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This paper is a revised version of an address and a response by the authors presented at the Midyear Conference of the Rabbinic Alumni of the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary, Yeshiva University in 1976. Professors Mayer and Waxman teach sociology at Brooklyn College and Rutgers University respectively.

MODERN JEWISH ORTHODOXY IN AMERICA: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000

To the chagrin of many unemployed professors of history, futurology, or the study of the future, has replaced the study of the past on many college campuses. Despite our reservations about man's ability to predict accurately the course of future events,¹ we do agree with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Hudson Institute, that there are statistically demonstrable trends which provide "baselines" or "a framework for speculation" on what American society will be like in the year 2,000.² The purpose of this paper is to discuss a number of baselines for the future of modern Orthodox Judaism in America.³

Perhaps the most crucial place to begin is with an examination of size. The number of people that a group counts as its own is important in all societies, and even more so to minorities. Basic as the question of numbers is, the answer involves very complex methodological problems. There is no simple method of determining who is and who is not an Orthodox Jew.⁴ Even if the matter of definition were resolved, there is still the matter of a reliable census. In 1965, Charles S. Liebman used the criterion of synagogue enrollments, and he estimated that there were a total of 205,640 adult males affiliated with 1,600 Orthodox synagogues in the United States.⁵ More recently, the National Jewish Population Study found that 11 percent of the approxi-

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mately 1,900,000 Jewish households in the United States, or approximately 209,000 Jewish households, describe themselves as "Orthodox."⁶ But this figure is not quite the whole picture. On the one hand the Study found that only 4.2 percent of the heads of household (or about 9,000) under the age of thirty identify themselves as Orthodox.⁷ On the other hand, there is good reason to suspect that a larger proportion of the older Jews would fall into the category which Liebman refers to as "non-observant Orthodox."⁸ Thus, in terms of charting baselines for the future, we suggest that this 4.2 percent figure, or the approximately 9,000 Orthodox Jewish families with heads of household under age 30, must be considered the solid stock in the future of American Orthodox Jewry.

A second set of figures which must be seriously considered is that dealing with the number of children enrolled in *yeshivot*, or Hebrew day schools. In terms of numbers there has been a virtual boom in the growth of the day school movement since World War II.

TABLE I*

Number of Hebrew Day Schools, Types, and Enrollments

	<i>Total Day Schools</i>	<i>High Schools</i>	<i>Total Enrollments</i>	<i>Number of Communities</i>
1940	35		7,700	7
1945	69	9	10,200	31
1955	180		35,500	68
1965	323	83	63,500	117
1970			72,000	
1975	425	138	82,200	160

As the above table indicates, the number of day schools grew from 35 to 323 and enrollments grew from 7,700 to 63,500 between the years 1940 to 1965. By 1975, there were a total

* Data based on materials provided by Torah Umesorah and on Alvin I. Schiff: *The Jewish Day School in America*, New York, Jewish Education Committee Press, 1966.

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of 425 day schools, 138 high schools, with a total enrollment of 82,200. These schools are located not only in the New York metropolitan area, but in 33 of the States. By 1975, every city in the United States with a Jewish population of 7,500 had at least one day school, as did four out of five of the cities with a Jewish population of 5,000-7,500. Among cities with smaller Jewish populations, one out of four with a population of 1,000 Jews had a Jewish day school.⁹ Since Orthodox affiliation is apparently directly correlated with *yeshiva* and day school education, these figures suggest that we may predict a considerable increase in the numbers of young Orthodox families, at least for the next decade.

Whether or not this pattern will continue into the twenty-first century, however, depends on quite another matter, namely, the family planning patterns of the next generation of Orthodox parents, and on this matter the data is far from clear and the studies which we have are tentative and imprecise. For example, in a study by Goldstein and Goldscheider,¹⁰ which is a model of methodological refinement, we find that there is a small difference in family size between Orthodox, Conservative and Reform Jews, but that difference disappears when control variables are introduced for age, generational status, secular education, and social status.¹¹ Leff's study of eight Young Israel synagogues found the average number of children to be 2.5,¹² which suggests that the modern Orthodox Jewish birth rate has levelled off at slightly more than the replacement level of 2.1 children, and that the modern Orthodox segment has only the barest edge over the non-Orthodox, since the overall American Jewish birth rate appears to be no more than 2.2 children.¹³

In any case, the pattern which emerges from the data on day school education presents an interesting paradox. Whereas earlier generations of American Jews were more apt to identify with Orthodoxy, until the Second World War they were, by and large, unable or unwilling to establish those institutions which would perpetuate Orthodoxy. By contrast, since the end of the War, when the balance of numbers shifted against Orthodoxy, *yeshivot* and day schools have dotted the Jewish communal landscape in increasing numbers.

