taking them to mean that Being serves in logic, religion and ethics in the same way, i.e., is the *same* problem and requires the same solution: God as archtype. This is not Cohen's meaning. Cohen means that "Being" is the problem for all three concerns, but religion is seen to solve it by means of an ontological claim whereas logic and ethics solve it axiomatically and epistemically. In logic "Being" is arrived at as a conclusion; in religion it is the foundational category from which all else proceeds and which makes everything else possible.[24]

What is the ultimate validity of Cohen's account? It is difficult here to be as enthusiastic about Cohen's success as were Rosenzweig and Shmuel Hugo Bergman;[25] but they caught a fundamental insight into Cohen's late work which Berkovits misses. Even if Cohen's late work does remain within the circle of Idealism, as professors Guttmann and Altmann have argued[26] on more subtle and persuasive grounds than Berkovits, it still marks a new stage in the development of modern Jewish philosophical thought about God and about God and man together. It struggles to resolve the demands of the impersonal God of

ethics and the personal God of religion, recognizing the uniqueness of the latter and its incommensurability with the former. And in so doing Cohen's thought breaks the apologetic circle in which Jewish thought had been largely imprisoned since the time of Kant.[27] Moreover, not only does the late Cohen know in *Die Religion* that God must Be, but he knows also that God must be a Redeemer God who forgives sins. Here one has to feel the full weight of the Talmudic quotation with which *Die Religion* begins:

> Happy are ye Israelites! Who is it who purifies you? — Your Father in Heaven.

Though Cohen is not able to provide an error free demonstration of this theological claim, his failure is not the failure of intention which Berkovits attributes to him, i.e., of never outgrowing God as an Idea. Rather it is a failure of philosophical method.

Perhaps the clearest, as well as the most moving, testimony to this new awareness in Cohen's late work is the centrality which the Psalms assume over against the Prophets who had held pride of place in the earlier works. Now it is the Psalmist searching after personal intimacy with God that is seen as the paradigmatic expression of Israel's religious genius, as compared to the ethical monotheism of the Prophets which so appealed to the early Cohen. The corollary of this, too, is telling: the late Cohen rediscovers prayer, for after all, what are the Psalms but prayers.

Space forbids an extended investigation of Berkovits's remaining critique of Cohen's view of the relation of "The Religion of Reason and Judaism" and of "Philosophy and Religion." It must be said, however, that in these sections Berkovits's general position cannot stand as presented because it is predicated on the over-simplistic and mistaken account of Cohen's late understanding of God and the related "concept of correlation" which has already been discussed. As such, the whole discussion lacks the textured fineness which recognizes the alternating and competing strands in Cohen's late works, resulting in a situation in which the valuable and unvaluable in Cohen's work are both disregarded. On the other hand, in these sections Berkovits often

does come close to the mark with regard to specific issues, especially when he discusses the inadequacies in Cohen's attempts to re-interpret specific traditional Jewish concepts in his own ethical idealist language. Berkovits is especially right when he points out in several different arguments (e.g., with regard to such concepts as Torah, *mitsvah,* Messianism, Zion, etc.) the general ahistoricity of Cohen's understanding and all that this entails for an adequate interpretation of Judaism. The shortcomings of Cohen's thought with respect to history are a serious limitation when trying to come to grips with a pre-eminently historical religion such as Judaism. Curiously, even here where he is on very secure ground, Berkovits weakens his case by making factual errors. For example, he makes the false statement that: "Cohen never makes mention of the Exodus,"[28] then states: "A religion of reason that disregards its (the Exodus) importance in the self-understanding of Judaism and in its world view is just not drawn from the sources of Judaism." Alas for Berkovits, Cohen *does* mention the Exodus — several times. In his discussion of justice Cohen writes: "All the commandments and all festive celebrations are a sign of 'remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt.' Hence, the entire Torah is a remembrance of the liberation from Egyptian slavery, which, as the cradle of the Jewish people, is not deplored, let alone condemned, but celebrated in gratitude."[29] Again, in his discussion of "Faithfulness" (*Die Treue*) Cohen, in keeping with the best of Jewish teaching, states:

> Remembering is therefore the psychological function of faithfulness. Thus, God remembers the covenant with the fathers, and Israel has to remember the benefits God bestowed on it. However, while it should remember the liberation from Egypt, this remembering is an active duty: Thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in the land of Egypt. Through this the memory changes into the social virtue of loving the stranger . . .[30]

There are also references to the Exodus in Cohen's discussion of the revelation at the Burning Bush, the issue of love of the stranger and the nature of the messianic future,[31] to name three further sources.

Finally, it should be noted that Berkovits is correct in his running theme that Cohen's late system, as found especially in *Die Religion,* introduces personal and religious categories into the discussion which run counter to elemental features of his earlier neo-Kantian systematic structure. Cohen does introduce doctrines that are required without adequate justification according to the Kantian modality. However, in contradistinction to Berkovits's criticism, their very introduction is *the* interesting feature of the entire discussion: that the great neo-Kantian Cohen should find that he needs to introduce such notions as messianism, revelation, Redeemer God, etc., in order to give a comprehensive account of human life is the revolutionary aspect of his late writings, and it is this aspect of his thinking which Rosenzweig, for example, was able to perceive. All Berkovits can see, however, is that Cohen failed to adequately justify these moves in a fully consistent systematic fashion, thus missing the forest for the trees.

Recognizing this subtle alternation between competing elements in Cohen's mature work requires that one's final judgment strike a balance between the enthusiastic Cohen supporters and the Berkovits-like critics. A sober conclusion seems to be that Cohen wanted to break with Kantianism, *did* break with Kantianism in essential respects, and yet his deep rooted attachment to Idealism did not allow him to move completely beyond its limiting parameters. Here, yet again, one is forcefully struck by Cohen's major contribution and perhaps the major positive achievement of *Die Religion,* namely, the recognition that in determining the fundamental general structure of human experience we *must* recognize individual, existential categories, which for Cohen are equivalent to the *religious* category, which had heretofore been excluded *a priori* from the Idealist phenomenology. Whether or not we agree with Cohen's methodological procedure as well as with his more general metaphysical deliberations for dealing with these categories, it is to his credit that he insisted on their recognition and established their distinctive character, as well as having gone a considerable distance in explaining this character. Unfortunately, Berkovits catches very little of this, seeing Cohen's work primarily in crude tones of

black and white. What little Berkovits does catch he portrays in pathetic terms as a struggle between Cohen's neo-Kantian intellect versus his Jewish *Baal-t'shuvah* heart.[32] This, however, misses the center of the *cognitive* thrust of Cohen's dialectical alternations in his late work. Cohen insists that man's *reason* requires God, not only man's heart. To misunderstand this is to misunderstand the entire nature of Cohen's late work and its importance. Thus, while I, too, hold that Cohen was unsuccessful in establishing the reconciliation of Idealism and religion that he sought, it is clear that Berkovits has not done justice to what Cohen did accomplish and to the significance for Jewish thought which his *Die Religion* represents. Berkovits thereby vitiates the value as the validity of much of his critique—whatever the ultimate independent conclusions one holds regarding Cohen's reflections.

III

Berkovits's second study considers the work of Franz Rosenzweig. After acknowledging the nobility of Rosenzweig's[33] life Berkovits gives a brief (7 pages) exposition of his thought under three headings:

1. Eternity, Holiness and Redemption;
2. Survival;
3. Judaism and Christianity.

This exegesis is perhaps the weakest of any of the exegetical reviews that Berkovits offers. Rosenzweig is notoriously hard to summarize and Berkovits's attempt re-confirms this fact.

Moving from exposition to criticism, Berkovits asserts directly:

> With all due respect to the saintly genius of Franz Rosenzweig, it would seem to us that it is impossible to accept any of his categories as fitting either the essence of Judaism, the nature of the Jew, or the history of the Jewish people.[34]

Though far too sweeping, this charge is at least partially accurate. The critical issues which Berkovits presents in support of

his contention, though for the most part, well known and unoriginal, are significant and identify many of the most pressing obscurities and confusions in Rosenzweig's thought. These issues center around Rosenzweig's a-temporal, a-historical image of the Jew and Judaism which colors everything else in his systematic analysis of the place and meaning of Judaism in history and reality.

Berkovits' is also right to see at least some of Rosenzweig's ideas as "Judaized" versions of Christian stereotypes of the Jew which forced themselves on Rosenzweig as a result of his personal encounter with Rosenstock-Huessey and Christianity. Again, as in his reflections on Cohen, Berkovits correctly stresses, in opposition to both Cohen and Rosenzweig, the significance of the actual, particular, national community of Israel and the historic centrality of the notion of Zion as a real historic possibility, related to the actuality of Jewish homelessness and exile. Yet there are, despite all that is pertinent in Berkovits's criticism, serious weaknesses in his review. Perhaps the most serious is methodological, relating to Berkovits's decision to explore Rosenzweig's thought almost exclusively on the basis of *Der Stern der Erlosung* (*The Star of Redemption*).[34a] As Rosenzweig's later writings indicate his thought continued to mature in a variety of directions after publication of *Der Stern*. To gain a full picture of his though therefore means casting a wider net. As it is, Berkovits ought more ccurately to have entitled his essay, "Some remarks on some aspects of *Der Stern,*" rather than "Franz Rosenzweig."

