

Rabbi Shubert Spero is rabbi of the Young Israel of Cleveland and lecturer in philosophy at Western Reserve University.

"IS THERE AN INDIGENOUS JEWISH THEOLOGY?"

I wish to defend the claim that there is an indigenous Jewish theology. Of the several words which comprise this assertion the one which is most misleading is the two-letter word "is" in the sentence, "There *is* an indigenous Jewish theology." For while the words "indigenous" and "Jewish" and "theology" might be vague, the word "is" is systematically ambiguous. No single word has given rise to more confusion and discussion in contemporary philosophy than this simple copula. There are, to name a few, the "is" of predication and the "is" of identity, and the "is" of existence, of which our own sentence is an instance. Bertrand Russell once said that "it is a disgrace to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word 'is' for so many entirely different ideas."¹

In what *sense*, then, am I asserting that there is an indigenous Jewish theology? Consider the question: "Is there a prime number greater than one hundred?" Clearly the answer to this question is not to be found by empirical investigation based on observation but by logical analysis based on the rules for the introduction of new expressions in the system of natural numbers.

Analogously, when I claim that there *is* an indigenous Jewish theology, I do not mean that it necessarily exists as an explicitly-formulated system of propositions, suitably labeled, to be discovered in a book of some sort. What I *am* asserting is that, given a commitment to the beliefs and practices of Judaism and an acceptance of the Bible and the Talmud, there follows by logical entailment a commitment to certain theological propositions. The individual adherent of Judaism may

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

never have reflected upon the theoretical pre-suppositions of his faith or, if he had, may never have taken the trouble to articulate these propositions in an explicit manner. But that is of no consequence for this question. Jewish theology is there. It is implicit. It is logically entailed by the beliefs and practices of Judaism, by the assertions of the Chumash and the expressions of the Midrash. It is there, waiting to be unpacked, to be drawn out, to be formulated in a systematic way. And, as I will indicate later, for many areas of Judaism this has already been done. If an individual Jew, confronted by the articulated implications of his commitment, chooses to ignore them, refuses to recognize them, or rejects them, he does so at the cost of forfeiting his claim to coherence, consistency and rationality. While the Ravad may have been right in his acerbic stricture against Maimonides, that many greater and better people than he had the same thought, he was right only in the sense that perhaps we cannot say of those who believe the one God to have corporeal attributes, that they are to be considered heretics or unworthy of a share in the world to come. On the other hand, Maimonides was undoubtedly correct that logically the unity of God *implies* His incorporeality and that to affirm one and deny the other is a self-contradiction. These others referred to by the Ravad may have been greater and better than Maimonides, but they were certainly less logical.²

What is theology? I use the word interchangeably with the phrase religious philosophy. There is perhaps one distinction between the two, which is not really relevant for our purposes, and that is that the theologian is one who operates from *within* the faith, from a posture of commitment, while the philosopher of religion may be a professional thinker who is examining religion from the outside, with no personal attachment. However be it, theology or religious philosophy, one is *engaged* in it as soon as one becomes reflective about one's religious faith. One is *doing* theology as soon as one becomes reflective about one's religious beliefs and puts into words either for one's own benefit or in order to communicate to others what *it is* that one believes in or *why* one is engaged in certain religious practices.

When Rav said: The *mitzvot* were given only for the purpose

TRADITION: *A Journal of Orthodox Thought*

of refining mankind, he was laying the groundwork for a philosophy of the *mitzvot*.³

When Rabbi Akiva said, "Everything is foreseen [by God] but free will is given [to man]," he was pointing up a profound paradox resulting from two opposed religious principles.⁴

When the schools of Hillel and Shammai for two and a half years debated the question of whether a man would have been better off if he had not been created, they were debating a theological issue with great existential candor.⁶

But even the Bible itself is a mine of Jewish theology. The simple answer to Rashi's opening question of why the Torah did not begin with the words "this month is to you . . ." is obviously and precisely, as pointed out by Nachmanides, that the Torah is *not* merely a halakhic code but is concerned to impart a theology, an anthropology, a philosophy of history and *that* is indeed the material to be found in these early portions.

