Unpacking the Iggerot: Megilla with a Microphone
Megilla with a Microphone / Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 2, #108
Summarizing the Iggerot
Before the era of COVID-19 and the ubiquity of Zoom, there was already a question about whether one may fulfill the mitzva of Megilla reading by listening to the reader via a microphone. In his inquiry to R. Moshe Feinstein, R. Chaim Ginzburg of Vancouver suggested that a voice amplified via a microphone would be tantamount to blowing a Shofar into a pit, as recorded in Mishna Rosh Hashana (3:7):
[If] one sounds [a shofar] into a pit, or into a cistern, or into [a large] jug, if he [clearly] heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled [his obligation]; but if he heard the sound of an echo, he has not fulfilled [his obligation].
R. Feinstein, however, rejects this analogy since the issue in the Mishna is that the initial sound has resultantly degraded—this is quite the opposite of a microphone which increases the strength of the speaker’s voice. Rather, he suggests that the potential issue is that the sound we hear has been disassociated from the original human’s voice and is merely an artificial, mechanical recreation. Since machines, such as microphones and loudspeakers, are “doing the work,” as it were, and since they have no obligation in the mitzva, neither can they be an agent to fulfill the commandment on another’s behalf.
Nonetheless, R. Feinstein argues that the sound produced by the amplifier is indeed the reader’s voice, if we grant a particular framework of speech:
From where do we derive the very power and nature of hearing? Perhaps it is simply a result of creating something via [vibrating] the air which reaches one’s ears…even when there is a brief delay.
R. Feinstein appears to argue that even standard speech and hearing require certain intermediary steps. The listeners’ ears collect the sound waves which then undergo a series of physiological processes until the brain can interpret it. Despite the many degrees of separation, we nonetheless view it as a direct result of the voice of the person speaking. To add just one more step via a microphone would still constitute an uninterrupted line of communication from the reader to the listener.
R. Feinstein preempts a concern that such a dispensation for Megilla reading may result in extrapolation to shofar blowing and mitzvot that operate under shomea ke-oneh. However, he dismisses that concern since it would be forbidden to use a microphone on Shabbat and holidays in either event. (He briefly adds that typical obligations that would need to be fulfilled on weekdays would be similarly achievable via a microphone, if one accepts that it works for Megilla, but see the next section where he walks this back a degree.)
Nonetheless, he cautions that “since this dispensation is not clear and this is all a new development, we should object [to using a microphone on Purim] in order to prevent the people from seeking other innovations that are in vogue in this country.”
Connecting the Iggerot
Despite this responsum of R. Feinstein being classified as the lenient position, it is noteworthy that in every iteration of this ruling he expresses some degree of hesitancy. His reluctance manifests in two responsa found in a later volume of Iggerot Moshe. In 1980, in Orah Hayyim (vol. 4, #126), R. Feinstein received a question from a seminary in Israel that wished to use a microphone in their synagogue so everyone could gather in a single location, rather than dividing the student body between the dining room and synagogue. R. Feinstein ruled that not only would it be preferable to split the group (even though it diminishes pirsumei nisa), but even to delay Megilla reading so that the cafeteria could be cleaned after Maariv and enable two smaller gatherings so as not to necessitate the use of this “inyan hadash,” the new-fangled innovation of introducing a microphone.
However, in Orah Hayyim (vol. 4, #91:4) he permits a woman in the hospital to listen to the Megilla (and hear havdalah) via the telephone since she has no other recourse. There are several interesting takeaways from this brief responsum:
- R. Feinstein draws the line when it comes to fulfilling Shema and Birkat ha-Mazon (“Grace After Meals”) via shomea ke-oneh over a microphone. While he does not explain his reasoning it appears that he is simply being more cautious when it comes to obligations that include Biblical elements.
- Since R. Feinstein is inclined to regard the sound produced by microphones as a person’s actual voice, it also means that one who hears a blessing recited through such a device would be obligated to answer “amen.” Of note is that out of a lenient ruling, a (small) stringency results as well.
- R. Feinstein sees no fundamental difference between a microphone and a telephone. A phone being a more radical step than a microphone as the person reading Megilla and the listeners are physically in two separate locations.
This will lead R. Feinstein’s opponents to pose the glaring question: Where does he draw the line?
Challenges to the Iggerot
Despite R. Feinstein’s relatively cautious approach to the circumscribed utilization of microphones (and telephones), many of his contemporaries were still not satisfied. R. Ovadia Yosef (Responsa Yehave Da’at, vol. 3, #54) writes that “it appears that R. Feinstein did not elucidate the matter adequately.” The locus classicus for the opposition team is an elaborate responsa of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minhat Shlomo, vol. 1, #9) which suggests that those who were willing to accept the use of a microphone for shomea ke-oneh purposes fundamentally misunderstood how a microphone operates. The microphone does not merely amplify one’s original voice, rather it reproduces an entirely novel sound that only resembles the original in form:
It is clear to me that only those who do not understand the nature of these devices and who do not know the truth consider this odd. For in my consultations with those who know both the science and halakha they all concurred with me.
