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FAITH AND ITS JUSTIFICATION

The contemporary Jew who seeks to understand the meaning of *faith* as it is found in Judaism will not succeed in his quest by merely examining the thirteen principles of faith formulated by Maimonides. Nor will it suffice to inspect all the occurrences of the expression *emunah* and its cognates in our vast literature.¹ For if, as we assume, the Jew of today is interested not simply in the content of faith but in the logic of faith then he must engage in further analysis. The content of faith simply tells him what propositions he is to believe. The logic of faith involves the question of the grounds for holding the belief; the relation, if any, between belief and evidence; the reasons that might be given for justifying the belief. Indeed it may well be that faith is "blind" and in this respect differs from ordinary beliefs in not requiring reasons or evidence. But then, this too must be understood. In what way does religious belief differ from ordinary beliefs which render it exempt from the requirements of justification? To embark upon such a study will surely take the inquirer beyond the commonly accepted meaning of the expression. For the way the classic Jewish philosophers thought of *emunah* is only part of the question. The other part involves an understanding of the general principles of rationality which govern our beliefs in science and ordinary life.

My aim is to offer such an extended analysis of faith or religious belief as it pertains to the contemporary Jew in his confrontation with Judaism. This type of analysis is in many respects similar to what has been called *explication*.² This not only draws upon the accepted meaning of the term but also proposes a somewhat new and more precise meaning for it. Thus, the

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process of explication is more a rational reconstruction than a mere descriptive analysis.

The reason why people usually attempt an explication is to try to reduce the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of ordinary usage and introduce a reinterpretation that will increase the clarity and precision of the expression in question. In philosophy of science such explication has usually been preparatory to the development of some new comprehensive theoretical system through the use of the reconstructed terms.

It is likewise my intention to explicate the meaning of the term *faith* and show how it functions in a theory designed to explain and guide the belief experience of the Jew.

Having the nature of proposals, explications cannot be judged as being either true or false. However, they are to be considered adequate only if the newly reconstructed term can be used to express at least a large part of what is customarily expressed by means of this term. Thus, when we have completed our analysis, the explicated version of *faith* must still account for most usages of the term in classic Jewish literature. It can also be judged more or less adequate depending on the extent to which it enables us to attain our objective of developing with its help, a systematic theory of Jewish religious belief.

What can we learn from an examination of the ways in which this word "faith" functions in religious discourse? Generally speaking, it would appear to be the special term used to refer to the act or state in which a person is when he assents to or accepts the religious outlook. Thus, when we say of a Jew, "He is a man of faith" (*Ba'al Ma'amin*) we imply that he is a functioning member of the religious community. Used in a religious context, the term "faith" describes not only a state of mind but says something about the total person. It refers to a complex experience which includes cognitive, mystical, psychological and behavioral elements. In order to understand the meaning of faith we shall have to unravel its different strands.

One of the more obvious connotations of the term faith in ordinary usage is its suggestion of certainty and strength of conviction. This is the relation in which the proposition stands to the mind cognizing it, which is the relation of believing. Belief

inwardly experienced as a psychological phenomenon is an unanalyzable kind of feeling which attaches to the content of belief. This feeling is usually more or less firm, more or less intense, depending upon a number of factors. When religious belief is characterized as faith there is the implication of sublime certainty such as in the definition offered by Maimonides, "By faith we understand . . . the conviction that the object of belief is exactly as it is apprehended."³

Faith is also associated with the readiness to act on the premise that the proposition in question is true. We have no way of knowing what a man's beliefs are, except by his actions and behavior which include, of course, his speech acts. The degree of intensity of a man's beliefs are frequently but not always measurable by how much that individual is willing to bet or risk on the assumption that a certain doctrine is true.⁴ Thus the great men of faith in Judaism are invariably extolled for their deeds: Abraham's readiness to sacrifice Isaac, Nachshon ben Aminadav's leap into the sea, Rabbi Akiva's martyrdom. The readiness to sacrifice life itself in obedience to God's command is testimony to the depth and tenacity of the individual's belief.

In later Rabbinic writing, the psychological and behavioral aspects of faith were separated out and referred to as the characteristic of *Bitachon*.⁵

Regardless, however, of what else "faith" entails, it must surely presuppose the existence of a reality that is the referent of the name "God" to whom one relates in faith. The statement, "I have faith *in* God" implies the statement, "I believe *that* God exists."⁶ The latter is an intellectual assent to a proposition and as such is a cognitive assertion. This is the relation in which the proposition stands to fact which is the truth or falsity of a proposition.

