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Note: This is a word-for-word transcript of an oral lecture and has not been edited to be read as a standalone text. Often the Rav’s tone, pauses, and vocal inflections impart meaning not discernable in the written version. The transcript is provided to accompany the audio lectures in order to help the listener catch every word.

Transcript: [When it] comes to the English text of the Guide of the Perplexed I’m lost; I simply can’t find anything; I had trouble finding a chapter. When you are used to a certain text, you cannot get used to another one.

Now let us resume the thread we left off last time. We spoke about the problem, the question of Jewish loneliness and fate and destiny in Judaism, and we said that Judaism can either be conceived and also experienced as a fact imposed upon man, or it can also be forged as a destiny freely accepted and made part of my existential awareness; and, of course, we said that basically the uniqueness of the Jew expresses itself in his being a member of a covenantal community. Then we asked what the covenant stands for, and we answered that covenant means commitment, and we are a community of the committed ones. We are committed to some goal, to some ultimate end. We are not free in certain respects; we have assumed obligations. What kind of obligations we assume, this is exactly the question which we have to take up today, yes.

Before I speak about the obligation of the covenant – and I said there are basically – there were two covenants, actually, reached, and these two covenants will express the uniqueness of the Jew and his peculiar station in society. As I spoke last time, we are both old-timers, residents, as Abraham said, and also strangers, sojourners. We are both at home and homeless. We are politically, economically, culturally at home in the United States, but transcendentally, metaphysically, the Jew is a homeless person. He is committed to the beyond.

Prophetic commitment as a burden

But before I am going to analyze the two basic covenants, which in my opinion express the essence and the gist of Judaism, I would like to add just a parenthetic remark. Basically, what we have accepted when we reached a covenant with God in our emergence as a people, or as a community, as a charismatic community, is a load, because any commitment is a load on the person. It’s a burden. To be committed means to carry a burden, to carry a load.

And it’s very interesting in Hebrew, it is something which is almost paradoxical, that the word prophecy, nevuah, in Hebrew, and the word massa, a burden, load, are synonyms. Many times the scriptures, instead of saying Malachi prophesied, so massa devar Adoshem beyad Malachi, the burden of God’s word on Malachi. Massa, massa, massa, mem sin aleph. Massa. Massa devar Adoshem beyad Malachi, in the twelve prophets, the last of the twelve prophets. Massa devar Adoshem beyad Malachi. What does it mean, a burden? Apparently the prophet’s task – Judaism is a prophetic religion – was not considered a very easy one, a simple one. It was a load, and a load, if I may say, a transcendental load. There is – sometimes one carries a load which is a natural load. This load does not weigh heavily upon the shoulders; but many times the load is a paradoxical one, which cannot be spelled out and interpreted in rational terms, and such a load, which I can experience, but I cannot understand many times, which is beyond my comprehension; but still, I cannot cast it off. Somehow this load, if I try to cast it off, it begins to trail me like an everlasting shadow. So this load is the load of the prophet.

So it means our commitment is a prophetic commitment; and if we say we are a community of committed, it means we are a community of prophets; and Moses said, Moses; I’ll take the Bible for instance. Moses said – will you be so kind and take the Bible? I’ll just, one second, yes. Yes, this is Numbers, just a moment. Numbers, I don’t see the chapters here. Numbers 11. Numbers 11, verse 29. Numbers, the fourth book in the Pentateuch, 11, verse 29. I would refer you to verse, first, just a moment, to verse 27.

“And there ran a young man and told Moses,” it was Joshua, his disciple, “and said, Eldad and Medad,” they are names, “are prophesying in the camp.” He thought that the fact that Eldad and Medad became prophets would annoy Moses, because they would emerge as his competitors, and they would compete for leadership. “And Joshua, the son of Nun, the minister,” it means the errand boy, “of Moses,” from his youth up, “answered and said;” it is Numbers 11, verse 28. “My Lord Moses, shut them in,” for disobedience, for insubordination. “And Moses said unto him, Are thou jealous for my sake? Would that all the Lord’s people were prophets, that the Lord would put his spirit upon them.” Isn’t it my wish that all the people of the Lord were prophets, and the Lord should put his spirit on them? It means, this is my vision, this is my dream, and if two people, commoners, began to prophesy, accepted the load, this is a happy day in my calendar. You should not be envious. You should not display jealousy for my sake. This is exactly [it]. And the Talmudic expression is, Yisroel, im einam nevi’im, benei nevi’im heimah; if they are not prophets themselves, at least they are sons of prophets. It means, prophecy is their heritage. What does prophecy mean in this case, with regard to us, the Jewish community as a whole? – nothing transcendental, nothing supernatural, nothing metaphysical, but the acceptance of a load, because prophecy, basically, is a load in Hebrew, massa.