Moving to specific issues, we begin by noting that Berkovits's use of traditional Jewish sources to counter Rosenzweig's image of Judaism is often as one sided as Rosenzweig's and again raises the important question of Berkovits's use and misuse of sources. Consider, for example, Berkovits's discussion of the role of the Torah in history. Rosenzweig, it is argued, sees the function of Torah "as taking hold of the this-worldly and transforming it into the contents of the future world, the world beyond."[35] Berkovits replies:

> We know nothing of that . . . Not even the Torah is eternal according

> to Jewish tradition. As one of the great teachers of the Talmud said: "The commandments of God were given in order to purify man." Once the goal is achieved, the Law will no longer be necessary. Only in the imperfection of the temporal world does the Law serve a purpose.[36]

Berkovits's position oversimplifies the views found in "Jewish tradition." There are Talmudic and post-Talmudic sources which refer to the pre-existence of the Torah and its role in creation[37] and clearly see the Torah as related to more than the "imperfection of the temporal world." And then there are perhaps the more telling sources that present considerable evidence that the Torah is binding and relevant far beyond the this-worldly parameters of the present age.

> R. Hezekiah said in the name of R. Simon b. Zahdi: All the Torah which you learn in this world is "vanity" in comparison with Torah (which you shall learn) in the world to come.[38]

Again, in contra-distinction to Berkovits, the eternity of the Torah in the future life was argued for by both Saadiah[39] and Maimonides.[40] Maimonides also held that the Torah will not be changed even in the Messianic Era. Likewise, Crescas and Albo, while disagreeing with Maimonides that the "immutability of the Torah" is a necessary principle belief of Judaism, also held that it is nonetheless a true belief.[41] The Kabbalists, as one would expect, go still further regarding the cosmic significance of the Torah. Though a complex subject, which we need not get too enmeshed in, one quotation from the kabbalistic material gives us a flavor of their view of the Torah and shows it far removed from what Berkovits claims "the Tradition" teaches (or he implies strongly permits):

> In regard to the new interpretations of the Torah that God will reveal in the Messianic Age, we may say that the Torah remains eternally the same, but that in the beginning it assumed the form of material combinations of letters which were adapted to the material world. But some day men will cast off this material body; they will be transfigured and recover the mystical body that was Adam's before the fall. Then they will understand the mystery of the Torah, its hidden aspects will be made manifest. And later, when at the end of the sixth millennium (that is, after the true Messianic redemption and the beginning of the

> new aeon) man becomes a still higher spiritual being, he will penetrate still deeper into the hidden mystery of the Torah. Then everyone will be able to understand the miraculous content of the Torah and the secret combinations and will thereby learn much concerning the secret essence of the world . . .[42]

Independent discussion of Rosenzweig's view of Torah is important in itself, being central to the task of trying to understand the theology of *Der Stern*. Valid criticism of Rosenzweig is indeed required as the position advanced has many lacunae. But instead of doing what is needed, Berkovits confuses the issue by taking the easy but self-destructive course of misrepresenting the traditional Jewish sources to help achieve his goal. This lapse, which is not an isolated instance, calls into question Berkovits's critical procedures.

Parenthetically, I would like to note, in order to demonstrate a larger hermeneutical point, that Berkovits's position *vis a vis* The Torah as here expounded by him could easily be classed as "Christian," for his view is shared by much, if not most, Christian opinion for obvious reasons. However, I do not wish to suggest that Berkovits's thought is too "Christian" (42A) and therefore not to be trusted, a charge he regularly levels at others. I do not mention this criticism for that reason but rather, and solely, to indicate that this maneuver, i.e., to attach the label "Christian" to a certain view thus believing that this disposes of an idea or position, is largely an empty gesture. Though this is one of Berkovits's most well worked and favored criticisms, it is ultimately of little real philosophical or theological consequence. "Argument by label" is not philosophical argument.

Beyond these specific issues there is also a major philosophical issue at stake in Rosenzweig's analysis of the Jewish situation and Berkovits's passionate rejection of this account. Rosenzweig's positive affirmation of Judaism after his "return" was based on his evaluation of Judaism as an "eternal" religion which was removed from the everyday flow of the historical world. Berkovits summarizes Rosenzweig's view in the following way:

> God withdrew the Jewish people from the dimension of history in which the nations live by giving Israel His law, which like a bridge arches over the flow of time "that rushes underneath in all eternity."[43]

Berkovits's further exegesis of Rosenzweig's meaning gives a distinctly negative and unappealing color to Rosenzweig's position which the original discussion does not convey, achieved especially by the introduction and constant repetition of the negative term "lifeless,"[44] which Rosenzweig does not use in the original. Berkovits is correct to call attention to the well-known fact that Rosenzweig's position is problematic.[45] Indeed, in an early writing, Rosenzweig speaks of "the curse of historicity" which Judaism escapes, and this trans-historical understanding remains a constant (problematic) feature of Rosenzweig's conception of Judaism.

Against Rosenzweig's a-historicity Berkovits is right, especially after the Holocaust and the remarkable creation of the State of Israel, to stress the importance of Zionism and the entire dimension of history for both Jews and Judaism. Yet in correctly calling attention to history one must first be fair to Rosenzweig who was writing in the first third of his cenury when the Holocaust was "unthinkable" and the establishment of a Jewish state an impossible dream. Being fair to Rosenzweig means understanding the Hegelian nature of his outlook and the implications of the Hegellian system *vis a vis* Judaism which he was directly philosophizing against. Rosenzweig argued for the a-historicity of Judaism in order to justify the eternal valadity of Judaism in the face of the Hegelian view that Judaism had been overcome by the ongoing dialectic of history and thus made obsolete. Hegel's position denied Judaism any living spirituality or authenticity. Berkovits, despite his polemic, shows no indication of understanding this fundamental feature of all of Rosenzweig's thinking. Indeed, he does not mention Hegel at all in discussing Rosenzweig. (Hegel is not cited in the Index.) Yet without the Hegelian milieu in which and against which Rosenzweig was always working, all discussion of Rosenzweig is "out of context." Moreover, Rosenzweig's "motives," are irretrievably lost and the door for incorrect attributions is thereby opened. Being fair to Rosenzweig does not make his position either more accurate or more acceptable in the post Hegelian, post-Holocaust world of today. It does, however, remove any stigma that might attach itself to him as a result of views he held for idealistic mo-

tives. Thus, for example, Rosenzweig was not averse to Zionism[46] as was Cohen and was known to support the idea of the establishment of religious kibbutzim in Israel.[47] Rosenzweig's main aversion was to secular Zianism which he saw as a historical and theological betrayal of Judaism's deepest beliefs. Writing to a friend who was a Reform Rabbi, he stated:

> Among the Zionists I find, whatever the theory may be, better Jews than among us.[48]

Then again, a deeper reflection that is encouraged by Berkovits's critique of Rosenzweig: haven't the last 35 years of Jewish history, encompassing Auschwitz and the rebirth of the State of Israel, made *all* pre-Holocaust theology obsolete? Is there *any* pre 1940 theology, or post 1945 theology for that matter,[49] which can *adequately* deal with these overwhelming events in the life of the Jewish people? (Zionism *per se* is not a theology.)

Of considerably more interest, however, in the present context is the larger issue which Rosenzweig ironically points us to: history. Rosenzweig called himself a "radical empiricist." Though it is sometimes hard to take this designation seriously while reading *Der Stern,* Rosenzweig did think his system reflected an authentic phenomenological account of Jewish identity and the place of the Jew and Judaism in history, including what he perceived as Israel's "a-historicity." And in certain respects Rosenzweig is not wrong. Certainly from the first century C.E. to the rise of the State of Israel, Jews as a national group have not been *prime* movers in history, though they have made more of a contribution than Rosenzweig recognized. This fact may hurt our pride but it is a fact nonetheless. Moreover, Rosenzweig is right to emphasize that Western history has, in large part, been the product of Christianity—though he had a blind spot *vis a vis* Islam. But his basic assertion was—is—right. The historical reality of *galut,* Jewish historical marginality and the Imperialism of Christianity (and Islam) are *major* theological problems for a Jewish philosophy of history, especially when one understands that for Rosenzweig (as for any Jewish philosophy of history) they are facts which relate to actual historical as well as supra-historical metaphysical modalities. Rosenzweig

recognized these historical phenomena, and even forced them to the center of Jewish theological concern, even if he deals with them in ways which are clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, no major modern theologian has caught the problematic element in these categories as has Rosenzweig, and Berkovits fails to recognize this. Furthermore, Berkovits's own attempt at a Jewish philosophy of history which stresses the distinction between "power history" (the real history of nations) and "faith history" (the history of Israel)[50] is hardly as profound as Rosenzweig's; it is little more than an apologetic account of the events, which tries to turn historical realities into cosmic values after the event. As deep as one's philosophical disagreements may go with Rosenzweig's position, and they run very deep with this author as they obviously do with Berkovits, his work represents a pioneering attempt at a Jewish philosophical account which gives proper emphasis to the historic exilic conditions of the Jew. It is also important to note that Rosenzweig's view could well serve as an ideology which would be acceptable to both secularists and many a-Zionistic liberal and Orthodox Jews, for example, the Naturei Karta in Jerusalem.

