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LOGOTHERAPY AND JUDAISM—SOME PHILOSOPHICAL COMPARISONS

INTRODUCTION

The luck of the draw, pot luck, and other forms of good fortune have been traditionally associated with Las Vegas, Bingo parlors, race tracks, etc. More recently, the projection of various personages on the world stage as giants of the spirit has been exposed in many instances as gross misrepresentation, if not distortion. Even the supposed choosing of a President is acknowledged to be more a matter of being in the right place at the right time, a fusion of the many necessary facets of luck, than it is a matter of possessing the talents and qualities for the job. One speaks of the "making" of the President, rather than the "choosing" of a President.

It would be expected that in the world of the intellect, the realm of scholarship, the element of luck should not be a factor. Ideas and issues should here be judged on objective grounds, without intervention of elements extraneous to the subject matter. Scientific objectivity and all that it implies militates in this direction. However, such is not always the case. Witness the differing reactions by Jews to Sigmund Freud and his Psychoanalysis in contrast to Viktor Frankl and his Logotherapy. Freud was accosted, even embraced by his Jewish brethren, even though he declared,

The Jewish societies in Vienna, in short the Jews altogether, have celebrated me like a national hero, although my service to the Jewish cause is confined to a single point—I have never denied my Jewishness.¹

Frankl, on the other hand, has been virtually ignored. Not only have Christians who studied Logotherapy ignored his relationship to Jewish tradition, but he is also almost unknown in contemporary Jewish thought. Frankl's relative obscurity in Jewish circles cannot be dismissed as an accident. He writes of an experience when lecturing a group of Jewish scholars,

I gave a lecture and they just tried to finish me off. Everybody was against my philosophy and said it is clear that everything has to be explained along the lines of Freudian psychoanalysis; because Freud is to this Jewish group higher than Moses; first comes Freud, and then let us see to what extent Moses can be compromised with Freud.²

Frankl writes further,

I have lectured at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. On the day before, I went through the desert, until I did not see anything but desert. The next day when I was lecturing on Logotherapy at the Hebrew University, I felt more lonely than when I was in the desert.⁸

All this, even though Frankl makes no pretenses about his Jewishness, and adheres, in his personal life, to much of the Jewish tradition. For reasons which must belong in the domain of mazzal, luck, Frankl the Jew has not been accepted by his brethren, whilst Freud the Jew has been accepted. What effect this has had on the prominence of Freudian psychoanalysis as opposed to the obscurity of Franklian Logotherapy in Jewish circles is a matter of conjecture. Suffice it to say that the responsibility for objectivity demands a closer examination of Logotherapy in the light of Jewish tradition. "Frankl, the man and his philosophy, deserves greater recognition and a wider audience."

This essay will present the basic philosophy which underlines Logotherapy as a clinical tool, and will propose some comparisons of this philosophy with traditional Jewish thought. It should be noted at the outset that what is being suggested is not an equating of Logotherapy with Judaism. The dialectic of Judaism on the issues which will be discussed is too variegated to identify the "Jewish" view. It will suffice to present some common ground shared by Logotherapy and Judaism.

I

Logotherapy, the teachings of the third Viennese School of Psychotherapy, is a psychotherapy which derives its tenets from the essence of man's spiritual dimension.

Man lives in three dimensions: the somatic, the mental, and the spiritual. The spiritual dimension cannot be ignored, for it is what makes us human.⁵

As opposed to the Freudian school, which centers on the will to pleasure, and the Adlerian school, which focuses on the will to power, this movement concentrates on the will to meaning. The kernel of the logotherapeutic thesis may be summed up in the following: ". . . the striving to find a meaning in one's life is the primary motivational force in man." Logotherapy attempts to understand man relative to the meaning of his existence. It concerns itself with the problems of meaninglessness, the "existential vacuum," and the resultant noogenic neuroses. Joseph Fabry has translated Logotherapy as "therapy of meaning." As an aside, Frankl refers to Leo Baeck's translation of Torah as "meaning," and sees a common direction shared by Logotherapy and Judaism.