But, of course, Judaism does not rest simply on the belief that God exists. There are a number of other putative facts, states of affairs to whose truth a Jew of faith subscribes. There are metaphysical realities such as the attributes of God and the existence of the human soul which he accepts. There are beliefs about the history of the Jewish people, the origin of the Torah and even the origin of the universe which are empirical in na-

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ture and which he holds to be true. There are also expectations about the future: the indestructability of the Jewish people, the coming of the Messiah and the immortality of the soul to which he is committed. These beliefs are usually not held in isolation or accepted individually but as a "package." There are a variety of factors which give a unitary character to the creedal aspects of Judaism so that it may be regarded as an interconnected, more or less systematic theory.⁷ Many of the beliefs taken separately and all of them considered together are cognitive or propositional in nature.⁸ They are beliefs that certain states of affairs, either on the empirical or on the transempirical realm have existed, do exist or will exist. Taken together as some sort of theory, these beliefs constitute an explanatory hypothesis which attempts to render intelligible our experiences in the world.

This places a religious theory like Judaism in the same league as science. Both make factual assertions. Both attempt to explain phenomena. Both warrant expectations. Both appeal to the existence of abstract entities. Is this to suggest that Judaism is in competition with science? The answer is no. For in spite of the similarities, the two are interested in different areas of experience and the purpose of explanation in the two instances is different. Science is interested in discovering regularities or laws so that it can control and manipulate phenomena. Judaism is interested in those aspects of experience which can yield clues as to our human destiny and the meaning of existence as a whole. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that the assertions of science and religion may sometimes overlap and contradict each other.⁹

As an explanatory theory, Judaism, like all cognitive beliefs must face the question of evidence or rational grounds for its acceptance. We thus arrive at the problem of justification. Can religious beliefs be rationally justified?

Before we proceed, it should, perhaps, be made more explicit that the main challenge of justification arises for Jewish faith only when it is acknowledged that propositional or cognitive elements are involved. If Judaism is only a matter of feeling, be it love or reverence or ontological dependence, then, if one has

it, one has it and there is nothing more that need be said. Just as having an aesthetic experience while visiting an art museum and liking it needs no justification, neither does one's approval of a religious experience while visiting a synagogue. Similarly, if Judaism were only a matter of behavior; of performing certain rituals or observing certain laws then one may justify one's actions by simply stating that one wishes to be counted as a member of the religious community which prescribes such behavior.

Once we acknowledge, however, that a part of the faith-experience, indeed its central core, is a matter of cognitive belief, i.e., that certain states of affairs obtain rather than others, then, it would seem that we become subject to the same standards of rational belief which guide us in other areas of life. It is surely *not* a *mitzvah* to believe everything: "the fool believes everything" even in the area of religion. If, as part of our religious faith, we do believe that certain facts are the case, what justification can we offer as to why or on what grounds we believe that God exists rather than the contrary? How do we go about justifying our belief that the Torah explanation of things is true rather than the Christian or that of some Eastern religion?

At one time it was thought that the alleged existence of special sources of knowledge within Judaism such as revelation or prophesy or an authority of some kind, somehow solved the problem. For our general knowledge, the argument went, we rely on reason. Therefore, we must have recourse to the principles and methods of deductive and inductive logic. However, our religious knowledge comes to us through revelation which transcends reason and logic. The distinction between revelation and reason while important to Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, is irrelevant to the problem under discussion. In medieval times, the problem primarily concerned the content of faith while for the contemporary Jew it is the logic of faith and its justification which is at issue. For, granting the possibility of revelation, what is your evidence that it ever took place? The assertion of revelation simply becomes another "belief-that" which requires justification. Similarly, the emphasis in Judaism upon certain overwhelming historical events such as the Exodus or an appeal to the uninterrupted tradition which affirms these

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events does not change the situation. The challenge will then simply be shifted to the question of the authenticity of the record and the reliability of the tradition.

Because faith involves one's relationship to God, it is sometimes argued that faith draws upon a direct apprehension or intuition or some sense of the presence of God as a personal encounter. However, religious experiences even of the most unusual kind, are always reducible to psychological statements about feelings and sensations which cannot warrant any existential deductions. An encounter with God must always be some sort of inference from one's own experience which is always subject to doubt and alternative interpretations.¹⁰

Before proposing a specific solution to the problem, let us attempt to formulate some idea of the *kind* of answer we are looking for. What must a suggested justification do in order to be considered effective in this area? What features must it have and what features must it not have in order to do the kind of job that religious faith requires it to do?

