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This essay was originally presented as a memorial lecture on the occasion of the *yahrzeit* of the author's father, Robert B. Harvey, z.l. at the Young Israel of Montreal, Quebec, on 8 Tevet, 5736. Professor Harvey, a frequent contributor, teaches philosophy and Jewish studies at McGill University.

HOLINESS: A COMMAND TO *IMITATIO DEI*

The Bible reports that man was created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27), but does not tell us what this image is—whether free will, choice, intellect, understanding, judgment, rulership, creativity, compassion, love, or something else entirely. This notion of man's Divine image is related to the similarly enigmatic notion of *imitatio Dei*. If man is an image of God, presumably he has the capability to imitate Him. Both notions are theologically difficult in that they imply a comparison between man and God, which seems to amount to anthropomorphism. Radical monotheism, one might suppose, would force us to interpret man's creation in the "image of God" in the negative sense alone: man is *merely* an image (*tselem*) of God, nothing but a shadow (*tselet*) of Him.¹ Such a brutal interpretation would be consistent with the words of the Psalm: "man is like unto vanity; his days are like a shadow [*ke-tselet*] that passeth away" (Psalms 144:4).

Yet the prophets did allow themselves to speak about God anthropomorphically. "Great is the power of the prophets, that they liken the Creator to His creature!"² Following the bold example of the prophets, the rabbis too spoke about God in human terms. The best known rabbinic interpretations of *imitatio Dei* are also the most emotively human and ingenuously anthropomorphic; for example, Rabbi Hama bar Hanina's exegesis of "After the Lord thy God ye shall walk" (Deuteronomy 13:15): how does one imitate God?—by clothing the naked, visiting the sick, comforting the mourner, and burying the dead!³ Our rabbis,

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like our prophets, were not interested in systematic or rational theology, nor anxious about epistemological problems—in the Greek sense—concerning the Divine Being.⁴ They were, however, interested in the fervid human experience of knowing God, of being close to Him, and of serving Him. Speaking of God as clothing the naked, visiting the sick, comforting the mourner, and burying the dead, teaches us many things—above all, that God is close to us and loves us. He is close to us, even though He is beyond our intellects and our language, even though He is, as Maimonides exclaims:

He Who is such that when the intellects contemplate His essence, their apprehension turns into incapacity . . . and when the tongues aspire to magnify Him by means of attributive qualifications, all eloquence turns into weariness and incapacity!⁵

According to reason, there is no “attributive qualification” which can be affirmed of God, and thus, as Maimonides suggests, the only non-fallacious praise of Him is silence: “silence is praise to Thee” (Psalms 65:2)!⁶ But rather than maintain a philosophically respectable silence about God, “the Torah speaks according to the language of man,”⁷ making the best of anthropomorphisms and metaphor. And it is only because of the precedent of the prophets and the rabbis that we are allowed in our prayers to speak about God in our necessarily inadequate language.⁸ Words designating human emotions, like “merciful” and “compassionate” (e.g., Exodus 34:6), are used to describe God, even though we are not expected to believe that He has emotions like ours. We are all accustomed to these figurative usages. There is, however, one exception to this anthropomorphic pattern; one case in which the creature is indeed likened to the Creator; in which God is not designated according to the language of man, but man according to the language of God. This exception is the predicate “holy.” All other predicates designate created things primarily and God only by extension; “holy” designates God primarily and created things only by extension.⁹

And the Lord spoke unto Moses saying, “Speak unto all the congregation of the children of Israel and say unto them: *Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy!*” (Leviticus 19:2).

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This is the strangest of commands. We can understand what it means for a human being to imitate God by doing acts of love (*gemilut hasadim*); but what does it mean for him to imitate God by being holy? Yet according to a cryptic dictum of Abba Saul's, "Ye shall be holy" is apparently a command to *imitatio Dei*:

Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy! Abba Saul says: "The King has a retinue. What must it do? *Imitate the King!*"¹⁰

How is it imaginable to imitate the King's holiness?! Is not He alone truly holy?! "Who is like unto Thee, majestic in *holiness!*" (Exodus 15:11). "There is none *holy* as the Lord, for there is none beside Thee-" (I Samuel 2:2). "To whom will ye liken Me that I should be equal, saith the *Holy One!*" (Isaiah 40:25). What then is the intent of the Holy One's command: "Ye shall be holy . . ."?

Whether in its primary designation of God or in its extended designation of created things, "holy" is a word peculiar to religion.¹¹ We can define in plain language what it means for a human being to be "good," "just," "merciful," "compassionate," or "loving," for these are adjectives used every day by human beings to describe other human beings. While such adjectives are often used in religious discourse, they also make perfectly good sense in the realm of the secular. But "holy" is different: by definition it has no meaning in the realm of the secular. The most elementary investigation of the meaning of "holy" leads immediately into the phenomenology of religion.

As is well known, the root of the Hebrew *kadosh*, "holy," and of its cognates, e.g., *kodesh* and *kedushah*, "holiness," means something like "to set apart from" or "to be set apart from," "to make distinct from" or "to be distinct from"; *kadosh* is partially synonymous with *parush* ("separated") and *nivdal* ("distinct"). God is the only true *kadosh*, for He alone is set apart from the accidents of the world.¹² In the language of the medievals, He is "necessary existence," not "contingent existence."¹³ The universe and everything in it is accidental, contingent; God alone is necessary. In the famous formulation of Maimonides:

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If one were to suppose that He does not exist, nothing could exist. And if one were to suppose that no existing thing other than Him exists, He alone would exist, and He would not be negated by their negation; for all those existing things need Him, but He, blessed be He, does not need them, not one of them!¹⁴

God is independent of the world He has created, but paradoxically the world is not independent of Him. "The Holy One, blessed be He, is the Place of the world, but world is not His place!"¹⁵ The world is defined in terms of God, but God is not—except figuratively—defined in terms of it. As God's existence is unconditional, so is His holiness unconditional. God is holy whether or not man sanctifies Him: ". . . for I . . . *am* holy" [Leviticus 19:2] — I am holy whether you sanctify Me or whether you do not sanctify Me."¹⁶

The connection between God's holiness and His being "the Place of the world, but the world . . . not His place" was observed by Rabbi Hasdai Crescas in the following extraordinary passage in which physics blends into Kabbalah:

