

REVIEW ESSAYS

Shalom Carmy

Rabbi Carmy, a frequent contributor, teaches Bible at the Yeshiva University.

RAV KUK'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Rav Kuk, Mr. Yaron tells us early in his erudite monograph,* was both a hedgehog and a fox, a visionary, most at home in contemplating the sublime religious ideal, and an inveterate planner, eager to deal with practical questions and with the multiple concerns of others. It is a virtue of Mr. Yaron's treatment that both Rav Kuks coexist in his book. Rav Kuk's world was broad. He demanded complete knowledge of the most specialized operational details in a school he thought of endorsing; advised Agnon on profanity in literature; took unambiguous stands on the politically divisive issues of his day, was condemned for writing an essay understood to be sympathetic to Jesus; reinstated a *shochet* suspected of homosexuality; wrote on mixed dancing and the role of women in the theater; urged the leadership of English Jewry to remind His Majesty that King Asa suffered from the gout because he drafted *talmidei hakhamim*. These incidents, some of which are recounted in the book, all present facets of an integrated

personality with a thought-out philosophy. It is no wonder, then, that many, including some non-Orthodox Israelis, have moved from admiration for the man to curiosity about his thought.

I

Expositors of Rav Kuk have always viewed him as being, primarily, a mystic. His historical importance has been considered to be his willingness to seek the hand of God in Zionism. According to Rav Kuk non-religious Zionists were engaged in fulfilling the Divine Plan and even Marxists were motivated by a love for their people and a yearning for social justice. The themes stressed in such an exposition relate, therefore, to Rav Kuk's mysticism and to his concept of Israel and Redemption. The nature of Jewish chosenness, the sense of cosmic unity through evolution, the sacred and the profane—such are the building blocks from which Rav Kuk's system, so to speak, is constructed. Mr. Yaron does not depart from this pattern. It is un-

* Zvi Yaron, *Mishnato Shel Harav Kuk*, (Jerusalem, Jewish Agency, 1974).

doubtedly the safest course for the biographer, wary of reading his own considerations into his subject.

Yet one wonders whether this contour of emphasis, biographically justifiable though it may be, provides us with a Rav Kuk philosophically relevant to our own intellectual context. Rav Kuk the great mystic may inspire us, conveying the excitement of experiences we had taken for granted, pointing at depths as yet beyond us; the propositions implied by him may be accepted by us as correct doctrine; and at the least, as a link in the chain of *gedolim*, he is, so to speak, a primary source of religious experience, worthy of the regard we owe a moral-religious teacher of stature. But this does not guarantee that he can contribute anything permanent to our task of somehow structuring, somehow understanding, the post-Kantian, post-metaphysical (in one sense of the word) world in which we live.

If all Rav Kuk had done as a thinker was to enable us not to withhold our love from non-religious Jews, he would be a great moralist. If he had only served us as an ideologist for *Yishuv Eretz-Yisrael*, he would be a significant leader for his generation. If all he had left was the record of his metaphysical experience, he would probably be considered a major figure in *Torat ha-Sod*. For all this, he is worthy of our attention. Yet I believe, and I will try to share this insight with you, that there is in Rav Kuk's work, a strand that is genuinely germane to our contemporary philosophical predica-

ment. Moreover, Rav Kuk did not develop this doctrine naively, but was aware that its status for his systematic thought was more than peripheral.

With Descartes, the philosophical "*oylem*" began to shift from metaphysics to epistemology. Methodological doubt, the necessity of complete justification of knowledge claims, the distrust of what had previously passed as normal common sense, placed question marks around such basic concepts as perception, substance, cause. With Kant, of course, and his so-called Copernican Revolution, epistemology became less concerned with justifying knowledge, and more pre-occupied with the structure of knowledge. Having, as an ever-increasingly important handmaiden to metaphysics, succeeded in sucking out that discipline's autonomy, epistemology *became* the essence of philosophical activity. The process of knowledge was of ultimate importance; and, if the structure of knowing was *not* the ultimate reality—then that reality could only be grasped as some inaccessible "thing-in-itself," of which we must profess absolute nescience. This is, of course, no more than a thumbnail sketch; overdrawn—precisely because so many philosophers strove so energetically to avoid the stark implications of this situation.