Frankl asserts that every form of clinical psychotherapy is based on a philosophy of man, a philosophy which is at times covert. "Every school of psychotherapy has a concept of man, although this concept is not always held consciously." Frankl's Logotherapy is, of course, no exception to this rule. Fortunately, the philosophy espoused by Logotherapy is fundamentally explicit. The concept of man which serves as the foundation of Logotherapy consists of three fundamental, interrelated assumptions: (1) freedom of will; (2) will to meaning; and (3) meaning of life.

 Π

FREEDOM OF WILL

According to Frankl, man possesses a positive vector, a natural

bent towards an objective goal in transcendent space. Frustration of this natural inclination may lead to what Frankl has termed "noogenic neuroses." Freedom of will is seen as the absence of any factor which impedes man's flight into noetic space. Three forces in and around man are generally regarded as constricting in this sense: instinct, inherited disposition, and environment.

With regard to instincts, Frankl asserts;

Certainly man has instincts, but these instincts do not have him. We have nothing against instincts, nor against a man's accepting them. But we hold that such acceptance must also presuppose the possibility of rejection. In other words, there must have been freedom of decision. We are concerned above all with man's freedom to accept or reject his instincts.¹⁰

Concerning inherited traits, Frankl counters that predisposition is an indication rather than a negation of freedom. He cites the evidence of identical twins who evolve differently from the same predisposition.

Of a pair of identical twins, one became a cunning criminal, whilst his brother became an equally cunning criminologist. Both were born with cunning, but this trait in itself implies no values, neither vice nor virtue.¹¹

Accordingly, the difference between the criminal and the criminologist is basically a difference in how each decides to parlay his cunning.

Frankl takes a parallel approach with regard to the environment factor. All depends on what man makes of his environment, on his attitude toward it.¹²

Instinct, heredity, and environment become, in Frankl's view, partial and potential determinants. They are partial determinants in that they establish the specific boundaries of human béhavior. Within these limits, man is free to decide what his stand will be. These factors are potential determinants in that man can accept, reject, or manipulate them according to his own volition. He possesses the ability to rise above the bounded surface area of psychic and somatic determinants into a new, dis-

tinctly human dimension, the spiritual, or noological. Floating in this dimension, man can look down at the forces which tend to dehumanize him, and ultimately he alone decides the extent to which he will be steered by them. In the noological domain, man exercises the distinctly human phenomenon of self-detachment, detaching his self from himself and becoming the arbiter of his future.

Frankl is not concerned with the reality that biology may confine man's vocational choice or that sociology may dictate it. As long as man, within a given framework, remains able to ascend the heights which are indicated by his humanity, as long as he retains the ability to actualize values, he is considered free. This stems from the implicit notion throughout Frankl's writings that freedom is interrupted only by factors which prevent man's natural bent to reach specific values. Frankl believes that no such factor exists, for with the potential of a determining factor is necessarily attached the ability to reject it. Frankl goes so far as to consider man's destiny, or his conditional factors, as prerequisites for freedom:

Freedom without destiny is impossible; freedom can only be freedom in the face of a destiny, a free stand toward destiny. Certainly man is free, but he is not floating freely in airless space. He is always surrounded by a host of restrictions. These restrictions, however, are the jumping-off points for his freedom. Freedom presupposes restrictions, is contingent upon restrictions...

The ground upon which a man walks is always being transcended in the process of walking, and serves as ground only to the extent that it is transcended, that it provides a springboard.

If we wanted to define man, we would have to call him that entity which has freed itself from whatever has determined it (determined it as a biological-psychological-sociological type); that entity, in other words, that transcends all these determinants either by conquering them and shaping them, or by deliberately submitting to them.¹⁸

In a word, Frankl admits the existence, even the necessity, of horizontal restrictions, but denies the existence of vertical restrictions. Man is conceived as having positive vertical vector, to be impeded by horizontal factors only as much as he allows.

