A Jewish Philosophy of Man

A Lecture Series by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik

Transcript & Audio for Lecture 5: The Dialectical Approach to the Individual and the Community

Delivered January 15, 1959

Transcript by Mark Smilowitz

Note: This is a word-for-word transcript of an oral lecture and has not been edited to be read as a standalone text. Often the Rav’s tone, pauses, and vocal inflections impart meaning not discernable in the written version. The transcript is provided to accompany the audio lectures in order to help the listener catch every word.

Transcript: You know, we have to pick up the thread from a month ago. May I ask you what I said last time, or shall I reveal? – because we have to continue. Alright, I see, I am a classroom teacher. Yes, correct. The uniqueness of man expresses itself not in his intellect, but in his being for himself. We may call it loneliness – being for himself, but it means an existence, an inner existence.

Review from previous lecture

We spoke about two forms of existence – first of all, the surface existence, where existence is expressed, let’s say, in action, or, if we may use a scientific formula, in terms of mass and energy – [and] an existence which cannot be expressed or manifested in action, but somehow it is hidden within, and man cannot be equated with what he is doing.

I mean, did we discuss that? What’s important is – at the conclusion of the lecture – I mean, you were already bored and I was a bit tired – I introduced the story of creation. Yes, I am a rabbi; I must go back to the Bible; this is my book of knowledge – so, the story of creation – and I pointed out to you at the time – if you have the biblical text – how does it work? Oh, yes. If you should take a look – the story of creation, Genesis 1, verse 26-27. This will be a short review, but it’s very important, because in order to understand the social institutions in Judaism, we must understand this dialectical philosophy. Genesis 1, verse 26-27.

“And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish.”

It’s interesting. He begins, “let us make man” – please pay attention to this – “man,” in singular, correct? Yes. Then, there is a change – “and let them have dominion.” This is the correct translation of the Hebraic text. veyirdu – let them have. I mean, you see, He begins to speak about man – and, of course, He should have spoken of him in the singular form – and right away there is a change, a grammatical change, and He uses the plural.

“And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God created man in His own image. In the image of God [He] created him; male and female created them.”

So it means two people were created. So we can understand that adam in Hebrew is a noun, but a collective noun sometimes. Adam is not only a single person. It’s always, I mean, it may represent humanity or mankind, because there is no plural to adam. Adam has no plural in Hebrew. It may be a collective noun. It means let us create man, and God created two, female and male, correct?

Now if we should – thank you very much – if we should turn the page, and – just a moment – Genesis 2, verse 18.

“And the Lord God said, It is not good that man should be alone. I will make him a helpmeet for him.”

And then verse 21. Correct, it’s 21.

“And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept. And he took one of his ribs, and closed up the place of his flesh instead thereof. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made He a woman, and brought her unto the man. And the man said, ‘This is now bone of my bones, flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man.’ Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh.”

Of course you know Bible critics already pointed out the discrepancy between these two accounts. [In] the first account we read, that God originally created female and male. In the second account, we find that originally only male was created; the female was created, the woman was created out of the body of the male. I mean you know what the Bible critics said, and the Bible critics always, when they had any difficulty in the Bible, they always said the one who copied the Bible had two sources, two accounts. The accounts were not commensurate, so he incorporated both into the text of the Bible. It’s a very – this is the standard answer. Basically Professor Cassuto of Rome, who lectured later in Jerusalem at the Hebrew University, pointed out that many times the Bible critics simply substituted text criticism for philosophical ideas. Sometimes there is no contradiction in the Bible at all; it’s only a question of two philosophical ideas – now, for instance, about the philosophy of man. For instance, they say the account in the Bible, the first account, speaks only of Elokim, of God, what the Greeks used to call Theòs. And the second account, it’s Lord God, Adoshem Elokim, Kúrios Theòs, in the Greek. Again, they say [it’s] two accounts. So Cassuto pointed out, the two accounts – actually, it’s one account, but expressed in two different ideas. With regard to the creation of man – and I’m telling you that not because I’m an Orthodox Rabbi and I believe in the integrity of the text – I mean this is true, but I’m not prompted by a religious motive in interpreting the Bible this way – don’t indict me for that; I mean it’s not fundamentalism which makes me interpret the Bible – but simply, I like to understand the Bible.

The dialectical approach to man in the two Creation stories in Genesis

There are two stories in the Bible. One story tells us that man was created man and female. The second was that the female was created out of the rib of – the bone, flesh of man. Basically, what the two stories want to convey to us is that first man and female were created, but the man did not meet the female, the woman, and the woman did not meet the man. They were in isolation. Each one was for himself. So it means – what difference does it make whether one man was created – man was created – or the woman was created as well? It’s not a question of priority; it’s a problem [that] man, male and female, were alone; there was no meeting; they didn’t meet; and the institution, call it marriage, whatever it is, did not come into existence. There was no fellowship. There was no companionship between man and woman. Two lonely creatures, alone on the face of the earth, not meeting each other – there was no cooperation – no cooperation, no meeting – each one, so to say, approached his problem in his own way, his own singular way.

“And God said, lo tov heyot ha’adam levado, it’s not good for man to be alone.” And it means that man – the story of creation of Eve means only one thing – that suddenly Eve, whatever her name was, the woman who was a stranger to man, became a part of him; so in order to express it in symbolic – in metaphors, it says that man fell asleep, and the woman suddenly was created out of his sleep. It means a union, a miraculous union, came about of man and the woman. As we say, “man leaves his father and mother, and cleaves to his wife” – exactly what He said. Man was created both alone, and together with the thou. As a matter of fact, the woman is not important – the important is the I and thou. There was an I and thou before, but they were lonely – there was neither I nor thou, you may want to say. They didn’t find each other, they didn’t see each other, they were not aware of each other’s existence. I mean, two people can live even in the same room, on the same street, and still not being – and being ignorant of each other’s existence. Later, this coalescence, this union, this, I would say, this fellowship, came into existence – the fellowship between man and woman. According to the Judaic philosophy, man and woman – the first, the most basic form of friendship and fellowship is created, I mean, takes place, between man and woman. That’s exactly what it is.

That’s what I said, I believe, last time. Now let us see. Judaism has introduced a dialectical moment into the individual-community relationship. Last time, I told you there are two basic theories. One theory gives priority to the community. Another theory says the individual takes precedence over the community. The Age of Enlightenment, like Rousseau, thought that [the] individuals can nicely get along without meeting anybody else. That’s why you call this philosophy, you call this theory, the Robinson Crusoe theory. If Robinson Crusoe could exist on an island somewhere in the South Sea, so anybody could exist on an island. Anybody could create an island for himself even in New York or in Philadelphia or in Boston. It’s not important. Anybody could become a Robinson Crusoe. Many of us are like that, exist like that. On the other hand, I mean, take Hegel, the philosophy which finally was crystallized into the political theory of the corporate state and totalitarian state, or totalitarian society – it’s not important how you call it – it’s irrelevant – he said, no, man is a servant of the community. You cannot imagine man, [except] only as a member of a group, one among the many.

We said Judaism disagrees with either theory. It did not accept the individualistic theory, nor did it accept the theory of the collective, the collectivist theory, that there is a supra-individual entity, unity, within which man can find his place, but the individual is completely absorbed. Judaism has introduced a dialect[ic] – because, as I said, if Judaism had subscribed to the individualistic philosophy, there would be only one account in the Bible, that man was created alone. The first account would be the final one. Had Judaism subscribed or accepted, the collectivistic philosophy of man, giving priority to the community, then another account, but only one, the second account, would be the most decisive one. Man and the woman were created and met. It means originally, within the scheme of creation, God planned for man not a lone existence, but an existence expressed and manifested in togetherness. Since the Bible has two accounts, then I don’t care – even if you won’t accept the account of the Bible critics – but there are two accounts. In our Bible, there are two accounts. I don’t care about the sources – it’s not important, I mean the literary construction of the text. But since the Bible has two accounts – of Adam and Eve alone, and the second account of Adam and Eve together, then it’s not just something arbitrary in the form of a contrat social [social contract], as Roseau wanted – Eve was brought – “and the Lord God brought Eve to man, the woman to man” – it means it was intended within the original scheme of creation, within the original plan of creation. So it means that Judaism subscribes neither to the individualistic theory, nor to the collectivistic, because if it did, one account would be sufficient.