It has long ago been pointed out that, to the extent that Rav Kuk has an epistemology, it is rooted in his doctrine of the creative imagination. Rav Kuk is aware that knowledge is not simply given, that the world is not a block that

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is presented to us, unchanged by our contemplation of it. To imagine is not to fantasize, but to create. This doctrine shows the influence of Maimonides, whose theory of prophecy provides for the participation of the imaginative faculty in the prophetic experience. What is not usually noted is that Rav Kuk realized that he had gone far beyond Maimonides. Maimonides had conceded the role of imagination; Rav Kuk justified it, indeed celebrated it. In doing so, Rav Kuk believed that he had given Maimonides' doctrine of prophecy a necessary foundation which Maimonides himself had been blind to, the absence of which would otherwise have vitiated Maimonides' contribution to the theology of prophecy.

THE REAL POSSIBLE: For Holiness there is no hyperbole in reality. Whatever is conceived and imagined and conceivable, actually is. This was the sublime kernel of the Kalamist theory, which was rejected by scholastic philosophy, inasmuch as the latter was unable to clarify itself.

The light of true faith, however, inheres only in *Kneset Yisrael*; all wisdom was, is, and will be, among our people, in the full majesty of their greatness; a wise and understanding people is this great nation; and the word of our God will stand forever.¹

The original controversy between the Kalam and Maimonides concerned a totally different issue, namely that of logical possibility. The Kalam maintained that any conceivable event is possible; while Maimonides held that events violating the laws of nature (e.g., the

law of gravitation) are imaginable, but nevertheless impossible. Rav Kuk is not concerned with the question of logical possibility but rather with the ontological status of possible states of affairs. Thus, from a technical point of view, he is guilty of an egregious misunderstanding of medieval philosophy.²

In fact, however, Rav Kuk is not arguing the status of physical law. He is, as he states, reaching for "the sublime kernel" of the Kalam position, not endorsing that position itself. At the heart of the matter: the Kalamists "trusted" the imagination; Maimonides did not. And distrust of the imagination belies an inability of "scholastic philosophy," with its allocation to imagination of a focal role in prophecy, to clarify itself. The epistemological function of the imagination should, according to Rav Kuk, be asserted joyfully, not admitted grudgingly, as the Rationalist scholastic would.

Variations on the imagination and the doctrine of possibility abound in the latter parts of the first, methodological, volume of *Orot haKodesh*. Around this epistemology cluster several of the ideas typical of Rav Kuk: some are explicitly related to this foundation; some cohere psychologically or experientially with it. Rav Kuk's great stress on literature and aesthetics lies in the realization that imaginative writing is creative communication rather than rhetoric and propaganda. The influential doctrine of tolerance associated with Rav Kuk draws, among other elements, on the awareness that a wrong world-view may yet partici-

pate, partially and perhaps unconsciously, in the truth. And at a profound level, the "reality" of the possible is the faith of one who, like Rav Kuk, never forgets that, on Judgment Day, we will be held responsible, not only for our works and intellectual activity, but also for our hope.³

It is imperative, though, to remember that not all imaginative projections carry the same truth-value. The ultimate criterion of veracity is not the imagination itself; it is theological. In the aphorism quoted previously, Rav Kuk stresses that possibility is real for Holiness, and continues to celebrate the true faith that inheres only in the faith-community of Israel. This renders Rav Kuk's theory of truth circular, as Jacob Agus⁴ has maintained—like every other revelational ontology. It is this transcendent given of Torah that distinguishes between Rav Kuk's thought and, say, the reflections of an astute Gestalt psychologist or the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Yet this need not be urged as an objection against Rav Kuk's views: the non-absolute status of the epistemological process expresses only too well the facts of religious experience, the awareness that there is a dimension to religious knowledge independent of our most creative efforts.

II

That Rav Kuk's interest in these questions places him solidly within the post-Kantian world of ideas, may be brought home by comparing him with the greatest religious

thinker of that world, one more different from Rav Kuk than whom, it would, at first blush, be difficult to conceive.

Let's begin by citing a remarkable aphorism of Rav Kuk:

REDEEMING THE SOULFUL CREATION: It happens that, while creating thoughts, one is grasped by a sort of fear. A thought comes to one: the thinker recognizes the total need to broaden the spread of its branches, to deepen its roots, the necessity of its penetration and development, its ramification and maieusis, with all the depth of its originality and clarity, the reckoning of all that belongs to its scope and to the crowd of thoughts surrounding it, bordering upon it. And a fear of the void (*Tohu*) grasps him. He remains with the unformed thought as it is, or through the pressure of this fear he seeks only one path in the darkness, and the thought does not burst through all the walls of its prison . . .

