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THANATOS, ID AND THE EVIL IMPULSE

INTRODUCTION

Man constantly seeks to understand the nature of the forces which seem to work within him and which he holds responsible for his behavior. He relegates the study of such matters to the rigors of a formal discipline such as psychology. Judaism, as a religion which concerns itself with the total man, also investigates and posits theories about the structure of consciousness, personality and the nature of various psychological mechanisms, drives and impulses. This paper will discuss one particular quasi-psychological concept oft spoken of in Biblical, Midrashic and Talmudic sources, the *yetzer hara* (literally, evil imagination), and attempt an analysis of it in terms of the Freudian psycho-analytic concepts of Thanatos — the death instinct — libido, and the id.

There is a multifold purpose for selecting a topic so seemingly narrow in scope. On one hand, we are engaged in scholastic pursuit of a tenable description of the *yetzer hara*. For this purpose alone, we need not disturb ourselves with the principles of Freudianism. However, while occupied with this same pursuit, many have adopted superficial approaches by attempting to establish similarities between the *yetzer hara*, the id or Thanatos on very dubious grounds. These Freudian concepts, therefore, become necessary to our discussion.

I

What are the Biblical, as well as the classical rabbinic sources, that make reference to the *yetzer hara*? We first encounter a Bib-

lical passage in which God says, "For I know his (man's) *yetzer*."¹ Schechter correctly indicates that *yetzer* could be understood to mean simply imagination or desire, whatever the nature of that desire be: good or evil.² However, other Biblical passages attribute a specific character to this *yetzer* viz.,

. . . the *yetzer* of the heart of man is evil from his youthful days.³

Also,

. . . and He understands all the imaginations of the thoughts (*kol yetzer machshavot*),

in which case, again, *yetzer* is usually explained to mean two hearts and two *yitzrim*; the "bad heart" with the bad *yetzer* and the "good heart" with the good *yetzer*.⁴ In yet another tradition, the rabbis explicate the extra letter *yud* in the word *vay-yitzer* (in the passage, "then the Lord formed (וַיִּצֶר) the man of dust . . ."⁵), as a hint to a belief in two *yitzrim*: good and evil.⁶

We begin to see at this point some conception of two forces in man, one of which is called *rah*; literally translated, evil. We shall see, however, that *rah* is a word whose connotations mean other than evil. In general, one finds the *yetzer hara* to be the more conspicuous of the two *yitzrim* throughout the later sources. Several opinions found in Midrashic and Talmudic literature add to the picture of an evil, scheming "enemy" or drive in man.

Some rabbis stated,

. . . the *yetzer hara* is problematic in that (even) man's (basic) nature is called evil, as it is said, "for the nature of man's heart is evil from his youth."⁷

Or,

. . . two *yitzrim* were created by the Holy One . . . a *yetzer* for idolatry and a *yetzer* for licentiousness. The former has already been destroyed while the latter still persists.⁸

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Another interesting observation reads,

Come and see (what is the case) by the goat or kid; once it sees a deep pit it retreats since there is no *yetzer hara* in an animal. Yet, the human infant is made headstrong by the *yetzer hara*; he (carelessly) touches a snake or scorpion.⁹

Finally,

the Good *yetzer* is poor and weak and has nothing tangible to show as a reward for obedience to it. The Evil *yetzer* is strong. Whatever the former is able to acquire through tireless labor, the latter snatches away easily by holding forth the immediate rewards of worldly pleasure.¹⁰

I have refrained from over-use of the phrases "evil impulse" or "evil instinct" which are usually acceptable translations for *yetzer hara*. The reason for this is that, first, there is yet to be discussed evidence which indicates that *yetzer hara* might not denote evil *per se* in an ethically judgmental sense. Furthermore, it is not clear that a *yetzer* is similar to what psychoanalysis labels "instinct."