So what is the Judaic approach to man and community? Who is, so to say, the master? Man the individual, or the community? I must say, the Judaic approach to community is a dialectical approach. It means, it accepts a thesis and an antithesis, a statement and its reverse, the contradiction, and it’s a dialectical approach. Judaism has introduced a dialectical moment into the individual community relationship. At the beginning, man was created alone, man and the woman – it doesn’t matter. Yet later, in the process of creation, God lets Eve emerge beside him as a companion, in order to alleviate the pain of a solitary existence. She was created out of his flesh and bone, and they both were united in one existential community. There is both. Existence means loneliness on the one hand; on the other hand, existence means community, in community, in fellowship, in friendship, in companionship.

You’ll ask me, I mean, both theses are mutually exclusive? I told you in my introduction, Judaism has operated many times, with two theses, which are mutually exclusive, and still accepted both. This two-valued logic of Aristotle, that if there is a contradiction, it means either the first thesis or the second thesis is untrue, was not accepted by Judaism. In other words, man is created both alone and together with others. He did not ask this, so to say – I mean, he did not ask for this dialectical experience. It was not done because man chose Eve, or, on the contrary, he preferred a lone existence. God did not consult man, and this is exactly why man was asleep. What’s the idea of man falling asleep? We have to understand the Bible a bit differently than we are used to. Why was he asleep? It means it was done without consulting him. It isn’t, like Rousseau said, [that] there was a contrac social; man suddenly realized, his lonely existence is bad; I have to ask for a maid, I have to ask the Lord God if He should provide me with a maid. First of all, God is not a marriage broker; I mean, if Adam had consulted him, He would have apparently referred him to some other marriage broker or to any club of lonely hearts. But he didn’t want it; it means – he was asleep – it means it was not in consultation with Adam. Adam had absolutely […]. It was intended within the original scheme of creation. This was planned within the Infinite Will and Infinite Wisdom of God, that man be both. Man should have, should actually – human existence should imply a contradiction, a conflict within itself. On the one hand, man wants to be alone, on the other hand, there is a craving in man to be together with someone else.

As a matter of fact, if we should analyze our own experiences, we will find two basic tendencies. Actually, many times we want to be alone; we are tired of men, we are tired of people; we want to escape into wilderness, simply become a hermit. Anyway, I can speak of myself as a rabbi, I would like to leave my community, everything, my students. On the other hand, sometimes we feel very lonely. We like to be together with someone else. Fellowship is an experience which is basic in our – with regard to our existence.

The impossibility of full commitment to and coalescence with the other

At this juncture, we suddenly come across a strange dichotomy. Judaism has rejected the theory about the primacy of the community by telling us that Adam was introduced into the world before Eve, or Eve before Adam, it doesn’t matter – but alone. On the other hand, we cannot subscribe to the individualistic philosophy either, because God brought the woman to the man. What does this paradox suggest to us? Simply, they are a dialectical philosophy with regard to the relationship between the individual and society. There is a basic antinomy within one’s existential experience. On the one hand, he is unique and different. He was created as one individual, free from all commitments to others, solitary and aloof. On the other hand, he experiences the need for communal existence, fellowship and friendship; he is unhappy with the role of a lonely figure; he craves for joining the thou, and for commitments, for taking on commitments and responsibilities. Of course, if there is a responsibility, a commitment, it means to the outside, to the thou. He wants to share his existence with others, be united with them, be one with the thou. Man is involved in a crisis. Basically, existence is an experience of crisis, for one reason, because loneliness and togetherness determine actually the human existential experience. They are mutually exclusive, and yet, they are basic and fundamental in our, so to say, in the unfolding of the personality. Man oscillates between a solitary, I would say, between a solitary Adam and a communicating Adam. An Adam who wants to confide in Eve. On the other hand, we have an Adam who is completely isolated, completely separated from anybody else. He is in the grip of both, of a movement of recoil into himself, retreat into his own shell, into his own selfhood, retreat into a strange selfhood, and also, he is also engaged in a movement of surging forward, advancing toward the outside. It’s like a pendulum swinging between two poles; it swings toward the thou, but when it comes too close to the thou, it begins to retreat again toward the other pole, the pole of loneliness and an existence for himself, solitude. Existence means a continuous attempting – I’ll show you pretty soon, with examples, that Judaism knew of it – it’s a continuous act of giving to others, on the part of the I. It’s continuous abandoning of oneself to the thou, of tearing down barriers which separate an individual personality from the other self. It is the venture, I mean, existence expresses itself in the venture of taking in the thou, into one’s private world, which perhaps is only understandable to him alone. This is on the one hand. And at the same time, existence expresses itself in continuous withdrawal into the hidden recesses of an uncommunicable I.

As I have emphasized in my previous lecture, that’s why, to Judaism, for instance, the sacrament of marriage appeared to be nonsensical. Catholics spoke of the sacrament of marriage; the union of marriage is inseparable. Judaism, you know – if something is simple in Judaism, it is to divorce the wife or the husband. Divorce is halakhically a very simple procedure. Basically, Judaism considers marriage simply as a contractual arrangement. Of course, contract is sacred in Judaism. A civil contract is sacred. That’s why many times when I read about a discussion in Israel about religious marriage and civil marriage, I simply do not understand this controversy. Basically, Judaism looks upon marriage as a civil arrangement, but the contract itself, even a sales contract, I mean, with regard to Jewish law, is a sacred institution. Marriage is sacred because any contract is sacred; but it’s nothing else but a contract. And of course, any contract, any contractual arrangement cannot be sacramental, cannot be an eternal arrangement. It can be broken up, or the contract can be forfeited and annulled. That’s why the divorce was introduced into Judaism as a basic institution. Why was it? – because Judaism says that any union between Adam and Eve can never attain perfection, because there is only one Adam who entered the marriage arrangement – which Adam? – the Adam who appeared on the face of the earth Friday late afternoon, and to whom Eve was brought as a wife. But the Adam who was created Friday morning alone, he never committed himself to Eve. You see, marriage is involved in this dialectical arrangement. If Adam swings toward togetherness, then marriage is valid; but if Adam changes his course, and begins to retreat, and engages into the movement of recoil, toward the pole of loneliness, then marriage is not valid. And if Adam had never been consulted, there was only one Adam. We always see two persons: solitary Adam, and communicative Adam, and any agreement, any contract signed by Adam is valid as long as Adam takes up his station within, so to say, around or close to the pole of togetherness; but he can’t stay there for a long time. He begins to swing toward loneliness. And if Adam is lonely, no agreement can bind him, because whatever he is for himself, he cannot commit to Eve; whatever Eve is for herself, she cannot commit to Adam. So that’s – all our contracts, all our social contracts, all our commitments, all our responsibilities, are relative, not absolute.

There’s only one commitment which is absolute in Judaism, and you understand this. It’s the commitment on the part of man toward God, because there, lonely man is committed to God. As I said it last time: Lonely God communicates with lonely man. That’s why the union between Adam and Eve can never attain perfection, because they remain strangers to each other.

