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THE LONELY MAN OF FAITH CONFRONTS THE ISH HA-HALAKHAH:
An Analysis of the Critique of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Philosophical Writings

INTRODUCTION

Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein, in a biographical sketch of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, notes that Rabbi Soloveitchik's major vehicle for transmitting his vast Talmudic and secular knowledge has always been the spoken word. As a result, there are among Rabbi Soloveitchik's publications but two articles of considerable length and only a handful of shorter articles that provide us with insight into his philosophical thought. Despite the limited publications, Rabbi Soloveitchik's philosophical writings have been critically analyzed in a number of books and periodicals. To date, however, no systematic response to the critique of Rabbi Soloveitchik's writings has appeared. This article will summarize Rabbi Soloveitchik's three most publicized essays and evaluate the critique to which they have been subjected.

I: ISH HA-HALAKHAH

In his earliest and perhaps most famous work, "Ish Ha-Halakhah," Rabbi Soloveitchik introduces us to the stylistic approach and the underlying theme that is fundamental to all his writings. Rabbi Soloveitchik does not deal with real existence, nor with abstractions from real existence; but with pure or ideal types. While in reality these types rarely if ever exist, the development of their form and characteristics is used by Rabbi Soloveitchik to clarify the complexities of human existence.
The paradoxes and tensions of human nature and man's awareness of his dual role as both subject and object are the problems of reality with which man must contend. The Man of Science gazes upon the universe with the intention of removing the unknown from nature by means of developing scientific and mathematical laws that categorize and classify nature's perplexities. That which cannot be categorized is not his concern. The Religious Man, uninterested in the mathematical-scientific domain, is completely enveloped in the vast mystery of existence. He too seeks answers. But in his search he finds that as he delves into the unraveling of nature's mysteries they become even more mysterious to him. While his physical existence remains in this world, his spiritual nature becomes dedicated to a supervening numinal realm.

In contrast to Religious Man, the Man of Halakhah is not overwhelmed by the problems of existence. He approaches existence armed with a priori concepts contained in the divinely given body of Jewish laws. Because these halakhic concepts deal with all aspects of reality, he uses them to develop a satisfying image of the nature of God, his fellow man, and his universe. Since he applies principles not only to problems of reality but also conceptualizes principles that relate to non-existing cases, the Man of Halakhah attains the lofty level of the pure theoretical Man of Science. Because he is in possession of norms which encompass his entire existence, he, unlike Religious Man, does not find it necessary to escape from temporal to transcendental reality.

Because even God has renounced authority in the domain of halakhic interpretation, the Man of Halakhah takes on full responsibility for the elaboration and progressive refinement of these laws. The Man of Halakhah, with this vote of confidence, is therefore able to rise above the anxiety, helplessness, and awe of human existence by setting standards and norms to otherwise unpredictable religious feelings. Halakhah thus becomes the objectification of religion into clearly defined principles and into a fixed pattern of lawfulness. As a result, the significance of a mitzvah is, to the halakhist, not in the feelings it evokes, but in the actual performance in its detailed exactitude. While a surge
of religious feeling would undoubtedly be subdued by this cold
exactling attitude, it is compensated by a general joyous sense of
dedication that accompanies the performance of these tasks.

Because, to Rabbi Soloveitchik, the ultimate level of Halakhic
achievement is the level of prophecy, he equates the intellectual
qualities necessary for the attainment of prophecy with the cre-
tative processes used by the halakhist. While the actual reception
of the Divine Spirit attained by the prophet is no longer in exist-
ence, nevertheless only the ideal Man of Halakhah could have
reached the state of preparedness necessary for its attainment.10

The halakhist, unlike the Christian saints, is not engaged in a
continuous battle against Desire since his laws have a moder-
ating effect upon him.11

Halakhah may also be considered the most democratic of
endeavors since anyone may enter the gates of the halls of study
and on his own volition, without the necessity of intermediaries,
use the halakhic process to become a creative partner of God.12

Neither is the Man of Halakhah fixed in time to a defined
and limited period in the historical process. The divinely set
laws that are his domain connects him with the history that pre-
ceded him and that which will succeed him.