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The same pattern holds with respect to *mikvaot*, the ritual baths in which Orthodox Jewish women immerse themselves after the conclusion of their menstrual cycles. Liebman cites a report that in 1928, there were few *mikvaot* available and even those were hardly used.¹⁴ By contrast, in 1974, there were approximately 100 community *mikvaot* in the United States, of which only about 10 percent are located in the New York Metropolitan area. Indeed, there is at least one community *mikvah* in more than half of the States in the United States, and many more private ones.¹⁵

These facts and figures indicate several significant trends with respect to the future of the Orthodox Jewish community in the United States. First, there is good reason to suspect that while the number of Orthodox Jews is bound to decline in the coming decades, the proportion of young Orthodox Jews to the total of Orthodox Jews is likely to increase. Second, the preceding facts and figures indicate that the Orthodox Jewish community is far more sophisticated in terms of organizational complexity and expertise than it was twenty-five years ago. This latter trend is further supported by the growth of large organizations such as the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA), the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), the National Society for Hebrew Day Schools (*Torah Umesorah*), the National Council of Young Israel, Yeshiva University Community Service Division, and many others which deal with various aspects of the national Orthodox Jewish community.¹⁶

Several other significant characteristics are those relating to educational, occupational and social class patterns. One of the accepted truisms of Jewish social science is that Orthodox Jews may be distinguished from their Conservative and Reform brethren by their lower academic, occupational and social status achievements. For example, Seymour Leventman asserts that "although there are local variations, the general pattern is an association among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform synagogues and lower, middle and upper class Jews respectively."¹⁷ Another accepted truism, not only in Jewish social science but in American social science generally, is that the pursuit of secular education and upward social mobility are causally related to

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the abandonment of Orthodox religiosity. Andrew M. Greeley has challenged this notion on the basis of his data on the religious attitudes and practices of graduate students.¹⁸ Insofar as Orthodox Jews, in particular, are concerned, the two most recent empirical studies available, that by Mayer on the Orthodox Jewish community in Boro Park, Brooklyn,¹⁹ and Leff's survey,²⁰ seriously challenge the conventional wisdom. They found that the vast majority of the parents whose children are enrolled in day schools expect their children to become professionals. The children appear to oblige their parents' expectations, at least in this matter, by attending colleges and universities. In a special survey of the Boro Park Young Israel Intercollegiate group, Mayer again found a uniformly high regard for both religious and secular education, with a high expectation rate of completing a college education.²¹ Moreover, approximately 9 percent of Mayer's sample who were under the age of 30 indicated that they were enrolled in an advanced degree program.²² In his Young Israel survey, Leff found that about 20 percent of the respondents had a master's degree and another 3 percent had completed or were working toward a doctorate.²³

Insofar as occupational patterns are concerned, Orthodox Jews have followed their non-Orthodox brethren out of blue-collar jobs and the crafts into business occupations and, more recently, from business to both the traditional free professions (e.g., law, medicine, accounting) as well as the bureaucratic and civil service professions (e.g., engineering, teaching, social work, public administration). Leff found that 63 percent of his respondents were in the professions.²⁴

With the changes in educational and occupational patterns there has been a commensurate upward trend in the income patterns of Orthodox Jews. Poor Jews notwithstanding,²⁵ the Orthodox Jewish community of today is solidly middle class. Both the Mayer and Leff figures confirm that the income achievements of Orthodox Jews are significantly higher than those of their urban neighbors.²⁶

The establishment of baselines for speculation about the future involves not only the description of statistically verifiable trends, but also the identification of broader cultural and social struc-

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tural tendencies which may be somewhat less amenable to empirical demonstration. For example, the patterns of educational and socio-economic achievement may be an integral part of or only coincidentally related to general economic and attitudinal patterns in American society. These larger patterns cannot be as accurately summarized as the patterns of achievement themselves. Nevertheless, an understanding of these broader patterns is essential to any speculation about the future.