And I said – I believe last time I said it, of course, at the conclusion of the lecture – that basically man can be judged by two criteria – by his inner experience, by his inner selfhood, and by his actions, and his actions I called the kerygma; it is the message he delivers to others. And I spoke about numinous Adam, the mysterious Adam, who is not involved in any commitment, in any responsibility – for himself, isolated, separated from the crowd. He is self-centered – I don’t mean this in the derogatory sense – self-centered and self-rooted. He cannot commit himself. On the other hand there is kerygmatic Adam, who passes on a message to others. After all, the bond between Eve and Adam is based on a message. Adam says something to Eve. Eve responds, answers Adam. It’s an exchange of words. It is the dialogue. What binds us together? – basically, the speech, the dialogue, the conversation. And how much can I express in a conversation? In a conversation I can express just one part, an infinitesimal part of my experience.

This was the Judaic attitude throughout society. How much can I express for you? – just an infinitesimal part of my experience. First of all, my vocabulary is perhaps limited. Secondly, there are certain experiences which don’t lend themselves to externalization, objectification, because always when you take an experience and you try to relate it to others, to tell others about the experience, so the experience right away becomes depersonalized, because you already tried to explain to others how you feel. If you explain to others how you feel, you have to employ categories and metaphors, symbols of language which take your very passionate, your very intimate experience, which is part and parcel of your inner core – and you try to objectify it, depersonalize it, universalize it, generalize it. It should be understandable and comprehensible to everybody. That’s all. I always say, marriage begins with a declaration of love. Of course, love is an inner experience, but when the declaration is passed on, the message is delivered to Eve, then love becomes depersonalized. It loses its passion, its wants, its very unique core. Only kerygmatic man who is capable to express himself – and I’ll tell you, if you’ll see many people, they have a facility for language, a facility for expressing themselves.

Of course, kerygmatic Adam somehow has, so to say, is manifested by far in a more pronounced manner than numinous Adam, the mysterious Adam. Some people are reticent, self-centered; alright, we’ll call it extroverts and introverts; but you see, if we begin to operate with psychological categories, we sometimes overlook the problem, basically. Basically, it’s not types. Judaism did not believe in types; there are introverts and extroverts. We are both, extroverts and introverts, but introversion is not just a habit on the part of man, or just a bent in his character; it’s a metaphysical experience. I exist here, within. I cannot relate myself to others. It’s a certain rebellion, revolt against authority of society, against authority of any institutionalized religion, against state. It’s a rebellion within the human being. I am for myself, no one can understand me, because I have no language to explain. Can you see my heart? The old expression, when man sees the eyes, God looks into the heart. What does it mean? Man sees only appearances. God sees the within-existence. This is […]; we call it introversion. It’s not introversion. It’s an existential experience.

On the other hand – this is numinous man. Numen means mysterious – mysterious man. He’s a numen to himself. On the other hand, there is kerygmatic man – man active, man endowed with speech, man capable of expressing, portraying himself, writing books, pouring out his thoughts, his feelings into a book, printing a confession about his life, writing an autobiography, telling people about the most intimate things of his life. This is kerygmatic man. This is Adam who was Adam and Eve Friday, late afternoon, that mysterious Friday about which the Bible speaks.

That’s why Judaism never said, no human institution has absolute or ultimate worth, significance, because in any institution, peoplehood, family, community, state, only kerygmatic Adam is involved; numinous, mysterious Adam for himself stays away from all those entanglements. It’s a complete policy, if I may use the dramatic language of the United States, of isolationism. Man basically is both an isolationist and also a very cooperative being, extremely cooperative, and Judaism did not, so to say, condemn either numinous Adam nor kerygmatic Adam. It said, both are welcome; it’s a dialectical experience.

And upon this foundation, the Judaic social ethic is based. Otherwise we cannot understand it. I’ll give you examples later, in the forthcoming lectures; certain laws with regard to tzedakah, charity, family, we cannot understand, unless we take into consideration this basic conflict within the human personality, between the kerygma, giving the message to others, and the numen, the mystery which cannot be disclosed to others, but it remains mine, mine forever.

They understand – I would say then – only kerygmatic Adam committed itself to Eve; numinous Adam never joined Eve; numinous Eve did not join Adam either – they understand only isolated experiences translated into the universal language which objectifies the intimate and depersonalizes the personal, and they understand each other in equivalents for a mysterious experience. They understand each other basically not as persons but as things and events. Basically the thou to me is not a person. He is an event. I mean, in spite of my effort to understand the thou, and to feel with him, and have compassion with him, and have sympathy, and share his troubles and his joys, he’s less than a person to me. Of course, you know, ve’ahavta lerei’acha kamokha, you should love thy neighbor as thyself. It’s a very nice ideal. It’s never been implemented. Never. We’ll interpret this idea later. It can never be implemented. And Judaism is a very realistic religion. It constitutes ideals, yes, but Judaism is always conscious, I mean, aware of the fact that there is not only an order of ideals; there’s an order of facts events and things, what we call an order of facticity, not only of ethical norms, and there is never complete commensurability between the two orders.

And basically when you look at the thou, it’s an event, it’s a thing, yes, an object, never a subject in the sense of individual personality, not even with regard to my father or to my mother. I like my mother, I love her, but to say that I feel just that I have an insight into her individual experience, would be ridiculous to say, and the same is true on the part of the child in regard to his parents, and perhaps, of course – this is already the greatest commitment – they always believe that with regard – parental love somehow is rooted in the numinous Adam, just a little bit. I don’t know. But, however, I saw even parents who lost children, and they survived. There is never complete forgetting, one can never forget a child, but they survived. Apparently even the parent can go on and continue without a child.

So all human commitments, responsibilities, unions, fellowships are just relative. There is no absolute commitment in this world. Of course, there are people who feel a stronger sense of commitment; there are people whose commitments are shallow, superficial, because they are emotionally superficial; they are shallow emotionally. There are people who are intellectually deep, profound, and intellectually shallow, and we also find people who are emotionally shallow; their emotions are just surface emotions; and some people have deep-rooted emotions, yes, but again, only relative. The I remains isolated, aloof.

It is a noble gesture on the part of the individual, certainly noble, to give, to open up, to share, to form fellowships. It is the main, perhaps the main law in our system of ethics. Social ethics in Judaism says, give! Step out of your isolation. Come forward. Forget about your numinous character. Stretch out your hand. Shake hands with the thou. Don’t live in an ivory tower, sheltered against the community, against others, against the outside. Share everything you have with others. Yes, we say it.

But Jewish ethics knows very well that this norm will never be implemented. It will be an attempt on the part of the individual to come forward, to share, to sympathize and to have compassion and to love and to help. But there will never be complete coalescence, complete merger, complete union, complete fellowship. He and she, or he and he – it doesn’t matter – will remain two individuals, lonely figures, solitary existences, which will never get acquainted, never. I don’t believe that even husband and wife, who lived for 40 years and, I say, in the perfect marriage, and love each other, respect each other, and raise a family, actually share each other’s troubles completely and, I would say, in an absolute sense. There is a partition separating them. I always say, if I should picture ourselves as a desk, with many drawers. So, of course, when we marry, so we try to mark the drawers for each other, but there is a drawer, whether the upper drawer or the lower drawer, both in the husband’s desk and the wife’s desk, which remains locked and closed. There is something which can never be said, expressed, told, passed on, externalized – numinous Adam.

The goals of giving will never be achieved. The unique personality is unable to communicate itself to the thou, and as such remains mute and inapproachable, what theologians call – I mean, not with regard to personality, with regard to that numinous – mysterious. Eve is as lonely as Adam, and Adam and Eve; they never find each other. Kerygmatic Adam and kerygmatic Eve do not succeed.

Human institutions are a failure. In long analysis, human institutions must fail. What does the institution want? What does every institution, any institution? – to bring Adam and Eve together. I mean, of course, they are symbolic of the I and the thou. They are brought together, yes, yes, but no – basar mibesari, flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone – it’s a beautiful dictum, but it’s not reality. It’s not reality. Friendship, community, marriage, any association, are never perfect because only kerygmatic Adam and Eve are involved.