In summary, the Man of Halakhah has a loftier and more
totalistic approach to the universe than does the Man of Science
or Religious Man. Only he can be successful in developing fully
satisfying images of the universe and in removing the major
perplexities of existence from his temporal world. He is unified
with the entire historical process, is not enslaved by desire, and
he alone is capable of reaching the ultimate level of human per-
fec tion, that of prophecy.

II: THE LONELY MAN OF FAITH

In “The Lonely Man of Faith,”13 Rabbi Soloveitchik’s second
lengthy philosophical writing, he once again embarks on typo-
logical categorization in an attempt to explain the paradox and
duality of human existence. Rabbi Soloveitchik begins by indi-
cating that there are four major discrepancies that must be re-
ociled in the Bible’s two accounts14 of the creation of man.
1. While Adam of the first account (Adam the First) was created in the image of God, no information is provided concerning the manner in which he was fashioned. In contrast, we are told that Adam the Second was fashioned out of the ground and received the breath of life from God through his nostrils.

2. Adam the First was commanded to fill the earth and subdue it, while Adam the Second was bidden to cultivate the Gan Eden and to preserve it.

3. The female was created together with Adam the First, while Adam the Second initially appeared alone. Only later was he provided with a female companion to be his helpmate and complement.

4. In the first account only the name E-lokhim appears, while in the second it is used in conjunction with Hashem.15

Rav Soloveitchik explains that the two accounts speak of two distinct “types” of men. Adam the First, formed in the Image of God, is a creator. He expresses his likeness to God through his drive for creative activity and through the immeasurable resources granted him (particularly his intelligence) for confronting his world. Adam the First, as a creative being, is willing to forego metaphysical speculation by asking only: “How does the cosmos function?” and not “Why does it function?” or “What is its essence?”. His sole motivation is the discovery of his human identity. He is creative, aggressive, beauty oriented and worldly minded equating human dignity with exercise of control over the environment.16 He is not interested in what is true but in what is functional, and thereby carries out the mandate addressed to him “to fill the earth and subdue it.”17

Adam the Second is also intrigued by the universe but approaches the cosmos with the “Why?” question. He is not a creative being but one interested in understanding what exists. He, unlike Adam the First, is receptive rather than dynamic, absorbed primarily in his awe-inspiring qualitative world wherein he seeks to establish a relationship with its Creator. The breath of life breathed by God into his nostrils alludes to Adam the Second’s preoccupation with God. To him dignity is not man’s sole quest. His method of self-discovery is by means of experiencing a redeemed existence.18

Because dignity is linked with attaining recognition, never with anonymity, Adam the First is a communicative social being
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who could not have been created alone and therefore emerged simultaneously with Eve. The community wherein he exists is a natural one, a reaction of man seeking survival against the challenges of a hostile environment.  

While the dignity-seeking Adam the First must control his environment, the redemption-seeking Adam the Second controls himself. Similarly, while dignity can be achieved only through the outside world, redemption may be accomplished in the privacy of one’s inner personality. Dignity is acquired when man advances, redemption when man retreats and lets himself be defeated by a Higher Being.  

Ironically, at the moment Adam the Second discovers his true identity he becomes aware of his aloneness. His covenantal companion, his wife, is granted him through defeat, when an overpowering sleep comes upon him. Yet we find that only he, and not Adam the First, is introduced to his mate by God who, because of man’s sacrificial action, joins in the formation of a covenantal community. E-lokhim signifying God as a source of cosmic dynamics sufficed for Adam the First. For Adam the Second Hashem symbolizing the communal relation between man and God had to be substituted.  

There are two ways in which the covenantal community between God and man may be formed: either when God addresses himself to man and establishes the covenantal-prophetic community or when man addresses himself to God in the formation of a covenantal-prayer community. Just like the prophet is the representative of others, likewise the inclusion of others is a prerequisite for the prayer community, which requires man to reveal himself to God through prayer and to his fellow man through love and sympathy and communal action.  