Yes. If you’ll open – the second – the Bible, Malachi. Massa devar Adoshem el Yisroel beyad Malachi It is the 12 prophets. It’s following Ezekiel. It’s following Ezekiel, but the last of the 12 prophets, the small prophets.

“The burden of the word of the Lord to Israel by Malachi.” This is [the] official English translation; it’s the correct translation. I never rely too much on the English translation, because it’s – due to the Vulgata and the Septuaginta, the Greek and the Latin translation – but in this case, they are right.

“The burden of the word of the Lord to Israel by Malachi.” It’s a burden; that’s exactly right. Prophecy in the Bible is called massa, a burden, which, even though weighs heavily upon the shoulders of the prophet, lends dignity and greatness to man. I wouldn’t say it gives him comfort, or it gives him ease, or even peace of mind, but at least dignity and greatness to man.

Interesting is the description of Jeremiah. Jeremiah described the burden of the prophet and the solitude – I spoke last time – the solitude of the prophet – his loneliness, or, as I said last time, his aloneness – in terse but pertinent words, and he also let us in on the secret of the response such an experience evokes. Let us quote Jeremiah indirectly by introducing a passage from Rambam, the Guide. Do you have the guide? Is it the same edition? It’s part 2, section 2, page 181. If you have the guide. Page 181, part 2, section 2, I believe. It is chapter 37. Chapter 37. At the end of the chapter. Chapter 37. Are the pages the same? No, it’s a different edition. But chapter 37 at the end. Yes.

“But the characteristic of the intellect is this.” It means the intellect of the prophet. No, no, no; before; will you be so kind that you’ll just – but the characteristic. “But the characteristic” – it is the end of chapter 37, section 2; Maimonides gives a description of the intellect of the prophet; it’s a typological description, basically.

“But the characteristic of the intellect is this: What the intellect of one receives,” it means of the prophet, “is transmitted to another, and so on, till a person is reached that can only himself be perfected by such” – Just a moment. “It is further” – excuse me – “It is further the nature of this element in man” – this is exactly; the following sentence – “that he who possesses an additional degree of that influence,” it means the prophet. It’s a very poor translation. I mean, whoever knows the Arabic and the Hebrew text. It’s a very – “influence” is a very poor translation. Even the Hebrew hashpa’ah is something else. Anyway, “influence, is compelled to address his fellow man” – there is a compulsion – “under all circumstances, whether he is listened to or not, even if he injures himself thereby.”

This is the nature of the prophetic burden. In man, there is almost – it is compelling; actually, you may call – of course, I mean, it would be ridiculous to apply a psychiatric term, because this means an anomaly – it’s compulsive on the part of the prophet. He has to do it, although his best interests tell him, don’t do that; don’t get involved, because you are a rebel against society; you try to overthrow a social order; you voice protest against accepted sacred institutions.

“Thus, we find prophets that did not leave off speaking to the people until they were slain. It is this divine influence that moves them, that does not allow them to rest in any way…”

It’s one of the most beautiful chapters in the Guide. Maimonides is always grand when he stops philosophizing and speaks in a simple language, when he is not over-sophisticated, Maimonides.

“…allow them to rest in any way, though they might bring upon themselves great evils by their action. When Jeremiah was despised, like other teachers and scholars of his age, he could not, though he desired it, he wanted, withhold his prophecy or cease from reminding the people of the truth which they rejected. And Jeremiah said, ‘for the word of the Lord was unto me a reproach, and a mocking all the day. And I said I will not mention it, nor will I again speak in his name’” – he wanted to desert his mission – “‘but it was in my heart a burning fire, enclosed in my bones, and I was wearied to keep it and did not prevail.’ This is also the meaning of the words of another prophet. ‘The Lord God hath spoken, who shall not prophesy?’”