Now, Judaism at this juncture points out a basic conflict within our existence: the incommensurability of two orders, that of uniqueness and togetherness, of seclusion and community. Man lives in two dimensions, in the numinous and the kerygmatic, for himself and with others. He is both visible and invisible to others. In other words, there is something in man which lends itself to communication, to externalization, and man is capable of expressing his experience in the form of a message, conceivable to others, and then man is to be looked at as a story. Actually, when we want to know man, how do you know him? We read his autobiography. So man is a story. Man is a story, and as such, is a very exciting story. It’s a romance. The story of any man is a romance, full of adventures. And, there is in man something aborig[inal]  – this is on the one hand; man is a story – on the other hand, there is something in man aboriginal and wholly other, wholly other, that cannot be subjected to universalization and categorialization, and, as such, remains outside of the kerygma realm, of the message realm, and beyond the reach of the objectifying hand. This something in man is inexpressible and esoteric, not to be communicated as a story to others, since there is no objective coherence and causal continuity in it, and it remains a numinous experience of oneself, in sight of which the I stands speechless, humble and amazed, and asks the eternal question; man asks himself, who am I? – because kerygmatic Adam cannot ask this question, who am I – who am I? There is a mathematical equation; I equals the amount of work and energy in which I have contributed toward the welfare of others. That’s all; simple equation – who am I. When we ask, who was Napoleon – who was Napoleon? Napoleon equals – there is an equation, a mathematical equation – the sum total of wars, certain social reforms, and so forth. All right, it’s a good equation, a bad equation – it doesn’t matter. Who was Theodore Roosevelt? Who was Franklin, F.D. Roosevelt? Who was [he]? It was actually the New Deal reforms introduced in the United States, the creation of a welfare state, and so forth. Ah! This is kerygmatic Adam; but numinous Adam, numinous Roosevelt, numinous Napoleon, will ask himself, who am I? I mean, you cannot say that – introduce such an equation that man equals only his actions, his deeds; only kerygmatic Adam equals, is identical with, his actions. Who am I? – basically, [when] we begin to think who we are, we never find an answer, do we? I don’t know who I am. This is the I who retreats into seclusion whenever man is exposed to the process of standardization, or whenever one’s life is being turned into a story to be told, or a kerygma to be delivered to others. It is – the question, who am I, is the eternal mystery, which is beyond understanding and rationalization, unfamiliar and extraordinary.

Now, I’m sorry – I called – I wanted Rabbi Feldman to call me, but I couldn’t, because he thought I was in Boston, and I was in New York. There was a beautiful story written by the Yiddish writer Peretz. I must say, if there was a writer who understood – intuitively; he was not a scholar – Judaic philosophy, it was Peretz – intuitively; of course, he makes mistakes, but he had the intuition of a genius to apprehend and comprehend basic Judaic ideas. And there is a short story which is called “The Kabbalists.” It is published in English, both by Maurice Samuel, I believe, and also an old translation by Helena Frank. It is Philadelphia Jewish Publication Society of America, 1906. A story – so there in the story, he portrays a conversation between two Kabbalists, between the master and the disciple; between the master – I would recommend to you to read this story, and many more like that – between the master and the disciple, and the master says,

“Therein,” said the teacher, “are many degrees of attainment: one knows a bit of a tune, another half a one, another a whole.

 

”There is one kind of tune that must have words, that is a low order of tune; it’s not sublime. But there is a higher kind: a tune that sings itself, but without words — a pure melody! But that melody must have a voice — and lips, through which the voice issue! And lips, you see, are material things!

 

”And the voice itself is refined matter, certainly, but matter none the less. Let us say, the voice stands midway between the spiritual and the material.

 

“However that may be, the tune that finds expression through a voice and is dependent on lips is not pure, not entirely pure, not yet really spiritual!

 

“The real tune sings itself without a voice — it sings itself within one, in the heart, in the thoughts!

 

“There you have the meaning of the words of King David: ‘All my bones shall say, how great Thou art, my God.’ It ought to sing in the marrow of the bones, that is where the tune should be — that is the highest praise we can give to God. That is no human tune that has been thought out! It is a fragment of the melody to which God created the world, the melody of the soul He breathed into man. Thus sings the Heavenly Family, thus sang the Rebbe, the master, whose memory be blessed.”

He speaks about different kinds of tunes. Of course, the tune expressed in words is man’s story, man’s commitment. The composer basically – we’ll take Beethoven – alright, they were beautiful compositions. Whatever he expressed in a symphony, it was just his kerygma. He had a tune within himself. Beethoven himself would never externalize himself. It is only part; it is perhaps only a reflection of the inner tune, of the inner melody, of the soul, of the heart, of the marrow, of the bones, as Peretz says; and this is true not only of a genius like Beethoven, or Goethe, or Kant, or Michelangelo; it is true of everybody.

There is a tune we sing: our story, our actions, our deeds, our lives, visible to others, understandable by others; people appreciate, people condemn us, people praise us. Yes; this is kerygmatic man, man in society, man in community, man within his family, man at his home. This is the tune, sometimes in words, sometimes without words, but he says a voice is certainly necessary, and a voice is something material. I mean, for the Kabbalists, it was between spiritual and material things, but we know from physics very well that the voice is as material as my own bones and flesh. It is a wave, airwaves. The voice is also material. But there is something immaterial – and it’s not a question of being immaterial; something subjective, intimate, personal, not detachable from the personality. This does not lend itself to anything. I can feel the tune. I can feel the melody, and the melody is my own existence. This is the melody of the existential experience. How can I sing it out? How can I write it out on a sheet in letters of music? I can’t.

This is numinous Adam who was created Friday morning, and it’s very interesting that the epithet tzelem Elohim, the image of God, is only mentioned with regard to numinous Adam. It is not mentioned with regard to Adam who found Eve. If Adam found Eve, he doesn’t have need for God. Man in company does not crave for God, because the company compensates him; it’s a substitute for God, basically; but numinous Adam feels alone, lonely, deserted, abandoned. He looks for companionship. He can’t find the companionship in this world of things and events, in this world of kerygma and story and melodies sung out in words and voices, in loud voices – in the still world of his within-world, and whom does he find in his within-world? – not Eve; nor does Eve find Adam in her within world – but God.

Judging the worth of an individual not by his kerygma but by his numinous existence

Now, returning to the axiological social problem – of course, this is metaphysics; this is a part of the Jewish metaphysics of the personality; but we are not so much interested in metaphysics as in its practical application in our daily life. What does this numinous Adam mean if in terms of social action, social welfare, and our dealings in terms of our interrelationships with people? – returning to the axiological social problem, we must unequivocally state that Judaism insisted that the genuine worth of the individual personality expresses itself not in the quality of the kerygma – I wanted to suggest it, but since I spoke about numinous Adam, I couldn’t express it – we must unequivocally state that Judaism insisted that the genuine worth of the individual personality expresses itself not in the quality of the kerygma – this is important – he is capable of delivering to the thou, or in the beauty of the story he tells to others – one has a beautiful story; one’s life story is a bit boring to others, not so adventurous – no, the individual worth does not consist in the beauty of the story, or in his accomplishments – but in the very fact that he exists. Man has intrinsic dignity because he is. Dignity of man is not attributed by Judaism to kerygmatic Adam, but to numinous Adam, because dignity of man goes back to tzelem Elohim, to the image of God [in which] he was created. Kerygmatic Adam was not created in the image of God, but numinous Adam [was]. And I said last time, this is basically the common denominator between God and man. They are both lonely.