We would suggest that there are a number of macro-societal, historical tendencies of both short and long ranges which serve as the background against which the picture of economic and social well-being which characterize the Orthodox community must be analyzed. Among the short range factors would be included such phenomena as the "New Left" and "Black Power" movements of the late 1960s and the recent wars in Israel, which have served both to raise group self-consciousness and also to mobilize people on behalf of existing or new organizations.²⁷ Other factors which have had positive consequences for Orthodox Judaism in the United States include some of the federal legislation during the 1960s, which both extended protection to the rights of minorities and also pumped public monies into programs which legitimately found their way into Orthodox organizations. We refer to these as short range because the extent of their persistence into the twenty-first century is questionable. For example, on the one hand, it is difficult to imagine that the laws protecting the rights of Sabbath observers will not remain a permanent feature of our legal system. On the other hand it is not at all difficult to imagine that the variety of programs under which Orthodox day-care services or *yeshiva* remedial-reading programs are federally funded may not survive into the next century.

There are also a number of apparently long-range tendencies in American society which have clearly facilitated the evolution of American Orthodoxy, and which will probably continue as important undercurrents of our lives. These tendencies include the diminishing influence of the family in transmitting skills and values to the next generation, the flight from the family by most members of the household for purposes of both work and leisure,

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the increasing involvement of all segments of the community, including women and children, in bureaucratically organized activities, the general willingness to abandon old institutions and neighborhoods when they have outlived their usefulness, and the general willingness to develop new institutions when there is a recognized need for them. These long-range tendencies are obviously not unique to Jews nor Orthodox Jews. They are part of the American way of life at least since the end of the nineteenth century.

Nor must these tendencies be viewed as solely negative in terms of their consequences. On the contrary, it may be argued that these tendencies have, in fact, enabled Orthodoxy to flourish in the twentieth century. For example, many decry what appears to be the erosion of the family. However, if we look at the educational accomplishments, both secular and religious, of the masses of immigrants who are the parents and grandparents of the current generation of America's Orthodox Jewry, the Orthodox could hardly prefer that it should have been the family which transmits Jewish education, as opposed to the *yeshivot* and day schools which have cropped up during the past two decades. Similarly, if one looks at the economic and occupational achievements of his (or her) parents and grandparents, he would probably be thankful that he did not follow in their footsteps. What may have been bad for the family as a social institution has, in fact, been good for Jews in general and for Orthodoxy in particular.

The opportunities for work and leisure for both men and women outside the home, and the corresponding bureaucratization of the structures in which work and leisure are pursued have also had a salutary influence on the quality of Orthodox life in America. Liberation from the drudgeries of home life has not only made more people producers and wage earners, but it has also turned a much larger population into consumers of such specialized services as Kosher-Chinese food, hasidic music in quadrophonic sound, Hineni happenings, and *Torah* classes and lectures at countless locations wherever Orthodox Jews are to be found in any appreciable numbers.

Thus, we would suggest that the numerical losses which Or-

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thodoxy has suffered in the United States can be attributed to the handicaps of pre-modern immigrants trying to adjust to life in the modern metropolis. The conditions of the modern metropolis, on the other hand, have been quite favorable to the resurgence of Orthodoxy in the second and third generation — albeit among fewer people. We emphasize that we are not simply restating Hansen's Law of the third generation return.²⁸ Orthodoxy is not being carried on by people whose grandparents were too weak to influence their parents to carry on the tradition. Rather, we aver, Orthodoxy owes its contemporary vitality to those people who, recognizing their own inability to successfully transmit it, had the foresight and resources to establish *yeshivot* and Jewish centers (or modernized synagogue structures such as the Young Israel movement) which would transmit Orthodoxy for them. The very social forces which have tended to weaken Orthodoxy among the masses of America's Jews have enabled Orthodoxy to flourish among a minority. Modernization, it seems, has cut both ways.