It means, who has the ability to suppress the message? And this is not, ladies and gentlemen, the characteristic of the prophet of old. It is basically the characteristic of the Jewish community, because, as I said, we have accepted the burden; the burden is not – we cannot just cast it off and not to prophesy; we are compelled to prophesy. This is exactly the covenant interpreted more or less in personalistic terms, I would say.

The two covenants, at the Exodus and at Sinai

Now, let me now examine the covenant itself; this is very important. This is – just was a parenthetical remark. If we examine the history of the covenant, as portrayed in Exodus, we will find out that God established with his people two covenants. One in Egypt, before the Exodus, and the other one at Sinai, at the time of Revelation.

Now let’s open Exodus 6, verses 5, 6, 7. Yes, Exodus 6, verses 5, 6, 7. Or, perhaps we will go back to verse 2.

“I am the Lord, and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac and unto Jacob as God Almighty, but by my name” – the four-letter name, the Tetragrammaton – “I made me not known to them.  And I have also established my covenant with them to give them the land of Canaan, the land of their sojournings, wherein they sojourned. And moreover, I have heard the groaning of the children of Israel whom the Egyptians keep in bondage, and I have remembered my covenant.  Wherefore say unto the children of Israel: I am the Lord” – it means the establishment of the covenant; it’s always, “I am the Lord” – “And I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians and I will deliver you from the bondage and I will redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great judgement” – and again – “And I will take you to Me” – this is the most important sentence in the covenant – “And I will take you to Me for a people and I will be to you a God.  And ye shall know that I am the Lord your God Who brought you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians [Exodus 6:2-7]”

This is the covenant. Always the covenant, so to say, the finale of the covenant is, I am your God, you are My people. It’s an agreement, contract; basically, it’s a contract. This is the first covenant that I spoke of, at the Exodus.

Now if you’ll take the book of Exodus, the same book, chapter 19, instead of chapter 6; chapter 19, verses 4 and 5, the famous address to Moses before the Revelation. It’s very famous. 4; 19, verse 4.

“Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles’ wings, and brought you unto Myself. Now therefore, if ye will hearken unto Me, unto My voice, indeed, and keep My covenant, there ye shall be My own treasure from among all peoples, for all the earth is Mine. And ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation.”

I – emphasis placed upon the last two words, “holy nation.” Now, it’s very interesting; the covenant of Egypt – the covenant of Egypt – but I must introduce here a Hebrew term, because in English, of course you have the two terms, but they don’t correspond. The covenant of Egypt – if you’ll go back to chapter 6. Exodus, chapter 6, verse 7.

“And I will take you to me for a people.” In Hebrew it is, velakachti eskhem li le’am – am, a people, am – ayin, concluding mem; am, a people. God speaks in terms of a people, as in Hebrew means am – I’ll have to operate with this term, am – ayin, mem setumah; the concluding mem; am, a people.

Here, he says the word, goy kadosh; goy; I mean, in Yiddish in vernacular, goy has assumed a funny – I don’t know how it developed – but a funny, a funny meaning; I mean, goy means a non-Jew; but goy basically means a nation. This is a nation. Apparently it was so. I mean, how it developed, I can imagine how it developed. The Talmud dealt with pagans, so the pagan was akum. Of course, then when the Christian society came up, so they eliminated the word pagans, because Christians are not pagans. So they had to describe a non-Jew. How can you say non-Jew? It means a man who belongs to another nation, of another nationality. So apparently at the beginning it was goy acher, a different nationality. So finally the printer decided, why do they need the qualification acher? So they left the word “goy.” Goy means a nation. This is how it has developed over the ages, basically. But basically goy means – in Hebrew it means – goy kadosh means a holy nation. If I should say in English – but it is bad; in the sense of political science and sociologically, it would not correspond semantically.

In the covenant – with regard to the covenant of Egypt, God speaks in terms of peoplehood. With regard to the covenant at Mount Sinai, He speaks in terms of nationhood, goy kadosh; you’ll be My people; in Sinai He says, you’ll be a sacred nation. And I’m not speaking now about the sacredness, about the adjectival qualification of sacredness. I’m not concerned for the time being with that. We’ll come later what sacredness means in Judaism. But here is goy, and here is, and there is am.