In fact, the case for Jewish theology seems to me to be *so* strong and *so* indubitable that perhaps we should ask — why it became a question in the first place? Why should anyone have thought that Judaism does *not* have a theology?

A number of pertinent considerations come to mind:

1) We erroneously learned to equate philosophy and theology with the style of Greek thought which was systematic, speculative, and formal. Because our people "did" their theology in a different key and with a different style we sometimes failed to recognize it as such. Jewish theology was enunciated spasmodically, more by impulse and never, in our primary sources, worked into a formal system.

2) Judaism's emphasis upon deeds, the Halakhah, and external behavior weakened concern with theology. As Schechter put it so aptly: "With God as a reality, revelation as a fact, the Torah as a rule of life and the hope of redemption as a most vivid expectation, they felt no need for formulating their dogmas into a creed — which is repeated — not because we *believe* but that we *may* believe."⁶ In short, Judaism apparently believed that it is the sign of a healthy religion to *have* a theology and *not* to be aware of it.

3) There were some technical objections to the assertion that

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

Judaism had a theology. Strictly speaking, theology means "the science of God." Traditionally, however, Judaism has always had little to say about God other than that He exists, that He is One and His acts are recognized in history, and that He requires certain things of His creatures. Maimonides developed this indigenous Jewish approach in his doctrine of negative differentiation with the well-known paradoxical consequence that the more you assert of God the less you know about Him. In fact one recent thinker insists upon regarding the Bible as "God's anthropology," (God's view of man) rather than man's theology.⁷ Another writer who sees the Halakhah as central likes to believe that rather than a theology what we have is a "Theonomy," a Divine Law.⁸ In a current review of Rabbi Soloveitchik's work, his theology is respectfully referred to as a "Misnagid phenomenology."⁹ But all of these different names merely help to point up emphases or an approach. In the larger sense with which we are concerned, these are *all* theology.

4) Another reason why theology was never encouraged in Judaism is because certain aspects of theology were considered dangerous to Judaism. For example, dogmatics is a part of theology. There were always many who feared the reduction of Judaism to thirteen principles (of Maimonides) or three principles (according to Rabbi Joseph Albo), with the implication that all else is perhaps not important. It is the same psychology that is behind the warning to be as careful with a minor *mitzvah* as with a major one.¹⁰ It was the same fear which prompted the Chatam Sofer, when asked "How many basic principles does Judaism have?", to answer, "613"! Another integral part of Jewish Theology has always been an investigation of the reasons for the *mitzvot*. Here, too, tradition has always sensed a danger! King Solomon is held up as the paradigm of one who would use his understanding of the purpose behind the *mitzvah* to reason his way to a personal exemption.¹¹ In this connection Maimonides' presentation of the reasons for the *mitzvot* did indeed confirm the fears of the traditionalists. The worst fear of all, however, was based on the association of theology with Rationalism as a philosophic school. For many, the inevitable result of theologizing was to end up with religious beliefs based

on fickle reason rather than unswerving faith. And the proof of the weakness of the former was seen in the large scale defection of Jews to Christianity in Spain during the massacres of 1391. In France and Germany during the terrible persecutions of the 13th and 14th centuries, the Ashkenazic communities stood firm. In Spain at the end of the 14th and early 15th centuries a large proportion succumbed. The crucial difference, such was the verdict of tradition, was to be found in the weakening of simple faith before the insidious reasoning of theology and philosophy.¹²

From the historical perspective it can be granted that there *was* justification to the fears I have just outlined. Some day, some historian of ideas is going to draw a distinction between the value of an idea itself and the use to which the idea is put by certain social groups.