There is certainly, however, some relationship between this fear, which is a dread of weakness, to one's moral condition, which needs to be corrected by inward repentance . . .

When all is said and done, man must redeem the components of his soul from their exiles, to ransom his imprisoned thoughts from their prisons, to say to the prisoners—come forth, to those in darkness—discover yourselves.⁵

In this passage Rav Kuk is describing the dark side of human creativity. If thought and imagination are indeed creative, then one is always tempted to hold back. One fears the possibilities opened up beneath one's feet, voids waiting to be filled by his creative act. And this dread is related to moral

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weakness, to lack of confidence in one's moral stance, in the right and responsibility to fulfill his creative vocation.

Fear of freedom, dread, the void of nothingness, dread of weakness⁶—these are all themes treated by Kierkegaard in *The Concept of Dread*. Without knowing Kierkegaard, or the impending career of *angst* in “the age of anxiety,” Rav Kuk was led to a remarkably similar analysis of *angst* and the creative personality.

We have previously noted that Rav Kuk's seemingly untrammelled endorsement of the imagination is, in fact, defined by a revealed context rooted in the Torah. Kierkegaard was forced to confront the same problem. Having constructed an elaborate phenomenology of human “existence” in his voluminous Pseudonymous writings, he finally must anchor experience in an ancient historical situation, and stake salvation on the individual's ability to become “contemporaneous” with that situation. It is because of this commitment to a radical, absurd, transcendent given, that commentators⁷ who would never dispute the great Dane's influence on what is known as Existentialism, would yet refuse him the dubious honor of the label “Existentialist.”

Rav Kuk was not troubled by the particular problems regarding the religious interpretation of history that agitated Kierkegaard, struggling to steer a middle course between Hegelian historicism and Lessing's critique of absolute historical religion. Nevertheless, the structure of their thought, regard-

ing the relationship between the human processes of knowledge and ultimate Reality, show the same tension.

But a most fundamental parallel between Rav Kuk and Kierkegaard refers to the question of possibility. Both thinkers are united in their concern with the concept of possibility, though they face it from diametrically opposed directions. The society which Kierkegaard pilloried was both absolutist and possibility-oriented. Kierkegaard's famous remark, that he could accept the Hegelian system if only Hegel had appended a note admitting that it was only a possibility, is to the point. On the other hand, precisely, perhaps, for this reason, intellectual society emphasized irony and detachment, perpetual flirting with possibility, over the commitment of the hedgehog to that “purity of heart” which is “to will one thing.” Kierkegaard's solution was to deflate the pretensions of “the System,” at the same time insisting on the ethical necessity to realize one's concrete, particular, situation: to “exist.”

In Rav Kuk's case, however, concrete existence was taken care of, so to speak, by the “four cubits of Halakhah.” The worlds of possibility—of vision, hope, art, of thought clarifying itself—these had no status. By grasping the realm of possibility as real, Rav Kuk was able to incorporate his own “poetic” tendencies within the traditional framework. One could philosophize, lyricize, interest oneself in science, because these activities, as well as Halakhah, were “real.”

Both Kierkegaard's burden and

Rav Kuk's message are essential for us. When I am tempted to give aesthetics, the joys of daily life, making things out of words, an elevated be-all-and-end-all status, I need Kierkegaard's harsh reminder that, relative to the vertical imperatives of *Torah uMitzvot*, art and science are, in Auden's characteristic phrase, "small beer."⁸ And feeling put-off by the narrow, alien, necessities, the cramping, endless exigency of an intellectual-emotional life without culture, without the freedom of "possibility," disinterested striving and experience, I need Rav Kuk's exuberance over the reality of aesthetic experience and its meaningful incorporation within a total religious existence. That I can, in intellectual honesty, combine both their teachings, owes to the fact that Rav Kuk, from his particular viewpoint, created a thoughtworld focussing on the same problems, and on the same basic concepts that exercise our own philosophical needs.

III

The preceding should not be taken to imply that Rav Kuk is offering a direct response to the crisis of European culture, acquainted with Kant and Schopenhauer though he was.⁹ No less than the non-Jewish world, Jewish theology was induced to devote its attention to the epistemological concern: the concern with the process through which one arrives at religious truth.