II

The first qualification has already been observed by scholars, based upon the following types of rabbinic statements:

There is no evil inclination (*sitra achra*) that does not contain a thread of the holy inclination (*sitra d'keddushah*).¹¹

Or, R. Samuel b. Nossan stated,

"And behold it was good" is a reference to the good *yetzer* while "behold it was very good"¹² is a reference to the evil *yetzer*. But is the evil *yetzer* to be considered very good? Actually, without the *yetzer hara*, man would not build a house, marry, have children or do business.¹³

Thus, one writer concludes that

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even the *yetzer hara* which corresponds roughly to man's untamed natural (and especially sexual) appetites or passions, is not intrinsically evil and, therefore, not to be completely repressed.¹⁴

Similarly, "the evil *yetzer*, as manifested socially and unmodified by the good *yetzer*, is considered in Jewish tradition to be "evil." However, intra-psychically, it has neutral moral value."¹⁵ In other words, since "evil" or "wrong" are terms whose meanings vary cross-culturally, the particular underlying forces which incline a person toward the fulfillment of basic primary needs (eating, sleeping, procreation, domination) cannot, *itself*, be rightly called "evil." If one society, for example, holds that marriage to a mother or sister is permissible and another does not — such that if such a bond was to be consummated, the latter society would castigate the participants — this should not have any bearing on the organismic drive which merely seeks propagation of a species. Thus, the fact that the *yetzer hara* causes sin and, as a result, death, does not make it an evil *yetzer* but, at most, a *yetzer* to do acts which are sometimes considered deviant and/or evil.¹⁶

From this observation, a variety of conclusions are possible. One is that if the *yetzer hara* represents a neutral life force it could be seen as an analogue to Freud's concept of Libido. Indeed, Andy Solomon, suggests that, ". . . the evil inclination . . . may be seen, actually, as the psychic energy, libido."¹⁷ Moreover, if the *yetzer hara* seems to cause behavior by its obedience to some sort of *pleasure-principle*, then again, perhaps, it represents the more primitive part of the psyche, the id, which also operates on such a principle.

On the other hand, if we view the *yetzer hara* as a cause of death, destruction, regression and aggression, perhaps it bears a closer resemblance to Thanatos.¹⁸ And if it is true that the *yetzer hara* causes man to "return to the earth" and to have backslides in his personality development then is this not terribly similar to Freud's own statement concerning the death instinct? Freud stated:

. . . we may suppose that the final aim of the destructive instinct is to reduce living things to an inorganic state. For this reason we call it a death instinct.¹⁹

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Andy Solomon comes close to dealing with the last possibility but veers off course and, instead, suggests a historical antecedent for Thanatos in an arcane Talmudic view of death *qua* biological cessation of life.

As for Thanatos, there is also a lodging in Jewish tradition . . . , in the Torah of R. Meir it was found written, "and it was very good": and behold *death* is good.²⁰

The author chooses to explain that tradition as meaning that,

. . . death . . . is not the end of life, but a part of the cycle of eternity. It is God's implement for change and rebirth. Without it man would have no incentive for productive work.²¹

This, in other words, would equate Thanatos with death itself rather than with the *yetzer hara* or any impulse.

A comment is in order concerning this conclusion. Freud's view of Thanatos was an entirely pessimistic conception and to it he relegated only dysfunctional characteristics. He considered it responsible for man's essential aggressiveness and for often exhibited self-destructive and self-defeating behaviors.²² This death-instinct expresses an innate tendency towards catabolism, i.e., any organism's fatal evolution toward stagnant inertia. (At certain levels, Freud makes little distinction between man and animal.) Furthermore, he considered that if the earliest state of an organism was an inanimate one, this regulatory principle of the aggression drive called for a return to the state of death.

Now, in Freud's view, the above is a portrait of an instinct which is the antithesis of constructiveness or of "an incentive for productive work." Thanatos, itself, would tend to draw man away from productivity. Moreover, unlike Eros, the energy of Thanatos cannot even be sublimated into productivity; only true libido can be sublimated.

All man's constructive activity comes from the libido. The only thing which cannot be reduced to Eros is the destructive instinct.²³

It would seem from the above that there is no real basis for

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grounding the concept of Thanatos in R. Meir's view of the motivating and growth provoking capacity of death. The former is an (hypothetical) intra-psychic entity, an instinct, while the latter is, at most, a philosophical way to approach death. We will say more about this shortly.

The second issue Solomon discusses is whether or not the *yetzer hara* can be equated with libido or, in extension, with its locus, the id. The similarity Solomon feels the *yetzer hara* and libido share is that they both seem to represent life forces which are above value judgment. And it is true, we have seen, that the *yetzer hara* cannot be considered an "evil" instinct. However, at this point we must consider whether it can even be considered an instinct.