Suffice it to say then, there are historical reasons why Judaism never developed a systematic, explicitly formulated theology. The point I wish to make now, however, is that today, when the Jewish community has lost its insularity, when the atmosphere is saturated with the spirit of science, the hallmark of which is skepticism of everything non-empirical, when Orthodoxy must demonstrate its superiority over rival Jewish theologies, one cannot have an intelligent, reflective Judaism either for oneself or for others without developing some kind of theology, some kind of religious philosophy in the broad sense. Once modern man has tasted of the fruit of the tree of philosophic sophistication, he cannot go back to the Eden of simple faith. Once man becomes aware of his epistemological nakedness, God Himself must help him to fashion a conceptual garment. Even in our classic age we were told that we must know what to answer the heretic.¹³ The heretic by definition was never interested in mere information. His questions required a *justification* of Judaism. To answer him one had to know theology. Today the questioning aspect of the heretic has been internalized. The demand for justification is within each of us. And the knowledge of what to answer must be built into our educational agencies if Judaism is to have a future.

As far as the dangers are concerned, most of those that I

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

have outlined can, I believe, be avoided by the new approach to theology which contemporary philosophy makes possible and whose main characteristics I shall outline later.

What specifically is to be expected from a Jewish theology?

1) Theology is needed to *explicate* various principles of Judaism which are not at all clear from the Bible and Talmud. For example, medieval Jewish Philosophy focused upon the concept of God, His Unity and His attributes, what we can know about God and what we cannot. This was of permanent value and is quite relevant to the crisis in contemporary Jewish thought. An example of something still needed, however, is a clarification of our *eschatological* concepts — Messiah, world to come, and resurrection — not an anthology of relevant passages but a systematic working through of these principles showing their meaning and implications.

2) Theology is needed to show the *relationship* between various principles of Judaism. For example, I once attempted to show how the Kabbalistic thinkers alone preserved the dynamic characteristics of the concept of God's Unity and that it is within *this* concept that one is to find the impulse and the origin of the concept of ultimate and inevitable redemption.¹⁴ *Achdut*, unity, implies *malkhut*, kingship, and, as Rabbi M. Ch. Luzatto points out, there is the notion of an *achdut bishlitah* which is implicit in Rashi's comment on the *Shema*. It happens that neither Saadia nor Maimonides nor Yehuda Halevi emphasized this point. Why is it important to know this? First, so that when we say the *Shema* we can concentrate on the full meaning of this important principle. Secondly, so that when we hear a prominent scholar saying that the Jews invented the Messianic vision because they had a lack-lustre origin, we will be able to supply the correct explanation.¹⁵

Another illustration of an outstanding relationship with important practical bearing is the problem of ethics and its relationship to God. Is something good because God wants it that way or does God want it that way because it is good? Our whole understanding of the Akedah (the binding of Isaac) depends upon how we resolve this issue.

3) A third task for theology is to reconcile apparent conflicts

TRADITION: *A Journal of Orthodox Thought*

between various principles such as between human freedom and divine omniscience, or between God's justice and God's mercy. This task is too well known to require further elucidation.

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the three aforementioned tasks are of an *internal* nature arising out of the *inner needs* of Judaism. None of these functions can be thought of as being motivated by an unholy desire to reconcile Judaism with anything foreign. None of these inquiries comes about through forbidden questions of the category: "what is above and what is below, what is before and what is after." They come to the surface simply because a Jew reflects about his Judaism. And that a Jew *may* reflect about his Judaism, — nay *ought* to reflect upon his Judaism — was long ago demonstrated by a Saadia, a Maimonides, a Bachya.

The Jew, however, no matter how pious, doesn't simply sit and contemplate his Torah. We live and move in history and the theoretical principle, clarified or not, sooner or later comes into abrupt confrontation with the jagged and indifferent edge of experience.

There is the problem of evil — the problem of the suffering of the righteous and the good fortune of the wicked — which has vexed and tortured believers from Job onwards. There is conflict with science regarding the origin of species and the age of the earth, with pertinent historical findings, with widely-held psychological theories. Under the pressure of these confrontations we are sent back *both* to re-examine our principles and to apply our critical faculties to the findings of science — and out of this intellectual ferment more Jewish Theology is born. But how can we neglect to mention the challenge to Jewish thought that is presented by the unique and awesome historic experiences of our own day. Nothing so pointedly illustrates at once *the need for*, and *our lack of* a Jewish theology, than our failure to grapple on a theological level with the meaning of an Auschwitz, the State of Israel, and the implications of the Space Age (Rabbi Norman Lamm's article on "The Religious Implications of Extraterrestrial Life" in the spring 1966 issue of *Tradition* is a good beginning), and to

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

deduce from them, their meaning for our people and a direction for the future.