Freedom, for Frankl, demands no special proof. It belongs "to the immediate data of his experience." 14

Freud once said:

Try and subject a number of very strongly differentiated human beings to the same amount of starvation. With the increase of the imperative need for food, all individual differences will be blotted out, and, in their place, we shall see the uniform expression of the one unsatisfied instinct.¹⁵

The concentration camps, in Frankl's view, proved Freud wrong. The camps proved that man cannot be reduced to a function of heredity and environment, for at the same time that some inmates of the camp degenerated into the innate camp bestiality, others exhibited the virtues of saintliness. A third variable, found only in the spiritual animal, man, is the decisive factor in human behavior, choice or decision. "Man ultimately decides for himself."¹⁶

The experiences of the concentration camps as proof of man's free will demand further explanation. Is not the skeptic likely to claim that those who behaved as bestially as their environment were compelled by conditions? As for the exceptions who attained saintly status, perhaps they possessed saintly instincts. Why derive from the few that man is free when the actions of the many indicate he is not?

The response to this is that freedom of the will, in Frankl's view, is not a necessary component of behavior, but a potential to be realized;

For in every case man retains the freedom and the possibility of deciding for or against the influence of his surroundings. Although he may seldom exert this freedom or utilize this opportunity to choose—it is open to him to do so.¹⁷

Man will be shaped by his environment as long as he does not pause and confront himself with life. Man becomes free the moment he detaches his self from himself and analyzes the meaning of his life vis-a-vis where life is carrying him, or the moment he becomes human. The prisoner of biology, sociology, or psychology is ultimately the man who has allowed these forces,

by his passivity, to impede his humaneness.

The notion of free will as developed by Logotherapy invites some interesting comparisons. Because Logotherapy is conceived as a secular discipline, the problem of free will vs. Providence is extraneous to the logotherapeutic framework. The theological ingredient in Judaic free will is lacking in Logotherapy, so that any comparison must make dimensional adjustments.

Sforno, commenting on the words ". . . He formed him in the likeness of God,"18 explains this as meaning man is master of choice. Free will is here seen as a Divine ingredient in man. The ultimate resolution of the free will vs. Providence problem appears to be a matter of faith. The Talmudic recognition of this problem comes in the form of a succinct statement stating the problem whilst at the same time using the problem as the solution. "Everything is foreseen but the right (of choice) is granted."19 The solution is the problem itself. All is foreseen, but not in a causative manner. God's foreknowledge and man's free will are not mutually exclusive. There is no attempt in this statement to solve the dilemma. Rather, it tends toward the idea that faith in God as the all-powerful and all-knowing Creator is what gives life purpose, what gives man faith in his own existence. Having faith in meaningful existence and in purposeful creation are inseparable concepts, and, as faith, have value in spite of seeming incomprehensibility. Without free will, however, life itself loses meaning, so that meaningfulness, and faith in same, are predicated on free will. Logotherapy too, which postulates the notion of the unconditional meaningfulness of human existence, has as its first philosophical principle the existence of free will.

The Franklian notion of freedom as dependent on destiny is a striking parallel to the Talmudic statement "Everything is in the hand of heaven except the fear of heaven." Rashi, in elaborating, explains that whether a man is tall or short, poor or rich, wise or stupid, depends on pre-destination; the only choice left for man is whether he will be righteous or wicked.

As the logotherapist would interpret it, man's environment, his social condition, his biological makeup, are of necessity predetermined, but the attitude of man to his condition remains

untouched by determinism. His social condition may prevent him from attaining certain vocational objectives, his biological makeup may restrict his social development, but no factor impedes man in his quest to realize meaning in his life situation.