All these philosophical considerations pass Berkovits by, at least in part because he seems to misunderstand, or perhaps it is only a case of not understanding thoroughly enough, what Rosenzweig means by the basic terms "life" and "eternity" and the dialectic between them in his discussion of history and history's relation to the meta-historical. Berkovits presents the two terms "life" and "eternity" as if they were unrelated to each other, being encased in some isolated, static, final form which allows no dialectical interaction flexibility. His account gives no sense of the fluidity, the open-endedness, the inter-penetration of the two separate yet inseparable ideas as they actually take place in Rosenzweig's dynamic reflections. The sharp dichotomy between "life" (i.e., history) and "eternity" which Berkovits sees is based on an inadequate grasp of Rosenzweig's position which is pre-eminently dialectical, as one would expect from someone schooled on Hegel. That is to say, for Rosenzweig, history and eternity, i.e., Jew and Christian, do *not* exist divorced from one another but rather the former is the ground as well as the

telos of the latter. Moreover, the dynamic of history is provided by the incursion of the eternal and this in three ways central to Rosenzweig's system — three points of the *Star* — Creation, Revelation and Redemption.[51] History begins in Creation, (one must recognize Rosenzweig's unique idealistic account of Creation which is deeply indebted to Cohen's notions on this topic), is transformed by Revelation towards its true goal, and achieves this goal in Redemption. As a consequence of this necessary intrusion of transcendental categories into the historical, the historical becomes at one and the same time inseparable from the transcendental and the transcendental becomes inseparable from the historical:

> Eternity is a future which, without ceasing to be future is nonetheless present.[52]

This dialectic is symbolized for Rosenzweig in the relations of Synagogue and Church, Jew and Christian. The Church, the Christian, History, all involve an eschatological dimension, a *final* cause, which defines both their present and their future. Thus, Rosenzweig argues:

> The world(s) future perfection is created, as future, simultaneously with the world.[53]

Any schizophrenic rendering of these relations, Berkovits's included, is too Marcionite, and a heresy on Rosenzweigian grounds, as it has been on orthodox Christian ones. Certainly the preponderant activity of history belongs to Christianity and is, for Rosenzweig, Christian history, but having recognized this one must not go on to commit the metaphysical as well as the logical error of *reducing* history to a completely non-eschatalogical, i.e., non-Jewish and non-eternal dimension of reality.

Moreover history, i.e., Christianity, is *not* the essential phenomena for Rosenzweig, and here again we see his transvaluation of Hegelianism. Rather, history represents a preliminary stage whose purpose and end is defined and guaranteed by eternity, i.e., by Judaism. Just as God guaranteed the victory of morality in Kantian systematics, so Judaism, as the symbol

of eternity, guarantees the victory of the Spirit in Rosenzweig's transmutation of Hegel's dialectic of the Spirit. Now it is not Judaism which is taken up and transcended by Christianity, especially in its Protestant form, but rather the reverse. Christianity's fulfillment is to be manifest through its being taken back up into the womb from which it sprang, Judaism. For Rosenzweig this fulfillment represents the *Eschaton*. Here we have a metaphysical version almost approximating the Messianic vision of the prophets with regard to the eschatological centrality of Israel. And, as we have just argued, this eschatological dimension also necessarily involves itself in the historical[54] (though not being *of* history and in a special Rosenzweigian sense of "historical"). Eternity, as represented by the Jew, constantly reminds the historical community of Christianity that the "end is not yet," that redemption still belongs to the future and that the work of Revelation is still to be completed in a future messianic consummation. Hence Judaism, though standing over against history, nonetheless enters into history as an imperative which gives history its meaning:

> Life becomes immortal in redemption's eternal hymn of praise.[55]

The entire Rosenzweigian system is intelligible only when these dialectical movements are fully taken account of. As we have noted, Creation, Revelation, especially Revelation, and Redemption are all involved in these movements between above and below, history and eternity, Jew and Christian. To fail to understand them, i.e., to try to interpret them in non-dialectical terms, as Berkovits does, is to caricaturize them and miss their essential meaning. Such a caricature cannot adequately understand the significance of Rosenzweig's final exhortation in *Der Stern*: "Into Life" (and thus also the whole intent of Rosenzweig's concern). Nachum Glatzer recalls the following incident:[56]

> The liberal critics of Zionism who stressed "the essence of Judaism" and the idea of eternity, were told by Rosenzweig that eternity as understood by Judaism lies not in the metaphysical clouds of timelessness but in its realization in our days. There is no "essence of Judaism" Rosenzweig taught, there is only: "Hear, O Israel!"

IV

The third and longest essay in the present volume[57] deals with the thought of Martin Buber and is divided into four sections:

1. The Teaching of Buber.
2. Buber's Testimony.
3. The Biblical Encounters.
4. Buber's Metaphysics.

As is his custom, Berkovits first exposits the major themes in Buber's dialogical position and then analyzes them.

Fundamental criticism of Buber's influential work, *I and Thou,* is long overdue; but, unfortunately, Berkovits's critique falls short for at least five reasons.

(1) Berkovits's interpretation indicates that he does not have complete mastery of Buber's voluminous writings, nor a full critical appreciation of how each element in the structure supports each other and receives its meaning in terms of the larger whole. In certain cases this leads to either over-simplified exegesis or to distortion. Moreover, his exegesis is stolid and stiff, and employs linguistic forms which are so un-Buberian that it is hard to recognize the authentic Buber in Berkovits's paraphrase. Then again, the exegesis is not altogether accurate because it tries to analyze Buber's position through concerns which are not always those of the philosophy of dialogue. In this respect, it is also apparent that Berkovits is not careful enough in working with the distinction between epistemological and ontological categories, often translating the former into the latter. This has especially negative consequences for his account of Buber's fundamental thesis of *I - Thou / I- It,* which is described primarily in ontological terms and presuppositions without recognizing the importance of the Kantian element in Buber's work which must be understood epistemologically as well as ontologically: *how* I know is inseparable from *what* I know.

Furthermore, regarding exegesis, it should be noted that instead of analyzing the meaning of basic Buberian terms, Berkovits merely repeats or paraphrases them. For example he writes:

> As the *I* of *I - Thou,* he (man) participates. The non-participating *I* is unreal.[58]

However, one is never clear what "participation" means. This failure of clarity, of course, is also found in the original Buberian sources which owe much of their appeal to their obscurity. However, this failure of precision leads to simple logical errors. Compare the statement just quoted regarding "participation" and Berkovits's statement written a few lines earlier: "The *I* of *I - It* is *much less real* than *I* in *I - Thou.*"[59] Notice the linguistic and logical confusion regarding the meaning of the term "real" as applied to the *I* of *I - It.* In the statement just quoted it is said to be "much less real," while in the former quotation the *I* is said to be "unreal." It cannot be both "much less real" and "unreal." Furthermore, which is the correct reading of Buber? To decide, we would first have to be clear about the use of the terms "real," "reality," etc., which are never defined, as well as many other features of Buber's epistemology and ontology which are ignored altogether. It certainly is of no help for Berkovits to add:

> To be real means to participate.[60]

As we have no clear sense of what "participation" means, little, if anything, is gained by this additional, circular, exegetical detail. These serious logical and conceptual weaknesses can be multiplied with regularity throughout Berkovits's exegesis and critique.