But over and above all these considerations there is an even more basic necessity for theology, a fundamental dependence upon philosophy which, it seems to me, no thinking Jew can avoid. One must be able to give a rational answer to the question: Why am I an Orthodox Jew? One must be able to give "reasons" not "causes." "Causes" are: "because I was brought up Orthodox," "because my parents were Orthodox." A "reason" would be: "I am Orthodox because I choose to believe that the Creator of the world revealed Himself to my forefathers at Mt. Sinai." And then one must be able to give reasons justifying that belief. If you will reply that your commitment is based upon faith about which you do not reason, you must nevertheless explain why it is that this faith needs no reasons and why it is that you choose to have faith in Judaism but not in Christianity or in Buddhism! Aristotle once said, "You say one must philosophize, then you must philosophize. You say one should not philosophize. Then, to prove your contention you must philosophize. In any case you must philosophize."

Consider Yehuda Halevi, who in many ways is the most Jewish of our philosophers. He attempted to do away with natural theology to ground Judaism upon its true epistemological basis which is — historical experience. "We know these things first from personal experience and afterwards through uninterrupted tradition which is equal to the former."¹⁶ Now all this is true, but having taken a position as to the epistemological grounds of our religious belief, we must be prepared to defend those should someone challenge the veracity of the experience or the authenticity of the Tradition. Once again we are in the midst of theology. The same answer has to be given to Samson R. Hirsch when he says: "The basis of your knowledge of God does not rest on belief which can after all allow an element of doubt. It rests solidly on the empirical evidence of your own senses . . . on what you have yourselves experienced. . . Both the Exodus and the Revelation are completely out of the realm of mere believing or thinking and are irrefutable facts which must serve as the starting points of all our other knowledge

with the same certainty as our own experience and the existence of the material world we see about us."¹⁷ These words are true when directed to the generation of the Exodus. They are not if directed to us. These events *cannot* serve as starting points to be accepted without question. Their acceptance is a matter of believing and thinking, and Hirsch himself attempts elsewhere to justify rationally the acceptance of the Oral Tradition.¹⁸ Once again we are in the midst of theology.

More recently, Heschel has attempted to distinguish between theology and depth theology. According to him, the former deals with the content of believing while depth theology "is a special type of inquiry whose theme is the act of believing; the substratum out of which belief arises."¹⁹ But upon analysis we find that this is only a confusing way of saying what has been known for a long time: that theology, as such, is never to be equated with the inwardness of faith, the experiential intimacy of the believing heart, the so-called "fact of faith."²⁰ Indeed, theological theories can never have the sanctity nor the epistemological status of the basic "facts of faith." A few pages later Heschel himself admits that the "insights of depth theology are vague and often defy formulation and expression and that it is the task of theology to establish the doctrines, bring about coherence and find words compatible with the insights." If so, we are better off to forget this misleading talk of theology and depth theology and speak only of the facts of faith and the attempt to talk about them which is theology.

Up to this point I have attempted to argue, I hope successfully, that 1) there *is* a Jewish theology, albeit largely implicit, and 2) that in our day, no thinking Jew can escape theologizing.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the question of an "indigenous" Jewish theology. Can there be such a thing?

I think it is quite clear that the perennial stumbling block encountered by all who would attempt to develop a Jewish Theology has been the invariable intrusion of contemporary Philosophical categories or presuppositions in terms of which the theologian would formulate, organize, and interpret his Jewish material. The inevitable result was an Aristotelian Judaism or a neo-Platonic Judaism or a neo-Kantian Judaism, or

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

even as someone recently maintained — although wrongly I think — that he saw in S. R. Hirsch a "Hegelian" exposition.²¹ In the same vein, some traditionalists today might dismiss the work of Rosenzweig and Buber as being an "existential version" of Judaism and, as such, impure and a distortion. This is not to say that every concept so treated necessarily becomes distorted. Quite the contrary, I think that it can be shown in many instances that the employment of foreign philosophical categories can sometimes bring out the truly Jewish content of an idea.