The usefulness of such a procedure becomes apparent once we consider the efforts made by medieval Jewish thinkers to prove the existence of God by the use of deductive proofs. Let us assume that such proofs can be constructed and are valid and sound. Are they, however, adequate for the job at hand? If we had sound proofs for the existence of God, then we would indeed have a rational basis for the certainty of faith. However, we would then be unable to account for the fact that the acceptance of the religious outlook is viewed as a voluntary act for which the individual is praised and for which he is held responsible. Maimonides considered belief in God as a *mitzvah* implying its voluntary nature. In the Bible, individuals are praised for having faith and condemned for lacking it, implying that it involves the making of a free decision.¹¹ If, however, we have necessary proofs for the existence of God, then surely beliefs thus arrived at, take on a coercive, involuntary character as the proof would appear to compel assent.¹²

It follows, therefore, that the justificatory apparatus we are seeking must be less than compelling. It must leave room for doubt so that in the final analysis, the move by which one opts

for Judaism is a decision freely made. Of course, since Hume and Kant, necessary proofs for the existence of God are no longer considered feasible. We need not worry therefore, about the prospect of the would-be believer being overwhelmed with indubitable arguments. But should we, instead, succeed in developing some sort of probabilistic set of arguments designed to defend the Torah hypothesis, we cannot identify that either as the act of religious commitment. For if we did, how would religious faith differ from science and the religious act of faith from the cognitive act of believing?

This leads us to the crucial insight that the religious faith-experience must consist of two separate components: 1.) a cognitive act of believing which is an intellectual judgment one arrives at after considering alternative theories in the light of whatever arguments or evidence are available. We can call this the "belief-that" component of faith. 2.) One makes a free decision to act on the possibility presented by (1) and commits oneself to the religious life associated with the theory. This may be referred to as the "belief-in" component and includes valuational, emotive and behavioral aspects.¹³

The relationship between the two components has already been alluded to. To believe *in* God presupposes a belief *that* God exists. However, the reverse does not hold. Thus, tradition speaks of a certain type of wicked person who recognizes his creator but chooses to rebel against Him. In the terminology of the Ramban, one could have *Emunah* but not *Bitachon*.

Let us now consider whether this view of faith as a complex phenomenon adequately accounts for the observed features of religious experience.

1.) The inclusion of the cognitive aspect reinstates the rational tradition in Jewish theology and draws support from the many instances in the Bible and Rabbinic literature where God's existence and powers seem to be inferred from various events and features of the universe.¹⁴ It means further that religious beliefs can be disputed and argued about. It implies that one just doesn't "get" religion like falling in love, but that one can search and inquire and rationally deliberate. We have already agreed that intellectual certainty is neither attainable nor de-

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sirable. All we can hope for on this level is a conclusion that the Torah theory of things is the most plausible or most probable of available theories.

2.) The strong convictions and passionate adherences associated with *Emunah* are not to be identified with intellectual certitude but as attaching to the "belief-in" component. The *Emunah Shelemah* (perfect faith) that is considered a religious virtue consists of a combination of certain overlapping emotional, evaluational and behavioral characteristics.

Belief in God contains an evaluative element that is both instrumental and intrinsic. It is certainly a good thing for all of us that God is loving, compassionate and merciful. Belief in God the Creator also has explanatory power. But above all, relating to God is considered good in itself. The high value and ultimate importance attached to matters like the bliss of fellowship with God or the hope of eternal salvation endows religious faith with characteristic enthusiasm and seriousness. The beauty and superlative value of the ideas of the Torah can generate love and adoration and reverence for the God about whom we may intellectually have some doubts.

The quality of strength associated with faith applies to the commitment, i.e., the readiness to sacrifice and undergo hardship in observance of the prescriptions of Judaism as well as persistence or tenacity of faith in face of negative evidence.

A subjective feeling of assurance, confidence and trust that things are as claimed by one's theory is another ingredient of the "belief-in" component. If strength of belief should be proportioned to the amount of evidence, how, it may be asked, can one rationally experience a feeling of assurance when the evidence is only probable? The answer is that a person may develop a feeling of confidence that there *must* be a God, because if there isn't, then his entire conception of a rational universe, moral principles and meaningful existence would collapse. He might learn to feel that the concept of a Godless universe is inconsistent with his deep-seated intimation that he has an immortal soul and that there must be a life after death. Dwelling upon these considerations may generate in him a feeling of sublime certainty that there is a God while still acknowledging

that the public evidence does not warrant such a conviction. Furthermore, it is conceivable that a person might have some personal experience, some religious encounter which in spite of the paucity of publicly verifiable evidence, has given him a feeling of overwhelming confidence that his religious beliefs are true.