However, there is a catch to this formulation. The conditions of post-War America which have been conducive to the resurgence of Orthodoxy have also had a formative impact upon the nature of Orthodoxy. Whereas in Europe and in an earlier America the synagogue and its rabbi constituted the organizational *centrum* of Orthodox life, contemporary Orthodoxy has become much more *yeshiva* centered. The major rabbinic figures are not the communal saints, but the *roshei yeshivot*, the Talmudic scholars. In those communities where the synagogue does play an important role in Orthodox life, its role is as likely to derive from its educational and social programs as from its more strictly religious functions.²⁹ This shift in the organizational center of gravity in the community has also had some important consequences for the Orthodox worldview, particularly for the worldview of the native, *yeshiva*-educated Orthodox. *Lomdut*, correct knowledge, has taken primacy over *midot* and *mitsvot*, or correct living. The *mitsvot* which are practiced are done so almost as a mark of sophistication, indicating the level of knowledge attained by the practitioner.

We hasten to point out that our comments are not meant to be

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critical. We seek to illustrate that blanket generalizations about the resurgence of Orthodoxy tend to camouflage developments which may be quite unorthodox, and which may force Jewish Orthodoxy into unanticipated directions.

Two unanticipated directions which, we feel, are of the greatest consequences for the future of the Orthodox community in America, concern the evolving shape of community and the evolving nature of identity. Insofar as Orthodoxy has always been associated with both organizational and psychological traditionalism, it is fair to say that its communal base has been some form of a ghetto, or *Gemeinschaft*, and its psychological base has been role-status consistency. If we may use the notion of *makom kavuah* (permanent place) somewhat loosely, it appears that it expresses very well the historic situation of the Orthodox Jew. He or she has been a person fixed in a place, both in terms of a geographic location and also a social location. More importantly, the location has been fixed in the person. This double fixedness has served to organize and anchor Orthodox Jewish life.

The quantitative and qualitative losses that Orthodoxy has suffered in the modern world, especially in America, may be attributed to the disruption of this fixedness. Or, more properly, they may be attributed to the inability of large numbers of people and organizations to come to terms with the disruption of this fixedness.

When we speak about the resurgence of Orthodoxy, then, we are not talking about a renewal of the fixedness of the Orthodox Jew. Rather, we are talking about new developments in organizational and psychological patterns which help the Orthodox Jew adapt to the absence of the traditional fixedness. We have previously referred to the primacy of the *yeshiva* and Jewish education in general as the major organizational shift in Orthodox life. This is an internal development of the community which has provided the modern Orthodox Jew with a symbolic universe in place of the traditional *Gemeinschaft*. Incidentally, the abund-

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ance of kosher-culture, from hasidic records to Judaic studies programs on college campuses has tended to serve a similar if not the same function.

However, there are important developments external to the Jewish community which have also had important impacts upon the nature of that community and the identities of its members. Here we have in mind developments in Western society, which have been characterized of late as post-industrial, or post-modern, society. One of the most important elements of a post-industrial society is the liberation of the majority of working people from primary production, or the production of goods. Since the 1950s, America has become the first society where the majority of whose workers are engaged in service occupations, ranging from clerks in large bureaucracies to free professionals, and to "armies" of students. Underlying this shift in the occupational structure, there has been an important shift from dependence on the direct use of physical energy to a greater dependence on the uses of information. The hero of the epoch is neither the merchant nor the machinist; it is the engineer. Simultaneously, the engineering mentality has come to be utilized not merely in production but also in marketing and management.

The implications of these developments for Orthodox Jewry in America are several and far-reaching. Firstly, Jews in general have been in the forefront of those occupations which are commonly associated with the post-industrial era. And, the resurgence of Orthodoxy has, at least in part, been made possible by virtue of some of the social benefits of that era (e.g., innovations in the preparation and packaging of foods, the shortened work week, the liberation of youth from the necessity of work, etc.). Assuming no war between the superpowers, one can anticipate a continuation and accentuation of these tendencies.

Moreover, there is a more subtle level on which the post-industrial age has relevance for Jewish Orthodoxy, the hints of which surround us. Along with the rise of "the unmeltable ethnics," the last several years have witnessed the growth of a variety of of exotic religious and quasi-religious movements, such as the Krishnas, the Moonies and the Transcendental Meditationists. From the point of view of the modern rationalist, these re-

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cent developments appear obnoxious, threatening the dominant values of the Western, modernized world. From a less anxious perspective, however, these developments divulge an important truth about the post-industrial society. It is a society without ultimate, transcendental values. This observation should not be confused with the oft-heard religious condemnation of this society as being materialistic or hedonistic. Materialism or hedonism may constitute philosophies which can serve as value systems. That many would not approve of such values or philosophies is an entirely other matter. We are averring that post-industrial society, by virtue of its emphasis on objective information processing, has completely displaced values from the sphere of public consensus. The recent agonies of our political system are ample evidence for this. But, this displacement of values from the realm of public consensus has not been altogether bad for religion.