The impulse behind this shift was essentially an expansive one. Medieval Jewish theology was Bib-

liocentric: systematic study of Rabbinic thought is not typical of it. One need only note the neglect of Talmudic Law when *ta'amei ha-Mitzvot* are discussed,¹⁰ or the lack of emphasis on *Torah sheb'Al Peh* in dogmatological literature. By the 16th Century this situation is ready for change: Maharal of Prague develops a theology inseparable from a copious exegetical concern with Talmud and Midrashic literature. Why this did not occur before is irrelevant for our purposes; what matters only is that the shift did take place. But with this development—as anyone who compares, let us say, the treatment of *Chazal* by Abravanel with that found in Maharal, will readily notice—the method of hermeneutics becomes, often enough, more memorable and more significant than the content of interpretation.

This new focussing on the process of understanding in theology may be compared to Kant's Copernican Revolution, and was, I believe, inevitable, once Jewish theology systematically incorporated rabbinic literature. The diffuseness of rabbinic material, the well-known Talmudic stress on the authority of the halakhic *process*, as well as the existence of *machloket*, all made it inconvenient and unwise to insist upon a content-oriented rabbinic theology. An exception, such as the Hirschian attempt to develop a Talmudic *ta'amei ha-Mitzvot*, only proves, by its strained quality, the aptness of the rule.

An illustrious chain of Jewish thinkers contribute, consciously or unconsciously, to the concentration of theology on the "epistemology"

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of Judaism, i.e., on the *mitzvah* of *Talmud Torah*. Such giants as R. Hayyim Volozhin, R. Shneur Zalman of Ladi, and the Netziv, all influenced Rav Kuk. The great interest evinced by men like Maharatz Chayot "in the relationship between the halakhic process and other functions, particular prophecy," may also (whatever its cause might have been) be considered a contribution in this direction. Rav Kuk himself wrote a revealing essay on the Talmudic statement "Sage is preferable to prophet."¹² At the same time, the emphasis on *Talmud Torah* underlined the fact that "secular" and non-halakhic pursuits could not boast similar justification.

These factors create a context for Rav Kuk's epistemological views, independent of the parallel transformation in European philosophy.

IV

You may have gotten the impression, from the earlier part of this essay, that I consider the difference between Rav Kuk's monistic, harmony-seeking, philosophy, and the fragmenting, alternative-presenting, non-integrating, world-view (let's call it "pluralism") to be primarily one of approach. In other words, since both the monist and the pluralist admit that human existence is, in fact, fragmented and unharmonious; and both share the faith that God will, "on that day," be One, and His Name One, therefore the basic difference between these approaches is which aspect of life to stress: the here-

and-now or the eschatological future. What I claim, however, is a certain community of intellectual concern between representatives of these *weltanschauungen*: specifically, a common fascination with the role of human creativity within the framework of *Yahadut*.

There are at least two practical intellectual questions, with which Rav Kuk was forced to deal, and with regard to which his analysis is, in part, determined by his monistic presuppositions. In both cases, the problematic revolves around the unity, or unification, of the various intellectual disciplines.

To what extent is it desirable that a Jew assimilate the best that has been thought and written by man? We are dealing with this question as it refers to culture: obviously it is impossible to consider somehow "modifying" Torah to fit some cultural criterion. The danger is not that of heresy, but of fragmentation. The monist, whose aim is, as much as is possible, to create a seamless spiritual experience, may be expected to avoid involvement with the "outside" even when he is not worried that such interaction would undermine his religious commitment. On the other hand, of course, a truly confident monist might welcome such a cultural "invasion" as a challenge to be worked through towards an increasingly universal monistic experience.¹³

While Rav Kuk's ethnocentric impulse was quite strong, his theoretical discussion of this problem is objective in approach. He distinguishes between three types of intellectual material:

1. There are thoughts, universal, great, holy, that have nothing to do with the heritage of any people or nation. All the wise of heart, all the holy of spirit, among all men upon the face of the earth, are equal with regard to them, for good . . .

2. Essentially the matters are so universal that it makes no difference what language or idiom is used, or what nationality the speaker. However, they are related to the emotions and to practical influences so intimately that their style varies with the content of each nation, its typical ways and thoughts. Therefore these matters should be specific to Israel, so as not to mingle our special pure style with an alien style . . . Sometimes there will be courageous men, wise of heart, who will know how to filter and strain the inner content, which is essentially the same, in order to formulate it in the special, pure, Israelite style. And this will be a blessing . . .

3. There are thoughts of truth and holiness that are specific to Israel, not only in style but also in content and inwardness. Whoever wishes to mix into these matters anything from the outside is adulterating and distorting. No change of form or beautification of style can help . . . However, it requires much experience, special knowledge, and habitual sharpness, to discriminate clearly between these alternatives, so as not to exchange one for the other. Therefore we find among the great men of yore some¹⁴ who use whatever comes to hand of the best non-Jewish thinkers, even in the most elevated matters; others flee from this completely; others stand in the middle, leaning this way and that, embracing with the right arm and rejecting with the left, and vice versa . . .¹⁵

It is, of course, the second category that is crucial for the relation between culture and Judaism.

