Unpacking the Iggerot: Appliances and Affluence
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Appliances and Affluence / Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 1, #104
Summarizing the Iggerot
It is no error that this column has the same citation from Iggerot Moshe to our previous one about Bat Mitzva ceremonies. Appended as the final paragraph to an already terse responsum, R. Moshe Feinstein briefly addressed his inquirer’s second question pertaining to the proper use of dishwashers in a kosher home. He writes:
And in regards to this new appliance used to wash one’s utensils called a dishwasher, whether one may [use it to] wash meat utensils and dairy utensils one after the other. Behold, it would require that the surface [the racks] that the utensils are placed on be designated for meat and another [set of racks] for dairy. However, regarding the actual dishwasher itself, wherein we place the [racks] that the utensils rest on, which is only the walls that surround it: it can be used for one after the other [i.e., for meat and dairy dishes consecutively].
With the ubiquity of dishwashers in the 21st century, such a truncated response to this kashrut quandary would seem insufficient, given the topic generated much controversy. However, this responsum was penned in 1957, while dishwashers only became relatively commonplace in the United States in the 1970s. It is understandable that over the following two decades, R. Feinstein penned several additional responsa to both clarify his reasoning as well as address corollary issues that emerged from his position.
Connecting the Iggerot
In Yoreh De’ah (vol. 2, #28, from 1964), R. Feinstein provides three rationales for why one should be permitted to suffice with a single dishwasher for both meat and dairy dishes. (Note: All references here to R. Feinstein’s opinion about one dishwasher for both means consecutively, never simultaneously.) First, he cites Rema (Y.D. 95:3) who rules that the very same basin of water could be used for cleaning meat and dairy dishes consecutively. R. Feinstein invokes the principle of noten ta’am bar noten ta’am, which posits that the flavor of the meat and dairy would have been diminished in the dishwater; once one variety of dish is removed, any residual taste left in the water would not be potent enough to effect the opposite dish which subsequently enters the water.
The second point he makes is that the overwhelming presence of water in the washing process would qualify for bittul be-shishim, a nullification of any problematic flavor in a 60:1 ratio.
Thirdly, he points out that vis-a-vis the modern dishwasher we do not even necessitate the first two considerations, as the water is drained and replaced from one cycle to the next. Each new dishwashing cycle begins with fresh parve (neutral) water.
Though, with such a persuasive argument in favor of a single dishwasher for meat and dairy, why did R. Feinstein not go the full length? Why did he still insist on requiring separate racks for meat and dairy? In principle, he concedes that the racks are not inherently different from the rest of the dishwasher chamber. However, there is concern for residue remaining on the racks from a previous cycle. Should, for instance, a dairy dish be placed on top of a leftover piece of meat, the considerations to be lenient listed above would be ineffective and one may very well have basar be-halav on their hands.
The following responsum in Iggerot Moshe (ibid, #29, authored in 1972) contains much of the same analysis. Though, it is worth noting that R. Feinstein actually articulates the term “racks” (in the iconic Yiddish transliteration style familiar to readers of Iggerot Moshe). Moreover, he addresses a slightly different scenario. Unlike meat and milk which are inherently permissible and need only be separated from each other to prevent the dishwasher from becoming non-kosher in the first place, should one want to kasher their dishwasher for Pesach, or return it to a state of kashrut after using it for forbidden food, it would need to undergo a haga’ala process (purging through hot water). In the prior responsum (ibid, #28), he already notes the categorical impossibility of kashering a dishwasher made of porcelain, a form of earthenware. And in #29 he goes a step further and states that even if the dishwasher is merely coated with porcelain it would still be impossible.
Or would it? There may yet be a way to salvage a non-kosher dishwasher.
Certainly, if it is composed of metal, such as stainless steel, one could effectuate the kashering process through haga’ala by cleaning out the dishwasher, waiting 24 hours from its last use, and then running it on a hotter temperature than the typical cycle (see Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 3, #58; see also our discussion on the halakhic implications of non-Biblical metals from a previous column, “Meit on a Plane”).