[The worth of an individual is found not in his accomplishments,] but in the very fact that he is alone, unique, one-timely, irreplaceable, different from others – in a word: in his numinous personality, in the great mystery of an individual existential experience, in the inability to pour out one’s thoughts, feelings, doubts, and strivings into a narrative to be understood and enjoyed and appreciated by others; or – availing ourselves of Peretz’s literary categories – the greatness of man manifests itself not in the song or in a melody spelled out in sound, in words or sound, but in the silent melody which intoxicates the heart and enraptures the soul, a melody which is audible only to the self and to the Great Infinite Self, and to no one else. Out of the dialectical experience of the I, Judaism isolated the moment of loneliness and set it up as the criterion by which the worth of a person is to be judged. Whether or not Adam joined Eve, whether or not Eve joined Adam, whether or not he affiliated himself with the thou, whether or not he put across his social message – everybody has a social message to deliver, to put across in terms of contribution to society –and made worthwhile contribution – all this is irrelevant as to the inner worth of the personality, since Judaism is concerned, for the time being, with man for himself, not man within the framework of the community.

Our Talmudic scholars said – it’s a famous dictum – why was man created alone? Lama nivra Adam yechidi? – in contradistinction to all other living creatures whose emergence took place within a group or a class system? If you’ll be so kind, and you’ll just take the Bible, and you’ll take, for instance Genesis 1, verse 21:

“And God created the great sea monsters, and every living creature that creepeth, wherewith the water swarmed, after its kind” – what does it mean “after its kind?” – lemineihu – what does it mean? – within a class and group system. And then, for instance, you’ll take verse 24:

“And God said: ‘Let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after its kind.’” Again, not one, not one steer was created, not one lion, not one worm, not one snake, [but a] system, class, species – within a species and class system.

As far as man is concerned, just two lonely individuals were created, Adam and Eve, who did not know each other. Why did the Creator, in making man depart from the general pattern of creation, why didn’t He create “mankind?” Why only one man? – mankind!

The answer our Sages gave to this question has revolutionized social philosophy in the antiquity and upset the Classical anthropology about which – I mean philosophical anthropology – about which I spoke before: Kol hamekayeim nefesh achat ke’ilu kiyeim olam maleh; whoever saves one life is rewarded as if he had saved the whole world. Man did not appear on the face of the earth within a class system because his worth would be measured by his contribution toward the welfare of the class; he was created alone because he is a world for himself, a microcosm – small world, a microcosm. And this dictum, ha’adam olam katan, man is a small world, veha’olam adam gadol, and the world is a great man, a big man, is a truism in medieval philosophy, Jewish medieval philosophy.

Someone raised his hand – yes?

[audience member:] But man was created in our image…

[the Rav:] In God’s image.

[audience member:] …which in itself is a kind.

[the Rav:] No – you mean later, to be passed on. But it cannot be – basically, you cannot speak – again – you cannot speak of mankind, because what does a kind mean, a class? Philosophically a class means something. How do you say – you speak of this individual table – let us take a very logical problem in classical logic – this individual table, and you speak of the table in general, at large. How do you arrive at a table, this universal, what we call universal? – by abstracting from the individual traits of the table and retaining only the universal, so to say, adjectives or traits. So, for instance, this table is, for instance, half round – so, I mean, this is not important for the table – for the table, you probably see it has some support and a board above. There are universal traits in things and there are individual traits. You create a class by abstracting – when you say the bear, the wolf – by abstracting from color, abstracting from height, abstracting from specific individual traits of a particular animal, but assembling so to say, the universal traits and forming a class. This has been known since Socrates. So now you’ll see mankind; you’ll abstract – from whom do you abstract? From numinous Adam you abstract? – because numinous Adam is the individual,j different Adam, unique Adam. Whom do you take in, into mankind? – only kerygmatic Adam; Adam’s story you take in. Actually, man as individual does not belong to mankind. He doesn’t belong to mankind at all. He is not a member of mankind because he has no commitment, and his essence, the core of his existence, expresses itself in otherness, in being different, in not being gleichgeschaltet, in not being standardized, in not subjecting oneself to equalization and standardization and universalization and generalization – for myself. So, always, mankind is also a relative concept – only kerygmatic man, but not numinous man.

In other words, the worth of man, as I said, kol hamekayem, whoever saves one soul is rewarded as if he had saved the whole world – in other words the worth of man is not derived from his involvement in a system of hypostatized, unitary supra-individuality – this is community – but flows from his own individual existence.

That is why the Halakhah has formulated very peculiar laws which reflect the concern of Judaism not with the crowd but with the lonely person. Interesting is that Judaism has simply preached a doctrine – perhaps I am exaggerating a bit, but I have no other way how to express it – Judaism has preached a doctrine of idealization of anonymity; it means, the anonymous person, humble; no one knows him, because they didn’t accomplish anything. It is the ideal for Judaism; idealization of anonymity. It’s a philosophy of the choiceness the bechira of the forlorn, desolate, very low, despised and unknown individual. It is – somehow, it preached a philosophy – I mean, so to say, it sent praise to the pauper and the vagabond.

The law of the prohibition to save the city by turning over someone to enemies

Now let me quote a law. It’s a famous law, and this law has been practiced by Jews around the centuries. If heathens – it means enemies; heathens – said to a group of Jewish women – [the] city is under siege, or a house [is] under siege, doesn’t matter – and heathens – of course it means an enemy; wherever the Talmud spoke of enemies it used the substitute, heathens – heathens said to a group of Jewish women, surrender one of your number to us, that we may defile her, or else we will defile all of you, they should all suffer defilement rather than surrender to them – regardless of the number of women who are involved –  a thousand, ten, a million – if someone demands the sacrifice of one individual in order to save the women, and the alternatives are clear-cut, and there is no doubt what will happen if this request will be denied – so the whole crowd of women, most respected women, should be subjected […]

[So too, if heathens] said to his Israelites, surrender one of your number to us that we may put him to death, otherwise we will kill all of you, they should suffer death rather than surrender a single Israelite to them, even if they specified an individual, even if they specified, saying surrender that particular person, man or woman, to us, or else. It is Maimonides’ Code, Foundations of Law 5,5.

They raised an opinion in the Palestinian Talmud, and this opinion was almost accepted universally, that even though the woman they specified is of lax morals and practices prostitution – this woman, this particular woman – or the man they want is a criminal deserving the death penalty anyway, the community must not extradite her or him in order to save the honor or their lives of hundreds of thousands of fearful and law abiding citizens. If a community is under siege, it must not sacrifice the life or the honor of an individual, notwithstanding the fact that this individual is guilty of the most abhorrent crime, in order to protect the many. Of course, after the siege will be lifted, the community itself, acting in freedom, in accordance with its moral and legal conscience and codes, will bring the transgressor, if he deserves a penalty, to try and punish him; but if it is a question of exchanging the individual for the crowd, even a prostitute must not be exchanged for a crowd consisting of the most honorable, God-fearing and God-loving women.

This is a strange law. Yet, when the question of I or he or she – the multitude or the single person – arises, the community must not take precedence over the most sordid life, which is, in the opinion of kerygmatic Adam, worthless. What does a prostitute mean to anybody? – a harlot? Why is it so? If Judaism measured accomplishments, kerygmas, life stories, contributions to society, [then] the law should have been changed. Yes, sir? Someone wanted to ask?

[audience member:] There is the protection of the individual by the community, [but] it doesn’t indicate how you protect the individual, other than the fact that you don’t sacrifice her, you don’t give her up; therefore, what is Jewish thinking relative to [a] Jew participating in war, which means that you protect the individual, but you also do harm to another individual?

[the Rav:] War was a problem in Judaism which gave us a lot of headaches. Basically Judaism is opposed to war. The only kind of war which Judaism knows and sanctions is a war of defense. Imperialistic wars are completely ruled out by Judaism. The only possible way how to fight war is in defense of lives, and if someone is aggressive, has evil designs. Of course, this is the maxim of haba lehorgecha hashkem lehargo; if one wants to kill you, you have a right to defend yourself. Self-defense is a basic right in Judaism, and war – the legality of war, if it is sanctioned by Judaism, is founded only upon the principle of self-defense. If one wants to find glory in war, I mean, the Greek – the type of wars fought by the Greeks, according to the Iliad and the Odyssey, are abhorrent to Judaism. I don’t say that many kings, as recorded in the Prophets, didn’t fight imperialistic wars; but this was always disapproved and condemned by the Prophets, by Isaiah, Jeremiah, and so forth. Yes, yes?