(2) Let us now consider Berkovits' critical review. Berkovits's major criticism of Buber is that Buber's appeal is subjective and "unprovable." Though correct, and though this criticism is obviously significant, Berkovits does not seem to realize that (a) most, if not all, philosophical arguments are "unprovable" in the sense in which he requires proof here; and (b) Buber's "subjective" claim is based on *philosophical* grounds, i.e., the Kierkegaardian-like thesis that "Truth is Subjectivity." Buber takes the position he does for *philosophical* reasons—most of which have been stated by Kierkegaard in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and echoed by all the existentialists ever

since. To challenge Buber's position, one has not only to state that his position is subjective—Buber, after all, is perfectly aware of this, but thinks it a major virtue—but has to show why the existentialist credo that "Truth is subjectivity" is a philosophical blunder. This Berkovits never takes up. Though this doctrine does lead to serious philosophical difficulties as I have argued elsewhere, Berkovits does not locate these difficulties nor does he show signs of understanding the logic of Buber's methodology of which these subjective and subjectivist claims are an integral part.[61] This is part of Berkovits's general failure to grasp not only the explicit elements in Buber's thought, but also the implicit and assumed elements which are not stated in the process of Buber's argument. And this in turn is related to the larger issue of "modernity" which was mentioned in the introductory remarks, for Buber is pre-eminently a modern man and a symbol of "modernity" and its concerns. His position, whether it be his "subjectivity," his "existentialism," his "situation morality," (Buber would not like this term applied to his work) or the like, is part of a movement of thought, as well as a mood which largely dominated European thought since World War I. To do justice to Buber's thought, even if critically, one must be aware of the implicit elements (especially related to Kant and Kierkegaard) in his thinking, and the issues, problems and historical circumstances to which he was replying.

(3) Berkovits's critique of the moral anarchy implicit in Buber's position is correct,[62] though heavy handed, as is his deep concern with the antinomianism of Buber's understanding of Judaism and Halakhah. However, in this latter case, Buber will not be persuaded merely by the charge that he is an antinomian, because the Halakhah has no validity to him, being for him only a human response to *I - Thou* (at best) which then becomes an *It* which stands in the way of new *I - Thou* relations rather than promoting them. Thus citing the Halakhah against Buber is to miss the point and to argue in a circle. The only time Halakhic evidence is persuasive is when both parties to a debate accept the validity or at least the value of the Halakhah. This is not the case with Buber. Larger methodological considerations become relevant at this point because the argument gets slippery

here on how to handle a position like Buber's — just how to expose the weakness of it. Unfortunately, Berkovits while doing a good deal of solid criticism here, nonetheless is not fully sensitive to the logical and methodological difficulties Buber's position presents, and his remarks are therefore sometimes wide of the mark.

(4) The primary intention of Berkovits's critique is to show that Buber's philosophy does not meet the traditional standards of Jewish Orthodoxy, the essay's original title in fact being, "A Jewish (i.e., Orthodox) Critique of the Philosophy of Martin Buber." However, as with so much else in Berkovits's approach, this comes as no surprise to anyone, least of all Buber who was not at all concerned to square his thinking with traditional teaching. Quite the contrary. The very power and appeal of Buber's thought is predicated on a historic situation in which the traditional views, analyses and answers are no longer seen to be viable and responsive to modern concerns. Buber's importance lies in the very fact of this recognition and his attempt, nonetheless, to confirm God's existence and presence in history while avoiding elements which seem "unbelievable" to him and many modern men. What Buber is calling into question is the whole of the rabbinic tradition. For him the rabbis had "mis-understood" the "essence of Judaism." If one realizes this, much of Berkovits's critique looks like intellectual shadow boxing. There is certainly much (everything?) that needs criticizing in Buber's approach to Judaism and Jewish tradition and his misunderstanding bordering on blindness of rabbinic Judaism. But all such criticism has to be offered in a way which indicates that it understands what it is in Buber that has made Buber the most influential Jewish philosopher since Maimonides (excluding Spinoza as a specifically "Jewish philosopher," and not forgetting Mendelssohn). Thus, even citing Biblical proof texts (with regard to which there are many problems in Berkovits's treatment) against Buber is to miss the point, for the validity of the Biblical text is perhaps the most serious issue of all which Buber and modern men have come to question. In other words, the entire philosophical and theological ground rules for engaging Buber are different from those used

in more traditional debate. Buber can certainly be effectively criticized — but the care and sophistication of the critic are of paramount importance.

(5) Berkovits's major charge against Buber's metaphysics is that it is pantheistic.[63] There is an element of truth in this and Berkovits is to be commended for catching it. Most expositors have missed it. But it is one thing to talk of an element of pantheism in Buber and another to set out his system as a thoroughgoing pantheism which it is not. Berkovits's "proof" to this end is achieved only by doing violent injustice to the sources he cites. What is present here is not pantheism in the technical sense but an expression of the very Jewish urge to give value to man and creation. Though Buber's enthusiasm for creation does at times overwhelm him and lead him into some extremely injudicious assertions, he is *not a* pantheist, i.e., he does not equate the world with God or God with the world without remainder. What appears to be pantheistic in Buber has its source in an admixture of Hegelian and Buberianly understood (or misunderstood) Kabbalistic - Hasidic[64] elements, and these elements do run through much of Buber's metaphysical musings. But in no case was Buber a "pantheist" *per se*. In every case where he had occasion to discuss the subject he vigorously criticized it as inimical to true religion, i.e., dialogical religion. Moreover, Berkovits's specific attempts to support this charge do not hold up on closer inspection. For example, Berkovits's "pantheistic" exposition of what is represented to be Buber's view of the relation of freedom and causality[65] is really to be understood as a Buberian admixture of Kantian and Kierkegaardian elements. There is no need at all to introduce pantheistic doctrines to account for Buber's position, unless one purposely wants to misunderstand what is at issue. What is wrong with Buber's ontology is nots its "pantheism" but its logical inconsistency, metaphysical impossibility, and philosophical obscurity. Berkovits seems to see all "improper" Jewish philosophy as the result of either pantheistic or "Christian" tendencies — and he accuses Buber of both; but evidence shows that there are many philosophical errors Jewish philosophers can and do make which are not instances of these categories. It appears that Berkovits needs more philosophical

imagination.

Without analyzing further specific passages, I must conclude that Berkovits's general account and critique of many of Buber's basic concepts (dialogue, philosophical anthropology, encounter, revelation, etc.) are forced and inadequate. For example, consider Berkovits's treatment of encounter/dialogue as a paradigm. Berkovits argues that Buber's version of these concepts is faulty because (among other things) in the encounter with God:

a. There is no dialogical equality;
b. There is no freedom;
c. God is not always present to man.

His reasons for so arguing are based primarily on his understanding of the Biblical accounts. But the understanding and "authority" of Biblical material are themselves subject to debate. Even more important, however, is the fact that his account of what the Biblical picture reveals of the God-man relation is not free of difficulty. For example, it is not clear that there is no dialogical equality or freedom in at least *some* Biblical God-man encounters. If it is true that Buber incorrectly reduces all Biblical encounters to his own dialogical model, it is equally true that Berkovits does the same in the direction of his undialogical model. Meanwhile the truth seems to be that no single model of Biblical encounter can be adequate. The evidence is too varied, requiring a more complex, polymorphous phenomenology to handle it adequately. Furthermore, if there were no freedom in the encounter as Berkovits argues, the majesty accorded man, and stressed so strongly in the traditional Jewish understanding of Israel's willingness to participate freely in the covenant and keep the Torah, would be without foundation. The structure of Torah/*mitsvah* requires an understanding of Divine-human encounter which includes freedom. And finally, Berkovits's criticism of what he takes to be Buber's optimism regarding the eternal presence of God and the ever-present possibility of encounter is deficient on at least two counts:

1. Buber is not significantly at odds here with most of the Jewish tradition, Berkovits notwithstanding;

2. Buber, especially after the Holocaust, recognized this problem and tried to respond to it, coining in the process his suggestive phrase (and the title of a late book of his) *The Eclipse of God.*

That this phrase is a metaphor that itself needs to be explained is true; but it seems that Buber at least recognized the problem which Berkovits wants to deny, and that his attempt is as serious, if still problematic, an attempt as any that has been made in modern Jewish thought. In short, therefore, we can conclude this section by noting that we still await a substantive criticism of Buber's views.

V

This essay is a reprint of Berkovits's famous critique of Mordecai Kaplan which first appeared in *TRADITION* (Fall 1959). Some of the faults common to Berkovits's approach are again in evidence: the misunderstandings, the forced renderings of passages, the unfairness of certain emphases and expositions. Yet it must be said that Berkovits's critique does strike home, especially his attack on the pseudo-scientific nature of Reconstructionism. This charge is right, for Kaplan's work is marred by a mistaken understanding of modern science and what philosophical implications can be correctly drawn from contemporary naturalism and social science.[66] Though put too polemically, Berkovits's conclusion is accurate:

> Since the Reconstructionist view of naturalism is so extremely naive and outdated, nothing but failure was to be expected from its "wedding of religion to naturalism."