Nevertheless, when this occurs, the theological enterprise in question is at least open to the *charge* of no longer being an "indigenous Jewish theology." Often, these philosophical assumptions are not realized by the thinker himself who, being a "child of his age," believes his presuppositions to be the very dictates of reason itself and quite "self-evident."²²

If we are to examine the origin and source of philosophical categories it appears doubtful if we ever had, or could have, an "indigenous Jewish Theology." Dr. Berkovits, in a perceptive article in *TRADITION*, seems willing to accept this condition and suggests that perhaps each generation needs to formulate its own Jewish Philosophy in the light of the philosophical categories of its day.²³ The criterion of its authenticity as a bonafide Jewish philosophy will be its "acknowledgement of God, Israel and the Torah as historic realities" and the success of its attempt "to provide the meta-physical corollary to the facts and events for which they stand."

I think this criterion is a good one as far as it goes and is certainly a *necessary* condition of any Jewish theology. However I cannot accept the distinction made by Rabbi Berkovits that these three — God, Israel and Torah — are the "constants" of Judaism because they are "*events*" whereas once we conceptualize regarding these three we are already in the realm of variables. It is clear from philosophical analysis that there is no absolute distinction between facts and theories, and that facts rarely if ever "speak for themselves." Certainly, it must be granted that "*events*" such as God, Israel and Torah, from the very moment they are apprehended by the Jew, are not

simple discriminated elements in sense perception, but are already shot through with interpretation and conceptualization. The givenness of Judaism is not merely that an actual communication occurred between the living God and Moses, but that this living God cannot be represented by anything visual, that He is "merciful" and that He is a "jealous God," that He is One. These are already ideas. Torah is not only an event — it has conceptual content. Israel is not merely a people that historically was the recipient of a Divine Revelation — it is a concept in whose givenness there is already an attachment to a land, a Messianic future, a promise of eternity. All of these ideas, vague as they may be, are already part of the *constant* of Judaism, denial of which makes any theology suspect.

I am, however, more optimistic about the possibility of an "indigenous Jewish theology" for two reasons:

1) We are more aware today than ever before of the possibilities of extraneous influences upon our theologizing and of the tentative nature of philosophical systems and we are not ready to accept any as final. We are much more conscious today of the many-faceted nature of Judaism, of its rationalism as well as its mysticism, of its Halakhah as well as its inwardness, and we will not easily accept a theology which does not, in some serious sense, account for all aspects of historic Judaism.

This awareness, this sophistication, puts us on our guard, makes us highly critical, and enables us to come ever closer to a truly "Jewish theology."

An analogous problem exists in the philosophy of history, where it is sometimes claimed that there cannot be an objective writing of history since each historian brings to his task his biases, his prejudices and his particular principle of interpretation.²⁴ For example, does he see economic forces as crucial, or ideas as the causal factor? But here, too, the answer can be that once we are aware of the sources of subjectivity, we can watch for them and work toward a balanced view.

2) There has been a radical change in our understanding of the task of the philosophic enterprise. Contemporary philosophy in both its empirical and linguistic aspects is suspicious of metaphysical systems. Gone are the ambitious expectations that phi-

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

losophy through its own royal road to truth can illuminate for us what *ought* to be or tell us about the world of *noumena*. The dominant conception of philosophy today is a sort of anti-philosophy consisting of a critical examination of the ultimate presuppositions, the notions of explanation, the logics of belief of the various disciplines. Contemporary philosophy is only concerned to ask what kind of situations does theological and religious language talk about and how.²⁵ Philosophy only supplies the tools of linguistic analysis and the rules of deductive and inductive logic. Thus philosophy itself, employed critically, can help us to detect our prejudgments and purify our theology of extraneous elements. Many of the dangers which Rationalism, in its attempt to prove the existence of God, posed for the faith of Judaism, are not factors in the type of philosophy current today.