What’s the difference between peoplehood and nationhood? But you see, when you look up a dictionary on political science, you’ll get a completely, completely different view, because, for instance, in English you can say, the American nation consists of many peoples. So people actually means something; I mean, we have a racial origin, common origin. A nation basically means a political society, in the colloquial now, in the vernacular. I don’t mean in the vernacular, in the scientific vernacular, but this is not where I am going; basically, a nation from the Latin natus, born, I mean, basically it has nothing to do with a political society; but I’ll orientate myself not according to the established definitions, which you’ll find in any political dictionary, a dictionary of political science, but what in Hebrew means am, am a people, and goy a nation. That’s what I want to describe.

Am in Hebrew basically means im, together, because in Hebrew if you say, “I was with him,” so you’ll say, “Ani bati imado,” or “im chaveri,” “im yedidi.” I came with him. So it means – im means together. So out of im, the noun, the term am, was formed – you see, was – emerged, and am denotes togetherness, togetherness, denotes togetherness, unity, unity. Apparently – let us not speak about the covenant in Sinai; let us take up the covenant in Egypt – the covenant in Egypt apparently committed us – it’s again a commitment, again a load, and again, if I may say, if I may use a term by Plato, Maimonides and Kierkegaard, it was a mad commitment, a crazy commitment, [a] paradoxical, absurd commitment, but it was done; of course we are too practical; perhaps if we had been consulted, we wouldn’t have accepted it, but apparently our parents, have, I mean, forefathers, was not as practically minded, as pragmatically orientated as we are, so we accepted, but it’s a crazy commitment, paradoxical. [It] means a togetherness commitment, that’s all, nothing else, a togetherness commitment. The covenant in Egypt committed us to a community existence, because basically am means community, community.

The existential community

And I would say – I would add one phrase – there are so many communities; there are political communities, and scientific communities, and educational communities, and all kinds of communities – because, there is a community – I mean, any common denominator creates a community – I would say it was an existential community. Our very existence, our very existence, as individuals and as members of a society, is a together existence, a together existence, not a single existence. The covenant addresses itself, the covenant in Egypt, prima facie, not only prima facie, but actually primarily, primarily addresses itself to the numinous I, about whom I spoke in the last lectures – to the I, I would say not the numinous I, but the numinous Jew – to man, to the Jew in seclusion – to the I in seclusion, or the Jew in seclusion – to man, or to the Jew for himself –  to solitary Abraham; if Adam is the symbol of man in general, is Abraham the symbol of the Jew in general – to solitary Abraham – and commands him, the man who is sheltered by his ego existence – somehow he is afraid to tear down the barrier separating him from the thou – the covenant addresses itself, or, God, through the covenant, addresses Himself, to the numinous Jew, and commands him to become accustomed to live with the other self.

It’s a great art. Covenant, contract – the covenant, the mere word covenant, the mere word co-, the Latin co-, the Latin co-, what does it mean? It’s already together, like im in Hebrew, like im in Hebrew means together, co-; whatever does in Latin co- is together, to get convened together, to be together, to live together. The covenant contract means something which grows out of a relationship between two beings, I and thou.

The numinous I, whenever he enters a contractual arrangement with God – first of all the covenant is established between man and God – but the moment a man reaches an agreement with God, he, ipso facto, commits himself also to the finite thou, because God never enters an agreement with the individual – this is Judaic thinking – unless the individual is ready to commit himself not only to God, what we call it in our vernacular, the Infinite Thou, not only – this commitment is not as important to God as the commitment to the finite thou. God says, yeah, we’ll enter an agreement, but not only between two people. If we are going to reach an agreement, form a community, I want three members. The community – three members should comprise the community. Who are the three members? Who are they? – I, God, thou, and he. Basically, the covenant is composed of three people, of the three personae of the grammar. Basically, it is the three personae of the grammar. It is I, thou, and he.

Of course, man can say, I’m an aristocrat, I don’t want to join him; it is not below my dignity to reach an agreement with God; I can have, so to say, social intercourse with God; He is a prominent citizen; but I’m a little bit reluctant to join that thou; [that] thou doesn’t come up to me socially, economically, educationally; so there is no agreement. It is I, capital I, thou, and he. Of course, thou and he are small. The first – this is basically – this is im. This is im, together, but not together with God; together with God, and with your, with your, with another finite being, whom you don’t like.