He is the Place of the world, but the world is not His place. This metaphor is remarkably apt, for as the dimensions of the void permeate through those of the body and its fullness, so His glory, blessed be He, is present in all the parts of the world and the fullness thereof, as it said, "[Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts,] the whole earth is full of His glory" [Isaiah 6:3] . . . Though God is holy and separated [*kadosh ve-nivdal*] . . . , still the whole earth is full of His glory, which is an allusion to the element of impregnation, which is one of the elements of His glory.¹⁷

Although the world is gloriously pregnant with the Divine, the Divine is emphatically separate from the world. In the language of moderns, *kadosh* here means "transcendent": God's holiness is His transcendence.¹⁸

The word *kadosh* and its cognates are in their primary signification negative.¹⁹ They tell us primarily what a thing is not, what it transcends, what it is separate from. Reason can understand what is not *kadosh*, but not what is *kadosh*; it can understand what the holy is separate from, but not what the holy is. To say that God is *kadosh* tells us nothing whatsoever about Him, except that He is not the world; that is, He is separate from con-

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tingent existence: He is transcendent.

If holiness is associated with awe, and the word *kadosh* and its cognates with the word *nora*, “awesome” (e.g., *neddar ba-kodesh nora tehillot*, Exodus 15:1; *yodu shimkha gadol ve-nora kadosh hu*, Psalm 99:3; *kadosh ve-nora shemo*, Psalm 111:9; *kadosh atah ve-nora shemekha*, ‘*Amidah* of High Holy Days; *Kadosh ve-Nora*, *hoshe’ah na, hakkafot* of *Simhat Torah*), it is apparently because true awe of God derives from our awareness of His transcendence: awareness of the Noumenal gives rise to awareness of the Numinous, and not the reverse.²⁰ The *mysterium tremendum*, the awesome consciousness of the Divine mystery, comes only *after* man has pushed his intellect as far as it can go, only *after* “apprehension turns into incapacity,” and He senses beyond the knowable the Unknown — the Separate, the Holy. Maimonides explains that while true love of God is a function of knowledge (“according to the knowledge is the love”),²¹ true awe of Him comes *after* knowledge and love, and is a result not of the knowledge but of the man of knowledge’s awareness of his ignorance:

How is the way to the love of Him and the awe of Him? When a man contemplates His wonderful, great works and creatures, and comes to realize from them His incomparable, infinite Wisdom, immediately he loves, praises, exalts, and lusts a great lust to know the great God, as David said: “My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God” [Psalms 42:3]. And when he reflects on these same objects, immediately he is taken aback, awestruck and fearing, and knows that he is a lowly, crass little creature, standing with meagre, trifling intellect before Him Who is the Perfection of Intellects, as David said: “When I behold Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers . . . What is man that Thou art mindful of him?” [Psalms 8:4-5].²²

Were one to express these thoughts of Maimonides’ in terms of the previously quoted passage from Rabbi Hasdai Crescas, he might say: we are able in some sense to know God because “He is the Place of the world,” but in another sense we must remain wholly ignorant of Him because “the world is not His place”; we are able to love God because “the whole world is full of His glory,” but we are in awe before Him because He is “holy, holy, holy.”²³

Thus, God alone is unconditionally holy because He alone is

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separate from creation. In what extended sense, however, is holiness predicated on created things? And in particular, in what extended sense is it predicated on "all the congregation of the children of Israel" in the command, "Ye shall be holy . . .?"

In the opening narrative of the Bible we hear of the primordial instance of holiness in the created world: the Sabbath. This narrative presents the genesis of the world as a process in which by the Word of God the original chaos and confusion, the formless *tohu va-vohu* (Genesis 1:2), undergoes in six days a series of separations, divisions, or demarcations: between day and night, land and water, species and species, and so on. According to the simple meaning of the Biblical text, Creation seems to be described less ambiguously as the separating of something into something else than as the production of something out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*);²⁴ indeed, according to Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra, the first verb of the Bible, *bara*, "to create," means literally "to divide" or "to demarcate."²⁵ But whereas the six days of Creation are explicitly characterized by many separations or divisions, they are not explicitly characterized by holiness; for although *kedushah* seems necessarily to involve separation, separation does not necessarily involve *kedushah*. There is, then, no explicit mention of holiness in the Bible until reference is made to the day which both completes the six days of Creation, and is separate and distinct from them: "And God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it (Genesis 2:3). The opening narrative of the Bible, therefore, tells how *tohu va-vohu* is transformed into holiness. But what is this holiness of the Sabbath?

A well known midrash contrasts the "hallowing" of the Sabbath with its "blessing": the Sabbath was blessed in regard to what it has, but hallowed in regard to what it does not have:

And God *blessed* the seventh day and hallowed it. Rabbi Ishmael says: "He *blessed* it by means of the *manna*, and He *hallowed* it by means of the *manna*. He *blessed* it by means of the *manna*, for on all the days of the week one omer would fall, but on the eve of the Sabbath two omers . . . And He *hallowed* it by means of the *manna*, for on it nothing whatsoever fell" [cf. Exodus 16:16-30].²⁶

Generalizing this positive versus negative theme, Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explains that the Sabbath is *blessed* in that on it a bonus

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of power is produced in our bodies and souls, but it is *holy* in that on it no work may be done as on other days.²⁷ Rabbi Isaac Arama takes this theme still further, and maintains that “holy” is the logical contrary of “blessed,” the latter signifying the realization of a desire (*hefets*), the former signifying its negation: the Sabbath is *blessed* in that it realizes the desire of the preceding six workdays; contrarily, it is *holy* in that it negates all work toward that desire (cf. Isaiah 58:13: *mimmetso heftsekha*).²⁸

The holiness of the Sabbath, the primordial instance of holiness in the created world, thus appears analogous to the holiness of God. Like God, the Sabbath is holy in virtue of *what it is not*, what it is separate from, what it transcends. The world is dependent on God, but God is *holy* because He is set apart from it; the six days are dependent on the Sabbath, but the Sabbath is *holy* because it is set apart from them. The analogy has its limits. God is in Himself absolutely different from the world, while the Sabbath is different from the other days not in itself but only relative to its special connection with the Divine; i.e., it is holy because God hallowed it (Genesis 2:3) and commanded us to “remember to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:18).