3.) "Faith" may be considered a *mitzvah* for whose observance the Jew will be held responsible because in these contexts we are referring to the "belief-in" component which is volitional. This is borne out by the phrase *Kabbalat Ol Malkhut Shamayim* (acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of God) used to describe the first commandment which suggests commitment rather than cognition.¹⁵

The point we are making then is that nothing less than a complex theory of faith of the type outlined above, can adequately account for the features of *Emunah* noticed in the Torah. An analysis in purely cognitive terms provides no room for the peculiarly religious elements of commitment and passionate conviction. On the other hand, an exclusively voluntaristic analysis would give us a theory akin to William James' *Will To Believe* or Pascals' *Wager* leaving us vulnerable to the charge of "issuing unrestricted licenses for wishful thinking."¹⁶

Having described the logical character of the faith experience, we are in a better position to discuss the question of justification. Different types of sentences require different kinds of justification or sometimes no justification at all.

As we indicated earlier, we shall take the position that faith in God and his Torah in its credal aspect constitutes a theory or an explanatory hypothesis similar in certain respects to theories in the physical sciences and in other respects to historical explanation. It is characterized by broad scope and includes references to theoretical or transcendent entities such as "God" and "soul." By "broad scope" we mean that it is offered as a total interpretation in which we assert that the world as a whole, that is, nature, history, human relations is of this or that kind.

A theory like the Torah hypotheses cannot be justified by ordinary inductive procedures since it makes no predictions

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regarding empirical regularities which are easily testable. Instead our theory which relies essentially on its explanatory force must be judged by how well it is supported by the weight of evidence. The latter consists mainly of the phenomena which it seeks to explain. This would range from the universe itself (Why is there something rather than nothing?) and instances of design in the universe to the occurrence of Hebrew prophesy. The "weight of evidence" is a function of 1.) the number and variety of the phenomena and 2.) how well the hypotheses performs its function of explanation, i.e., the notion of "fit" or degree of precision and detail by which the theory accounts for the phenomena.

Obviously we cannot ignore those features of experience which would appear to contradict the assumptions of the theory such as the occurrence of undeserved pain and suffering in the world. The weight of evidence will therefore consist of the cumulative effect of those converging lines of successful explanation balanced against the negative features. The resulting judgment would then have to be compared to the way in which the evidence supports rival religious theories.

When we finally lay out all the pieces of evidence and consider all the areas of human experience which seem to support the Torah theory, there may emerge a pattern in the facts, a noticing of relationships which constitutes an explanatory factor over and above the simple sum of the evidential elements successfully explained. This has been called the "connecting technique" and is found in historical, judicial and aesthetic judgment.¹⁷ Assuming the Torah to be true, the believer begins to "see" the connection between instances of design in the physical universe and traces of providence in Jewish history. The experience of the emerging pattern is similar to that of a person "catching on" to the plot of a play in the middle of the second act.

In using this method of converging lines of evidence we are able to integrate arguments that may have only partial force. Thus while the teleological proof for the existence of God fails as a proof it can be reconstructed as an argument which points to phenomena which can receive a plausible explanation by a

total religious theory.¹⁸

This then, is the main criterion which the creedal portion of Judaism ("Belief-that") must satisfy before it can be considered a candidate for adoption ("Belief-in") i.e., *it must be supported by the evidence as well as or better than any alternative theory.*¹⁹ I believe this can be shown to be the case for Judaism today and should constitute the primary task of Jewish theology. Moreover, I believe that most Jewish thinkers in all ages, implicitly believed this to be so regardless of whether they put the matter in these precise terms or not. Thus a Jew may assert: "I believe that God exists and that the Torah explanation of things is true" and may justify his belief by appealing to the same canons of rationality which hold in the general cognitive realm, i.e., *evidential support.*

At this point, an objection will most certainly be raised: "Although a particular hypothesis may be best supported by the *available* evidence, scientific procedure may often dictate suspension of judgment on grounds that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant a conclusion. Even if we should assume, therefore, that your Torah theory is the most plausible one and therefore *may* be true, the evidence is far from conclusive. On what grounds do you justify your acceptance of the theory?"