III

Whether or not the *yetzer hara* is an analogue to the id or Thanatos is an issue which has validity only after one has proven that the *yetzer hara* is, in fact, also some type of instinct. Actually, "instinct" is merely the accepted translation for certain entities which Freud called *triebe*. *Triebe* and *Instinkt* in German have quite different connotations.

Instinkt implies a fixed pattern of response to stimuli—like the web-spinning behavior of a spider. *Triebe*, on the other hand, pertains to a stimulus which creates a demand for some behavioral response . . . All that Freud insisted upon was the necessity for assuming an *internal motivating source* (italics mine), in contrast to the radical empiricists who viewed the organism as merely the passive recipient and recorder of external experiences.²⁴

Furthermore, Freud's concept of *triebe* implies only an internal excitation that *requires* discharge. It does not imply fixed unlearned responses.²⁵ Thus, some writers have suggested that "drive" would be a more instructive term for *aggressiveness* and *constructiveness*. Yet, as for the constructs of the id and Thanatos, perhaps instinct is still a better description of how Freud viewed them. Simple erotic and destructive tendencies, i.e., drives for particular incidents of the need to perform construc-

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tive or destructive acts, seem to be *psychological* concepts derived from clinical observation; the life and death “instincts” — Eros and Thanatos — are *biological* concepts. The latter are not psychic representations of endosomatic stimuli (drives) but are biological trends similar or equal to metabolism and catabolism. *Acts* involving man’s essential destructiveness, for example, should be seen as expressions of a destructive *drive* which, in turn, is seen as a derivative of Thanatos; the destructive drives must be seen as *manifestations* of the hypothesized Thanatos (see fig. 1.). Indeed,

the death instinct itself does not appear as (an) element of psychological interpretations suggested in analysis. Interpretations may refer to destructive or constructive strivings, but their biological root is not relevant for psychological investigation and treatment, just as the assumption, made by some theoretical biologists, that the mortality of all living organisms is ultimately due to the principle of entropy, the second theorem of thermodynamics, has no direct bearing upon the study and treatment of cardiac failure.²⁶




Fig. 1

A final instructive historical note. In Freud’s fourth revision of his drive theory, he hypothesized a structural organization for both the life and death instincts which he called the id.²⁷ That is, both the constructive sexual drives as well as the de-

structive, aggressive drives stem from instincts contained in the id. Thus, the id, in itself, cannot fairly be called "good" or "bad" as we indicated above and it is a term which when employed, always refers to both instincts.

If we will accept, therefore, that destructiveness and constructiveness are both drives which stem from instincts contained in the id, Thanatos and Eros, and that Thanatos and Eros are instincts of the sort described, is the *yetzer hara* similar to either an instinct or to a drive?

IV

In the three possible comparisons which could be made between the *yetzer hara* and either 1) the entire construct of the Id, 2) the death instinct or 3) any specific constructive or destructive drive, there appears insufficient evidence to indicate that the *yetzer hara* represents any of these.

First, I question whether the *yetzer hara* is an instinct at all. An instinct is some stimulus which arises within the body (endosomatic) which can become conscious only through the ideas and affect that become associated with the expression of its aims.²⁸ There is no direct statement in the Talmud or Midrash that alludes to anything similar to this.²⁹ The sources do, however, discuss the age at which the *yetzer hara* is first supposed to exist in the individual. R. Judah originally felt that the *yetzer hara* was already present in the embryonic state, which could substantiate the argument for an innate, somatic position, but later came to believe that: ". . . at the door (of man's entering the world) the sin lieth."³⁰ Thus, R. Judah rejected the "innate" position in favor of one which sees the *yetzer hara* as a more *post uterine* developmental phenomena. Other sources concur that while the *yetzer tov* first comes to man at the age of thirteen, the *yetzer hara* is present at earliest childhood.³¹ This, in fact, is the general consensus. It is also true that the *yetzer hara* has both constructive and destructive powers.³² In this sense, it can be seen as some type of life force. Yet, to say that it is an instinct is false. God's providence, for example, or the past experience of a child's interactions with his parents

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and peers are forces in our lives but they are not *instincts*. The *yetzer hara* is simply not a biological construct. Thus, we must reject the first hypothesis.