Of course, the individual, the individual, numinous self, who was in seclusion, tries, if he accepts the agreement, then he tries, if he accepts the agreement – this is the conditio sine qua non; otherwise no agreement is reached – if he accepts the terms of the agreement, so he tries, or has to try at least, to liberate himself from solitude – it’s an act – to liberate himself from solitude, and join hands with the other self. The other self is also a bit stubborn, and obstinate, and he is also hiding in the recesses of his own personality. He doesn’t want to come out of this, of this warm shelter. But he is forced by the covenant: come out! Emerge! Out of your hiding! Covenant basically means fellowship, of God, as I said, I, thou, and he. The first emergence, basically what happens, kerygmatic man – I spoke about numinous man and charismatic man – who forces numinous man to emerge into the open, to pass on his message to society, and to become a member of society, of the community, who forces him? Religiously – of course sociologically you have many forces, I mean, anthropologically – but I’m speaking now from the standpoint of religion; who forces numinous, the numinous Jew, to become a member of a community, regardless whether it is in accordance with his interests, or it is sometimes, I mean, as Maimonides says, sometimes he may inflict injury upon himself by committing himself to others? Who forces him? – the covenant.

Man, secluded man, looks for companionship – although it’s sometimes very hard to get out of this, of his shelter – because of the covenant. Out – kerygmatic man, out of the recesses of his numinous existence – and this occurs with the establishment of a covenantal society.

The community is a strange one; it’s a strange community. It is an all-inclusive community fellowship. The difference between the Judaic community and the secular community, the sociological community, is only one. It’s one difference. The sociological community is I, thou, and he. Correct? That’s all. All three personae of the grammar form a community, nothing else. If you have many, it’s in plural; it’s we, you, and they. That’s all, nothing else. The Jewish community, the biblical community, and this community which was accepted in Jewish history, I mean, theologically, is a community also. I, thou, he, small, and He, capital. That’s all. There is a fourth member to the community, and the fourth member to the community is God himself. It’s a community of finitude and infinity. It’s an all-inclusive community. The sociological community is restrict[ed], confined to the dimensions of finitude while the Judaic community is an all-inclusive community. It’s finitude plus infinity.

Of course, mathematically, it’s a paradox. Because if you take finitude plus infinity mathematically, it equals infinity. Correct. So it means finitude disappears. But, in our viewpoint, there is a place for finitude, for finite man to exist in the presence of God. God does not consume man, does not smother him. Man and God can be two equal fellows in one society. There is a funny approach in Judaism; Christianity had never understood it, in its life, never. There is equality between God and man on the one hand, and of course, on the other hand, it is an endless gap. But on the one hand, God is my friend. Where do you have it? Adoshem ro’i lo echsar, is quite possible – so we all translate, God is my shepherd, I shall not want – but it’s quite possible that the real interpretation – Nachmanides wants to say so – is God is my friend, my colleague; I shall not want. Basically, in Hebrew, is ro’eh a shepherd, and re’ah, a colleague – might stem from the same origin. Yes.

The covenant – now let’s come back. This is the covenant in Egypt. This covenant, this sort of a covenant was established in Egypt. The covenant of am – let us stick to the Hebrew term, because it expresses, I mean, the very essence of the covenant – the covenant of am of togetherness, of a community existence, of a fellowship, of I, thou, he and He, capital, finds expression, I would say, at many levels. And I want to say it in practical terms. Up to here it was a bit – I operated with some abstract terms, but Judaism is always – likes any metaphysical idea, to see any metaphysical idea, translated into practical terms. If it cannot be expressed in practical terms and converted into a norm to guide man, metaphysics, in the opinion of the Judaic, I mean of Judaism, has no significance. It means like that – together. It’s a covenant of together, yeah, togetherness.

And let me make it very simple. First – togetherness in the present; togetherness in the present. It means community – and please note each word because I’m going to explain it – community of interests, feelings, and responsibilities – community of interests, feelings, and responsibilities. And I would say more than interests, feelings, and responsibilities, I would say a community of experiences. This would cover everything. And a community of experiences, both passional experiences – it means experiences of suffering – passional experiences, and also eudaimonic experiences, experiences of happiness – at both levels. So number one – but in the present. Right here and now.

Second – this is the covenant; this is what the covenant required of us; this is the law – second – together at the level of the historical drama, unity of the historical drama, or unity of the historical occurrence, or, together in all three dimensions of time, together in the past, or rather together with the past, I would say rather, together with the past, which is gone, together with the future, which hasn’t been born yet – it is together – events which have almost faded out our memory – together with events which have not yet taken place. It means together in memory and together in hope; together in retrospect and together in vision and hope and dream. This is the second element of the covenant.