And he is also moving in the right direction when he goes on to argue that:

> Any one who undertakes the task will have to attempt to harmonize a mature naturalism with a mature supernaturalism.[67]

This theme, which was also taken up and well argued by Emil Fackenheim in his critique[68] of Kaplan, is to the point. However, it should be noted that it is not clear what a "mature naturalism"

and a "mature supernaturalism" would be. Again, on the positive side, Berkovits's emphases on Kaplan's inability to deal with moral value and evil within his system is instructive and raises an issue of fundamental importance.

Berkovits treats Kaplan primarily as a metaphysician or theologian whose main concern is to propound an alternative metaphysics to that of traditional Judaism. The very title of Berkovits's essay reflects this perspective clearly: "Reconstructionalist-Theology; A Central Evaluation." But Kaplan does not want to be seen as a theologian. He has very little sympathy with theology, and is a poor theologian out of necessity to support his primary aim: the survival of the Jewish people. Kaplan is another paradigm of the modern Jew who is deeply committed to the Jewish people, while finding it impossible to believe in *Torah mi Sinai.* In order to make a rationale for Israel's continued existence he gives, as the English philosopher Bradley said, "bad reasons for what he believes on instinct." The primary lines of Kaplan's defense of the Jewish people proceed along the sociological avenues suggested by Emile Durkheim and his sociological and anthropological heirs. Kaplan's work is more a Jewish sociology than a Jewish theology in the formal sense; or, more precisely, it is theology generated by sociological concerns and built upon sociological and anthropological presuppositions. It would probably even be true to say that it is theology done in support of sociological commitments. Berkovits does not see this sociological dimension or its ramifications. He treats Kaplan's work in ways that are often inappropriate, forcing it into forms and patterns, especially metaphysical patterns, which it does not have, and which are of little or no concern to it. Berkovits treats Kaplan as a systematic theologian which he is not, and has no intention of being. While it is true that Kaplan's image of "supernaturalism" is a "strawman," and out of touch with the best modern theology, Berkovits makes Kaplan into something of a "strawman" by not realizing that the center of his thinking is social reality—the *group,* in this case the Jewish people. Everything radiates from this center and all value is mediated and adjudicated in relation to it. Moreover, Kaplan's sociological emphasis reflects an aspect of modern rationality,

with its inversion of transcendence and immanence, as well as with its anthropological tnd sociological emphases, which cannot be ignored or dismissed out of hand—even if Kaplan's particular presentation of these concerns is weak.

Moving to more specific items, one also finds certain aspects of the detailed charges Berkovits lays against Kaplan unsatisfactorily handled. For example, Berkovits argues that Kaplan's errors lie not only in his employment of various forms of pseudoscience and in his confusion over the difference between facts and values, but also in his pantheism. As with Buber, perhaps even more so, there are elements in Kaplan's thought which can be viewed as pantheistic in a broad sense, but to charge Kaplan with a technical pantheistic doctrine is an error. It would ascribe to Kaplan metaphysical doctrines about God and ultimate reality which Kaplan carefully eschews as part of his inherited Kantian reticence to do metaphysics at all. Berkovits's attempt to elicit the claimed Spinozistic character of Kaplan's ethic is extremely forced and inaccurate.[69] Whatever are the failings of Reconstructionist ethics, it is not a deterministic pantheistic position akin to that propounded in Spinoza's *Ethics,* nor is its concern with the group at all akin to Spinoza's ontological concern for the unity of all things in the One Divine substance. Berkovits recognizes that Kaplan says contradictory things, yet presents Kaplan's view as essentially pantheistic. At the same time he also notes that Kaplan's thought include doctrines which are in contradiction to his supposed systematic pantheism, and these contradictions are, of course, presented as further evidence of Kaplan's confusion. However, it makes as much sense, and is truer to the larger concerns of Kaplan which Berkovits is insensitive to, to say that Kaplan is not a pantheist but at the same time that he holds confused doctrines which are in contradiction to his fundamentally non-pantheistic stance. It is true that Kaplan's position is confused with regard to systematic metaphysical doctrines, but confusion is not pantheism.[70] Moreover, Berkovits seems to confuse naturalism and pantheism and fails to make the important metaphysical distinctions which individuate the two concepts. This lack of precision leads Berkovits to render and misunderstand many of Kaplan's basic doc-

trines as ontological statements whereas Kaplan seems to intend them primarily as socially pragmatic and/or ethical propositions. Of course, one cannot have a religious morality without a religious ontology, but which is which needs to be carefully delineated and the failure to do so à la Berkovits leads to fundamental misunderstandings.

Finally, Berkovits is quick to criticize those, like Cohen and Rosenzweig, who do not seem to give enough weight to history in their attempts to frame a philosophy of Judaism, but he fails to come to grips with the technical issue of how one investigates history and how one evaluates the historical record. It is not simply a case of reading "meaning" off the surface of history, for the "meaning" of history is obscure. In Kaplan's thought this methodological problem forces itself to the surface, for he reads a different "meaning" from history than does Berkovits. Indeed, he charges those who would defend an Orthodox position like Berkovits's with not taking history seriously enough, as well as with reading into history metaphysical and theological doctrines which are illusory and unjustifiable. Here the real issues relevant to formulating the systematic and methodological skeleton of a philosophy of Judaism begin to be engaged, but precisely here Berkovits seems unwilling to become party to the discussion.

VI

The final essay deals with the thought of A. J. Heschel. It is neither an extended treatment of Heschel's work, nor of Heschel's treatment of "major themes in modern philosophies of Judaism," but a review-essay of Heschel's book on the prophets[70a] (*The Prophets*, N. Y. 1962).

Berkovits focuses on Heschel's analysis of prophetic religion in terms of Divine pathos and sympathy. He sums up Heschel's position:

> God is passible; He is affected by what man does and He reacts according to His affection. He is a God of pathos. He is "emotionally affected" by the conduct of man.[71]

He quotes the following essential sentence from Heschel:

> This notion that God can be intimately affected, that He possesses not merely intelligence and will, but also pathos, basically defines the prophetic consciousness of God.[72]

This objective prophetic consciousness has a subjective counterpart which Heschel defines as prophetic sympathy: The prophet aligning himself sympathetically with God's pathos so that he can fully represent God's desires to the people. Berkovits summarizes this Heschelian position to mean:

> He (the prophet) feels God's feeling. The prophets react to the Divine pathos with sympathy for God . . . Sympathy is a feeling which feels the feeling to which it reacts . . . Because of this sympathy, the prophet, is guided, not by what he feels, but rather by What God feels. In moments of intense sympathy for God, the prophet is moved by the pathos of God.[73]

On the basis of this exegesis Berkovits moves to the attack. The target is obvious, the age-old problem of anthropomorphism and more precisely anthropopathism. Yet the target is more elusive than Berkovits realizes. Heschel knows as well as Berkovits that language is a major philosophical problem. He knows about anthropopathism and its attendant difficulties; yet as a man of profound faith he wants to sustain the intelligibility in some form of religious language, and hence of the larger issue of Biblical faith. Berkovits even cites Heschel's constant disclaimers that this language is not literal, that it constantly points beyond itself, that it is, when all is said and done, mysterious, paradoxical, evocative but not descriptive.[74] And yet Berkovits treats Heschel as if he were a simple-minded fundamentalist with no theological sophistication, as if what he were doing were ridiculous. He fails to understand that Heschel's attempt, even if it is unsuccessful, is profound. It is profound—and very Jewish, despite Berkovits's remarks to the contrary—because it is trying to explicate the depth of the Biblical imagery pertaining to the meaning of man's existential relation to God, while recognizing the wisdom inherent in the traditional dictum that the Bible "is written in the language of man." In no sense is Heschel trying to write a meta-

physical treatise about God's being; rather he is making one of the most sustained contemporary attempts to explain what the relation of God and man entails, and why God needs man as much as man needs God, themes he develops in his other works.[75]

To defend his literalistic reading of Heschel, Berkovits calls up the venerable ghost of Maimonides and the medievals who were also familiar with the problem of anthropomorphism. Their introduction, however, does not really settle anything: the argument from authority is not a philosophical argument. Moreover, on reflecting on the medieval material, four responses suggest themselves.

1. Despite the universal veneration of Maimonides, his theory of negative attributes does *not* appear to be philosophically viable. Indeed, it is probably (a) more inimical to maintaining meaningful religious discourse than Heschel's attempt—fully recognizing all the obvious criticisms which can be raised against Heschel as well as the defenses made for Maimonides, especially regarding God's ethical attributes; (b) even Maimonides' own medieval contemporaries were not universally ecstatic over the theory, and this can be seen in both Jewish quarters and in the alternative theories, like the significant theory of analogy in Aquinas which specifically cites, evaluates and rejects Maimonides' position.