[audience member:] Doesn’t this contradict the individual sacrifices throughout the Bible, like Jonah, Jephthah…

[the Rav:] Yes, you are right. I mean, Jephthah is a sacrifice which our Rabbis have disapproved of, I mean, when he sacrificed his daughter. Who else did you mention? Jonah, where did he sacrifice himself? – he himself? Yeah, this is the duty of the individual – I’ll come later to it, when I’ll discuss the ethical problem. There’s an ethical problem; the duty of the individual is to sacrifice himself for the community, yes. You see, we’ll see how Judaism – it’s a dialectical approach. Judaism will tell the individual, yes, my dear friend, I demand from others to respect you, not according to your contribution to society, but according to your inner worth; but, however, however, I demand from you to act not as a numinous person, and to say, my dignity is assured because I exist, but to make yourself, so to say, worthy of the respect of others in terms of your kerygma. So it means, others must not sacrifice the individual; the individual is duty-bound to sacrifice himself for the community. Otherwise – you see, to speak about numinous Adam, glorifying him, and putting him on the pedestal, it would mean that men would become selfish, egocentric – there’s a danger; there’s an element of risk. You see, others should treat the individual according to his inner worth; I must treat myself not according to my intrinsic worth, because this means inactivity, this means selfishness, this means egocentricity, this means, I mean, this means the individual will consider himself as the center of the world, everything revolves about him; you know what it may lead to. I must say, “I am nothing,” as Abraham said, “I am just dust and ashes;” If I have worth, it’s because I’m a servant of the community. It’s a dialectical approach; that’s why I call it a dialectical approach. It’s a strange approach, but it is a dialectical approach.

So, all these sacrifices you find in the Bible – you see, the trouble with Jephthah was that he didn’t sacrifice himself; he sacrificed his daughter. This was the trouble. If he did it, if he sacrificed himself, we would glorify him now; he would be considered a hero.

[audience member:] What about Abraham and Isaac?

[the Rav:] Abrah – I expected this problem, this question. I’ll beg you to suffer with me for a while; I’ll come to the story of the akeidah. It’s premature, [but] it’s a good question; it’s a good problem; but I – you’ll tolerate my ignorance now.

[audience member:] […] you alluded, this principle was, in the European communities, of not giving up some individuals, because it appears that all communities operated during the last war on the principle that we will give up part of the community to the Nazi quotas because the rest of the community will be safe. And a recent article in the Commentary, which talks about two ghetto dictators…

[the Rav:] Two ghetto dictators? You mean the heads of the communities, probably.

[audience member:] Jewish, yeah, the Jewish community; the two were Moses Merin of Sosnovitz and Jacob Gens of Vilna, where they were operating on the principle of – they would select a certain number of Jews – they were doing the Nazis’ dirty work for them –and ship them off…

[the Rav:] I know, I know about it.

[audience member:] …and the community seemed to go along with the principle that, which they promoted, that we will give up part of the community in order to save…

[the Rav;] …the whole community, the rest of it. I’ll tell you. As a matter of fact, Gens, I knew personally. It is the story of Kastner, you know, the trial of Kastner in Tillman. Of course, it is in contravention of the basic Jewish law. If the communities approved of it, that is no proof that this was done in conformity with our ethical conscience.

On the other hand, I’ll tell you frankly, when this judge, Halevi, condemned Kastner, I said it was a mistake, because I don’t know how I would have acted if I had been in the ghetto. In general, we have no right to condemn them, nor to approve of them. We cannot approve because it’s contrary to the basic Jewish ethic. However, to condemn them – we are human beings as well, afflicted with the same frailties and weaknesses, and I don’t know whether I wouldn’t have acted like Kastner, trying to save my family and a few of my friends, and for this sake to say, I mean, to retain my beloved ones, perhaps I would have sacrificed the rest of the community; but it certainly was not done in conformity with Jewish law, and I don’t believe there was a communal consent. People were helpless, people were frightened. In general, in such a situation, it’s hard to expect people to act intelligently many times, and, particularly, consistently. I mean, they were frightened, they were like – many people told me of their experiences – simply, I mean, their intellect was paralyzed; they were guided by instinct, and of course, if guided by instinct like the animal in the field, then the ethical norm plays no role. The ethical norm is important when man is guided by the intellect; [if] he’s guided by the instinct, you see the impulse for survival, and that’s all; but I would never say that, actually, rabbinical authorities, I mean responsible authorities – we have black sheep, we have – responsible authorities would have approved of such a policy. Such a policy is even a million Jews and one individual, the individual cannot be sacrificed for the million Jews. Whether it is practically wise, I don’t know, gentlemen. Our religion was realistic, but never wise. Never wise.

[audience member:] Wasn’t there also a kind of consistent regard for the person with the outstanding…

[the Rav:] Correct. Good question. For the scholar, you mean. For the scholar, particularly.

[audience member:] …and during the last war, there were organizations which were set up to save the intellectual, the outstanding person, rather than…

[the Rav:] Yes, I’ll tell you, of course, for scholars, we Jews respect the intellect. But, again, these societies acted – well, there were societies to save scholars – many scholars were saved as a matter of fact, yes. This business of giving preference to the scholar, however great, in Jewish law and Jewish knowledge, over the simpleton, is non-Jewish. We did it, perhaps I myself was involved in it, but to say that I acted in conformity with Jewish law – because any shoemaker in Vilna, or any wood chopper in Vilna, had the same intrinsic worth as the greatest of scholars.

And the question, if you can’t save all, whom should you save? – is also a problem. So there are many opinions. There are many opinions about it. One opinion is you simply draw lots. You leave it to chance. You leave it to chance. You have no right to decide, because this decision cannot be entrusted to me, because I always prefer the man who is kerygmatically, so to say, prominent, who delivers a good kerygma, who deserves recognition of the crowd. Another opinion is that if you can’t save all, so you let all be killed. It’s an extreme opinion. Don’t be saved by the death of others.

I’ll give you an example. Two people – the famous Talmudic statement. Two people walk in the desert. They have only one pitcher of water. One can be saved, the other one cannot be saved. The pitcher of water – it’s interesting; so the law is so: if the pitcher of water is in the possession of one, he may drink the water; but however, if the pitcher of water is not in the possession of one, but in some place, so both must die; and of course, if one is stronger, he could run to that place and get hold of the pitcher of water before the weaker one will get there. Both must die, and no one must be saved by the death of his friend.

We are very strict about it. You ask a good question. Did we implement these laws? In the Middle Ages, yes. The medieval Jew was perhaps ignorant, but there was an ethical personality. He implemented them. However, in modern times, of course, I can tell you – but it’s indicative of our approach to the individual.

The law of the High Priest on erev Yom Kippur who finds an anonymous corpse

Let me give you another example. Perhaps this example is a little more characteristic, because it does not deal with emergencies, with situations which are – with tragic situations, but it’s a general law pertaining to an everyday situation. We all know that the priests, the kohanim, were enjoined from defiling themselves by contact with dead bodies. You know that; I mean, you can find it in the Bible if you want to. Just for reference, I want to say, this is Leviticus, Leviticus 21, verse 1, I would say, verse 1-15. “There shall none defile himself for the dead among his people;” you know; it was very strict law, very strictly enforced, and the kohen who was defiled could not enter the sanctuary or the Temple; he could not worship, could not be part of the service. It means simply he was, for a period of seven days at least, he was excommunicated for defiling himself with a dead body.