Halakhah asks man to unite these two Adams within his existence. The same Bible that tells man to “Love thy God with all thy heart” tells him to build a house, cut his harvest, etc. The function of Halakhah is to remind man that he is a member of both a covenantal and majestic community. Halakhah, being monistic in its approach, obviously views the majestic community of Adam the First and the covenantal community of Adam the Second not as contradictory, but as complementary. Man must be creative and conquering and, at the same time, the
Contemporary Adam has failed to heed the duality in man. His success in the majestic-creative enterprises has led him to deny that an Adam the Second exists. Although he stands associated with some religious establishment, his religious community is not one governed by a desire for redemption, but is dedicated to dignity and success. Contemporary majestic man, because of his failure to strive for a higher mode of existence, has remained an incomplete being.

If the mystery of revelation could be translated into cultural terms, then Adam the Second could come to peace with, and be understood by contemporary Adam the First. However, because of the uniqueness of the faith experience, it is impossible fully to accomplish this goal. Consequently, contemporary Man of Faith suffers loneliness of a special kind. His loneliness is not only an ontological one, but is also a social one, since he is ridiculed whenever he attempts to deliver the message of faith. Nevertheless it is part of his unique task to continue tenaciously to deliver this message to majestic contemporary Adam the First.

III: Confrontation

Again basing himself on the Biblical account of creation, Rabbi Soloveitchik sees man on three progressive levels of being. On the first level man feels so totally natural in the universe that he fails to view his existence as a task or opportunity. On the second, man is confronted by nature and attempts to control it. On the third level he confronts others and in doing so realizes that though he finds companionship, he can never again overcome the barrier that separates his inner self from others. While men pursue common goals and thus engage in common enterprise, their ultimate destinies are not the same. Thus man, even when acting as an ezer, experiences a state of k'negdo. He is a social being yet at the same time a lonely creature. Man's inner personality is never involved in communal existence but always remains in seclusion.

As Jews, we have been burdened with a twofold confronta-
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tion. We are human beings sharing with others the general encounter with nature. Yet we are members of a covenantal community which has managed to preserve its identity while being confronted by other faith communities under the most unfavorable conditions. The present proponents of confrontation with other faith communities, despite maintaining a desire for the preservation of the Jewish community, have obviously not fully grasped the real nature and implications of meaningful Jewish identity. They continue to speak of Jewish identity without realizing that there can be no identity without uniqueness, a uniqueness that expresses itself in a threefold manner.

1. The Divine imperatives to which one community is unreservedly committed is not to be equated with the ethos and ritual of another.
2. The belief that its own system of dogmas, doctrines, and values is best fitted for the attainment of an ultimate good is essential to the faith community.
3. Each community is unyielding in its eschatological expectations and perceives the "end of time" as an era where their particular faith will be universally embraced.

The second misconception of those advocating full confrontation is their failure to realize the compatibility of a dual confrontation. There is no contradiction between coordinating our activities with others and at the same time confronting them as members of another faith community. It is only because non-Jewish society has confronted us in a mood of defiance that it has been impossible for us to participate in full in the universal confrontation between man and his universe.

Any confrontation with another faith community must therefore be on a mundane level rather than on a theological one. The relationship must be outerdirected to the secular orders in which we function. The great encounter between God and man is a personal affair, incomprehensible not only to the outsider but even to a fellow member of the same faith community. Our commitment to that community cannot be compromised.

IV: Analysis of Critique

In his critique of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s thought, Eugene Boro-
TRADITION: A Journal of Orthodox Thought

witz\textsuperscript{33} dwells upon the difficulty in dealing with typologies. Although their use may be illuminating, it is never quite clear how these types arose, why they and not others were selected, and precisely how they relate to each other. Strikovsky\textsuperscript{34} further notes that even within Rabbi Soloveitchik's works there seem to be contradictions regarding the types that he employs. While the "Ish Ha-Halakhah"\textsuperscript{35} is portrayed as a scholar who makes use of Halakhah's \textit{a priori} system to construct a meaningful perspective on life, his counterpart, the "Lonely Man of Faith"\textsuperscript{36} appears awed and mystified by his surroundings. In a similarly contradictory manner, the "Ish Ha-Halakhah" enjoys both the worlds of knowledge and religion, while the "Lonely Man of Faith" oscillates between two worlds, seeking to be in one just as he begins to accustom himself to the other. To the inner discrepancies cited by Strikovsky, one may add that still another contradiction appears to exist between the types employed in the "Lonely Man of Faith" and "Confrontation" articles. While in the "Lonely Man of Faith" essay, man is portrayed on two levels of existence, that of creative Adam the First and spiritual Adam the Second, in contrast, the "Confrontation" article develops three progressive levels of man's being:

- a. natural man, who fails to grasp the nature of his existence;
- b. man confronting nature and attempting to control it;
- c. man confronting his fellow man and discovering the barrier that separates him from others.\textsuperscript{37}

Though Borowitz's general criticism of typologies seems well founded, the inner contradictions cited by Strikovsky between the "Ish Ha-Halakhah" and "Lonely Man of Faith" appear to be largely inapplicable. Strikovsky naturally assumed that the chronological order in which the articles appeared is to be used as the guide for their interpretation. It is quite evident, however, that the essay "The Lonely Man of Faith" is to be viewed as a predecessor, in terms of philosophical development, to the "Ish Ha-Halakhah" article. If we should view the "Lonely Man of Faith" as a development of the dualism in the quests of men, and the "Ish Ha-Halakhah" article as dealing with the unique and superior approach of one who seeks to integrate a redemptive
quest into his existence through life-long commitment to the discipline of Halakhah, then Strikovsky’s contradictions no longer exist. In this sense Professor Kaplan, in his recent article on Rabbi Soloveitchik’s thought proceeds in logical sequence by commencing with an analysis of the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay in his development of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s religious philosophy.

Closer scrutiny of the “Confrontation” and “Lonely Man of Faith” articles would indicate that there, too, no true discrepancy exists. Although, at first glance, the “Confrontation” article appears to employ three distinct character types in contradiction to “Lonely Man’s” two, in reality the initial two types identified in the “Confrontation” article (that of man in a natural state, and man confronting nature) represent nothing more than two progressive levels of a creative Adam the First existence. In the initial stage Adam is awed by his environment, but he quickly adapts and proceeds in majestic conquest of it.

Jacob Agus provides further criticism of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s thought in his Guideposts in Modern Judaism where he argues that even if Halakhah has evolved consecrated religious personalities, as is suggested in “Ish Ha-Halakhah,” this does not attest to the truth of Halakhah, nor to its enduring significance. Agus fails to recognize, however, that Rabbi Soloveitchik surely had no interest in attempting to establish Halakhah’s validity, since the very applicability of Halakhah presupposes a belief in the truth emanating from its Divine origin. Rabbi Soloveitchik simply seeks to indicate in what manner the halakhist, having accepted Halakhah as a tool with which to formulate his mode of existence, emerges as an ideal superior type.

Agus further objects to the use of prophecy as the level of ultimate attainment in the halakhic personality. He claims that by its very nature as a rationally ordained system of law, Halakhah precludes the intervention of non-rational prophecy. Strikovsky responds correctly to this criticism by indicating that precisely for this reason Rabbi Soloveitchik refuses fully to equate the halakhist with the prophet, choosing instead to limit the equation to the requisite intellectual processes that are mutual to both.
As part of his general objection to the use of typologies, Boro-
weit‡ claims that Rabbi Soloveitchik's types are not essentially
Jewish but could easily be applied to personality types within
Roman Catholicism. Strikovsky disagrees. He asserts that while
one not adhering to the binding nature of Halakhah may view
these typologies as being not exclusively Jewish, a Jew who is
accepting Halakhah could make no such error. Based on Rabbi
Soloveitchik's position in the article "Confrontation," each
faith community is firmly convinced of both the truth and su-
periority of its particular doctrine. Thus to Rabbi Soloveitchik
it is evident that only one pursuing halakhic doctrine can attain
the superior level of the "Ish Ha-Halakhah."

Rabbi Soloveitchik's insistence that a basic similarity exists
between the halakhist and the mathematical physicist by virtue
of their common approach to reality with an a priori system, is
contested by Agus who cannot see how halakhic principles can
possibly be construed to be a priori. Kaplan questions this
equation further by suggesting an obvious distinction between
the two disciplines. While the system of abstract mathematical
relations is one that the scientist has himself created, it is diffi-
cult to see how the halakhic system, having been revealed by
God, can logically be conceived as part of the a priori world
of the halakhist himself.