V

Does the *yetzer hara* represent an antecedent to the death instinct? We have already mentioned the disparity between death and the death instinct. Let us add that since the *yetzer hara* is not an instinct it, therefore, cannot be analagous to Thanatos. Furthermore, the Jewish view of total human momentum and of the nature of historical change is a forward, teleological and constructive model. Our belief in Messiah, in the World to Come and in the ability of man to repent (*Teshuvah*) are all indications of our particularly progressive, non-catabolic *weltanschauung*. So, while death, destructiveness and aggressiveness may stem from the *yetzer hara*, there is still too much contradiction involved in equating the latter with Thanatos.

That the *yetzer hara* contains both constructive and destructive attributes may lead us to compare it with the id; the id being the locus of both Eros as well as Thanatos. The difficulty encountered here is that while the id drives are unconscious — “the drives of the id are unconscious not only in a descriptive sense but also in a dynamic sense in that their access to consciousness is actively opposed”³³ — rabbinic sources maintain that we can have complete control over the *yetzer hara*.³⁴ Moreover, while superficially both constructs seem to operate on a pleasure principle, in the *yetzer hara* this refers simply to the traditional belief that unrestricted hedonic pursuit is primitive, contrary to the Torah and, thus evil, while in the id, this principle merely implies that an organism has a tendency to rid itself of tensions — both external and derived from drives — by the most immediate route. That is, the drive for the pursuit of worldly pleasure by *yetzer hara* is no analogue to Freud’s more sophisticated tension-reduction mechanism of the id.

VI

Is the belief that the “*yetzer* for licentiousness” still persists as a dominant inclination in man at all a similar one to that of the pervasiveness of libido *qua* the energy of the sexual drive?³⁵ Again, there is only a semantical similarity. Sexuality, in psychoanalysis, refers not merely to matters pertaining to copulation or preparatory to it but includes all sensual strivings and satisfactions (competition, need for achievement, need to create, etc.).

Sexuality, in the Freudian sense, does not begin in puberty, after an asexual childhood, nor does it end with the end of genital discharge; it starts at birth or nearly so, and ends with death. Sexuality penetrates most of our activities which are to a large extent, though by no means only, satisfactions of sexual drives . . .³⁶

Now, it is true that some sources indicated that the *yetzer hara*, probably including its particular sexual connotation, begins at birth or nearly so. This, again, is a merely fortuitous similarity. Libido is seen as a deep-seated life force for *all constructive activities*. In the course of a normal development, libido, or sexual energy, becomes attached to various body organs and undergoes what Freud termed the “vicissitudes of the Libido,” i.e., the direction of this energy inward, outward, towards fixation, regression and sublimation.³⁷

It seems that the sexuality inherent in the *yetzer hara* refers only to sexual offenses or, on the positive level, to the fulfillment of marriage. There is no indication that the concept of *yetzer hara* encompasses a theory of the eroticization of other organs in the body. Moreover, we can argue that if someone holds that the *yetzer hara* represents destructive forces then it cannot be libido since libido, as Freud postulated it, is unable to explain aggression, perversion and narcissism. On the third hand, the drive of the *yetzer hara* is never related to any mechanism like *sublimation*. Sublimation implies that the sexual need *itself* is manifested and released in the “higher” activities of culture and personality which the sexual need has called into being.³⁸ Sublimation also refers to Freud’s opinion that “higher”

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psychic activities *as such* are brought into being through sexual activity and to be *nothing but* disguised manifestations of this activity. "The 'higher' activity is a way of escape *created* by the libido."³⁹

Once again, while the *yetzer hara* is sometimes spoken of as the *motivator* for specific activities it is nowhere viewed as specific energy sublimated into psychic or life activities, aspirations and cultural perfection. In general, we cannot accept a view which holds that all of our lives' activities are motivated by extrinsic causes. For example, we are enjoined to study the Torah "for Torah's sake" and for no other motivation.⁴⁰ How can this be possible if, even on an unconscious level, such pursuit is merely a tension reducing expression of transformed sexual energy or that, on another level, we learn Torah because of an impulse to *return* to our infantile stage and to recover the feeling of pleasure experienced then; the tendency towards progress being, in reality, a regressive force?⁴¹

VII

From our analysis of the meaning of *yetzer hara* and Freud's psychoanalytic concepts we conclude that there can be no comparison between them for the following reasons: *yetzer hara* is not