This rather unexceptional observation that the Sabbath does not differ in itself from the other days will help to explain why the separation of the Sabbath from the six days is called “holiness,” whereas the many separations, divisions, or demarcations which had characterized the six days of Creation are not. The hexaemeric separations are distinctions *in nature*, in the phenomenal world, and are therefore intelligible to reason and science, whereas the separation of the Sabbath from the six days is not a distinction in nature but rather *in consciousness* (Divine or human), and therefore is not intelligible to reason and science.²⁹ Distinctions in nature are perceived by *homo sapiens*, distinctions in holiness by *homo religiosus*.

The primordial example of holiness in the created world, thus, is an example of holiness in time, and there are many other examples of holiness in time (e.g., the holy days: *mikrae kodesh*).³⁰ There are also many examples of holiness in space (e.g., the Land of Israel, Jerusalem, the Temple; and cf. Exodus 3:5, Josh.

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5:15). As a holy time refers to the separation of time from time in (Divine or human) consciousness but not in nature, so a holy place refers to the separation of space from space in (Divine or human) consciousness but not in nature. The holiness of the Temple is no more apparent to the physicist than is the holiness of the Sabbath. A holy time or place is to *homo sapiens* no different from any other time or place in the world; but to *homo religiosus* it is somehow perceived to have a special subjective connection with the Divine beyond the world, with the Transcendent, the Holy One. It is in virtue of this special connection that some times, places, or other things in the created world, are by extension said to be "holy," when in truth the Holy One alone is holy.

In his "Sacred and Profane," Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik writes:

The two fundamental dimensions of *kedushah* are *makom* and *zeman* — "Place-consciousness" and "Time-consciousness." The halakhic violations of *yotse, notar, huts le-zemano u-mekomo* are defections in place or time. *Kedushah* may be profaned by such defections.³¹

It might be fruitful to try to analyze the Halakhah as a whole within the conceptual framework of Place-consciousness and Time-consciousness. The Talmudic Order of Kodashim ("Holy Things") perhaps would most easily lend itself to such an analysis.³² A paradigmatic case is the Amoraic dispute whether *piggul* (Leviticus 7:18; 19:8) means only *huts le-zemano* or also *huts le-mekomo*.³³ That the Halakhah is concerned with *Time-consciousness* and *Place-consciousness*, and not with time and space as natural phenomena, is exemplified by the rule that sacrifices are invalidated by *mahshevet ha-zeman* or *mahshevet ha-makom*.³⁴

Neither in nature nor defined by the laws of nature, the *kedushah* of created things is in consciousness, and in Judaism is defined only by the Halakhah.³⁵ It is the Halakhah that defines the holiness of the Sabbath, of the Temple, or of the Biblical books. A created thing is called "holy" because of its special subjective connection with the Divine, but its holiness is defined objectively by the Halakhah.

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To say that the Halakhah defines holiness is to say that times, places, and other created things are in Judaism considered holy only in virtue of the commandments of the Holy One.³⁶ "Holiness," explains Rabbi Soloveitchik in the course of an analysis of the phenomenon of Halakhah, "marks the reflection . . . of Transcendence in our concrete world."³⁷ God alone is transcendent. His transcendence is inexplicably reflected in His commandments, and this reflection is holiness in the concrete world.

At this junction, we may digress very briefly to observe that it is a serious existential question whether *man* can endure if he is only *homo sapiens* and not *homo religiosus*. It has been argued that the elemental *religious* distinctions between holy and profane are the coordinates which make possible our orientation in the world; that, without the holy, nature presents itself to man as uncreated, that is to say, as *tohu va-vohu*: one day differs not from the other, nor one place from the other; time and space are regular, homogeneous, neutral, monotonous. "Why so many existences, since they all resemble each other?" moans the disoriented atheist who, not knowing the holy, fears that he is doomed to existential nausea.³⁸ Now, if it were supposed that man *needs* the holy in order to be man, then it should at least be stressed that he does not need it in order to be *homo sapiens*. The map of holiness—in Judaism, the Halakhah—does not make the universe any more intelligible. However, it does make it more awesome; it makes possible the replacement of the numbing feeling of nausea with the fearful awareness of the sublime. Enabling man to rise out of the *tohu va-vohu*, it allows him to stand up in dignity and to face the Holy One. If, then, holiness is a human *need*, it is not in terms of the zoological definition of man, but in terms of his Biblical definition: man, unaware of the holy, is a meaningless shadow; aware of it, he is the image of *God*.

Beyond the question of holy times, holy places, and other holy objects, there remains the question of the command to "all the congregation of the children of Israel": "Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy!" Even if we can make sense out of calling a time, a place, or an object "holy," what possible sense can we make out of calling a nation "holy," or a human being "holy"? Let us consider Leviticus 19:2 and its parallels:

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Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy! (Leviticus 19:2).

Rashi comments: "Be separate [*hevu perushim*] from the forbidden sexual relationships [listed in Leviticus 18:6f.] and from [sexual] sin." Holiness here is separation from *forbidden sex*.³⁹

And ye shall be holy men unto Me; therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field! (Exodus 22:30).

Rashi comments: "If you are holy and separated [*perushim*] from the abominations of *nevelot* and *terefot*, then you are Mine; and if not, you are not Mine!" Holiness here is separation from *forbidden foods*.⁴⁰

Sanctify yourselves and be ye holy, for I am the Lord thy God! (Leviticus 20:7).

Rashi comments: "This is separation [*perishut*] from idolatry [described in Leviticus 20]." Holiness here is separation from *forbidden worship*.⁴¹

This last sense of holiness virtually includes the first two. Ceremonies involving sex and food were fundamental to ancient Canaanite idolatry no less than to modern idolatry. Separating ourselves from forbidden sex and forbidden foods, we in effect separate ourselves from idolatrous practices involving sex and food. Generally speaking, therefore, *the command to holiness is the command to separate ourselves from idolatry*. When the nation of Israel is commanded to be holy, it is commanded to set itself apart from the idolatrous nations.

And ye shall be holy unto Me, for I the Lord am holy, and have made you distinct from the peoples, that you should be Mine! (Leviticus 20:25-26).

Rashi comments: "If you are distinct [*muvdalim*] from them [sc., the idolatrous nations], then you are Mine; if not, then you belong to Nebuchadnezzar and his fellows."⁴² Similarly, on the verse "And ye shall be a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Exodus 19:6), the *Mekhilta* comments:

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holy and sanctified, separated [*perushim*] from the nations of the world and their abominations.⁴³

As a time or place is "holy" in that it is set apart from other times and places, so the nation of Israel is "holy" in that it is commanded to set itself apart from the other nations. If Israel separates itself from the forbidden practices of the idolatrous nations, then — only then! — is it a nation holy unto God, set apart for His service.