The philosophy of it is a different story. There is a certain aversion on the part of Judaism toward death. Judaism felt helpless in the face of death. It’s a different story. Yes.

The law is as such that the ordinary priest, the kohen, must not defile himself with dead bodies other than immediate relatives. Immediate relatives are seven relatives: wife, children, brother and sister, and parents. However, it was forbidden to the High Priest to come in contact and contaminate himself with any dead, even if they are his closest relatives. As it is said, in the chapter I referred you to: “Nor [defile himself for his] father, or for his mother” There are other people who attend the funeral, who make the proper arrangement. You want to express your emotions, your love for your father? – you are forbidden to do so.

But if the High Priest was traveling on the highway and found a dead body, just a corpse, [in a] state of disintegration, so he must take care of the body and bury it. He must not defile himself with the beloved father and mother, because there are others who will make the appropriate arrangement; yet, if he comes across a dead body that has been dumped somewhere, murdered in the field or in the woods, he is duty bound to defile himself, to preoccupy himself with its interment.

Now, this is the law. Now, let me just dramatize a bit this law; but this is true, I mean; as a matter of fact, the Talmud spoke of such an incident. We may imagine the following complication. The following complication which may arise on such an occasion.

The date is erev Yom Hakippurim; it’s the day preceding Yom Kippur. The High Priest has readied himself for the great Day of Atonement for months and weeks, because on the Day of Atonement, he will represent the Jewish people before the Almighty in the inner sanctum. You know what the sanctum sanctorum meant – the kodesh hakodashim – no one was allowed to enter; only the High Priest – for the great ceremonial of the service of the Day of Atonement. This ceremonial, this service could only be performed by the High Priest. No ordinary priest had access to the Temple on that day. There was only one person who could appear as the spokesman representing the Jewish community on that great holy sacred day – but the High Priest. Whoever has even a fleeting knowledge of the history of the Second Commonwealth knows what the service on the Day of Atonement meant to the people – sacrifices, confessions, kneeling – the High Priest on that day was, so to say, the beloved hero of the Jewish community. We have Roman sources – not only Jewish sources; Roman sources – Roman historians recorded this ceremonial, how the High Priest was escorted from his house into the Temple and taken back at night, in the evening, back to his home. I mean, he was the most admired person; an echo of this you can still find in the service on the Day of Atonement read in the synagogue and temples; the famous, so to say, hymn, “How great was the High Priest when he left the sanctuary,” mah nehedar haya kohein gadol. The man was the man who millions admired and for whose safety they ardently prayed – and I’m not exaggerating there; I’m not dramatizing there. The passage in Ben Sira, we have from the famous poet of the Second Commonwealth, Ben Sira, which we still recite on the Day of Atonement, reveals to us – actually, he still abounds in, I would say, in superlatives, describing, portraying the High Priest on the Day of Atonement. We still hear the ecstatic voices of the crowd which watch the High Priest performing the magnificent task.

And yet – this is just introduction – and yet, the High Priest, this day, erev Yom Kippur, just a few hours before sunset, the High Priest, who is about to perform the most glorious service of the year, which is eagerly anticipated by the entire community, took a walk in the woods, and found a body. And there is a question in the Talmud, what should come first? Shall he just walk back to town – nothing else – just back to town; it’s not far from town; a few miles from town – go back, or ride back to town, on a donkey or on a horse, and tell the people, “There’s a dead body; take care of it,” and he shouldn’t touch the body because he must be fit for the service, for the performance in the Temple – or, he should disregard everything else, disregard, forget the whole world, the community, and what he has to do tomorrow, and bend down, pick up the dead body on his shoulder, and bring it to the town, of course. And of course – and this was a question, and the question was answered unequivocally – yes, he must not leave the body even for one second. He must forget his duties, all his commitments to the community, this ceremonial, his pride of being able to perform this great ceremonial, and entering the sanctuary, the sanctum sanctorum – and attend to the burial and become a grave digger […].

And yet the High Priest who is about to perform the most glorious service of the year, which is eagerly anticipated by the entire community – must take care of the burial, and thus defile and disqualify himself from worshiping God on the most solemn day of the year. The absence of the High Priest – and the people always, I mean, they were a bit superstitious; if something happened to the High Priest, it was a bad omen, a bad time. And the people – the absence of the High Priest may cancel out the whole service, because there is no one else to substitute for him. No one else was trained for the very complex service, and they used to train the High Priest for weeks, how to perform it. It may cancel out the whole service. It may cancel out the whole service on that day, since, in some cases there might be no one to replace him; still the High Priest must dismiss from his mind the great ceremonial, the community, the Temple, glory and joy associated with the service, and devote himself to a dreary task of grave digging, and carrying a dead body, which is in a state of disintegration and decomposition.

Why? Why should he disappoint the entire community, and forfeit the noblest of experiences, the one of catharsis and purification on the Day of Atonement?

Who was this person whose body was abandoned? Let us understand. Who was this person whose body was abandoned? – the king? – the king’s body was taken care of; the archbishop comes to his funeral – certainly not an important figure. Some – of course, whose body could be abandoned, and no one demanded the body, asked for the body? – some anonymous being, perhaps a vagabond or a leper. A leper usually lived in the woods; they were not admitted to the community. A leper or a sinner was expelled, excommunicated from his hometown. Why should the great aristocrat – and the High Priest was considered the aristocrat of the community – who is charged ­­­with responsibility for the spiritual welfare of the Jewish community, defile himself, and thus not realize the hopes and expectations of millions of people? What is the answer? – for the sake of burying a vagabond, some anonymous person?

The answer to it is a simple one. The greatness of the individual is the supreme principle in Judaism. It reigns supreme. The inner worth of the person, which is dependent not upon accomplishment and success, but upon his uniqueness and loneliness, is the foundation of Judaic ethics. Each person, however humble, however humble his station is in life, and however downtrodden and anonymous he is, however inferior he is in every respect to his fellow man, and however poor in attainments, each person is blessed with something singular, and ipso facto, he is great. And the whole service, the idea of forgiveness, and mercy and catharsis on the Day of Atonement, the message of the day, the sanctity of the Temple, would be stripped of their meaning and become a mockery if the person who is selected to represent the Jewish community before the Almighty did not appreciate the glory of the individual and the worth and dignity of the helpless, forlorn and the wretched person, the vagabond, the pauper, the prostitute, who might have lost everything, everything in life, but not the image of God. This is a law. It’s very characteristic of our approach.

Audience questions and responses

[audience member:] Doesn’t this contradict the earlier […] You said that the concept of the community or the concept of the individual is something that Judaism didn’t completely accept either.

[the Rav:] Yes, I always said, yes, I said so. As far as the individual is concerned, he must place the community above his interest. As far as others are concerned, they must place the thou above the community. You see, this is the dialectical swinging. I must do everything in order to promote the welfare of the community, and even if supreme sacrifice is required. We’ll come to certain laws about it. On the contrary, when you treat me, then I am above the community. You have no right to say that millions of people [who] expect atonement should come first, and the poor individual should be buried later. You must place the individual above the community. This is how Judaism operates.

[audience member:] You’re talking about man’s responsibility in relation to man. Therefore, this also includes, although it has, I imagine, and extends itself to every man, irrespective of color, creed, religion, etc.