If we look at several circumstances across Iggerot Moshe such as kashering a dishwasher inadvertently rendered non-kosher (Y.D., vol. 3, #28), a home with a pre-installed dishwasher purchased from a non-Jew (ibid, #29), and the salvaging of an entire set of china dishes (Y.D., vol. 1, #43), R. Feinstein essentially proposes five mitigating concerns that, when at least some of them are combined, could be used in cases of financial exigency.
(1) If there was a presence of a soap or detergent-like substance, it would constitute a davar ha-pogem, and neutralize any of the otherwise edible flavors present. So it is possible that the dishwasher (and dishes) were never rendered non-kosher from the outset, thereby saving us the trouble of even needing to inquire whether there is a method for kashering porcelain in the first place.
(2) Biblically, flavor already begins to dissipate after twenty four hours (notein ta’am lefegam), and only then requires kashering due to a Rabbinic safeguard. Based on Hakham Tzvi’s understanding of a discussion in Avoda Zara, after twelve full months, any residual flavor would have completely faded away, thereby requiring no further action. (This is particularly useful in the not infrequent case of inheriting dishes that had been left in storage for over a year.)
(3) Nonetheless, R. Feinstein still wanted to employ an additional method of performing haga’ala three times (based on Ba’al ha-Ittur, cited in Tur, Y.D. 121).
(4) As mentioned above, the need to kasher a utensil after 24 hours have elapsed is only a Rabbinic stringency. Therefore, otherwise kosher food that was cooked in a non-kosher pot after twenty-four hours is permissible post-facto. R. Dovid Feinstein suggested to his father that since the dishwasher is designated for cleaning not cooking, it would technically be permissible to resume use after twenty-four hours have elapsed without requiring any further action—since the Rabbinic safeguard was only instituted vis-a-vis utensils used for cooking.
(5) Finally, R. Yaakov Emden cites his father, the Hakham Tzvi, that unlike ancient earthenware vessels, porcelain is similar to glass—so smooth that it does not absorb any flavor and thus is impervious to any kashrut issues. This would, again, obviate the issue from the outset.
None of these points would have been compelling on their own. But, in extenuating scenarios, R. Feinstein employed combinations of them in a manner that both maintained the integrity of kashrut and ensured the consumer’s economic welfare to avoid becoming imperiled—a point that we will elaborate on in the final section.
Challenges to the Iggerot
It occurred many times throughout R. Feinstein’s illustrious career that many thought he was too lenient; perhaps more surprisingly in this particular case some even thought he was too stringent.
R. Moshe Stern (Responsa Be’er Moshe, vol. #7, Kuntres Electric, 2:70) excoriated anyone who would entertain the possibility that a dishwasher, which is a kli rishon al gabei ha-eish, could possibly be used for meat and dairy, even separately. He exclaims that Heaven forfend such an arrangement could be permitted, “such a matter shall not be done among the people of Israel!” He notes that he subsequently encountered several of R. Feinstein’s responsa on the topic, and while he acknowledges that R. Feinstein is certainly a legitimate source of halakhic instruction, he remained unmoved and ruled against the use of a single dishwasher for meat and dairy for anyone who would consult him.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, R. Ovadia Yosef (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 10, Y.D., #4) argued that R. Feinstein did not go far enough! While R. Yosef says it is commendable to wash the meat and dairy dishes separately, however, due to factors such as the presence of detergent, in principle they could be washed at the very same time! This makes R. Feinstein’s position look rather stringent in comparison, and needless to say is in stark contrast to R. Stern who opposed a single dishwasher for separate washing of meat and dairy under any circumstances.