2. There is a curious blindness attached to Berkovits's appeal to the medievals. He notes that Maimonides rejected the attribution of emotional predicates to God on the philosophical grounds of God's immutability. To make such attributions would challenge God's immutability and hence His perfection according to Maimonides' inherited Aristotelian notion of perfection. What Berkovits fails to appreciate is that the notion of perfection here involved is perhaps inappropriate and needs to be rethought. Heschel makes this precise point and Berkovits refers to it,[76] but Berkovits misses the force of this remark thinking it is only a historical point about the origin of the Eleatic idea of perfection. Some classical thinkers seem to have had some notion of this problem, and more recently it has been the subject of major theological re-thinking by A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.[77] Berkovits asserts:

> The truth is that even though the Bible calls perfect only His work and it never refers to God as Absolute, absoluteness is implied in the Biblical concept of God as well as perfection.

And a little farther on he writes:

> "The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is not the God of Aristotle, but certainly (sic) includes the philosopher's concept of absoluteness.[78]

Really? One would have thought that the absence of certain attributions in the Bible would be cause to pause and proceed slowly with dogmatic assertions about the "God concept" of the Bible. It would also appear that it is by no means clear what these terms—absolute and perfect—mean when applied to God. Moreover, it would seem to involve certain logical convolutions to hold that though the God of the Bible is not the God of the philosophers "He certainly includes the philosophers' concept of absoluteness." If this is so what individuates the one from the other? Can the former include all the predicates of the latter and yet be the former? It is precisely the different entailments of the two concepts of God that was at the heart of the medieval debate: the absoluteness of Aristotle's Prime Mover was not—could not logically be—the absoluteness of the God of Genesis (who had a will, which was an imperfection for the Greeks); though the medievals did not always realize this either.

3. There is one irony here which must be noted. It was precisely the thesis of perfection entailing immutability that served as Spinoza's absolute presupposition which led him to his pantheism and determinism. Of all those who took the Eleatic idea of perfection seriously, it was primarily Spinoza who was willing to follow out the logical implications of this doctrine. If Berkovits finds the Eleatic metaphysic of perfection so plausible, it is he who may be a pantheist!

4. Lastly, one should appreciate that despite Berkovits's remarks, Heschel was fully aware of the medieval debate over anthropomorphism. It should be recalled that he wrote a number of learned papers on Maimonides[79] including a biography.[80] He was also the author of scholarly papers on Saadiah[81] and Ibn Gabirol[82] among others. In contradistinction to Berkovits, I would suggest that Heschel was consciously philosophizing

against the medievals, aware of their position and trying to do something quite different. It would prove, I think, a fruitful exercise to compare Heschel's analysis of Biblical language and Maimonides' analysis as offered in the *Guide;* I would suggest that Heschel may have had this exact counterpart in his mind's eye while working on the *Prophets.*

Berkovits's treatment of Heschel also forces us again to consider the question of sources, their use and interpretation. Not satisfied with calling up the medieval philosophers Berkovits calls in the other classics of Judaism: Biblical, Talmudic and even Kabbalistic. He even quotes from Hayim Vital's defense against the charge of anthropomorphism at the end of Chapter I of some editions of his *Eits Hayyim* and from Moshe Hayim Luzzato's remarks in his *Hoker u' Mekubbal,* charging that even these Kabbalists would never go as far in attributing passibility to God as Heschel does in his theology of pathos. But I suspect it is just these Kabbalistic sources that are at the root of Heschel's thinking, imbibed deeply in the rich Hasidic world of his youth. There is certainly as much Divine passibility in classical Kabbalah as there is in Heschel; and at the same time what the Kabbalists try to protect through their postulation of the ineffable *Ein Sof* is precisely what Heschel wants to protect when he eschews talk of God's essence; indeed he could well have written the very phrases (and comes close in places) Berkovits cites from the classical Kabbalistic sources. The same may also be said about the Biblical and rabbinic materials. When all is concluded, one is faced with the inescapable fact that there are Biblical and rabbinic materials which are sound evidences for a theory of Divine passibility as they stand. One can explain them away in a number of fashions, but this is quite a different matter. This is not to say all the texts Heschel cites are what he suggests, but then again it is clearly not the case that none of them are, for after all the sorting and analyzing of the sources is done there is evidence for some real element of Divine passibility in the traditional materials. Berkovits indeed is forced to make the telling admission that there are "innumerable anthropopathic passages in the Aggadah and Midrash"[88] and that to deal with them one must recognize that "Theology demands meaningful

interpretation,"[84] and again that his view is dictated by "The theological climate (which) is determined by a long tradition of affirmation of Divine impassibility *in face of numerous Biblical texts to the contrary.*"[85] At this point, and only at this point, do the complex hermeneutical and theological issues begin to be engaged, and arguments, not assertions and oversimplifications, are required. Moreover, it is here where Berkovits should show how religious language can work without analogical use of language or the like. It behooves him to indicate how the Biblical and rabbinic discussions can retain their theological meaning and value without committing some of the moves made by Heschel; and where one wants to dissociate oneself from Heschel, how to protect the intelligibility of one's God-language. Thus, for example, one has to push Berkovits on his agreement with Heschel that God is a personal God. Berkovits summarizes Heschel's view in the following manner:

> The reality of God is experienced by the prophet as God's *care* and *concern* for His creation. "Man stands under God's 'concern' is the basic message of all prophecy."[86]

Berkovits then acknowledges his agreement with this view by adding:

> These are, of course, familiar thoughts, well understood by all who have some knowledge of Biblical theology or religious philosophy.[87]

But what does Berkovits mean when he agrees to speak of "God's care and concern?" Can he make out a philosophical case in which these terms retain their intelligibility while avoiding the anthropopathetic errors he attributes to Heschel? Berkovits does not seem aware that the position he advances is logically self-contradictory, for he does not attempt any resolution of the self-referential inconsistency. This is not surprising, however, as it is an easy thing this late in the history of philosophy to recognize that religious language presents large, perhaps even insuperable problems, foremost among them being a workable theory of analogy or something else that will do a similar job

so as to avoid the error of anthropomorphism and anthropopathism, while it is quite another matter to advance any suggestion which will assist in the resolution of this issue. Moreover, returning to Berkovits's remarks about Heschel, it is not the case that Heschel simply "takes the metaphorical language of the Midrash and call(s) it a theology of pathos,"[88] but rather it is a case of his trying to show what this particular language is about, why the Bible and Midrash use it and not some other language, and how we are to do justice to the claims made for the sanctity and revelatory quality of the text without being literalists on the one hand or willy-nilly liberals on the other. Berkovits reminds us of the rabbinic use of the term *"Keveyakhol,"* "as it were," to qualify anthropopathic and anthropomorphic expressions[89] and this is a reminder well worth noting. But at the same time we must also realize that the text does use specific anthropomorphic and anthropomorphic expressions even if it uses them as it were *"keveyakhol."*

Furthermore, Berkovits, after agreeing with Heschel that the Biblical God does know individuals, and does "realize them as a concrete fact,"[90] still feels compelled to disagree with Heschel's conclusion that this individual relation between God and man entails Divine passability. To support this conclusion, however, Berkovits does not resort to argument or evidence, but to an article of faith:

> God's realizing man as a concrete fact and not an abstraction is enveloped in mystery.[91]

He then concludes, as if he had really settled the issue, with the logical barbarism that "surely, (sic) our mystery is much more logical than Dr. Heschel's." How one mystery can be "more logical" than another is the greatest mystery of all.[92]

There remains one final major component of Berkovits's critique of Heschel to take note of and by now it is an expected charge: Heschel's theology of pathos/sympathy is too close to a Christian-like theology.[93] Berkovits attempts to document this charge by some random citations from Christian literature, and a brief disquisition on Christian theology. This charge against

Heschel is unworthy. Heschel's theology is deeply rooted in Jewish sources, especially the Hasidic milieu of his youth. And if he is guilty of perhaps over-emphasizing the personal and subjective elements in these sources it is certainly not because he is in some sense a crypto-Christian or doing crypto-Christian theology. A perusal of the sources reveals adequate data to construct a Heschelian theology "out of the sources of Judaism." Berkovits's citations from Hermann Lotze's *Microcosmus* and A. M. Fairbairn's obscure work *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* to substantiate this charge are so tendentious as to border on the ridiculous. There is a great deal amiss in Heschel's theology and it can be brought into the open without the absurdity of following Berkovits's passion for finding Christians under every modern Jewish theologian's bed, "conclusively" demonstrated by quoting thinkers like A. M. Fairbairn and showing that Heschel is a fellow traveller of Christian Patripassian theology!

In a recent letter to *Judaism*,[93a] in reply to an article by Sol Tanenzapf, Berkovits, obviously stung by Tanenzapf's remarks about the question of his treatment of Heschel and Christianity, tried to back away from the topic by writing:

> As if I had criticized Heschel for being "too" Christian. The truth is that I was showing that what makes sense within the frame of reference of Christianity is utterly meaningless in the context of Judaism.