Distinct, but not disjunct, from the problem of the integration of cultural experience, is the more technical question of the relationship between Halakhah and science. Do we consider halakhic categories to be *sui generis*, as autonomous *vis-à-vis* the categories of other disciplines as these are *vis-à-vis* Halakhah? Or should we insist on the unity of knowledge in all its forms, not excepting Halakhah and science?

The burden of this problem can be brought home by examining some cases in point: should *chimmutz*, for example, be identified with the chemical process of leavening? If so, are we committed to accept the scientific relevance of the halakhic category to the chemical (e.g., regarding the eighteen-minute time limit). Or can one distinguish between *chimmutz* and leavening as categories belonging to different disciplines, thus eliminating any such science-religion clash.¹⁶ If salting does not significantly drain the blood from a piece of meat, can one state that salt is a *mattir* of the meat, regardless of the actual percentage of blood that is drained? Or is one obligated somehow, to "justify" the Halakhah scientifically?¹⁷ Should the challenge of evolution be countered by minimizing the relevance of science to religion; or should one admit a real confrontation between biology and the Torah?¹⁸

Rav Kuk, maintaining the unity of human knowledge, did not wish to establish a dichotomy between religion and Halakhah, on the one hand, and science on the other. In a *responsa* concerning *metzitzah*,¹⁹

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he insists that *metzitzah* must have genuine medical value: one cannot justify its retention on the grounds that it is a "pure" Halakhah, independent of the facts established by other disciplines. While this position may be attributed to Rav Kuk's "fundamentalism," it would also seem to draw on his reluctance to fragmentize intellectual experience.

Similarly, with regard to evolution, Rav Kuk does not attempt to separate the religious question from the scientific theory. He investigates, rather, the possibility of reinterpreting Jewish sources in a manner consonant with evolution, or the possibility that evolution may be scientifically wrong.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from this entire analysis is that one may reject Rav Kuk's metaphysical monism, or the approach to particular issues predicated upon it, without considering his philosophy to be unattractive or its study, unrewarding. One may be a pluralist, reject Rav Kuk's synthetic approach to science and religion, insist upon man's ineluctable ontological loneliness in the universe, wrinkle one's nose at the slightest *soupcou* of pantheism, or simply believe that *yahadut* does not conform well to the monistic model; yet still find, in Rav Kuk's thought, a central element congenial to one's own. This may be irritating to all-or-nothing, wholehog Kukians; but should certainly be a source of insight for the rest of us.

V

It is in his footnotes that Mr.

Yaron attempts to create a larger context for his subject. By providing parallels to Rav Kuk's thought among other Jewish thinkers, such as Rav Dessler, the Netziv, the Chazon Ish, or even Bahye ibn Pakkuda, he enables us to understand what exactly Rav Kuk meant to affirm or deny, to innovate or to renovate. That we lack thorough philosophical analysis of many of these writers themselves, only makes the volume at hand more useful. Even readers not directly interested in Rav Kuk will profit from the survey of literature on "tolerance" that is featured in the last chapter.

Mr. Yaron's reference to non-Jewish sources are rather general, often vague, and sometimes (as is inevitable) miss the opportunity to teach us something by delving more deeply into a parallel. After several footnotes dealing with Teilhard de Chardin, for example, one hopes in vain for some specific analysis of the Jesuit's quasi-scientific terminology as it may illuminate Rav Kuk's categories, or at least for a reference to the trenchant attack on Teilhard's thought from the Catholic Left in America (most notably Garry Wills' *Bare Ruined Choirs*)²⁰ and its implications for the self-styled spiritual progeny of Rav Kuk. Or when, (p. 157) he cites Rav Kuk's view that one of the purposes of social punishment is "the awareness that one should not do evil, and that the evildoer should be punished in order to strengthen this good awareness," it would be in place to indicate the thorniness of punishment theory, and the similarity of

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Rav Kuk's view to that of A. C. Ewing²¹ (the expressive theory). One suspects that many of these notes are meant to seduce individuals who ordinarily are not exposed to general intellectual discussions, into broadening their horizons. (But in that case, what are we to make of the first note to Chapter 2, in which, the reader is referred, to clarify the tensions of "secularization" in modern society, to the opening paragraph of *A Tale of Two Cities*? Any reader who did not recognize the reference for what it is, and looked it

up, would certainly feel trifled with.)