Frankl's reference to the twins with cunning, one of whom became a lawyer, the other a criminal, has its parallel in the following Talmudic passage;

He who is born under Mars will be a shedder of blood. R. Ashi observed: Either a surgeon, a thief, a slaughterer, or a circumciser.²¹

The mazzal man is born under, his destiny, is not a negation of the idea of free will. According to Logotherapy, man's freedom can only be understood in the face of some destiny.

Ш

THE WILL TO MEANING

The second major philosophical tent of Logotherapy is the will to meaning.

Pleasure and power, the fulcrums of life according to Freud and Adler, are undermined by Frankl. At no time does he moralize against these principles. His outlook towards them is an outgrowth of life experiences. Frankl, here and throughout his works, creates a unique form of experiental philosophy, combining his experiences as a doctor and concentration camp inmate with his existentialist leanings. He establishes as a yardstick the properly functioning human being, function here taken in an existential sense. Life's goals and aspirations are judged according to their utility in attaining and maintaining proper functioning. The will to pleasure, for Frankl, "is a self-defeating principle inasmuch as the more a man would really set out to strive for pleasure the less he would gain it."22 Moreover, most cases of sexual neuroses are resultant of striving directly for pleasure. In healthy reality, pleasure is merely a byproduct of fulfillment. The will to power is really the tools manipulated by man in order to achieve some goal. There is a higher principle guiding life, the will to meaning.

In the last analysis, it turns out that both the will to pleasure and the will to power are derivatives of the original will to meaning. Pleasure, as mentioned above, is an effect of meaning fulfillment; power is a means to an end. A certain amount of power, such as economic or financial power, is generally a prerequisite of meaning fulfillment. Thus we could say that the will to pleasure mistakes the effect for the end; while the will to power mistakes the means to an end for the end itself.²³

Frankl is not hereby denying that man aims for pleasure or power. That such striving is the underlying cause of certain neuroses leads Frankl to reject them as absolute goals in a properly functioning human being; the properly functioning human being serving as the model, or construct, of Frankl's philosophy.

The striving to find a meaning in one's life has been categorized by Frankl as will to differentiate from drive. Man is not driven toward meaning, for then his behavior would be symptomatically equivalent to the homeostatic urge involved in the pleasure principle. Meaning would lose meaning, and would become a tool through which man satisfies his desire for equilibrium.

Then, too, will admits of choice, whereas drive implies an irresistable inner force compelling behavior. Freedom of will is the necessary philosophical forerunner of the will to meaning.

Meaning as a drive would also not fit into Frankl's implicit system of man as positive vertical vector. Satisfying drives have as their ultimate purpose the relaxation of the tension caused by them. But tensionless man is directionless man, and directionless man is bound to develop those neuroses that are born of directionlessness, or boredom, or, as Frankl calls it, the existential vacuum. It is thus rejected as drive and established as will on the grounds that as a drive it would not be conducive to the human model.

Even self-realization and self-actualization are seen as side effects of man's search for a meaning outside himself:

... the true meaning of life is to be found in the world rather than within man or his own psyche, as though it were a closed system. By the same token, the real aim of human existence cannot be found in

what is called self-actualization. Human existence is essentially self-transcendence rather than self-actualization. Self-actualization is not a possible aim at all, for the simple reason that the more a man would strive for it, the more he would miss it. For only to the extent to which man commits himself to the fulfillment of his life's meaning, to this extent he also actualizes himself. In other words, self-actualization cannot be attained if it is made an end in itself, but only as a side effect of self-transcendence.²⁴

Frankl adds a new component to his human model. Man is perceived as positive vertical vector of infinite magnitude. Self-transcendence is a never-ending dynamic, just as life and meaning. Man is always striving; one accomplishment is not an excuse to relax from the responsibilities facing man, is not an end in itself. Self-actualization would perhaps set a limit to the human vector, inviting through the suspension of dynamics some form of neurosis.

Accomplishment becomes the momentum for additional accomplishment, and in this perpetual process man fulfills, tangentially, his own self.