In a recent symposium on the directions for contemporary Jewish philosophy, Michael Wyschogrod — a professional philosopher and an orthodox Jew — confirms this judgment. "We are living in the post-enlightenment period and Jewish Philosophy can therefore return to its own sources instead of validating itself by criteria foreign to it."²⁶ This realization has cut across denominational lines and three years ago at the annual meeting of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, three papers were read urging their colleagues, in the words of S. R. Hirsch, "to forget inherited prejudices and opinions concerning Judaism . . . to go back to the source . . . to know Judaism out of itself." The program of S. R. Hirsch, the development of a "*sich selbst begreifendes Judentum*" can be achieved today. The tools are not Jewish. But they don't have to be. They are universal, as they should be.

How would one recognize an indigenous Jewish theology? What are the conditions of adequacy for such a conceptual structure? In the space of this paper we can only present the barest outline. Useful at this point is an analogy to the relationship which holds between scientific theories and empirical facts. A scientific theory may be considered confirmed if

1) it explains or accounts for all the relevant facts in terms of the theory and

TRADITION: *A Journal of Orthodox Thought*

philosophy of the *mitzvot*. The classic example of this is the contention of S. R. Hirsch that the purpose of the Sabbath is not merely for its physical rest. Since an examination of the Halakhah reveals that the Torah forbids *melekheth machshevet* (purposeful work) the purpose of the Sabbath is to teach man that he may not create, that he is only a creature; a "steward of God's estate" and that only God is the creator.

3) There is a third intersection between theology and Halakhah. This is where pure theological principles have become crystallized into Halakhah. So, for example, the Halakhah legislates that if a person does not subscribe to belief in *Torah min Hashamayim* (divine Revelation of the Torah) he is classified as a heretic with various halakhic consequences. There are several "duties of the heart" which, once they are prescribed, fall into the area of the Halakhah. Now these are best described as instances where theology has become part of the *content* of the Halakhah and as such these principles are truly authoritative. In fact, one could properly argue that in many of these instances they came to be embodied in the Halakhah because they were principles in Albo's sense — that in their absence, Judaism is not viable.

4) Now as a result of doing "philosophy of Halakhah" in the sense of 2) we may come up with certain theological principles which may be called *pre-suppositions of the Halakhah*, which Rabbi Walter S. Wurzbarger, in a recent insightful article, calls "meta-halakhic propositions."³⁰ Now I cannot agree that *all* the propositions that Rabbi Wurzbarger chooses to call meta-halakhic are indeed so. He fails to distinguish, if I read him right, between what I have called "theology crystallized into Halakhah" (my number three), which is merely halakhic propositions, and Halakhah subjected to philosophical analysis, all of whose conclusions can legitimately be called meta-halakhic (my number two). Hence, even if one should hold with Chasdai Crescas that "belief in God" cannot be a *mitzvah* and is thus not Halakhah, nevertheless this principle *can* qualify as a meta-halakhic proposition since it is unquestionably presupposed by the entire structure of Halakhah.

It is not clear to me what significance Rabbi Wurzbarger

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

places upon these meta-halakhic propositions. If, as it sometimes appears, he merely wishes to show that the "Halakhah is not devoid of all theological and philosophical presuppositions" and these are *necessary* conditions for any authentic Jewish theology, I quite agree. On the other hand, if he wishes to claim that "it is feasible to construct a philosophy of Halakhic Judaism [read Orthodox Judaism] out of the Halakhic data available to us,"³¹ I cannot agree. It has yet to be demonstrated that a philosophy of the Halakhah is the equivalent of a philosophy of Judaism.