If this straight-forward point were all that Berkovits intended in the original article why didn't he just say that? I leave it to readers to decide this issue. Therefore, I merely reproduce, without further comment, the opening paragraph of Berkovits's discussion, as well as three of his later statements on this theme.

> There is little doubt that in the context of Jewish thought and religious sensitivity, Dr. Heschel's position is most original. And yet, when he speaks of man's participating in "the inner life" of God and God's sharing in the life of man, there is a somewhat familiar ring about it. When he elaborates in innumerable variations on the prophet's feeling "His heart" and experiencing "the pain in the heart of God" as his own, or when he reveals the secret of sympathy as a situation in which "man experiences God as his own being," it does not take much per-

spicuity to realize that one has encountered these concepts in one's readings — in Christian theology.[94]

"In Christianity, God does have pathos in exactly the same sense as Dr. Heschel understands the term."[95]

"Already in the second and third century C.E., a theology of pathos was formulated in the Christian church which comes very close to that of Dr. Heschel.[96]."

"Heschel's view corresponds, as we have noted, to the position of the Patripassians in Christian theology."[97]

Conclusion

This essay has indicated serious weaknesses in Berkovits's work. It has objected to the terminology, methodology, logic and tone of much of his exposition and criticism with respect to major modern Jewish thinkers. And these objections are all serious ones in appraising the abiding value of Berkovits's writings. Throughout this essay an attempt has been made to demonstrate where this rigour is lacking. Certainly Berkovits has alerted readers to the serious issues in modern Jewish thought that need re-appraisal but it is unfortunate that his eye for specific errors is not attended by a larger understanding of why the errors, if they are errors, were made. Such an understanding might have rescued him from his unfairness to Cohen, Rosenzweig, Buber, Kaplan and Heschel and I believe it would have allowed for a more accurate and penetrating account of his subject. Furthermore, the topic of the need for a broader understanding of the subject under review is inextricably related to the larger methodological issues of how "one does philosophy," especially the unavoidable problem of how one reads philosophical and other texts. Then again, a higher degree of philosophical self-consciousness and severer internal criticism in all these areas would have saved Berkovits from at least some his more unacceptable remarks.

However, Berkovits must be commended for initiating serious, critical debate about contemporary Jewish philosophical issues, even if his criticism has serious flaws.

NOTES

N.B. All references to E. Berkovits, *Major Themes in Modern Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y. 1974) will be referred to as *Berkovits.*

1. It should be noted for instance that we still lack a *complete,* expert history of Modern Jewish Thought, the closest facsimile being Nathan Rotenstreich's *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times* (N. Y. 1962), translated from the original Hebrew version of this work and to a lesser extent, Julius Guttmann's *Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y., 1964). Both studies, however, end with Rosenzweig, who is treated very briefly, and ignore the post World War I period completely, i.e., Buber, Kaplan, Heschel, etc. And though each of these works is unquestionably valuable, both studies also have their serious weaknesses. A second and more meaningful feature of the neglect of the modern period is the absence of quality programs for the training of young scholars in the area of modern Jewish thought either in the United States or Israel. The only university that can claim to have made any serious attempt to meet this need is probably Brandeis, much to its credit.

2. An excellent example of this historical-exegetical tendency can be perceived in the vast secondary literature on Martin Buber, the most studied and written on, modern Jewish thinker. Among all the literature on Buber there is very little of first rate philosophical importance.

3. An example of the creative criticism I have in mind is A. Altmann's essay on H. Cohen, see note 28 below, or again S. H. Bergmann's work on Cohen, see note 27 below. On Rosenzweig, there is little of value aside from the work of N. Glatzer; and on Buber the best, though still largely unsatisfactory, work is found in *The Phil. of Martin Buber,* ed. P. Schilpp and M. Friedman (Illinois, 1967).

4. *Berkovits,* page 4.

5. H. Cohen, *Judische Schriften,* ed. Bruno Strauss with an Introduction by Franz Rosenzweig, 3 volumes (Berlin 1924).

6. Cf., for example, Cohen's remarks in *Die Ethik des reinen Willens* (2nd ed. 1907), pp. 402 ff.

7. See F. Rosenzweig's remarks in his "Einleitung" to the *Judische Schriften,* volume I, pp. 20-21.

8. Berkovits's exact statement is: "Our attention, however, will be concentrated on two works in which Cohen's religion of reason found its final statement: the one entitled *Der Begriff* . . . and the other *Die Religion,*" *Berkovits,* p. 1.

9. In the 2nd edition of this work the definite article "Die" was omitted in accordance with instructions Cohen had left. On the significance of this omission, see Trude Weiss Rosemann's review of the English translation of this work in *Judaism,* Fall 1973. It should also be noted that an English translation of *Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums* is now available as *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism,* trans. S. Kaplan (N. Y., 1972).

10. *Berkovits,* p. 1.

11. *Berkovits,* p. 2.

12. See F. Rosenzweig's *op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. XXXII ff.

13. *Berkovits,* p. 8.

14. Berkovits very inadequately discusses this issue in three quarters of a page, see *Berkovits,* p. 6 ff.

15. H. Cohen, *Die Religion,* p. 194.

16. H. Cohen, *op. cit.* p, 41.

17. H. Cohen, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

18. H. Cohen, *op. cit.,* p. 48. For more, see Cohen's entire discussion of the topic in *Die Religion,* pp. 47-8.

19. See *Berkovits's* discussion, pp. 5-6.

20. See *Berkovits,* p. 5.

21. See *Berkovits,* Chapter I, Note 19.

22. *Berkovits,* p. 32. Italics are mine.

23. Of course having established this a-symmetrical relation of Being → Becoming, Being does serve, both by design as well as by accident in functional roles. But this is almost always the case in any form of a theistic metaphysic.

24. See H. Cohen, *Die Religion,* Chapter I, and *Der Begriff,* pp. 18-20.

25. See for example, S. H. Bergmann's comments in his *Faith and Reason* (N. Y., 1963).

26. See J. Guttmann, *Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y., 1964), p. 415; and A. Altmann's excellent article, "Hermann Cohen's Begriff der Korrelation" — *In zwei Welten* (Tel Aviv, 1962). See also J. Agus, *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y., 1941).

27. For a different view see Emil Fackenheim's, "Herman Cohen — Fifty Years After," the *Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture,* No. 12 (N. Y., 1969), p. 23. See also A. Altmann, *op. cit.* and J. Guttmann, *op. cit.* Though agreeing with a large measure of Fackenheim's carefully drawn conclusion on this matter, as well as with much that Professors Gutmann and Altmann have argued, (they are the source of Fackenheim's views as he indicates), I am still of the opinion that all three scholars are still too cautious in their estimation of the "Reality" of God in the late Cohen. Not that Cohen has established God's reality, but his attempt to do so seems to me more profound and also more successful (though still unsuccessful!) than these three most eminent Jewish scholars hold. It should be added here that this difference is also probably a corollary of the larger issue of my somewhat different reading of the history of modern Jewish thought, and Cohen's place in it, than that held by Professors Fackenheim, Guttmann and Altmann.

28. *Berkovits,* p. 20.

29. H. Cohen, *Die Religion,* p. 508. The present translation is from the English translation of *Religion of Reason,* p. 431.

30. H. Cohen, *Die Religion,* p. 520. The present translation is from the English translation of *Religion of Reason,* p. 441.

31. For these references to the Exodus, see H. Cohen, *Die Religion,* p. 49 on the Burning Bush and Revelation, p. 146, on the Love of the Stranger p. 327, on the relation of the Exodus to Messianism.

32. *Berkovits,* p. 36.

33. The discussion of Berkovits's treatment of Rosenzweig as well as of Buber, Kaplan and Heschel that follow will, of necessity, have to be shorter than was the treatment of Cohen. It is hoped that the critical philosophical reflections regarding Cohen will serve as a model of what is wrong with Berkovits's approach and general presentation. The less detailed studies of later thinkers will address themselves to specific issues raised by Berkovits which call for critical comment and review.

34. *Berkovits,* p. 47.

34a. *Der Stern der Erlosung* (1921, 2nd ed. 1929). There is an English translation of this work by the title, *The Star of Redemption,* translated by W. Hallo (N. Y., 1971).

35. *Berkovits,* p. 51.

36. *Berkovits,* pp. 51 f.

37. See for example, *Gen. R.* 164; *ARN* 31, p. 91; *Lev. R.* 19:1; *Avot* 3:14. Among the medievals see H. Crescas, *Or Adonai* 2:6; and, of course, the widely held views on this subject in the Kabbalistic literature, for example, *Zohar* 3, 152a.

38. *Eccles. R.,* 2:1.