Yet such cavilling aside, one must appreciate the work Mr. Yaron has given us. Fame, said Rilke, is no more than the quintessence of all the old misunderstandings collecting round a new name.²² To save Rav Kuk from the idolatry of fame requires both dedication to honest intellectual biography, and the serious attempt to clarify and flesh out Rav Kuk's abiding significance. One desideratum may be a thorough commentary on *Orot haKodesh*, Rav Kuk's *magnum opus*.

NOTES

1. *Orot haKodesh*, Second *Sha'ar*, section 43.
2. Cf. Eliezer Schweid's stimulating analysis in his *Studies in Maimonides' Eight Chapters* (Jewish Agency; 2nd edition, 1969), pp. 45-53. R. David Cohen, in his notes to *Orot haKodesh* (*ibid.*, sec. 46) speculates that Crescas' theory of possibility (*Or haShem*, Part III) reflects Kukian considerations. The ontic status of future possible events has concerned philosophers since Aristotle's "Sea battle"; but cf. H. A. Wolfson: *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 109ff. It should also be noted that in Maharal of Prague one finds an elevation in the status of the imagination. See Kleinberger, *Educational Philosophy of Maharal of Prague* (Jerusalem, 1962), p. 48, on the role of imagination within intellect.
3. *Shabbat* 31a.
4. *Banner of Jerusalem* (New York, 1946), p. 164.
5. *Orot haKodesh* (*ibid.*, sec. 32). Cf. *Eder haYekar* (Jerusalem, 5727), pp. 119ff.
6. It is interesting that Rav Kuk describes this fear as a *Dohak* (my translation "pressure") which is reminiscent of the etymology of *angst* as a narrowness.
7. E.g. J. Brown in his *Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth*. Many commentators on the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* have stressed its pseudonymous character to underline this fact. E.g. Garelick: *The Anti-Christianity of Soren Kierkegaard* (Hague, 1965) and Allison — "Christianity and Nonsense" (*Review of Metaphysics*, 20, 3.).
8. *The Dyer's Hand* (Random House, 1962), p. 456.

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9. Yaron, p. 105 n. 40.
10. Blatantly in Maimonides' *Guide*, III, 41; see Y. Levinger's article *Proceedings of Fourth World Congress for Jewish Studies*.
11. See the references cited in E. Urbach: *Halakhah uNevuah* (Tarbiz, Vol. 18), n. 2. Dr. Mayer Hershkovics, in his biography of Maharatz Chayot (Jerusalem, 5732), pp. 379ff. stresses the polemical context of Chayot's writings on the subject.
12. In *Orot*. The Talmudic statement is in *Baba Batra* 12a.
13. On the question of monism vs. pluralism in Jewish theology see N. Lamm: "The Unity Theme and its Implications for Moderns" (*TRADITION*, 1961); W. S. Wurzbarger "Pluralism and the Halakhah" (*TRADITION*, 1962), reprinted in *A Treasury of Tradition*. My own thinking on the relation of religion and culture is more fully developed in "Religion and Culture in Israel" (*TRADITION* 14, 2).
14. The printed text reads *acherim* but should read *achadim*.
15. *Eder haYekar*, pp. 122-3. Yaron's discussion, pp. 215ff.
16. This example is derived from Rabbi Dr. Moses Tendler: "Halachic and Scientific Categories: The Need For Clarification" (*Gesher*, 1969).
17. This example was suggested by a *shiur* of *Maran haRav* Joseph B. Soloveitchik during the 1968-69 year.
18. The separationist view is championed by Dr. Sol Roth in "Science and Religion," in *Studies in Torah Judaism* (Yeshiva University, 1969). Dov Frimer discusses attempts to harmonize Jewish tradition and evolutionary biology in *Yavneh Review*, Vol. 9 (cf. my editorial comment to Frimer's paper).
19. *Da'at Kohen*: Yoreh-Deah no. 142.
20. Cf. Robert Bly's poem "Asian Peace Offers Rejected Without Publication" (in *The Light Around the Body*, Harper & Row, 1967), in which "Rusk's assistants eat hurriedly,/Talking of Teilhard de Chardin."
21. *The Morality of Punishment* (London, 1929).
22. Quoted in H. E. Holthusen: *Rilke: A Study of His Later Poetry* (Yale, 1952), p. 8.