It is by observing the commandments of the Torah that Israel separates itself from the forbidden practices of the idolatrous nations, as God is said to have declared to the children of Israel:

Were it not for my Torah which you accepted, I would not recognize you, nor would I regard you more than any of the other idolaters.⁴⁴

According to Maimonides' teaching, "the root of all the commandments"⁴⁵ and "the foundation of the entire Torah and the pivot around which it turns"⁴⁶ is the prohibition of idolatry. Indeed, our rabbis said: "Anyone who affirms idolatry denies the whole Torah, and *anyone who denies idolatry affirms the whole Torah!*"⁴⁷

If holiness is separation from idolatry, and the Torah aims to destroy idolatry, then the Torah simultaneously aims to create holiness. Thus, the great teaching which appears in the *Sifra* with regard to Leviticus 19:2 and in the *Sifre* with regard to Numbers 15:41. "Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy!": *this is the holiness of all the commandments!*"; "... and do *all My commandments*, and be *holy* unto your God': *this is the holiness of all the commandments!*" *Zo kedushat kol ha-mitsvot!*⁴⁸ Thus the standard benediction: "Blessed art Thou . . . Who has sanctified us *by means of His commandments.*" Thus also the *'Amidah* of *Shabbat*: "sanctify us *by means of Thy commandments.*" The very performance of the commandments creates holiness, even as it negates idolatry. The command to be holy refers to nothing other than *kedushat kol ha-mitsvot*. To be holy means to do the commandments of the Holy One. Maimonides does not count the command to be holy as one of the 613 commandments precisely because he considers it a general

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charge encompassing the entire 613: "There is no difference between His saying 'Ye shall be holy' and His having said 'Do My commandments!'"⁴⁹

On the verse, "The Lord will establish thee for a holy people unto Himself . . . if thou shalt keep the commandments of the Lord thy God . . ." (Deuteronomy 28:9), Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra comments succinctly: "Holiness is to *keep the commandments!*"

Just as we cannot define God's holiness except negatively, as separation from the world, so we cannot define the holiness of the commandments except negatively, as separation from idolatry. The holiness of the commandments is the worship of God, but it is intelligible to us only as the negation of the worship of the world. Maimonides writes in his *Guide of the Perplexed*:

Know that all the practices of the worship, such as reading the Torah, prayer, and the performance of other commandments, have only the end of training you to occupy yourself with His commandments, may He be exalted, rather than with matters pertaining to this world; you should act as if you were occupied with Him, may He be exalted, and not that which is other than Him.⁵⁰

The end of all the 613 commandments, the end of *the one command* to be holy, is to train us to do all the commandments, i.e., to be holy. The holiness of the commandments is its own end, not a means to something else. It is necessarily theotropic, not egoistic, for were it egoistic it would be idolatrous. "All the while a person thinks only to perfect himself, even in spiritual perfection [*shelemut ruhanit!*], this is not within the realm of *kedushah!*" writes Rabbi Abraham Isaac Ha-Kohen Kuk, an ardent mystic who was nonetheless one of the most profound modern students of Maimonidean philosophy. Holiness, he continues, is not "the lust for self-perfection [or to translate according to current jargon, "self-fulfillment"], which derives [at least in part] from the . . . self-love that is dependent on nothing but the natural instinct of existence implanted in every living being."⁵¹ Holiness derives not from the natural, but from the Supernatural.

The command to be holy is *imitatio Dei* because it aims to set us apart from the worship of the world, even as the Holy

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One is set apart from the world.

As I am *Kadosh*, so you be *kedoshim*; as I am *Parush*, so you be *perushim*.⁵²

The holiness of the commandments has its source in the holiness of the Commander. In occupying ourselves with His commandments, i.e., with the command to be holy, it is as if we are occupying ourselves with the Holy One.

In the eyes of the Torah, holiness in the created world is always *kedushat ha-mitsvot*. Times, places, and other created things are called "holy" in virtue of the commandments of the Holy One, and it is in virtue of their vocation to do the commandments of the Holy One that the children of Israel are called "holy." From the point of view of the Halakhah, the holiness of times, places, and other created things presupposes the command to be holy in two senses. First, since their holiness is in virtue of the commandments, were there no command to be holy, i.e., were the commandments not commanded, there could be no holiness in virtue of them. Second, since the Torah, once revealed, is no longer in Heaven,⁵³ it is up to the commanded to define the commandments: "Inasmuch as they [Israel] are sanctified [*mekuddeshim*] unto Heaven, what they sanctify is sanctified!"⁵⁴

To be sure, the holiness of "all the congregation of the children of Israel" is not a fact, but a command. It *cannot* be a fact because the scope of the 613 commandments is vast, their obligation interminable, and no living person can acquit himself of them: no sooner is one commandment fulfilled than new commandments are rushing upon us!⁵⁵ Only the holiness of God is absolute: "Ye *shall be* holy . . . I *am* holy!" The Torah *commands* the congregation *to be* holy. It was Korah, in his rebellion against the idea of *kedushat ha-mitsvot*, who taught: "all the congregation *are* holy."⁵⁶

All the commandments create holiness, the "moral" ones and the "ceremonial" ones alike. The notion of holiness is amoral. It applies equally to love thy neighbor (Leviticus 19:8) and to *piggul* (*ibid.*, 19:7). The people of Israel are commanded to be holy both by walking in the compassionate ways of God (Deuter-

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onomy 28:9) and by distinguishing between clean and unclean animals (Leviticus 20:25-26). "God the Holy One is hallowed through righteousness" (Isaiah 5:16), but also through the Temple sacrifices (Leviticus 22:32).

While the *imitatio Dei* of the command to "walk in His ways" is *moral*, the *imitatio Dei* of the command to be holy is peculiarly *religious*.

In its approach to mourning, as elsewhere, the Torah simultaneously prohibits idolatry and prescribes holiness:

Ye shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead; for thou art a *holy people* unto the Lord thy God (Deuteronomy 14:1-2).