In order to respond to this objection we must appreciate the distinction between rules of confirmation and rules of acceptance as it obtains in science. By rules of confirmation we mean considerations which tell us what kinds of evidence confirms and what degree of confirmation is conferred by a given body of evidence. By rules of acceptance we mean standards as to how strong the evidential support must be before the hypothesis can be accepted or what is to be done when rival hypotheses are equally supported by the evidence. It has been noted that once we pass beyond the confirmation rules and into the area of acceptance, we begin to deal with pragmatics, i.e., the broad purposes and objectives of science. Thus, where evidential criteria are not decisive we may opt in favor of a particular theory because it contributes to system building or has predictive force. There is no single rule in science as to how much evidence is required for acceptance of an hypothesis. Thus, if the hypothesis

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in question is to be made the basis of a specific course of action where failure might involve fatal consequences for people, we would insist upon much more evidence than otherwise. But even in cases of pure scientific research, rules of acceptance will presuppose some sort of evaluation which reflects the aims and goals of science.²⁰

When we are considering theories where the interest is religious, then quite legitimately, the valuation which influences the choice of our rules of acceptance, properly reflect the objectives of the religious enterprise. We can see this quite clearly if we consider the possible outcomes of deciding to accept a particular hypothesis on the basis of a given body of evidence.

1. The hypothesis is accepted as presumably true and is in fact true.
2. The hypothesis is rejected as presumably false and is in fact false.
3. The hypothesis is accepted as presumably true and is in fact false.
4. The hypothesis is rejected as presumably false and is in fact true.

In order to work out a rule we must assign definite values or disvalues to these different outcomes. Herein lies the difference between the scientific and religious orientation. The scientist places great disvalue on outcome No. 3. He must minimize error. There is no urgency. Particular truths we may lose today will be regained tomorrow. Science can think in terms of the "long run." Decisions can be postponed indefinitely.

What is crucial to the person interested in religion, however, is not the disvalue of outcome No. 3 but rather the disvalue of outcome No. 4, i.e., the possibility of losing the truth! The "long run" which exists for humanity does not exist for the individual person. For he, in the words of William James, "plays the game of life not to escape losses, for he brings nothing with him to lose; he plays it for gains and it is now or never for him."²¹ Therefore, considering the aims and goals of religious inquiry, it is quite rational for a person to decide to adopt a theory even though in a scientific question with comparable evidence, a suspension of judgment would be appropriate.

We return now to the individual who on the basis of the available evidence has judged the Torah theory to be as probable or the most probable of theories. What is his next step?

He must assign values to the various possible outcomes. For the logic that is involved now is no longer the method of hypothesis but the logic of decision procedure, i.e., to evaluate available lines of action in terms of their desirabilities and probabilities. We are dealing now with practical wisdom or the canon of prudence. Here the rational man is one who adopts a policy if and only if he judges its expected gain or value to exceed the expected gain from not pursuing the policy. The expected gain is the sum of the values of each possible outcome multiplied by the probability of that outcome.

This is the place for considerations found in that type of apologetic literature which attempts to convey a sense of the beauty and serenity of the Jewish way of life, the bliss of fellowship with God, the sense of meaning imparted to life, the sheer ecstasy of prayer. In short, the candidate for faith must *evaluate* the concepts, way of life, vision and promise of Judaism. This process too, must not be regarded as purely subjective and personal, but should involve certain criteria which if satisfied, can provide justification for the valuational aspect of "Belief-in." It must be asked whether the object of worship of this particular religious theory and the values it endorses are *worthy* of the regard and adoration solicited. Writers in the area of ethics have suggested certain criteria for judging moral principles and an entire way of life which appeal to the principles of comprehensiveness, valuational coherence, universalizability, or ability to meet human needs.²² The value judgments which must precede the "Belief-in" commitment ought to be made in the light of these criteria.

The final step in the logic of faith is the deliberation which brings together the probabilities of the "Belief-that" stage and the value judgments just made, eventuating in the decision to accept the Torah and the Jewish way of life. This is the "Belief-in" component which is a volitional act justified by the criteria of practical rationality. It is of the utmost importance however, to remember just what this effort of will is being called upon to do: 1.) To provide criteria of acceptance where the evidence might support, more or less equally, several competing theories. 2.) To transform the theoretic entertainment of a probable

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proposition into a commitment. We are *not* looking to the will to turn a cognitive probability into a cognitive certainty.