Whereas the forces of the post-industrial society have tended to destroy the community of public consensus, they have, on the other hand, made possible the emergence of new, smaller-scale structures. Bizarre as these new religious movements may appear, they are indications of a spiritual quest, particularly among the young and the educated who are the cutting edge of the post-industrial age. These new movements are also indications of the resolutions of this spiritual quest. The reference, in Jewish circles, to a so-called "turn to the right," is another indication of this spiritual quest. From our perspective, then, religion in general and Judaism in particular have benefitted greatly from the post-industrial society. But while the post-industrial age has tended to create a spiritually thirsty public, it has not helped to strengthen the mainstream organized religious bodies. And herein lies a paradox for social science and a practical problem for the Orthodox rabbinate and its synagogue movement. The reasons for the latter problem, it appears, may be found in divergent conceptions of community and divergent experiences of identity.

Jewish communities of the three major branches of Judaism flourished throughout the 1950s and early 1960s by becoming the Jewish counterparts of the larger host community. Social

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programs, from basketball games to political discussions, became important features of the over-all organization of the community. This form of organization was successful because it helped to cope with an important aspect of Jewish identity, the pull of assimilation. The modern Jewish center, whether it was a local "Y" or a Young Israel synagogue, became a way of integrating being Jewish with being an American.³⁰ But these organizations and their programs rested on the implicit need for such psychological integration. Such integration was and is necessary for those to whom America has represented a set of coherent and desirable values and life-styles.

However, as has been indicated, one of the most pervasive consequences of the post-industrial age has been the disruption of precisely those values, such as the work ethic and the faith in progress, which have given coherence and normative power to the American way of life. This disruption has made it necessary for individuals to seek meaning for their lives from sources other than being "good Americans," and has also tended to undermine those religious organizations whose success depends on their ability to integrate their programs and philosophies with the American way of life. The new organizations or structures which have entered the religious limelight in recent years, such as some hasidic movements, the Hineni movement, and the *havurah* movement, have achieved success because they cater not to the pull of assimilation, but to the need for ultimate meaning.

In the final analysis, it appears that the Orthodox rabbinate and synagogue movement will be successful in attracting the next generation of America's Jews to the extent that they address themselves to this thirst for ultimate meaning. The techniques by which the so-called "right wing" Orthodox and Jewish counter-culture groups are achieving their successes involve matters of both style and content. They have embarked upon vigorous programs of outreach and self-advertisement which are both necessary and productive in a highly competitive spiritual marketplace. Traditional Orthodoxy has always maintained a more defensive posture *vis-a-vis* its actual and potential audience. But such a posture is likely to be inappropriate in the current and foreseeable religious market. Another important element of style

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is the emphasis on personal contact and the intimacy of small groups. Both the leadership and the groups enjoy a sense of charisma in the lives of their followers. It is precisely this charisma which invests otherwise mundane experiences with a sense of ultimacy. Achieving charismatic appeal is, of course, far more difficult than self-advertising; but the two are not unrelated. However, it is in the realm of charismatic appeal that the established Orthodox rabbinate runs into the most difficulty.

The bureaucratic role, which the role of the rabbi has become in recent years, is not easily charismatized. Yet, it is a role which contains the sparks of charisma, namely, spiritual leadership. The problem which confronts the rabbinate is how to recapture the charismatic content of the bureaucratized role. Here, too, the more successful "right wing" groups offer suggestive models. Its spokesmen and spokeswomen capture their audience not because they represent a particular movement or group, but rather because they seem to be genuinely moved people. They inspire as much as they educate. Modern Orthodoxy has acquired a few such leaders in recent years, and they can serve as models for the type of leadership necessary to capture a rather large groping audience. The extent to which the contemporary leadership adjusts itself and its institutions to the new conditions will determine the quantity and quality of the next generation of Orthodox Jews in America.