Seeking to shatter the formidable idolatry of death and thereby to effect holiness, the Torah is sparse in explicit positive commandments concerning mourning;⁵⁷ and while there are many and complicated Rabbinic laws and practices incumbent on the mourner, these too must be understood as seeking to destroy idolatry and to effect holiness. Of these, probably none is more cherished among the people than the recital of the *Kaddish*, the affirmation of God's holiness which the bereaved is responsible to proclaim even though his world has been turned into *tohu va-vohu*. This ancient prayer teaches that although the Holy One is "above all the blessings, songs, praises and supplications uttered in the world," nonetheless *it is His Will* that we magnify and sanctify His great Name in the world He created.⁵⁸

The Holy One is beyond all our words. Reason insists that our only praise to Him is silence. What is man, this shadow, this lowly creature of trifling intellect, that the Holy One should be mindful of him? Yet inexplicably it is His Will that man sanctify His Name in the created world. And it is His Will that all the congregation of Israel, by observing His 613 iconoclastic commandments, sanctify His Name among the nations. Therefore, He commanded us:

Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy!

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NOTES

1. Cf. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Yahadut 'Am Yehudi, u-Medinat Yisrael* (Tel-Aviv, 5735-1975), p. 74: "Man is nothing but an image of God, i.e., man in himself and of himself lacks all essence and all meaning; for he is nothing but the image [*tselem*] or the shadow [*tsel*] of the true Essence and Meaning (similar to Plato's shadows)." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16, 317.

2. *Gen. Rabbah* 27:1: *tsurah le-Yotserah* is euphemistic. Cf. *Mekhilta, Bahodesh, Yitro*, 4. Cf. Maimonides, *Guide*, I, 46.

3. *Sotah* 14a. See my "Love: the Beginning and the End of Torah," *TRADITION*, vol. xv, no. 4, 1976, p. 8. There, the *gemilut hasadim* aspect of *imitatio Dei* was discussed; here, the *kedushah* aspect is discussed. The present essay may be seen as an elaboration of note 6 of the Love lecture.

4. Cf., e.g., Rabad, *ad Maimonides, Yad*, Repentance 3:7, who notes that there are Scriptural and Aggadic texts which *meshabbeshot et ha-de'ot*; i.e., which confuse rational thoughts. The force of Rabad's comment seems to be that the prophets and rabbis had non-philosophic priorities which recommended the usage of non-philosophic language, and they were perfectly willing to risk the philosophical misunderstandings which might sometimes ensue from such usage. I understand *de'ot* here as synonymous with *muskalot (intelligibilia)*. But cf. I. Twersky, *Rabad of Posquières* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), p. 282; H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 108.

5. *Guide*, I, 58, Pines trans. (Chicago, 1963), p. 137.

6. *Ibid.*, I, 59, p. 139.

7. *Berakhot* 31b, *et al.* See Saadia Gaon, *ad Dan*. 7:25; Hai Gaon, in B. M. Lewin, ed., *Otsar Ha-Geonim*, vol. i, *Berakhot* 59a (Haifa, 5688-1928), pp. 130-132; Bahya ibn Pakuda, *Duties of the Heart*, I, 10; Judah Ha-Levi, *Kuzari*, V, 27; Abraham ibn Ezra, *ad Is.* 6:2 and *Shitah Aheret ad Gen.* 1:3; Abraham ibn Daud, *Emunah Ramah*, I, 6, Weil ed. (Frankfurt, 1852), p. 39, Maimonides, Introduction to *Helek*, principle 3; *Yad*, Yesode ha-Torah 1:9; *Guide*, I, 26, 29, 33, 46, 47, 53, 59; III, 13.

8. See *Berakhot* 33b. Cf. Maimonides, *Guide*, I, 59, pp. 140-141; 61, p. 148.

9. See R. Meir Simha Ha-Kohen of Divinsk, *Meshekh Hokhmah, ad Exod.* 32:19, Copperman ed. (Jerusalem, 5735-1974), pp. 504-510, in explanation of Moses' breaking the Tables of the Law: "There is nothing [in itself] holy in the world . . . God alone, may His Name be blessed, is holy in virtue of His necessary existence." Thus, even the Tables of the Law could have been turned into objects of idolatry! Had Moses given them to the erring people, "they would have exchanged the calf for the Tables, and not departed from their error!" (p. 506).

Cf. Leon Roth, *Ha-Dat ve-'Erkhe ha-Adam* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 5733-1973), pp. 20-30.

10. *Sifra, Kedoshim, ad Leviticus* 19:2; *Yalkut Shimoni, Leviticus* 604. A variant reading has *mehakkeh* ("imitate") spelled with a *kaf*, not *kuf*, and would change the text to: "Await the King!" Cf. my "Love," etc., pp. 18-19, note 8.

11. See Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (London, 1950); Mircea Eliade,

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The Sacred and the Profane (New York, 1961). Cf. Leibowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 26: "holiness is a concept which has no humanitarian or anthropocentric meaning."

12. Cf., e.g., Judah Ha-Levi, *Kuzari*, IV, 3. Cf. R. Naphtali Tsevi Yehudah Berlin, *Ha'amek Davar*, ad Exod. 15:11, s.v. *neddar ba-kodesh*: "He is set apart [*mufrash*] from the processes of nature [*halikhot ha-teva'*]."

13. E.g., Abraham ibn Daud, *Emunah Ramah*, II, 1, p. 47: "The philosophers have adopted the convention of calling anything whose existence is dependent on another existence *efshar ha-metsiut* [literally, "possible of existence"], for it is possible that it exist or that it not exist, and [either way], the universal existence will persist. As for that upon which the existence of all things is dependent, and which does not acquire its existence from another, if there is such a thing, they call it *mehuyyav ha-metsiut* [literally, "necessary of existence"]." Cf. Maimonides, *Guide*, II, 1, third speculation, pp. 247-249.

14. *Yad*, Yesode ha-Torah 1:2-3.

15. Gen. Rabbah 68:9, *et al.*

16. *Sifra*, *loc. cit.*

17. *Or Ha-Shem*, I, 2, 1; in H. A. Wolfson, *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), pp. 200-201, and cf. pp. 459-462, notes 92-94. Cf. Malbim, ad Is. 6:3.