Frankl's rejection of the pleasure principle as it is self-defeating has some interesting parallels in Talmudic literature. According to Norman Salit, the self-defeating nature of the striving for pleasure

... is in the nature of the motivation that appears in a similar maxim in the Talmud: "From him who seeks greatness, greatness flees; but him who flees from greatness, greatness follows." The real saints were those who sought not sainthood but service.²⁵

The formula as stated by Frankl that the more a person sets out to strive for pleasure the less he will gain it, is more clearly alluded to in the following;

Nobody departs from the world with half his desire gratified. If he has a hundred he wants to turn them into two hundred, and if he has two hundred he wants to turn them into four hundred.²⁶

The idea of the will to power as a means rather than an end is clearly congenial to the Judaic view, which places so much

responsibility on the man with means, and calls the various forms of charity, *tzedakah*, implying that sharing wealth is just and equitable, not philanthropic. The power gained through wealth becomes the means through which to actualize the meaning values entailed in possession.

Frankl proposes the will to meaning as the primary motivational force in man. One senses almost intuitively that the term "meaning" employed by Frankl is closely akin to what the Talmud intends with the term "Torah." Thus, the statement "Every man is born for toil . . ."²⁷ is explained as meaning ". . . that one was created to labor in the Torah."²⁸ Torah becomes the vehicle for meaning.

The affinity the basic thrust of Logotherapy has with Judaic cosmology invites the following observation;

What Frankl calls "Logotherapy" and the "will to meaning" is not unlike the striving for an ordered, meaningful cosmos on the part of the rabbinic teachers in their own times.²⁹

Frankl insists that the essence of the human endeavor is self-transcendence. We now call upon Frankl himself to illustrate how the notion of self-transcendence relates to Judaism. Frankl, in alluding to the statement of Hillel, "... But if I am for my own self (only), what am I..."³⁰, expounds:

... what here comes in is no more nor less than the self-transcendent quality of human existence. The question, What am I if I do it for my own sake only—requires the answer: In no event a truly human being. For it is a characteristic constituent of human existence that it transcends itself, that it reaches out for something other than itself.⁸¹

Frankl delineates sharply between the concept of self-transcendence and the notion of self-actualization, calling self-actualization a side-effect of self-transcendence rather than a primary phenomenon. This recalls the Talmudic dictum, "Make them not a crown wherewith to magnify thyself, nor a spade wherewith to dig,"³² which can be interpreted in the logotherapeutic vein as: Do not make Torah, the transcendent value system, a crown, a vehicle for self-actualization. Meaning must be pursued for its own sake, *lishmah*; the self-realization follows naturally.

IV

THE MEANING OF LIFE

The third major philosophical tenet of Logotherapy is the meaning of life. As opposed to the concepts of freedom of will and will to meaning, which are approached on phenomenological grounds, Frankl's concept of the meaning of life is a little more abstract.

Logotherapy conceives of man as one who wills. To conceive of man as one who wills, as one who is "pulled by meaning," is to conceive of a world filled with objective meaning. Frankl stands in rigid opposition to the homunculist, nothing-but picture of man; man portrayed as biology-sociology-psychology; the subject, man, being reduced to an object, or accident, of his conditions. Concurrently, Frankl rejects the subjectivization of all values, the reduction of meaning to mere self-expression. Man, like the decrepit arc, needs a pulling tension, a subject-object dynamics, or, in Frankl's words, noodynamics:

Cognition is grounded, indispensably, on a field of polar tension between the objective and the subjective, for only on this basis is the essential dynamic of the cognitive act established. I call this dynamic "noodynamic"—in contrast to all psychodynamics.³⁴

Man oscillates between the subjective "I am" and the objective "I ought," and insofar as he strives for the ought he transcends his self and actualizes his responsibleness. In Frankl's view, "Existence falters unless it is lived in terms of transcendence toward something beyond itself."

The subject, man, is thus confronted with objective values. These values pull him, eliciting from him the noodynamic reponse which willfully transcends the subjective state into the objective value world.