NOTES

1. Our reservations are several. First, there is the statement of Rabbi Yochanan: "From the time the Temple was destroyed, prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to fools and children" (*Talmud Bavli, Bava Kama* 12b). And, there is the statement attributed to the sociologist, Amitai Etzioni, that if sociology were evaluated on the basis of its predictive ability, it would be virtually worthless.

2. Cf., Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner: *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, New York, Macmillan, 1967.

3. Many of the technological innovations listed as likely, less-likely, and far-out possibilities listed by Kahn and Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-57, are relevant for Orthodox Jews.

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4. The problem becomes even more complicated when it comes to distinctions as between Orthodox and "modern Orthodox." Two stimulating essays by spokesmen of the latter which, at the same time, are suggestive of some of the definitional difficulties, are Emanuel Rackman: "A Challenge to Orthodoxy," *Judaism*, Vol. 18, 1969, pp. 143-158, and Shlomo Riskin: "Orthodoxy and Her Alleged Heretics," *TRADITION*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring 1976, pp. 34-44.
5. Charles S. Liebman: "Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life," *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 66, 1965. Reprinted in Charles S. Liebman: *Aspects of the Religious Behavior of American Jews*, New York, Ktav Publishing House, 1974, pp. 111-187.
6. Fred Massarick: *Jewish Identity: Facts for Planning*, New York, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1974, p. 2.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Liebman, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-126.
9. Based upon information supplied by Torah Umesorah.
10. Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider: *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1968.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-136.
12. Bertram A. Leff: *The Modern Orthodox Jew: Acculturation and Religious Identification*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Adelphi University, 1974.
13. Marshall Sklare: *America's Jews*, New York, Random House, 1971, pp. 41-44. While it is true that Jews have a low birth rate and are becoming an increasingly smaller percentage of the population in the United States, this does not mean that, even with the intermarriage rate, "the American Jewish community is literally halving itself," as Shlomo Riskin argues (Riskin, *op. cit.*, p. 42, and Neal Kaunfer and Zev Shanken: "An Interview With Shlomo Riskin," *Response*, No. 29, Spring 1976, p. 10.
14. Charles S. Liebman: *The Ambivalent American Jew*, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973, p. 56.
15. Data supplied by Rabbi Sholom Gold and derived from a national survey by the Rabbinical Council of America. Includes only *mikvaot* known to R.C.A. rabbis. Cf. Nadine Brozan: "Despite Opposition, Jewish Ritual of Mikvah is Revitalized," *New York Times*, August 16, 1976, p. 35.
16. A more detailed list can be found in the listing of "National Jewish Organization," included in each volume of the *American Jewish Year Book*.
17. Seymour Leventman: "From Shtetl to Suburb," in Peter I. Rose (Ed.): *The Ghetto and Beyond*, New York, Random House, 1969, p. 46.
18. Andrew M. Greeley: *Religion in the Year 2000*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1969, pp. 35-49.
19. Egon Mayer: *Modern Jewish Orthodoxy in Post-Modern America: A Case Study of the Jewish Community of Boro Park*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1974.
20. Leff, *op. cit.*
21. Mayer, Egon: "Generational Conflict and Religious Orthodoxy," *Jewish Social Studies*, forthcoming.
22. *Ibid.*

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23. Leff, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
25. Cf. Naomi Levine and Martin Hochbaum (Eds.): *Poor Jews: An American Awakening*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1974.
26. Mayer, *op. cit.*
27. Nathan Glazer: *American Judaism*, Revised Edition, University of Chicago Press, 1972, pp. 151-186.
28. Marcus Lee Hansen: *The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant*, Rock Island, Ill., Augustana Historical Society, 1938. Also see Will Herberg: *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, Garden City, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960; Stephen Sharot: "The Three-Generation Thesis and the American Jews," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, June 1973, pp. 151-164.
29. Consequently, the role of rabbi has undergone change. According to Eliezer Berkovitz ("A Contemporary Rabbinical School for Orthodox Jewry," *TRADITION*, Vol. 9, 1967, p. 48), "we have been witnessing the continued decline of the rabbinical office and ineffectiveness of spiritual leadership in our communities." Seymour Leventman expresses the same thought (*op. cit.*, p. 52).
30. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that Mordecai Kaplan and several other Conservative rabbis were among the founders of the Young Israel movement.