18. See Otto, *op. cit.*, ch. 8, p. 52. Cf. Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 26. See also Israel Efros, *Ancient Jewish Philosophy* (Detroit, 1964; New York, 1976): "In the Seraphic song the thrice repeated word *kadosh* indicates absolute transcendence, and in the second distich the term *kavod* . . . God's majesty and power unfolding themselves in history" (p. 12). In connection with "transcendence," Efros cites also "He is the Place of the world but the world is not His place" (p. 66). Efros' intriguing thesis concerning the tension between *kadosh* and *kavod* may have been influenced by Crescas. See also R. Isidore Epstein, *The Faith of Judaism* (London, 1954), who cites both Crescas and Efros (whose thesis had appeared in 1950), and writes: "Sufficiently explicit . . . is Isaiah's song of the *Seraphs*: 'Holy, Holy, Holy . . . the fullness of the whole earth in His glory,' in which we hear the proclamation both of God's transcendence (His Holiness), and His immanence (the fullness of the earth which constitutes His glory) . . . 'He is the Place of the world, but the world is not His place'" (p. 142; cf. p. 163). Cf., *idem*, *Judaism* (London, 1959), ch. 14, p. 137. Cf. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "The Lonely Man of Faith," *TRADITION*, vol. vii, no. 2, 1965, p. 31: "Did not the angels sing *kadosh, kadosh, kadosh, holy, holy, holy, transcendent, transcendent, transcendent, yet . . . melo kol ha-arets kevodo*, He . . . resides in every infinitesimal particle of creation and the whole universe is replete with His glory? In short, the cosmic experience is antithetic and tantalizing. It exhausts itself in the awesome dichotomy of God's involvement in the drama of creation, and His exaltedness above and remoteness from this very drama."

19. See Roth, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

20. Otto is not always clear about this crucial point. In his discussion of Gen. 28:17 (*op. cit.*, pp. 126-127), he takes the first part of Jacob's exclamation ("How *nora* is this place!") to be an expression of the "primal numinous awe" which is in itself sufficient to establish a place as "holy," and he takes the sec-

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ond part of the exclamation ("This is none other than the house of God!") to be but an "explication and interpretation." "Worship," he concludes, "is possible without this further explicative process." Otto's exegesis is not merely mistaken, but idolatrous! Cf. Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 29: "The secret of religion is not to be found in Jacob's first words . . . but in what comes after them . . . not the *place*, but the *Lord* of the place, is essential." Cf. Abraham J. Heschel, *God in Search of Man* (New York, 1959), p. 75: "Awe is a sense for the transcendence, for the reference everywhere to Him Who is behind all things."

21. *Yad, Teshuvah* 10:6.

22. *Ibid.*, *Yesode ha-Torah* 2:3; cf. 4:12.

23. To be sure, Maimonides himself would never have expressed his thoughts in this way, since he accepted the Aristotelian definition of *place* as "that which surrounds." In fact, Crescas' interpretation of "He is the Place of the world" comes at the conclusion of his critique of Aristotle's definition of *place*, and is a sharp polemic against Maimonides' Aristotelian interpretation according to which "He is the Place of the world" actually indicates God's *separateness* from the world (cf. *Guide*, I, 70). Cf. also Crescas' rejection, *loc. cit.*, of Maimonides' Aristotelian interpretation of Ezek. 3:12 in *Guide*, I, 8. Although Crescas' interpretation today seems reasonable and attractive (see note 18 above), it must have seemed outrageous to his philosophically minded contemporaries. Even his own student, Mattathias Ha-Yitshari, *Commentary on Avot*, 6:1, s.v., *ohev et ha-Makom* (MS. Heb. 61, Harvard), p. 77b, presumed the Aristotelian definition of *makom*: "Since a place completely surrounds the thing of which it is the place, and since that which surrounds is greater than that which is surrounded, anything which exceeds another in perfection is metaphorically called its 'place, until the First Cause, may He be blessed, Who is the 'Place' of the world." Mattathias may have written these comments before his teacher formulated his critique of Aristotle's definition.

24. See *ad loc.*: *va-yavdel . . . va-yavdel . . . le-havdil . . . u-le-havdil*, etc. Cf. *Gen. Rabbah* 1:9, where the philosopher, basing himself on what he takes to be the plain meaning of Gen. 1:1-2, argues that God did *not* create *tohu va-vohu*, darkness, air, water, or the deep; Rabban Gamliel replies to him by citing proof-texts from the Prophets and the Hagiographa, but does not argue that the plain meaning of Gen. 1:1-2 is creation *ex nihilo*. Note also that Gen. 1:2 begins *ve-ha-arets haytah*, not *va-tihyeh ha-arets* as we should expect if *bara* is taken to imply the creation *ex nihilo* of *tohu va-vohu* (cf. Rashi on Gen. 4:1; and cf. Ibn Ezra *ad* Gen. 1:2, *ve-al titmah*, etc.; both Ibn Ezra, *loc. cit.*, s.v., *tohu*, and Rashbam, *ad* Gen. 1:1-2, follow the Targums in translating *tohu va-vohu* as "unpopulated").

Rashi (whose opinions on Creation were contaminated by neither the Kalam nor Aristotle) did not take Gen. 1:1-2 to be an account of creation *ex nihilo* (see carefully, *ad loc.*). Cf. also Rashi's analogy between the creation of a man from a drop of sperm and the creation of the world from *tohu va-vohu*: "The Holy One, blessed be He, indeed makes a man out of a small, insubstantial drop; then how much more so can He create him out of the dust [in the Resurrection]! What is more, He created the whole world in its entirety out of *tohu*!" (*ad Sanhedrin* 91a, s.v., *'akhshav she-yesh mayim*).

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Maimonides (who studied extensively both the Kalam and Aristotle) states that the Biblical texts do not necessarily imply creation *ex nihilo* (*Guide*, II, 25, pp. 327-328); his interpretation of *bereshit* (*ibid.*, II, 30, p. 349) is one of the more esoteric puzzles of the *Guide*.

25. *Ad loc.*: "ligzor ve-la-sum ge'vul nigzar." Cf. *idem*, *ad* Is. 45:7: darkness and evil are not essences created *ex nihilo* by God, but privations of light and peace; i.e., they are the contraries from which light and peace are demarcated. But cf. Nahmanides, *ad* Gen. 1:1, who holds that *bara* denotes *creatio ex nihilo*.

26. *Gen. Rabbah* 11:2, *et al.* Cf. Rashi, *ad* Gen. 2:3.

27. *Ad* Gen. 2:3.

28. See 'Akedat Yitshak, Genesis, *Bereshit*, *sha'ar* iv.

29. That the difference between the Sabbath and the six days is in fact undetectable by science is admitted even by a Kabbalist like Nahmanides. See his criticism of Ibn Ezra, *ad* Gen. 2:3: "*en zeh mussag be-hergesh le-anashim.*" Although Nahmanides, the mystic, surely enjoys the irony of thus chiding the rationalist Ibn Ezra, he seems nonetheless serious in his opinion that the Sabbath blessedness is not a *sensibile*, i.e., not observable by the empirical scientist.