Many contemporary kashrut agencies have simply adopted the most prohibitive position. For instance the OK states that dishwashers “should be designated for either milk or meat and not used interchangeably.” The likely explanation is that subscribing to the most stringent position typically ensures the smallest margin for halakhic error, a reasoning advocated by R. Stern in his aforementioned responsum. R. Shlomo Wahrman, a remarkable scholar who served as the Rosh Yeshiva of HANC High School in New York, offers a variation of this argument in his Sefer She’arit Yosef (vol. 3, pp. 408-410). After engaging with R. Feinstein’s ruling and even suggesting a potential leniency of his own (see endnote), he incorporates the opinion of his teacher, R. Eliezer Silver, who argued that based on the Shulhan Arukh (Y.D. 242:10) a sage is forbidden to permit something that appears unreasonable to the public. To the untrained eye, a dishwasher should be no different than a pot on a stovetop which can certainly not be used for meat and dairy, even interchangeably. After all, it took R. Feinstein several steps and justifications to explain just how it could work, and even then there was a distinction between the dishwashing chamber versus the racks that the utensils rest upon. This opens a Pandora’s Box about the extent a posek should “play it safe” and eliminate any room for error versus approaching such halakhic nuances as educational opportunities for the community. We can also wonder whether the fact that R. Silver’s passing in 1968, just on the cusp of dishwashers becoming commonplace, could have impacted his point of view by not perceiving it as the necessity it has developed into for many today.
Reflecting on the Iggerot
We noted from the outset that the initial responsum regarding Bat Mitzva ceremonies was also R. Feinstein’s first foray into the quandary of modern dishwashers. While the likely explanation for these two seemingly disparate topics appearing in the same responsum was simply that the inquirer had sent both concurrently, we may yet be able to identify a common theme, should the reader permit me some homiletical license.
The development of bnei mitzva ceremonies and parties as well as the ubiquity of appliances like dishwashers are two examples of the growing affluence in the United States and other economically developed countries. Much ink has been spilled on the arms race of bar and bat mitzva parties. This comes at a time when the wealth in certain sectors of the Orthodox communities has enabled some to afford a kitchen with the capacity for not one, not two, but three dishwashing appliances for meat, dairy and parve respectively (in some extreme cases even Pesach dishwashers in a separate kitchen used just those eight hametz-free days a year).
At the same time, R. Feinstein was well aware of the many Torah observant individuals and families who could hardly make ends meet—including some who were fortunate if they merely had enough food with which to dirty those dishes. If we take a step back and look at some related responsa we can observe how he endeavored to maintain a rigorous halakhic standard while allowing for enough flexibility to accommodate the financial limits of many of his constituents. Unlike his rulings on dishwashers, he was far more ambivalent about using one oven for meat and dairy, even consecutively (Y.D., vol. 1, #40). However, he leaves open the door to designate the oven as either meat or dairy and simply cover the opposite type. Likewise, he rules that the same sink can be used for meat and dairy, provided there is a separate surface inserted when washing each (ibid, #42). Practically, what emerges from R. Feinstein’s responsa is that if certain safeguards are in place it is fully legitimate to possess a single dishwasher, a single oven, and a single sink and by no means compromise one’s status as a fully halakha-abiding observant Jew. This trend in psak allows for individuals of more limited economic standing to not be relegated to a lower religious category by pure dint of their finances, or lack thereof.
R. Feinstein’s concern and compassion for the struggling individual is not merely a creative theory that emerges from a preponderance of the evidence cited above. In his aforementioned responsum on only requiring a single sink he explicitly incorporates concern for the housewife’s challenges:
However since it is a significant hardship and the women who are involved in this say “Rebbe, how could you impose so much upon us,” I will explain this matter…and it will be elucidated how our women are conducting themselves properly.
This is akin to what he writes in Yoreh Dea’h (vol. 3, #28), cited earlier:
However, when there is no other place to rent except for the residence that belonged to the gentile and the woman feels weak or does not have sufficient time to handwash dishes due to her childrearing responsibilities, there is perhaps room to be lenient [to kasher] even within twelve months.
Again, he is keenly aware of the limited time and energy that working parents possess. And he also understands that, for many, hiring household help is simply not in the financial cards, thereby necessitating an internal halakhic solution.
It is also worth pointing to his responsum (Yoreh Dea’h, vol. 2, #46) on the topic of kashering porcelain dishes, where he exhibits the need for flexibility for a family that has decided to observe kashrut and are in need of some form of recourse to salvage their currently non-kosher dinnerware. He notably invoked factors such as preventing major momentary loss (hefsed gadol) and the imperative to make the path to repentance accessible (takanat ha-shavim) as justifications to be flexible.