Now let us analyze on that. Let us analyze the covenant as far as it pertains to the present, to the present. The covenant – as I said, a community of interests, responsibilities, and experiences, passional and eudaimonic; it means pleasant experiences and unpleasant experiences.

What does it mean? – I mean in practical terms, in very simple practical terms. It’s no use beating around the bush in such matters. You have to spell it out the way Judaism tried to spell it out. You should never make a philosophy – this is the trouble with, now, modern existentialism, if applied to Judaic problems; it’s a nice philosophy, many a time, but, I asked one of the leaders, all right, but I asked him in Yiddish, what is the tachles? All right, everything’s said and done, so what is the conclusion? What shall we do? The Jew only asked, what shall I do? The Greek asked, what is it? But the Jew – in order to understand what he should do, he must understand what the word stands for, of course, but the problem of the prophet [is], mah Adoshem Elokekha doresh mimekha, what does God demand from you; what does He want? Never mind metaphysics.

Together in the present – this covenantal commitment can be spelled out – again, gentlemen, together in the present, at three practical, I would say in three practical different areas of endeavor.

Community of shared interests

First of all, unity of interests; I would say solidarity. I would say solidarity. All Jews – that’s what Judaism tries to tell us, many times – all Jews share the same historical destiny. No Jew, however prominent, however prominent, or anonymous, regardless – perhaps very prominent and anonymous – nobody may submerge in the crowd and disappear and by so doing escape the destiny of our people. No one is exempted from the terms of the common historical affairs. There are no exemptions in the Jewish community. Differences as to color – because basically we are a people, a funny people; it’s hard to say we are one race; if judged by criteria, anthropological criteria, I don’t care about it, because to us, Judaism, the convert, the proselyte, is just the same aristocrat as the high priest. These racial elements absolutely play no role in Judaism. Judaism – if there is some charismatic endowment in Judaism, it’s not a biological endowment – our blood, our bodies [are] the same – it is a load; it depends how much of a load we carry, and of course, if one carries a bigger load, he might be a chosen person, of course, and if one tries to lighten his load, of course he’s not as chosen as the other one. It’s up to us to be chosen or to be like any other people, or to be below the level of any other people. I always say, the Jews basically have two alternatives; he hasn’t got three. It’s either he’s above other people, or he’s below. Like others is hard; I don’t know; it’s hard to be like others; I don’t know. Here we are. You see, the Midrash says, uma zu, this nation, when it begins to ascend, it may reach the stars; and when it begins to roll down the hill, it may reach the unfathomable depths, sink to very low depths. Anyway, let’s […].

Differences in the color of the skin, cultural diversity, economic discrepancies, language, dress, mores, and differences in the general social milieu must not dispel the feeling of solidarity which binds all Jews together. Whether they live in the culturally advanced Western societies, or in the Far East, or in Israel, or in North Africa, whether they live on Park Avenue, or in the […], in Algiers, in Algeria, they all are exposed to similar vicissitudes of history.

And I want you to know, this is not a prophecy of doom. It’s a certain approach, that there is no aristocracy in Judaism. I don’t mean aristocracy in the sense of blue blood, but I mean aristocracy – no Jew can say, what happened to X cannot happen to me. This is a mistake, gentlemen. I am very far, I am completely – I resent very much when Zionist leaders of the type – Ben Gurion begins to tell us how unreliable the diaspora is; and I don’t say the diaspora is not reliable; I don’t say it; but I say something else; if the diaspora is not reliable, so is Israel. If – I must use the Hebrew expression, chas veshalom, the day should come on which the American government and American people should turn anti-Semitic, and begin to pass anti-Jewish legislation, and engage in a campaign of religious persecution, or minority persecution, then, of course, we have no shelter here, but we won’t have any shelter in Israel. Ridiculous; many times – not him personally, because I never met him – but the Zionist leaders – it is crazy because it’s nonsensical – because the security in Israel, safety, depends upon the American, the Western society. If ever – not only the United States, for the United States is the leading country – but the Western society should go anti-Semitic, then there is no safety in Israel. On the contrary, I believe, there will be more safety in America, even in an anti-Semitic America than in Israel, with Nasser on the one hand, and Qasem on the other. […].