30. Cf. Abraham J. Heschel, *The Sabbath* (New York, 1951), who argues that the chronological priority of the Sabbath among holy things is indicative of the general priority in Judaism of holiness in time over holiness in space: "The mythical mind would expect that, after heaven and earth have been established, God would create a holy place . . . Yet it seems as if to the Bible it is *holiness in time*, the Sabbath, which comes first" (p. 9).

31. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Sacred and Profane: *Kodesh* and *Chol* in World Perspectives," in *Gesher* (a publication of the Student Organization of Yeshiva University), vol. iii, no. 1 (Sivan 5726 - June 1966), p. 9.

32. Not only because of the explicit spacial or temporal character of most of its *halakhot*, but also because it treats of '*avodat ha-kodesh* par excellence, and thus in studying it (as opposed, say, to *Nezikin*) there is less likelihood that we confuse the peculiarly religious value of holiness with attending moral, political, social, aesthetic, pragmatic, or other anthropocentric values. For this same reason, it makes good religious sense to teach children *Leviticus* before attempting to teach them the multiangular sagas of *Genesis* and *Exodus* (cf. *Lev. Rabbah* 7:3).

33. *Zevahim* 28a-29a. The conclusion that *piggul* means *huts le-zemano*, together with the general principle (*Zevahim* 2:3, *Menahot* 1:3) that those who eat of an offering invalidated by *huts le-zemano* incur *karet*, but not so those who eat of an offering invalidated by *huts le-mekomo*, may perhaps be exploited as evidence for Heschel's thesis on holiness and time (cf. note 30 above).

34. *Zevahim* 2-4. Cf. Maimonides, *Yad*, *Pesule ha-Mukdashin* 13:1.

35. The notion of holiness is of course not unique to Judaism: what is unique to Judaism is the halakhic objectification of holiness. See carefully J. B. Soloveitchik, "Ish ha-Halakhah," in *Be-Sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahad*, ed., P. Peli (Jerusalem, 5736-1976), pp. 85-108.

The raw, powerful awareness of the Holy, unchained by the Halakhah, can lead to the abominations of idolatry. Cf. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kuk, *Igrot Ha-*

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Rayah (Jerusalem, 5722-1961), vol. ii, letter 379, p. 43, concerning the Binding of Isaac and the cult of Molech. Cf. Y. Leibowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 31, who, in a clever cooptation of Tchernikhovsky, explains that the Torah ties up free, idolatrous religiosity "with the *tefillin* straps!"

36. See R. Meir Simha Ha-Kohen of Divinsk, *loc. cit.* Cf. Y. Leibowitz, "Yihudo shel 'Am Yisrael," in *Petahim*, 3 (33), Tamuz 5735 - June 1975, pp. 21-25.

37. J. B. Soloveitchik, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Cf. *Mekhilta*, Ba-Hodesh, *Yitro*, 4: "'And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai' [Ex. 19:20]: the Holy One, blessed be He, bent down the . . . heavens . . . upon the Mountain." Cf. *Tanhuma*, ad Exod. 34:5.

38. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *La Nausée* (Paris, 1938), p. 187; cf. *Nausea* (New York, 1959), pp. 178-181: "Existence everywhere, infinitely, in excess, forever and everywhere . . . this profusion of beings without origin . . . mounting up as high as the sky, spilling over, filling everything with its gelatinous slither . . . it was the World, the naked World suddenly revealing itself, and I choked with rage at the gross, absurd being . . . I shouted 'filth! what rotten filth!' and shook myself to get rid of this sticky filth, but . . . there was so much, tons and tons of existence, endless . . ." Cf. *idem*, *Being and Nothingness* (New York, 1966), Part Three, ch. 2, I: "We must not take the term *nausea* as a metaphor derived from our physical disgust. On the contrary . . . it is on the foundation of this nausea that . . . empirical nauseas . . . are produced . . ." Sartre's illness is existential: he knows *what* the holy is supposed to be, but does not know the holy. Cf. his worthy definition of "holiness": "the sacred object is an object which is in the world and which points to a transcendence beyond the world" (*op. cit.*, Part Three, ch. 3, I, p. 487). This definition differs from Rabbi Soloveitchik's (cited in note 37 above) only in that it speaks of "pointing to" instead of "reflecting," and of "a transcendence" instead of "Transcendence."

Toward a diagnosis of the atheist's existential nausea, see M. Eliade, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24: "For religious man, space is not homogeneous . . . some parts . . . are qualitatively different from others . . . For religious man, this spatial non-homogeneity finds expression in the experience of an opposition between space that is sacred . . . and all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it . . . [T]he religious experience of the nonhomogeneity of space is a primordial experience . . . The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the world. In the homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible and hence no *orientation* can be established, the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a center. So it is clear to what a degree the discovery — that is, the revelation — of sacred space possesses existential value for religious man; for nothing can begin, nothing can be *done*, without a previous orientation — and any orientation implies acquiring a fixed point . . . *If the world is to be lived in*, it must be *founded* — and no world can come to birth in the chaos of the homogeneity and relativity of profane space. The discovery . . . of a fixed point . . . is equivalent to the creation of the world . . . For profane experience, on the contrary, space is homogeneous and neutral . . . Geometrical space can be cut and delineated in any direction; but no qualitative differentiation and hence, no orientation are given by virtue of its inherent structure . . . The pro-

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fane experience . . . maintains . . . the relativity of space. No true orientation is now possible, for the fixed point no longer enjoys a unique ontological status; it appears and disappears in accordance with the needs of the day. Properly speaking, there is no longer any world, there are only fragments of a shattered universe, an amorphous mass consisting of an infinite number of more or less neutral places . . ." Eliade is convinced that "profane existence is never found in the pure state." No one ever "succeeds in completely doing away with religious behavior."

39. *Ad loc.* Cf. *Lev. Rabbah* 24:6; *et al.*

40. *Ad loc.* Cf. *Mekhilta*, Kaspā, *Mishpatim*, 2.

41. *Ad loc.* Cf. *Sifra*, *Kedoshim*, *ad loc.*

42. *Ad loc.* Cf. *Sifra*, *Kedoshim*, *ad loc.*

43. *Mekhilta*, Ba-Hodesh, *Yitro*, 2.