1. an instinct *per se*, because it is neither an endosomatic construct nor is it a biological construct;
2. Thanatos (the death instinct), because Thanatos is an instinct and is a *purely* destructive, regressive and catabolistic urge which does not fit into the Jewish philosophical framework;
3. Eros (the constructive life instinct), because Eros is an instinct and does not explain destructivity or aggressiveness;
4. Libido, because the libido is a somatic energy of specific quantity which operates on a tension-reduction principle and through sublimation—concepts not clearly established in the rabbinic literature;
5. the id, because id is a reservoir of libido, is the housing of the combined instincts of Eros and Thanatos, and is a means of primitive phylogenetic drives which seek expression through various symptoms and sublimated activities which the *yetzer hara* does not seem to possess.

What, then, is *yetzer hara*? In rabbinic literature it has been

depicted as follows:

1. only evil;
2. containing both constructive and destructive urges leading to sin and, ultimately, to death; and
3. containing *neutral* forces whose constructivity and destructivity depend on their use.

When attempting to understand the motivation for sin in man, it was helpful and instructive to identify certain urges created in man by God with a model such as the *yetzer hara*. Some conceptions of the *yetzer hara* viewed it as the sinful nature, or *yetzer*, of man. However, sexual and competitive drives were quickly recognized as forces which could easily hallow *or* corrupt and be either hallowed or corrupted. It must be noted: the *yetzer hara* is a metaphysical concept and is not closely analogous to the biological constructs postulated by Freud. The forces which urge — indeed, we dare not say “cause” — man to sin can and should be overruled by man’s basic goodness. The “energy” of the *yetzer hara* neither stimulates *all* life activities nor is it transmogrified into higher cultural activities, ideas or spiritual development. The Jewish view of death, once again, is that it is ultimately brought about by sin.⁴² Our lives progress towards growth, not return — even death is not permanent. *Teshuvah*, repentance, which literally means return, represents creative growth.⁴³

We know that the basic nature of man is actually considered good in Jewish philosophy as implied by the concept of *imitatio Dei*, man is created in the image of God. Man’s capacity for goodness is a reflection of the goodness of God.

The idea that human goodness derives from the goodness of God is well expressed in the *Sefer ha-Yashar* of Zechariah ha-Yevani . . . “The good deeds which we perform point to the goodness of the Creator, just as smoke points to fire.”⁴⁴

We hold that man shares in God’s freedom and that he consciously designs and grows. Thus, his nature cannot be wholly determined by unconscious instincts, good or bad, as implied by psychodynamics. It seems, therefore, that the *yetzer hara* is

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best viewed as an *external* force, i.e., not identical with man's natural good self, which merely represents primary or animalistic drives *when* perverted to base levels or indulged in to the point of sin.⁴⁵ It is not an instinct *sui generis* which either directly or indirectly causes man to act in any way. It is, as it were, a model superimposed *post hoc* on man's sinful behaviors but is never viewed as the total dynamic of human personality. Caution, accordingly, should be used in future comparisons between the *yetzer hara* and any of the psychoanalytic concepts described here.

NOTES

1. Deuteronomy 31:21.
2. Schechter, Solomon, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, New York: Schocken Books, 1961, pp. 242-243. Cf. also Isaiah, ben Avraham and Sharfman, B. (trans.), *The Pentateuch and Rashi's Commentary: a linear translation into English*, New York: S. S. & R. Publishing Co., Inc., 1949, Vol. V., p. 283; who translate *yetzer* as "imagination." Cf. also Erich Fromm, *You Shall Be As Gods*, Conn.: Fawcett, 1966, p. 126.
3. Genesis 8:21. Or, as paraphrased by the *T. Jer. Berakhot* 6b, "Even in his state as a minor, man's thoughts are evil."
4. I Chron. 28:9 and cf. notes of R. David Kimchi (RDK) who explains that *yetzer* means the ability of the heart to discern between good and evil. Cf. also Schechter, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.
5. Genesis 2:7.
6. *Berakhot* 61a.
7. *Kiddushin* 30b.
8. *Shir ha-Shirim Rabba* 7:13.
9. Avot d'Rav Nosson 15. Other comments indicate that there is indeed a *yetzer hara* in animals. Cf. Gen. R. 12:18 which states to the effect that, in physical respects, man resembles animal. God created man because He was not satisfied with either animals or angels. The latter failed to satisfy Him because they have no evil *yetzer*. The animals, on the other hand, lacked a good *yetzer*. Cf. also Gen. R. 14:34, ". . . and if man pursues evil, he is likened to an animal."
10. *P'siktah Rabbasi* 9:2.
11. *Zohar Tosefta* ii, 69b.
12. Genesis 1:31.
13. Gen. R. 1:31; 9:7; Eccl. R. 3:11.
14. *Encyclopedia Judaica*, New York: Macmillan, 1971, Vol. VIII:1318.
15. Solomon, Andy, "Eros-Thanatos: a modification of Freudian instinct theory in the light of Torah teachings," *TRADITION*, 1973, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 95-96.