As stated above, R. Feinstein himself preempted this argument by redefining what constitutes an uninterrupted voice. R. Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim u-Zemanim he-Hadash, vol. 4, #446, fn. 1), however, attacks R. Feinstein’s reasoning from a different angle: If we grant that one may use a microphone then why stop there—perhaps a live radio broadcast should also be viable (such as how R. Feinstein already authorized the use of a telephone in extenuating circumstances). R. Feinstein’s ruling leads to a reductio ad absurdum: Why could one not just listen to a recording of Megilla reading from 20 years ago?
R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach notes that even R. Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz (Hazon Ish), was open (at least in theory) to the idea that a microphone or telephone constitutes one’s uninterrupted voice. The fact that both R. Feinstein and, potentially, Hazon Ish adopted such a position forced a subsequent authority to offer some form of elucidation. R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk (Responsa Mahzeh Eliyahu, 91:5) argues that certainly these two poskim were well aware of the fact that the microphone and amplifier are merely replicating the input sound. However, Jewish law operates based on what can be perceived by the naked eye (or in this case, ear), akin to how we need not account for microbes when checking our vegetables or water. The average onlooker ignores the intricacies of the technological mechanics taking place. To them it feels as if they are simply hearing the original speaker’s voice at an increased volume. If this explanation is true, it would represent a fascinating methodological choice by R. Feinstein to disregard the scientific reality of the halakhic experience.
Reflecting on the Iggerot
In light of R. Falk’s presentation, R. Feinstein might respond to his disputants that there is a significant difference between listening to someone speak through a microphone versus a recording. A live voice, synchronously amplified over a microphone maintains the experience of hearing directly from the speaker, while a recording does not. What remains less clear, however, are the shades of gray that lie between these two poles. This responsum in Iggerot Moshe was referenced by many in attempting to justify the use of Zoom (and similar video-conferencing programs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in addition to the tenuous analogy to a microphone, in which the reader is physically present in the same room, there is ample concern that such leniencies, invoked under extreme emergency situations, will then become the norm at later junctures when there is no public crisis.
R. Sternbuch described how during the British Mandate in Palestine, there was a group of Jews who petitioned for a broadcast of Megilla reading over the radio. In light of their successful advocacy, some people listened to Megilla on the radio (instead of attending a live reading), as they saw it as a symbol of Jewish national achievement.
Even in the post-pandemic era, one can find people who prefer to continue attending certain prayers via Zoom, often to facilitate the recitation of Kaddish, despite not being physically with a minyan. For many who are either marginally or not connected at all to the observant community the distinction between the standards for a sha’at ha-dehak versus normative practice does not always resonate. If one fulfilled the mitzva of Megilla during COVID-19 via Zoom, why is it any less valid post-COVID? And if it is invalid now, what does that say about the permission granted by rabbis during the pandemic? Did that reading not count on God’s metaphysical scorecard? While such technology has connected many elderly and sick people who would otherwise be unable to attend shul, it has also created an alternative option for healthy, able-bodied people to take the easy way out. Aside from the halakhic implications of turning an emergency measure (bidiavad) into new norms (lekhathila), the effect on communal bonds and social connections—matters of profound significance in the life of a religious community—are too weighty to delve into here.
One may be inclined to portray R. Feinstein’s hesitancy to fully permit the use of a microphone as equivocation or timidity. However, we see the wisdom of his measured ruling play out as Zoom minyan has become all too de rigueur and has had a questionable halakhic and social impact on communities that have uncritically continued to rely on it post-COVID.
Endnote: There is a connection to be drawn between the topic of microphones for Megilla and the prohibition of listening to kol isha, a woman’s singing voice. It stands to reason that if one disagrees with R. Feinstein, and considers the sound issuing forth as nothing more than a mechanical reproduction of a voice (one incapable of fulfilling mitzvot for the listener), then it could be argued that neither would listening to a woman’s singing voice over a microphone, telephone, or recording constitute a prohibition of kol isha. In that case, it might be possible to suggest one would only have to account for whether it evokes illicit thoughts, which can vary based on content and context. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, who argued that a microphone is an independent sound, consistently rules that kol isha over a microphone or recording is not inherently forbidden (Halikhot Shlomo, Tefilla 20:12.) For more on this point, see R. Henkin, Responsa Bnei Banim (vol. 2, 1:37; and vol. 3, 35:11), and Sefer Avo Beitekha: Tzeniut ve-Kirva bein Gevarim le-Nashim (ch. 17).
See also Responsa Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot (vol. 6, #53-55) regarding cochlear implants. For more of the reception history on R. Feinstein’s responsum see Petihat ha-Iggerot (pp. 179-182), and Sefer ha-Hashmal be-Halakha (ch. 13) for an expansive discussion of our topic.
Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later podcast.
Prepare ahead for our next installment on kippot in the workplace (April 4): Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim, vol. 4, #2.