Kaplan resolves the difficulty of the science-Halakhah equa-
tion by contending that Rabbi Soloveitchik's position can be
properly understood only in light of Hermann Cohen's theory of
science which suggests that the scientist does not explain the
world in its own terms, but constructs abstract-formal mathe-
matical systems in terms of which natural-sense phenomena could
be explained. Cohen's philosophy of science may then logically
be equated with the halakhic process in view of Rabbi Solo-
veitchik's contention that his grandfather, Rabbi Hayim Solo-
veitchik, introduced a similar approach to the study of Halak-
hah. Instead of explaining the Halakhah in its own terms by
merely organizing, classifying, and resolving difficulties and
problems, Reb Hayim developed a system of abstract concepts
which he in turn used as a vehicle for explaining the Halakhah.
Thus, Rabbi Soloveitchik's unique conception of both the scien-
tist and halakhist allows him rightfully to declare that their respective approaches are similar.

Although he contends that Rabbi Soloveitchik’s insistence on the objective nature of the Halakhah is basically well-founded, Kaplan nevertheless feels that Rabbi Soloveitchik has pressed the analogy between Halakhah and mathematical physics too far. He argues that we find a number of halakhic categories, i.e., darkhei shalom, darkhei noam, (to which may be added, derekh tovim, ha-yashar v’hatov, etc.) which are inherently subjective since they can only be applied on the basis of general non-halakhic value judgments. Neither can the Halakhah be viewed as self-sufficient since many conceptual realms such as aggadah, kabbalah, philosophy, and science necessarily impinge upon it. Agus similarly charges that any attempt to develop a self-sufficient philosophy of Halakhah can only meet with futility since a critical examination of the classical formulations of Halakhah would undoubtedly show that there has been much influence from non-halakhic sources.

In response to the rather cogent argument that Halakhah is neither totally objective, nor does it lend itself to the development of a self-sufficient philosophy, we cite an article by Walter Wurzburger, “Meta-Halakhic Propositions,” where he suggests that this form of criticism may well stem from a basic misconception of the precise nature of the halakhist’s role in the process of halakhic development. Dr. Wurzburger argues that even if we maintain that differences of opinion on halakhic issues reflect divergent philosophies of life, this does not deny Halakhah its basic objectivity, since the halakhic scholar, though guided by his personal value judgments and his own understanding of the Halakhah, is nevertheless bound by the Biblical and Talmudic texts which serve to provide a framework for his freedom of interpretation. Thus, it may be argued that Rabbi Soloveitchik, in insisting on Halakhah’s objectivity, refers only to the objective core within which the halakhist operates, a contention whose plausibility may be supported by the fact that in the very “Ish Ha-Halakhah” article in which the Halakhah’s objective nature is emphasized, Rabbi Soloveitchik declares that it is precisely the freedom of interpretation afforded the halakhist that allows
him to become a creative partner of God. Dr. Wurzburger further contends that just as the halakhist’s interpretive role does not violate Halakhah’s essentially objective core, neither does the employment of categories of thought that stem from non-halakhic sources necessarily violate the self-sufficiency of Halakhah. Such outside impingement is irrelevant as long as it can be harmonized with an authentic halakhic approach. Drawing an analogy from science, he notes that just as the validity of a scientific hypothesis is dependent solely upon its success in correlating a given set of scientific data, the source of a halakhic proposition should rightfully be evaluated only in light of its use in forming what may be viewed as an authentic halakhic outlook.

Perhaps one may add that rather than undermining the notion of Halakhah’s objectivity and usefulness for the formulation of a Jewish philosophy of life, the existence of halakhic categories such as darkhei noam and darkhei shalom which Kaplan terms inherently subjective due to their applicability solely on the basis of non-halakhic value judgments, may instead be used in support of Halakhah’s basic objective core. While there can be little doubt that some halakhic norms like hayashar v’hatov, derekh tovim, and those cited by Kaplan are situational and denote direction rather than specific action, it nevertheless seems illogical to assume that they would exist as halakhic categories (some of which are judicially enforceable) were they to be guided solely by man’s independent moral sense. Instead, the very existence of such halakhic norms suggests that the Torah deems it possible to extract from halakhic data metaphysical and ethical propositions which enable man to formulate a philosophy of life to effectively guide him in the spirit of Halakhah even when confronted with situations where one’s action is not governed by Halakhah’s fixed and rigid objective standards.