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16. As R. Chananiah b. Dosa said, "It is not the ferocious ass which kills, it is sin which kills." (*Berakhot* 33a). Similarly, it seems that it is not the *yetzer hara* which causes death, but sin. Cf. *vide* note 42.

17. Solomon, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

18. Cf. *Yoma* 69b. I am equating the Talmud's statement to the effect that without the *yetzer hara* man would never do business (*Gen. R.* 9:7), with some conception of an aggressive impulse.

19. Freud, Sigmund, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, New York: Norton, 1949, p. 5.

20. Solomon, *op. cit.*, p. 95; *Gen. R.* 9.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

22. Blum, Gerald, *Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality*, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1953, p. 18. Freud believed that the aggressive impulse was beyond the pleasure principle in the sense that the discharge of aggression, unlike the discharge of libido, is unaccompanied by pleasure in and of itself. However, Hartman *et al* have suggested that aggression bears the same relation to pleasure and to unpleasure as does libido: discharge of aggression, generally speaking, gives rise to pleasure while accumulation and lack of discharge, generally speaking, gives rise to unpleasure. (Hartman, H., Kris, E. & Loewenstein, R. M., Notes on the theory of aggression, *Psychoan. Study Child*, 1949 (3-43 in C. Brenner, The Psychoanalytic Concept of Aggression, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1971, 52, p. 140.)

23. Nuttin, Joseph, *Psychoanalysis and Personality*, New York: Mentor, 1962, pp. 82-83.

24. Holzman, Philip, *Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology*, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1970, p. 113. Also see Waelder, Robert, *Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis*, New York: Schocken Books, 1960, pp. 98-103.

25. Holzman, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Freud, himself, talked about the "far-reaching instinctive knowledge of animals . . . if human beings too possessed an *instinctive* endowment such as this." (Freud, S., *The Unconscious*, Standard Works, London: Hogarth Press, 1915, Vol. 14, p. 195.)

26. Waelder, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

27. Holzman, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

29. Schechter, *op. cit.*, p. 244, quotes *Eccl. R.* 4:15, ". . . the foolish old king . . . to whom all the *organs* of the body show obedience." This might have been an interesting ground for evidence of endosomatic sources of the *yetzer hara*. Unfortunately, this is a misquote as the reference in the location cited states *s'hackol shomein lo*, ". . . all *mankind* harkens to it."

30. *Sanhedrin* 91b; *Gen. R.* 34:6.

31. *Eccl. R.* 4:15. Other sources say that a child does not sin until the age of ten (*Tanchuma Gen.* 7).

32. Cf. note 13 and text.

33. Holzman, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

34. "Who is mighty? He who controls his *yetzer*." *Avot* 4:1.

35. Cf. *Shir haShirim Rabba* 7:13; *Gen. R.* 1:31 and *Eccl. R.* 3:11.

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36. Waelder, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
37. Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
38. Nuttin, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 79-80.
40. *Avot* 6:1.
41. Nuttin, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
42. Cf. Gen. R. 8:11, “. . . if he will sin he will die, and if not; he will live.”
43. Lichtenstein, Aaron, *R. Joseph Soloveitchik*, in Simon Novek (Ed.), *Great Jewish Thinkers of the Twentieth Century*, Mass.: Colonial Press, Inc., 1963, p. 296. Cf. also Metzger, Alter, *Rabbi Kook's Philosophy of Repentance*, New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1968, pp. 18-19, 20: “Repentance is perceived not only as remorse for transgressions but also as the actualization of the inherent creative potential within the specific individual” (p. 18).
44. Epstein, Isidore, *The Faith of Judaism*, London: Soncino Press, 1954, p. 216.
45. Schechter, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-263.