44. *Exod. Rabbah* 47:3.

45. *Yad*, 'Akum 2:4.

46. *Guide*, III, 29, p. 521; cf. 37, p. 542.

47. *Sifre*, Num., *Be-Shallah*, 111; *Sifre*, Deut., *Reeh*, 54; *Horayot* 8a; *Kiddushin* 40a; *Hullin* 5a. Cf. Rashi, *ad Deut.* 11:28; Maimonides, *Yad*, *loc. cit.*; *Guide*, III, 29, pp. 521-522.

48. *Sifra*, *Kedoshim*, *ad Leviticus* 20:7; *Sifre*, Num., *Be-Shallah*, 115. Cf. Maimonides, *Book of the Commandments*, Introduction, principle 4; *Guide*, III, 47, p. 595.

49. *Book of the Commandments*, *loc. cit.* Maimonides writes concerning *Leviticus* 11:44 and 19:2: "They are commands to fulfill the whole Torah, as if He said, 'Be holy by doing everything in which I have commanded you, and keep away from everything which I have prohibited to you.'" Maimonides quotes also the *Mekhilta* (Kaspā, *Mishpatim*, 2): "When God creates a commandment for Israel, he adds to them holiness."

50. *Guide*, III, 5, p. 622. With regard to the question of *imitatio Dei*, this passage should be read in conjunction with *Yad*, *Yesode ha-Torah* 4:8; 7:1, 6.

On the distinction between worship of the world and worship of God, see Emmanuel Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté* (Paris, 1963), pp. 256-257: "I think of Heidegger and the Heideggerians. One would want to retrieve the world . . . To retrieve the world is to retrieve a childhood mysteriously rolled up in Place . . . Here, then, is the eternal seductiveness of paganism, beyond the infantilism of idolatry which has long been surmounted. *The holy filtering through the world* — Judaism can be only the negation of this." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28: "*Le judaïsme a désensorcelé le monde*," etc. Cf. *idem*, *Quatre lectures talmudiques* (Paris, 1968), on *Sotah* 34b-35a ("Terre promise ou terre permise"), pp. 113-148. Cf. notes 35-36 above.

51. *'Olat Rayah* (Jerusalem, 5723-1963), p. 282; cf. pp. 8-9.

52. *Sifra*, *Shemini*, *ad Leviticus* 11:44; *Kedoshim*, *ad Leviticus* 20:26; *et al.* The reading found in some later editions, "so you are *kedoshim* . . . so you are *perushim*," is presumably a scribal corruption. Cf. readings in Vatican MS., Codex Assemani 66 (facsimile ed.; New York, 5717-1956).

53. *Deuteronomy* 30:12; *Bava Mets'va* 59b.

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54. *Gen. Rabbah* 15:24; cf. *ad loc*: "I sanctify Israel, and they sanctify Me!" Cf. J. B. Soloveitchik, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-94.

55. See R. Hasdai Crescas, *Or Ha-Shem*, II, 6, 1 (end of chapter), concerning Eccles. 7:20 ("there is not a righteous man," etc.). Cf. *ibid.*, *Hakdamah*: "the commandments are in the nature of the possible, which is wider than the sea, and knowledge will not comprehend the particulars, for they are infinite." Cf. Efros, *op. cit.*, p. 117, on the command to be holy: "It is a constant inner drive that robs man of his calm. It is the fire and flame of the previous concepts. It is their infinite dimension. And we should translate Leviticus 19:2 thus: 'Ye shall be holy' — ye shall be infinite . . . Greek philosophy, radiant with harmony and with the golden path, would never have grasped Hebraic Holiness in all its restlessness and infinity." Cf. Nahmanides, *ad* Leviticus 19:2, whose interpretation of the command ("that we be *perushim min ha-muttarot*") may at first glance seem to be the very opposite to that of Efros. However, Nahmanides' Kabbalistic reference to *devekut* (in exegesis of "for I the Lord your God am holy") indicates that he also took this command to be the "infinite dimension" of all the others. Cf. *idem*, *ad* Maimonides, *Book of the Commandments*, *loc. cit.*

56. Cf. Martin Buber, *Moses* (New York, 1958), p. 190: "For Korah the people . . . were already holy. They had been chosen by God and He dwelt in their midst, so why should there be further need of ways and choice?" Cf. Leibowitz, "Yihudo," etc., p. 24, on the "Judaism of Moses" (holiness as an *obligation*) vs. the "Judaism of Korah" (holiness as a *right*).

Korah's notorious questions, whether an all-blue *tallit* needs blue fringes and whether a house full of Torah scrolls needs a *mezuzah* (*Gen. Rabbah* 18:3, *et al.*), are based on the premise that the *mitsvot* are to be justified anthropocentrically, i.e., by appeal to their utility to the agent, a premise contradicting the theocentric idea of *kedushat ha-mitsvot*.

57. Cf. my "Love," etc. (cited in note 3 above), p. 14.

58. According to the literal meaning of the *Kaddish*, *ki-re'uteh* ("in accordance with His Will") modifies the entire first clause, and not, as usually supposed, the verb *bara* ("He created"). The point is not that the world was created according to God's Will, but that it is His Will that His Name be magnified and sanctified in the world He created. The meaning is unequivocal in the parallel text recited prior to the Sabbath reading of the Torah: "Above everything, let the Name of the King . . . be magnified and sanctified in the worlds He has created . . . in accordance with His Will, and in accordance with the will of them who fear Him, and in accordance with the will of the entire House of Israel" (See *Soferim* 14:6[12]). See Elijah Gaon of Vilna, "Diyukim sheba-nussah ha-tefillah," 241, in *Siddur Ha-Gera* (New York, 1953), p. 144b. See R. Jehiel Michal Epstein, *'Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim*, 56. Cf. R. David de Sola Pool, *The Old Jewish-Aramaic Prayer, the Kaddish* (Leipzig, 1909; Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 33-35.

For a connection between the *Kaddish* and Leviticus 19:2, see *Lev. Rabbah* 24:1: "'Ye shall be holy' . . . When is the Name of the Holy One, blessed be He, magnified and sanctified in His world [cf. Ezek. 38:23] . . .?"

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On the theological meaning of the *Kaddish*, see R. Hasdai Crescas, *Or Hashem*, IIB, 1, 1.