Rabbi Soloveitchik’s contention that the feeling of loneliness is the universal experience of the “Man of Faith” is criticized by Strikovsky as lacking solid Biblical or Talmudic support. Rabbi Soloveitchik’s reference, in an article entitled “Ma-Dedekh Mi-Dod,” to Moses’s return from his abode of loneliness after his descent from heaven, is dismissed by Strikovsky as be-
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ing far removed from the plain and simple meaning of the Torah’s narrative which suggests that Moses’ seclusion was motivated solely by his disappointment in the nation’s fashioning of the golden calf. Although it is true that no concrete source for spiritual man’s loneliness is provided in the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay, Rabbi Soloveitchik has elsewhere indicated that the very story of Adam and Eve’s creation upon which the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay is founded, provided him his source. In a recently published summary of a public lecture, Rabbi Soloveitchik suggests that the term levado of the verse in Gen. II, (“It is not good that he be levado”), can have two possible meanings: alone and lonely. Rabbi Soloveitchik argues that the verse cannot logically refer to man’s being alone, since Genesis I had amply dealt with procreation and sexual desire, both of which presume the existence of man’s physical companion. Clearly the term is meant to refer to spiritual man’s loneliness which is founded upon the feeling that he does not share a mutual destiny with those that surround him. Thus it was to partially relieve his spiritual loneliness that Adam was in need of a partner who would at least in some measure share a common destiny with him.

V: Evaluation

Rabbi Soloveitchik’s philosophical thought undoubtedly classifies him as a religious existentialist who seems to have enjoyed many influences, both Judaic and non-Judaic. His understanding of the nature of pure science in the “Ish Ha-Halakhah” was clearly influenced by Hermann Cohen’s philosophy of science, while his view regarding the universal loneliness of man seems to have had its origin in Kierkegaardian thought. A partial parallel to Buber’s “I and Thou” may perhaps be discerned from Rabbi Soloveitchik’s development of the I, Thou, He covenantal meeting with God in the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay, and in his insistence that only in such a relationship can man touch upon the inner personality of his fellow man. Despite the vast differences in approach and philosophy, Rabbi Soloveitchik’s contention that only through halakhic concepts can one
formulate a satisfactory view of the universe is somewhat similar to Hirsch’s insistence upon an inner study of mitzvot in order to derive God’s intents. Although the ideal “Ish Ha-Halakhah” seems to be vastly anti-Hassidic, many of the classical themes of Hassidic thought appear in Rabbi Soloveitchik’s writings. Thus two of the major themes of the Hassidic work Tanya, the mutual responsibility of one Jew for another and the interrelatedness of all Jews, play a prominent role in the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay. Of course, these notions are so basic to Jewish thought in general that no direct influence need be assumed.

Although we responded to some of the criticism leveled at Rabbi Soloveitchik’s philosophy, his use of typologies remains a problem. Borowitz indicates that it is difficult to see how typologies would be of much use to the average reader because of the difficulty in making the deductions necessary for application to reality.

Compounding this difficulty is Rabbi Soloveitchik’s relatively limited writings, which greatly frustrate any effort to integrate and thoroughly evaluate his thought. Rabbi Lichtenstein, indicated that Rabbi Soloveitchik had initially planned a doctoral dissertation on Maimonides and Plato which contained as its thesis that general Maimonidean scholarship was mistaken in viewing Maimonides as a confirmed Aristotelian. Perhaps such a work would have allowed us a fuller and richer glimpse into his thought, and would have served to complement the limited material that is presently available to us.

NOTES

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summarizing anew the “Ish Ha-Halakhah” article from its original Hebrew, I have used the English language summations found in the works of Agus, Borowitz, and Kaplan.


5. While the existence of a pure “Ish Ha-Halakhah” and pure Adam the First (of the “Lonely Man of Faith” essay) is within the realm of possibility, the actual existence of a pure Adam the Second would appear impossible.