[the Rav:] Certainly. Certainly. I want you to understand, when we speak, we operate with two concepts in Judaism. The question is our parochial approach and our universal approach. You know, many followers of [the] Jewish people accuse Judaism of being too parochially minded. In fact, all the laws they promulgate and formulate – good laws – but they say the laws apply only to their own kind, to the Jew, but not to the Gentile. You know that. Basically, I’ll tell you. I want to be very truthful with you. I don’t want to engage in apologetics. We operate with two concepts. We speak of the dignity of the personality; we also speak of the sanctity of the personality – two concepts. Until now, I’ve been speaking not about sanctity of the personality – I’ve never mentioned this word – but the dignity of the personality. Many laws come under the category of dignity of the personality; other laws come under the category of sanctity of the personality. If you ask me whether we are parochial or universal in our approach, I’ll give you the straight answer, and this is the true answer. If dignity of the personality is involved, there is no distinction as to race, color, religion, between the Bushmen in Australia and the great Jew, and the great Jewish scholar in New York or in Jerusalem. If it’s a question of the sanctity of the personality, we speak of a charismatic community, a chosen community, and, of course, as a chosen community, we are committed to the Jewish community. But social ethics does not deal with the sanctity of the personality, but with the dignity of the personality. All ethical laws, all civil laws, are equally applied to all men. Yes, sir?

[audience member:] The law that you just elaborated on, doesn’t that somehow contravene the basic thing that you’re trying to tell us? Let me say what I have in mind here. You made the analogy of Peretz, an analogy without words, without physical action. You are putting – the law puts the sanctity of the body, of the physical body…

[the Rav:] Not like this. I’m just objecting to […]. No, the body is important because the body, basically, if you are made, what you […] Judaism, again, differs from Christianity in one respect. When Christianity spoke of man, it had in mind the soul, or spiritual man, whatever. Judaism always – in this regard, Judaism is very close to the scientific interpretation. Judaism looks upon man, first of all, as a body. That’s why the body – the dignity of the personality, is reflected on the body as well.

[audience member:] Even to the exclusion of what the appearance of the High Priesthood and service would do […] for the inner self of the […]?

[the Rav:] Yes, sir. You see, again, we are so much influenced by Christian concepts – the spiritual meaning of the heart – we have never operated with such concepts. Yes, sir?

[audience member:] I just wanted to say that it seems that there’s a kind of spiritual commitment of man to man, even before man to God in this situation; or man to the God in man; if the High Priest’s duty…

[the Rav:] I understand. I understand your question. Let me answer this. I intended to talk about it, but – I’ll talk later about it – just in short. You see, if one should ask me – once a Christian theologian asked me, what do I consider the greatest achievement of Judaism? What is the most singular contribution that Judaism made toward the welfare, the spiritual welfare of mankind? Of course, you’ll tell [me] monotheism, yes, but this is already an old phrase. As you say in Yiddish, es hot a bord; it has a long beard already. And basically, monotheism, if we are [talking] about monotheism, of course, Jewish religion is monotheistic; but you may find monotheistic philosophies among the Greeks as well, not being aware of Jewish monotheism, and perhaps even in the Egyptian cultural orbit there were attempts to introduce a monotheistic religion, a monotheistic cult. This is not a great… Huh? Yeah, all right. But what is important – The greatest, in my opinion, the greatest contribution of Judaism – that Judaism made toward the spiritual welfare of mankind, is that Judaism unified and combined cult with the ethos. If you will take a great man like Socrates or Plato, so he said, the gods, how do you serve the gods? – or god; it doesn’t matter whether gods or god. How do you serve them? You have to, so to say, discharge your specific duties toward them – sacrifices, prayer, service, build Temples, erect statues, sing hymns to them; but the gods of the Olympus, they are not interested in my relationship toward my fellow man. This is my own business. This is my own problem. Philosophy will deal with this. So, of course, pagan religion had no ethic. All the gods were interested in was in cult, in cultic performances. As a matter of fact, I mean, the gods themselves were of very lax morals. I mean, you know mythology. You couldn’t trust the gods; they were deceitful, they were lust[ful], full of lust and gluttony, I mean, sneaky, […], you know the Greek mythology. And this is true of every pagan culture; I’m pointing out the Greek, because the Greek is culturally the center of civilization; it made a tremendous contribution to the advancement of society.

Judaism was the first religion which came [and said] – you serve God? – of course, there are certain forms of service to God, cultic service – but this is not the main service; God is interested in your ethical life, in morality. You can serve him not only by sacrificing – sacrificing is an unimportant detail in Judaism. Of course, as I already said, institutionalized religion must have some tangible forms of worship. Otherwise, it cannot exist. It will disappear in thin air. But, I’m interested in how you treat your fellow man, how you treat the laborer, how you treat the poor, how you treat the pauper – paso’ach tiftach es yadekha, open up your hand and support the man who is about to fall – support him – how you treat your father and mother, the king – how he treats his citizens – I mean the ethos. You serve God not only by sacrifice, but also, and perhaps mainly, by realizing the moral law which was introduced by God. This is very important.

You’ll take the Decalogue. I mean, if you count all the injunctions, all the precepts in the Decalogue – how many are occupied with cult, with the cultic performance gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen? How many? Not even one. Even the Sabbath has a social meaning to us. “In order that your slave and your ox and the beast in the field should rest.” “And you should remember that you were a slave in Egypt,” and that’s why I want you to handle your slaves in a decent manner. And this was the first foundation of Judaism.

Of course, we have an institution of sacrifice too, but it’s [of] secondary importance. And what did all the prophets preach? People say the prophets were opposed to sacrifice, to worship, to cult. It isn’t true. This is again a mistake on the part of the Bible critics. They were not opposed to cult, and men must engage in cultic performances. You see, you cannot take religion and equate it completely with the ethos; you’ll feel that you miss something; there is in man something which demands, I would say, expression and manifestation in cultic forms, through a service. There is a service; we have a service, a Temple service. We have prayers, but they are secondary.

That’s why I say, when liberal Judaism says the temple is the center of Jewish life, and Conservative Jews say the synagogue is the center, and now Orthodox rabbis begin to say that the beit hakenesset is the center, I say they are all lying. Neither the Reform temple, nor the Conservative synagogue, nor the Orthodox beit hakenesset [is the center.] The center of Jewish life is the home, the street, the shop, the nightclub, the beach, the highway – God is everywhere. Of course, it’s very nice to come into a temple, if the temple reflects my life outside of the temple; but if there is the great gap, you understand, this gulf separating my mundane life, my life, my behavior in my office, my relationship to my employees, and my humble attitude in the temple; if there is [this] gulf, that’s when the prophets say, what’s the use of bringing a sacrifice if your hands are stained with blood? [There’s] no contradiction. Judaism always required unity, and unity means consistency, identity, the same person.

You see, what is the trouble with Catholicism? The trouble with Catholicism is, psychologically, that the Catholic basically is a schizophrenic. There is a split in his personality. I can imagine – we’ll take an example; take Franco in Spain. Of course, his hands are stained with blood. So, I can imagine, very well, and I do – I’ve never seen him – so, I can imagine that Franco comes in on Easter Sunday – Easter Sunday, probably every Sunday he attends Mass – he’s a pious, devout Catholic – he comes into the cathedral in Madrid, kneels, bends his head against the stone floor of the cathedral, and says the famous Latin dictum, Non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat; not my will, but Yours should become real – and he means it; he certainly means it; it’s not hypocrisy. I don’t say it’s hypocrisy. He’s humble, and he submits himself to divine will, to divine judgment, and prays for atonement, and he delivers himself into God’s hand. Why should I say he’s a hypocrite? The word hypocrisy is used too often. But this prevails as long as he’s enveloped by the shadows of the cathedral, as long as he’s intoxicated by the fragrance of the incense, which is burnt on the altar, as long as the Savior looks upon him from the crucifix; but the moment he steps over the threshold of the cathedral into clear sunlight, so he can sign, on the threshold of the cathedral, a death sentence for a young revolutionary. It’s possible.

Such a thing, to Judaism – this is the most abominable, the most incomprehensible, the most paradoxical experience.

That’s your question. You asked me, there is a duty [of the High Priest]? Yes. There is a duty to God; but the duty to bury the dead is also a duty to God; and [regarding] the question [of] how you serve God, through bringing sacrifices or through burying a lonely person, the second duty comes, takes precedence over the first one.

All right, let’s stop for a while.

End of lecture 5