In the latter part of this paper I have argued for the feasibility today of an indigenous Jewish theology and the conditions of adequacy which such a theology would be required to meet in order to be so judged. I think it should be clear that on the basis of what I have said there can be more than one indigenous Jewish Theology. There are areas where more than one alternate belief may fit the "facts of faith." For example: Can a Jew believe that God may reveal another Torah? What does Judaism involve in terms of psychological theory or self theory? Is Beauty an objective value in Judaism?

I would also like to suggest that we cease accepting and rejecting theologies as wholes. It is not necessary that we accept or reject Rambam *in toto*, or Moshe Chaim Luzzatto *in toto*. Each concept in Judaism must be examined critically and individually. It is by no means obvious that accepting any one part of Rambam's philosophy necessarily entails a commitment to the whole.

We must also learn to do our theology piecemeal and to build slowly toward a picture of the whole. Instead of first conceiving of an over-all grandiose scheme as to the purpose and character of Judaism and then try to force the individual concepts into the pattern, we must reverse the process. Before writing books on Judaism we must first write monographs. Let us concentrate first upon an analysis of specific concepts, special areas with as few presuppositions as possible. Only after the result of such work is before us can we go on to synthesize our conclusions and join the fragments together.

There is today a great need for, and an interest in, Jewish

TRADITION: *A Journal of Orthodox Thought*

Theology. The editors and sponsors of such journals as *Tradition* and *Judaism* are to be commended for providing both a stimulus and an outlet for work in this area. It is true that the word "Theology" has had a bad taste and bad associations for traditional Jews in the past. I believe, however, that the term *can* be reinstated if we remember that "we can admit that religious truth arises in the heart and all that theology asks is that it come out through the head."

NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 2nd edition. London: Allen and Unwin, 1920, p. 100.
2. *Mishneh Torah*, *Teshuvah* 3:7.
3. *Bereshit Rabbah* 44.
4. *Avot* 3:16.
5. *Eruvin* 13 b.
6. Solomon Schechter, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, New York: Schocken Books, 1961, p. 12.
7. A. J. Heschel, *Man is Not Alone*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951, p. 129.
8. I. Grunfeld, *Horeb*, London: The Soncino Press, 1962, Introd., p. xiv (Vol. 1).
9. E. Borowitz, "The Typological Theology of J. B. Soloveitchik," *Judaism*, Vol. 15, No. 2.
10. *Avot* 2:1.
11. *Sanhedrin* 21 b.
12. See Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1961, Vols. 1 & 2, particularly Vol. 2.
13. *Avot* 2:14.
14. Shubert Spero, "Unity of God as Dynamic of Redemption," *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 1.
15. H. Greenstone, *Messiah Idea in Jewish History*, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1906, p. 24.
16. Yehuda Halevi, *Kitab Al Khazari*, Trans. by H. Hirshfeld, New York: Bernard and Richards Co. 1927, p. 47.
17. S. R. Hirsch, *Commentary on Ex. 19:4*. Translated by I. Levy. London: 1958.
18. *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by N. Frankfort: 1908-12, Vol. 1 p. 97.
19. A. J. Heschel, *The Insecurity of Freedom*, New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1966, p. 117.

"Is There an Indigenous Jewish Theology?"

20. See J. Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963, pp. 76-77.
21. Noah H. Rosenbloom in *Historica Judaica*, New York, Vol. XXII No. 1.
22. On the role of "Pre-Suppositions." See R. G. Collingwood's *An Essay In Metaphysics*, Parts I & II. Oxford University Press, 1940.
23. "What is Jewish Philosophy?" *Tradition* Vol. 3 No. 2, p. 121.
24. See W. H. Walsh. *Philosophy of History*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, Chap. 5.
25. I. T. Ramsey, "Contemporary Philosophy and the Christian Faith" in *Religious Studies*, Vol. 1. No. 1.
26. In *Judaism* Vol. II No. 3, p. 196.
27. S. Belkin, *In His Image*, London, New York, Toronto: Abelard-Schuman, 1961, p. 16.
28. G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, New York: Schocken Books, 1941, p. 28.
29. Gen. 1:27.
30. "Meta-Halakhic Propositions," in *Leo Jung Jubilee Volume*, New York, 1962.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 212.