So it’s not a prophecy of doom; but, however, there is not, there is no security. […] the human being has no security, always. This American ideal that man can find security is false. Man has no security as an individual, as I said many times. If I have a big bank account, am I secure? I’m not secure, because the vicissitudes of life are not only in the economic area. Today I can move my fingers, next day I cannot move my fingers. Is this security? Who can secure me against a heart attack, or a shock, or a paralytic shock? Who can secure me? It’s ridiculous when people speak about security. There is no security. And the Jew – to say, I am secure, and that’s all, is ridiculous. I say it for many reasons, ladies and gentlemen; I say it because this is the sense – it’s not – first of all, this is the prevailing mood in Judaism, but it’s not pessimism, you understand; it’s not pessimism. It’s like a Jew; a Jew is never secure as a person; on the other hand, the Jew is an optimist. It’s a combination. The Jew thinks in dialectical terms. The thesis is right, but the antithesis is also right. The thesis is right, no one is secure. The antithesis is also right; a man should feel secure as far as possible. You see, if you operate with a thesis and antithesis, you understand, this is dialectical thinking; you don’t operate with ultimates, either this or that; no; but then you develop a different approach.

I am saying that for two reasons. I told you, my interpretation of Judaism is not objective. No person who interprets Judaism can be objective. Judaism is an experience, and experiences vary, as personalities vary. Of course, my interpretation of Judaism is an outgrowth of my own personality, my own experiences. I lived for many years in Germany, the good years. The seven good years, we say it in biblical language. And Germany was ruled by social democracy in the 20’s. And then the German Jew, and of course in Poland we used to have, in Poland and in Lithuania we used to have antisemitic violence and outbreaks from time to time. So German Jews, assimilated Jews – all German Jews were assimilated, whether they were pious or not pious, but they were assimilated – and don’t forget, the German society, Jewish society was integrated into the German society by far more than the American Jewish society is integrated into the American society, because integration is a problem of years; it’s not a question which, you can bring it about by changing the language; it’s a question of mores, and it’s a way of thinking; and don’t forget the German Jewish society was as old almost as the German civilized society. You tell me what happened in Poland could not happen here, that it’s impossible. And of course, I mean, Hitler was on the scene a little bit, but of course he was more a comical figure in 1926, 1927, 1925; he was a comical figure; no one paid attention, serious attention to him, a crackpot from Vienna who didn’t speak a decent German. He spoke a grammatically wrong, faulty German. That’s a fact; he never learned how to speak German properly, even when he was the leader, the Führer of the German people – it cannot happen here. And I always felt a certain sense of complacency about it, complacency and security. That’s exactly – it happened – it could have happened in Germany – and then to say that Germany is different from all nations – it’s ridiculous. I knew many Germans, good Germans and bad Germans, very cultured people as far as culture is concerned. They are second to none in philosophy, in physics. Who wrote beautiful books about ethics if not the German people? – the categorical imperative, that man should sacrifice himself for the categorical imperative, and so forth; even the Notlüge, the necessary lie, one shouldn’t say even a necessary lie to save his life. Who said it if not Fichte, the famous German philosopher? But still.

Why is it? – because human beings can be either devils or angels. And we are all human beings. I am not sure that even in Israel, a Hitler is impossible. Even in Israel it is possible. We are also human beings. With all our charismatic endowment we are still human beings, and a human being is not reliable. That’s all.

You know what David says? All men are liars. It’s correct, but it doesn’t mean you shouldn’t trust man, but you should always remember that. Watch out, yes. You know the Talmudic expression, kabdeihu vechashdeihu, pay him respect, but watch out.

[audience member:] No wonder you can’t be secure.

[the Rav:] Not so much for pick pockets – vicissitudes of life, and there are biological vicissitudes, and there are also historical vicissitudes. At certain periods a nation might go crazy, might run amok; a nation, not only an individual. We saw it with Germany. Now Germans are a sober people again. All right, you have some anti-Semites, I mean crackpots; doesn’t mean anything; we have crackpots here too; who cares about it?