Our explication of the concept of faith has given us an analysis which is applicable universally, which is as it should be. Jewish faith will be distinguishable by its content rather than by its logic.

An understanding of the different components of religious faith, their respective logics and the way they interact can be helpful in clarifying the nature of religious disagreements and determining the methods by which they may be resolved. Clearly, it will make an enormous difference whether the dispute is over the cognitive aspect and therefore a disagreement in belief or over the value judgments involved and hence a disagreement in attitudes only.

Our analysis can also be helpful to religious teachers in treating the person who has lost his faith and is on the verge of forsaking tradition. Careful questioning should be able to reveal the point at which the faith process has broken down. Is it that the individual no longer believes the assertions of the Torah to be probable or is it that he no longer considers its outcome to be as desirable as he did before in light of the sacrifices it might involve?

In our view the explication of faith that has been presented meets the conditions of adequacy described at the beginning of this paper. This multi-dimensional interaction of the valuational and the theoretic, the volitional and the cognitive, the attitudinal and the evidential in the process of religious faith is precisely the sort of thing that religious faith should be, — at once a reasoned justifiable belief compatible with the demands of critical intelligence and a responsible decision and personal commitment which is revelatory of one's real self.

NOTES

1. This is essentially the approach of Louis Jacobs in his book, *Faith* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968) which combines a history of the use of the term in Jewish thought with reports of discussions in recent philosophical journals without attempting an explication.

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2. See Carl Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Foundations of the Unity of Science*, Vol. II, No. 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 11.
3. Moses Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1942), p. 67.
4. See Richard H. Niebuhr, "On the Nature of Faith" and Raziel Abelson, "The Logic of Faith and Belief" in *Religious Experience and Truth*. Ed. by S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961).
5. "ספר האמונה והבטחון" לרבינו משה ב'ר נחמן גורונדי, פרק א'
6. כל הבטח מאמין ואין כל המאמין בוטח (רמ"ב)
- See also K. Bendall and F. Ferré, *Exploring the Logic of Faith* (New York: Association Press, 1962), p. 90.
7. The factors which contribute to the unitary and systematic character of Jewish religious beliefs are briefly: their source in a common "authority"; their inclusion in a single framework of dramatic narrative and their systematic connection by logical relations.
8. See my article, "Is Religion a Separate Language Game?" *TRADITION*, Vol. 11, No. 2 where I discuss the concepts of "intelligibility" and "empirical import."
9. See my review article, "Does the Science-Religion Conflict Rest on a Mistake?" in *TRADITION*, Vol. 9, No. 4.
10. The difficulties inherent in the approach of "encounter" suggested by M. Granatstein in *TRADITION*, Vol. 10, No. 4 are indicated in Chapter 8 of *Language, Logic and God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961) by F. Ferré.
11. Psalms 78:22, Ex. 14:31, Gen. 15:6, Num. 20:12.
12. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," *Knowledge and Value*. Ed. by E. Sprague and P. Taylor (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1959).
13. That "Belief-in" sentences are not reducible to "Belief-that" sentences is conclusively demonstrated by H. H. Price in "Belief 'in' and Belief 'that,'" *Religious Studies* I, No. 1 (Oct. 1965), p. 12, and Colin Grant, "Belief in and Belief That," *International Congress of Philosophy XIIth*, Vol. 5 (Firenze: Sansoni, 1960), p. 190.
14. Isaiah 40:26, Psalms 94:9, Gen. Rabah 39:1.
15. See commentary of Nachmanides on Ex. 20:2.
16. See criticism of James in Wallace Matson, *The Existence of God* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 202.
17. John Wisdom, "Gods" in *An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry* Ed. by J. Margolis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968).
18. See Alvin Plantinga, *God and Other Minds* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967).
19. Other criteria might be consistency, coherence and factual correctness of empirical assertions.
20. C. G. Hempel, "Science and Human Values" in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 92. Isaac Levi, "Belief and

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Action," *Monist* XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1964), p. 313.

21. William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality" in *The Will To Believe and Other Essays* (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 94, No. 1.

22. Paul W. Taylor, "The Normative Function of Meta-ethics," *Philosophical Review* LXVII, 1958, p. 16-32. Marcus G. Singer, *Generalization in Ethics* (New York: Knopf, 1961). Herbert Feigl, "De Principis Non Disputandum . . ." *Philosophical Analysis*. Ed. by Max Black (New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 679.