R. Moshe Feinstein was by no means a wealthy man. While he is often associated with his Lower East Side residence, the truth was that he and his family could not initially afford to move to Manhattan. For a while they lived in Brooklyn and he earned a measly seven-dollar-a-week salary from the yeshiva. The pay was so meager that he could not afford to commute home daily and instead slept on one of the pews in the beit midrash of Mesivta Tifereth Jerusalem, only to return home for Shabbat (Man Malki Rabbanan, p. 24).
R. Feinstein and his family were far from the only ones to experience near-crippling poverty. R. Meir Amsel, editor of the Kovetz HaMaor (10:6 [Nissan 5719], p.40), wrote upon the publication of the first volume of Iggerot Moshe:
It is remarkable to see how this Rosh Mesivta, who is generally cloistered and exerting himself in the four cubits of halakha of his yeshiva, Mesivta Tifereth Jerusalem, still has a very strong connection to all that occurs in the lives of Jews and congregations in all corners of the world…and he endeavors with his greatness in Torah not to be needlessly stringent. Rather he attempts to use the power of leniency to the extent that it is possible in law in order to lighten the very heavy load that is upon his inquirers and to aid them in their difficult struggles to survive.
R. Feinstein’s leniencies were not frivolous. They were dispensed to provide some measure of assistance to a society of Jews struggling to be observant and still manage to put food on the table. Imagine if he witnessed what the bar/bat mitzva industrial complex has turned into today. Imagine if he could witness the opulence that many well-to-do Torah observant households now possess. No doubt he would be horrified at some of the contemporary trends in conspicuous consumption described in TRADITION’s recent symposium! He reportedly expounded that “we see many Jews who think that they need to experience all of the pleasures of this world—granted that they are faithful Jews who will do so in a kosher manner. And this very way of thinking is treif” (Mesoret Moshe, vol. 3, pp. 472-473). Moreover, in his own homiletics (Darash Moshe, Drush no. 8, p. 251), he articulates that the sinister nature of jealousy is that man is generally content but only desires more because he contrasts himself to his neighbor. One could only imagine how R. Feinstein would have reacted if he were alive to witness the unabashed consumerism of bnei mitzvah parties which have, in some cases, essentially supplanted the centrality of the religious significance of the childhood milestone. (See Chaim Strauchler’s column, TRADITION Questions: Bar Mitzva Logos for more on these developments.)
On the one hand, R. Feinstein’s rulings can serve as a paradigm for ensuring that there is a place for everyone who desires to observe the Torah, regardless of their socioeconomic standing. And at the same time, we should understand that he was not likely looking to dispense these more radical leniencies for those who did not require them. To paraphrase a quip I once heard from R. Aryeh Lebowitz: If you can afford two Mercedes Benz, you can afford two dishwashers. If we are going to pour exorbitant volumes of money into our Orthodox lifestyle, let it be channeled toward the part that actually makes it Orthodox.
Endnote: As we alluded to above, R. Shlomo Wahrman provided his own rationale to permit washing meat and dairy consecutively in the same dishwasher. Based on Radvaz (vol. 1, #223), Hamudei Daniel (#1), cited in the Pitkhei Teshuva (Y.D. 105:8), and Maharasham (vol. 1, #197), he deduces that a transference of flavor does not occur if the two objects make contact and are immediately disconnected. He posits that the same logic would apply to modern dishwashers which propel a stream of water whereby the old water is immediately replaced with new water in mere seconds. On the other hand, for the very reason that there are parts of the cycle which only spray water, but are not soaking the dishes, R. Yisrael Rosen (Tehumin, vol. 11, p. 130) points out that the nullification in sixty principle that R. Feinstein had propounded may not be applicable.
For a further accounting of the reception of R. Feinstein’s dishwasher position, see Petihat ha-Iggerot (pp. 414-415). And for a succinct and practical overview, see R. Yitzchak Yaakov Fuchs’ HaKashrut: Halikhot ve-Hanhagot Kashrut ha-Mitbah veha-Ma’akhalim (pp. 55-57).
Prepare ahead: Next column (November 28) on Mikve, Mysticism & Money / Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., vol. 3, #136.
Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later podcast.