Frankl offers no proof that objective values exist. That these values are objective follows necessarily from Frankl's view of man. The human model, the properly functioning man, is directed towards meaning. If meaning were subjective, the dynamics of transcendence would be destroyed and existence would falter.

Therefore, meaning must be objective. No circular argument, this principle as well as others in Frankl's system are derived from the premise that truth is perceived in utility. Man is at his best when indulging in self-transcendence; thus testifying to the validity of the concept of self-transcendence. Since self-transcendence demands objective values, objective values are as real as existence. It would be folly to believe that man is born without the tools of human existence, the tools needed to achieve his mission in life.

In Frankl's notion of objective values is salient an unshakeable faith in the unconditional meaning of existence. It is this faith in unconditional meaning which is the hallmark of Logotherapy. The three basic philosophical tenets of Logotherapy are emanations from this faith. Meaningful existence means that man *chooses* his existence, and is not driven to choose but rather wills his choice. The choice, however, is resultant of a confrontation with *objective* values. Man decides whether to say yes or no to these values.

There is, according to Frankl, no general, all-encompassing meaning of life. It is comparable to the question posed to a chess player, "What is the best move?" There is no best move just as there is no universal meaning. Instead, meaning is detected in man's confrontation with his unique situation. Every man is unique, all situations are unique, hence all confrontations are unique. Each confrontation carries its own particular meaning; man detects the objective meaning in the subjectiveness of his situation.

Frankl does categorize three species of values contained in life. They are (1) creative values, or what man gives to life; (2) experiental values, or what man takes from the world in terms of his experience; and (3) attitudinal values, or the stand man takes toward an unchangeable aspect of his existence.

Attitudinal values are central to Logotherapy, for they are directly linked to the concept of unconditional meaningfulness. Frankl insists that even when man is choked by tortuous suffering, he can still exercise his humaneness.

Thus, life has a meaning to the last breath. For the possibility of

realizing values by the very attitude with which we face our unchangeable suffering—this possibility exists to the very last moment . . . 36

Man's life is judged not on a quantitative basis, but on what he makes of his life situation, a qualitative judgment. The meaningful question is not "what," but "how;" not what was accomplished, rather how was life lived, how were the singular opportunities that total man's existence used?

It is not from the length of its span that we can ever draw conclusions as to a life's meaningfulness. We cannot, after all, judge a biography by its length, by the number of pages in it; we must judge by the richness of the contents. The heroic life of one who has died young certainly has more content and meaning than the existence of some long-lived dullard. Sometimes the "unfinisheds" are among the most beautiful symphonies.³⁷

In the suffering situation, the range of choice is naturally constricted, but attitudinal choices are still available. That man cannot choose to travel to a country which can use his talents because he is bedridden does not mean he is not free. The constrictedness of his situation gives birth to unique objective values which form the matrix of his choice options. Freedom itself is only meaningful in the face of values which confront man.

Frankl's notion of objective values again strikes a close parallel with the Judaic notion of values embodied in Torah.

What is the meaning of the verse: "And I will give thee the tables of stone, and the law and the commandment, which I have written that thou mayest teach them?" 'Tables of stone:' these are the ten commandments; 'the law:' this is the Pentateuch; 'the commandment:' this is the Mishnah; 'which I have written:' these are the prophets and the Hagiographa; 'that thou mayest teach them:' this is the Gemara. It teaches (us) that all these things were given to Moses on Sinai.³⁸

This Talmudic passage is a statement establishing the value code of Judaism as given at revelation. Revelation is the handing down of the tools of the human dynamic, values, to human-kind. The objectivity of values is established through its emanating from a source outside the subject, man. The path of

Frankl's insistence on objective values approximates, within the secular dimension, the theological thrust of Judaism.