39. Saadiah, *Emunot v'Deot,* 3:7.

40. For Maimonides' views see his *Commentary on The Mishnah,* Sanh. 10; *Yad,* Yesodei ha-Torah, 9; *Guide,* 2:29, 39.

41. See Hasdai Crescas, *Or Adonai,* 3 pt. 1, 5-1-2; Joseph Albo, *Sefer ha-Ikkarim,* 3:13-22. For a detailed discussion of this and related aspects of the eternity of the Torah see S. Katz, *Jewish Concepts* (Jerusalem and New York, 1977).

42. Abraham Azulai, *Hesed le-Avraham* (1685) II, 27. For a detailed discussion of this source as well as of the entire question of the role of Torah in Kabbalistic thought see G. Scholem's Essay, "The Meaning of Torah in Jewish Mysticism," in his *On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism* (N. Y., 1974).

42a. For a thorough discussion of the Christian position on this issue see W. D. Davies, *The Torah in the Messianic Age/or the World to Come* (Phila., 1952), and also the same authors *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (N. Y., 1967).

43. F. Rosenzweig, *Der Stern,* Volume 3, p. 100 cited by *Berkovits,* p. 39.

44. *Berkovits,* p. 39 ff.

45. All students of Rosenzweig have noted this.

46. For a valuable discussion of Rosenzweig's views on Zionism see Yaacov Fleischman's essay, "Franz Rosenzweig as a critic of Zionism" in *Conservative Judaism* (Fall, 1967).

47. F. Rosenzweig, *Briefe,* p. 572.

48. See F. Rosenzweig, *Briefe,* p. 591.

49. For a review of post Holocaust Jewish thought see this author's discussion of "Jewish Thought since 1945," in S. Katz (ed.) *Jewish Philosophers* (1975), pp. 203-266. See also my "The Holocaust: Four Responses" in *The Encyclopedia Judaica Yearbook,* 1975-76. See also my "Holocaust Theology: A Critique" in *Religious Studies* (forthcoming) and "Richard Rubenstein's Theology" (forthcoming).

50. See Berkovits's discussion of these topics in *Berkovits,* p. 66 f.
51. See Part II of Rosenzweig's *Star.*
52. F. Rosenzweig, *Star,* Part II, p. 224.
53. *Ibid.*
54. See Rosenzweig's discussion of this issue in the *Star,* Part III.
55. F. Rosenzweig, *Star,* Part II, p. 253.
56. N. Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig* (N. Y., 1961), p. 32.
57. This appeared as a separate monograph published by Yeshiva University, (N. Y., 1962).
58. *Berkovits,* p. 69.
59. *Berkovits,* p. 69 (underlining is mine).
60. *Berkovits,* p. 69.
61. See S. Katz, "Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," in *Religious Studies,* Vol. 13 (Dec., 1977); and the same author's "Martin Buber A Critical Precis," in the *Bulletin of the Association of Jewish Studies* (Jan., 1975); and his "Martin Buber's Concept of God: Critical Reflections" in *Papers of the Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies* (1977), (forthcoming).
62. For more on the problems inherent in Buber's moral philosophy see the essay by M. Fox in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber,* (eds.)P. Schilpp and M. Friedman (Illinois, 1967), pp. 151-170. Fox's conclusions are, I think, substantially correct. Buber was deeply stung by Fox's essay, see his reply in "Reply to Critics" in this same volume. See also my articles referred to above, note 61.
65. See *Berkovits,* section IV of the Buber essay, pp. 118-137.
64. For a detailed discussion of Buber's (mis)-understanding of Hasidism see, G. Scholem, "Martin Buber's Interpretation of Hasidism" in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (N. Y., 1971), pp. 227-250. R. Schatz-Uffenheimer essay in the *Philosophy of Martin Buber,* (eds.) P. Schilpp and M. Friedman, pp. 403-434; S. Katz, "Martin Buber's Misuse of Hasidic Sources" in the *Proceedings of the 13th World Congress of the I.A.H.R.*A substantial monograph on this theme entitled *Hasidism and Martin Buber* is also being readied by me for publication.
65. See *Berkovits,* p. 127.
66. For more on the question of the "pseudo-scientific" nature of much of Kaplan's work see S. Katz, "Mordecai Kaplan: 9 Philosophical Demurrer" in *Sh'Ma* (Nov. 1, 1974).
67. *Berkovits,* p. 190.
68. E. Fackenheim, "A Critique of Reconstruction" in *CCAR Journal* (June, 1960).
69. *Berkovits,* pp. 169-172, esp. 172.
70. See the critical essay by H. Wiemen on, "Kaplan's Idea of God," in *Mordecai Kaplan: an Evaluation,* (eds.) I. Eisenstein and E. Kohn (N. Y., 1952), pp. 193-210. Wieman shows how obscure, confused and inconsistent Kaplan's view of God is.
70a. Heschel, A. J., *The Prophets* (N. Y., 1962).
71. *Berkovits,* p. 12.
72. Heschel, *The Prophets,* p. 233, cited by Berkovits.
73. *Berkovits,* p. 194.

74. See, for example, *Berkovits,* p. 195.

75. See, for example, Heschel's, *God in Search of Man* (N. Y., 1956), and *Man is not Alone* (N. Y., 1951).

76. *Berkovits,* p. 202 f.

77. The relation of Heschel's thought to a Whiteheadian position, especially after the manner of Charles Hartshorne, has been discussed in the recent literature by Sol Tanenzapf, who champions this view, and by Harold Schulweis, who criticizes it. It is also referred to by Berkovits in a recent letter replying to Tanenzapf's criticism of his (the presently reprinted essay) critique of Heschel. I agree with the general line of Schulweis' criticism and think Tanenzapf's enthusiasm for Whitehead and Hartshorne misguided. See Sol Tanenzapf, "Heschel and his Critics," in *Judaism,* Summer (1974), pp. 276-286; Harold Schulweis, "Hartshorne and Heschel," in *Judaism,* Winter (1975), pp. 58-62; and E. Berkovits, "A Reaction to Tanenzapf," in *Judaism,* Winter (1975), pp. 115-116. Attention should also be called to Edmund Cherbonnier's two articles supporting Heschel's views: "A. J. Heschel's The Philosophy of the Bible," in *Commentary,* 27 (Jan., 1959), and "Heschel as a Religious Thinker" in *Conservative Judaism,* 23 (Fall, 1968).

78. *Berkovits,* pp. 202 f.

79. See, for example, Heschel's papers: "Did Maimonides Strive for Prophetic Inspiration," in *The Louis Ginzburg Jubilee Volume* (in Hebrew), (1945), pp. 159-188; and "Inspiration *(Ruach ha-Kodesh)* in the Middle Ages," in *The Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume* (in Hebrew), (1950), pp. 175-208.

80. *Maimonides: Eine Biographie,* (Berlin, 1935).

81. For several of Heschel's writings on Saadiah see his, *The Quest for Certainty in Saadiah's Philosophy,* (N. Y., 1944).

82. Heschel's essays on Ibn Gabirol include: "Der Begriff der Finheit in der Philosophie Gabirol's," in *Monatsschrift für die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums,* vol. 82 (1938) pp. 89-111; "Das Wesen der Dinge nach der Lehre Gabirol's" in *HUCA,* Vol. 14 (1939), pp. 359-85; "Der Begriff des Seins in der Philosophie Gabirol's," in *Festschrift Jakob Freimann Zum* 70, (1937), pp. 67-77. An abridged English translation of this last essay appeared in the Heschel memorial issue of *Conservative Judaism,* Vol. 28, No. 1, Fall (1972) as "The Concept of Beings in the Philosophy of Ibn Gabirol" translated by David W. Silverman.

83. *Berkovits,* p. 218.

84. *Berkovits,* p. 218.

85. *Berkovits,* p. 224 (underlining is mine).

86. *Berkovits,* p. 192 (underlining is mine).

87. *Berkovits,* p. 193.

88. *Berkovits,* p. 218.

89. *Berkovits,* p. 218.

90. See *Berkovits,* pp. 204-205.

91. *Berkovits,* p. 205.

92. On the logical problems which appeals to "mystery" in theology involve see S. Katz, "The Logic and Language of Mystery," in *Christ, Faith and His-*

tory, (eds., S. Sykes and J. Clayton), (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 239-262. See also my "Language, Epistemology and Mystical Pluralism" in S. Katz (ed.), *Mysticism and Philosophical Analyses* (New York, 1978). One also recalls Tanenzapf's remark in his discussion of Berkovits's Critique of Heschel that one can "say of Berkovits what he said of Heschel (on p. 203 of this book): 'to call something a mystery is no theology either,' " S. Tanenzapf, *op. cit.,* p. 283.

93. *Berkovits,* pp. 220-224.

93a. See note 77.

94. *Berkovits,* p. 220.

95. *Berkovits,* p. 221.

96. *Berkovits,* p. 221.

97. *Berkovits,* p. 224.