7. Ibid., pp. 663-672.

8. Ibid., pp. 701-702.


10. Ibid., pp. 729-732.

11. Ibid., p. 691.

12. Ibid., p. 679.


16. Ibid., pp. 12-16.


19. Ibid., p. 19.


21. Ibid., p. 33.


23. Ibid., pp. 51-53.

24. Ibid., p. 63.

25. Ibid., p. 65.

26. Ibid.

27. TRADITION, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 5-30.


30. Ibid., pp. 20-30.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.


34. Aryeh Strikovsky, op. cit., Gesher, pp. 133-150. Dr. Strikovsky is presently preparing a book on Rabbi Soloveitchik’s philosophy.

35. Talpiot, 1944, loc. cit.


37. TRADITION, vol. 6, no. 4, 1964.

38. See sections 1-3 of this article.

39. TRADITION, Summer 1973. While the sequence adopted by Kaplan aids us with our resolution, Kaplan himself attempts to resolve the inner contradictions between the “Lonely Man of Faith” and “Ish Ha-Halakhah” essays by
equating the Man of Halakhah, by dint of his creative thought processes, to creative Adam the First. It seems, however, far fetched to assume that Rabbi Soloveitchik failed to distinguish between the intellectual creativity of the Man of Halakhah and the physical creativity of Adam the First.

40. pp. 37-44.
41. This position has been established by Rabbi Soloveitchik in the “Confrontation” article where he argues that one cannot be “confronted” on basic religious dogma.
42. op. cit., pp. 42-44.
43. loc. cit.
44. loc. cit.
45. loc. cit.
46. loc. cit.
47. loc. cit.
49. Rabbi Soloveitchik’s view of his grandfather, Reb Chayim’s approach to Talmudic study is formulated in an article entitled “Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod,” Ha-Doar, vol. 42, no. 39, p. 755.
50. loc. cit.
51. loc. cit.
52. Dr. Wurzburger’s article appears in Leo Jung Jubilee Volume, p. 211.
53. op. cit., pp. 701-702.
54. In 1966 Rabbi Soloveitchik was preparing an article entitled, “Is a Philosophy of Halakhah Possible” for that year’s Fall issue of TRADITION. It is most unfortunate that the article never appeared since it would undoubtedly have shed much light on the subject of Halakhah’s objectivity and self-sufficiency.
55. See Bach on Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 12. For a further discussion of the enforceability of supra-legal ethical norms, see S. Federbush, Ha-musar V’hamishpat B’Yisrael; Z. Y. Meltzer, “Lifnim Mishurat Hadin” in Memorial Volume to the Late Chief Rabbi Herzog; M. Silberg, Kach Darka Shel Talmud. See also A. Lichtenstein’s article “Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?” in Marvin Fox’s Modern Jewish Ethics, for a thorough analysis of the halakhic nature of the Torah’s subjective norms.
56. The position that situational halakhic norms exist only because they had been preceded by rigid objective halakhic standards is formulated by Nachmanides in his commentary on the Pentateuch (Lev. 19:2), where he argues that the Torah’s broad injunctions always follow rigid objective norms governing that same area of conduct. “And this is the Torah’s nature: to detail and then to generalize in a similar manner. Thus, after the admonition concerning the particulars of civil law and all interpersonal dealings . . . it states in a general manner ‘And you shall do the right and the good.’” See also Nachmanides’ commentary to Deut. 6:18 where this idea is expounded in even greater detail. Magid Mishneh, in his commentary on Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, Hilkhhot Shekhenim 14:5, also appears to adopt the position that the relation of relativistic norms to Halakhah is vital for the definition of general goals, and for
molding a halakhic orientation.


58. The lecture, originally delivered in December 1971 at Stern College for Women, has been summarized in a recent Yeshiva University student publication, Shiurei Ha-rav, under the title “Adam and Eve.”


60. See above, footnote no. 48.

61. Martin Buber, I and Thou, Scribners & Sons.

62. See Dayan Grunfeld’s introduction to Hirsch’s commentary on the Pentateuch.

63. Likutei Emurim, ch. 32. See Strikovsky, op cit., p 139.

64. Borowitz, op. cit.

65. op. cit.