In Judaism, man is confronted with the unique value set which encompasses Torah. The concept of tinok shenishbah, the child who is taken into captivity, and is thus not blamed for his non-adherence to Judaism, may be seen as based on the absence of a confrontation with Judaism. The captive child has never had a chance to say "yes" to Judaism, and his non-adherence is therefore not considered saying "no" to Judaism. Ideally, the Jew's choosing of his faith is the outgrowth of his confrontation with that faith, what Logotherapy would call a subject-object dynamics. However, when the subject is denied encounter with the objective, the resultant vacuum cannot be ascribed to him.

Judaism too, does not prescribe any set, rigid path to human existence. Whether one is a sage or a laborer, ". . . from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water," man can carve a niche for himself in the encounter which is life. The vital factor is "Let all thine actions be for (the sake of) the name of Heaven," that is, the actions should be oriented in the transcendent meaning direction.

Frankl's distinction between creative and experiental values finds its expression in Judaism. Again, we call on Frankl himself to illustrate:

Meaning can be found in life . . . for six days by working. But . . . work is not the only task we have—literally man was not made only to labor. That is to say, the meaning of Shabbat may well consist in reaching beyond work. There are creative values, there are experiental values, there are attitudinal values. This means we may find the meaning in our lives through a deed we are doing, through a work we are creating, through an achievement and accomplishment, through creativity, six days. But also through our experience. Not through what we give to the world but what we receive from the world; what we take in.⁴¹

The attitudinal value concept and its importance in facing suffering again invite comparison with the anecdote reported in the Talmud when R. Eliezer fell ill. Three elders tried to comfort him by praising him and his great deeds. The fourth, R. Akiba,

R. Akiba explained his statement through an allusion to a particularly evil monarch who was unmindful of all attempts to reform him but was brought back on the right path through suffering. Man's proper attitude to his suffering makes suffering precious. Indeed, "He who joyfully bears the chastisements that befall him brings salvation to the world."

It goes almost without saying that Frankl's approach to life on a qualitative rather than quantitative basis is congenial to Judaic thought. Although there are such ostensibly quantitative maxims, as "... everything is in accordance with the preponderance of (man's) deed(s),"44 yet the feeling that life is a qualitative entity persists. "One may acquire eternity in a single hour, another may acquire it after many years!"45 Quantity yes, but qualitative quantity.

 \mathbf{v}

This essay has attempted to show how the philosophical foundations of Logotherapy relate to Judaism. At this point, I am not prepared to say that everything in Logotherapy is an expression of Jewish tradition, or is even compatible with Judaism. What can be asserted without hesitation is that there is enough reason to believe that a dialogue between Judaism and Logotherapy is possible, if not imperative.

It is true that Frankl conceives Logotherapy as a secular theory. Yet this secularity is not intended to cut off the religious dimension. It is a secularity in the form of religion for the non-religious, an attempt to make Logotherapy available even to the atheist and agnostic. This openness of Logotherapy leads into many theological areas, including Judaism.

Consciously or unconsciously, Frankl has given expression to traditional Jewish concepts and insights; his Logotherapeutic approach to the ills of the human psyche are consistent with the basic tenets of Judaism.⁴⁶

Those who feel the need to develop a Jewish psychotherapy need not resort to dubious creativity when a system which is

apparently open to Judaic thought and is acknowledged for its clinical efficacy is available. One can at this point in time only echo the feeling that insofar as Logotherapy is concerned, it has been almost ignored by its most logical advocate. This is unfortunate for both, as Judaism and Logotherapy can only gain from a direct confrontation with one another.

NOTES

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 - 39. Deuteronomy 29:10.
 - 40. Abot 2:12.
- 41. Viktor E. Frankl, "Friday Lecture," in *Three Lectures on Logotherapy*, Transcription of a Tape Printed as a Manuscript, Brandeis, California, Brandeis Institute, July, 1966, p. 15-16.
 - 42. Sanhedrin 101:a.
 - 43. Ta'anit 8:a.
 - 44. Abot 3:15.
 - 45. Abodah Zarah 10:b.
 - 46. Norman Salit, op. cit., p. 307.