But the Jewish history wants the solidarity of fate. Yes, disaster for one community, Judaism said, even though distant from and strange to the other community must alarm and summon to defensive action all Jewish communities. If one community finds itself in trouble…

[audience member:] There’s a contradiction here of the statement this is one world, but one world for Jews only, apparently, because certainly in our practice, again, perhaps it’s not true generally, but in America here our practice around different religions, around different colors around different practices, even among some of those Jews, doesn’t testify to an observance of this one world for others, including Jews.

[the Rav:] Basically – I’ll tell you – basically I’m speaking now about one world for Jews – one destiny; I wouldn’t say one world –

[audience member:] That’s what I’m, what bothers me.

[the Rav:] – but basically later I’ll show you that what Judaism demands parochially from the Jew seen within the Jewish community is also demanded from the Jew universally, that the Jew should consider himself a part of humanity and also consider that the common destiny of humanity is one. But we start as Jews, and we climb up little by little to another level, the universal level. That’s exactly correct. But whether American Jews have it or not it’s hard for me to say. I believe they have it. I’ll speak about it. I believe, I was wondering whether American Jews have this experience of the covenant of im, whether they have it or not. I was wondering many times and I arrived at many different conclusions many times, various times, but the final conclusion is – as I grow older either I become wiser or more foolish, I don’t know – but I am more convinced that American Jews have this feeling for the covenant. Whether he spells it out or not is a different story. American Jews – [he] feels a lot and doesn’t dare to say many things. There is a lot he feels; intuitively he knows a lot, an American Jew. Somehow there’s an inner fear about the American Jew to spell out what he feels.

[audience member:] You’re saying philosophically then we have…

[the Rav:] I would say each American Jew feels himself a part of the general Jewish community, not only American Jewish community, but the general Jewish community, because it is so; but American Jews – I know many American fathers are afraid to tell their children what they feel, what they feel about themselves, somehow; I don’t know, there’s a certain reluctance about American Jews to say what he is, what he stands for. Many times it’s a hide and seek game, play the American Jew; but let me continue – this is just the first aspect.

All Jewish community – not because of sympathy you must help them, and pity, but for the distinct feeling of involvement of the Jew with the fate of the other Jew, regardless of the endless distance geographically, culturally and politically separating one Jew from another. If a Jew tries to desert his people and to flee the common destiny to which he was committed, he is dragged back by a cruel and cynical fate. I feel impelled to refer you again to the story of Jonah which is impregnated with symbolism, how he is dragged back to God Whom he tried to flee and to desert.

Interesting is the story in the Bible. Moses, before he was elected to become the redeemer of the Jewish people, had to experience – had to go through a funny experience. Moses the prince, the darling of Pharaoh, leaves the royal palace and walks out and goes out to his brothers and witnesses a very paradoxical episode – an Egyptian taskmaster smiting a Hebrew slave, one of his brothers. See, basically, if you’ll take a look at Exodus – the Bible is very terse, but one word conveys the idea. If you’ll take Exodus 2, verse 11:

“And it came to pass in those days, when Moses was grown up that he went out unto his brethren and looked on their burdens.” What kind of brethren were they to him? What kind of brothers were they to him? He was not raised in the ghetto, Moses, according to the Bible biblical story; he was raised in the royal palace. What kind of brothers were they to him, and what impelled Moses to leave the premises of comfort and luxury, of oriental comfort and luxury, and go to the slave camp, to the concentration camp, and witness, so to say, the travail and the pain and suffering of some strangers, of some Hebrews, whom he didn’t know, as a matter of fact. What impelled him? I don’t know what impelled him, but if you’d ask me, some inner force, I mean, compulsive force, something impelled him.

“And” – “brethren” – “and he looked on their burdens.” What does it mean, he looked on their burdens? What does it mean, he looked on their burdens? What does it mean, he looked on their burdens? It’s not a question of looking. It means he experienced their burdens. Of course, the Bible doesn’t tell you the expression “experience.” Looking means participating, sharing the burdens.

And what did he see? “Vayar ish mitzri makeh ish ivri me’echav, and he saw an Egyptian smiting a Hebrew, one of his brethren.” And may – you know what Moses did; he defended him. What does it show? That before [becoming] the Redeemer, [before] Moses was elected as Redeemer and leader, he had to do one thing, identify himself with the people. If he hadn’t identified himself with the people, if he hadn’t identified himself with the people, he would have never been elected the Messiah of Israel. The Messiah of Israel does not come from the aristocracy, does not come from the above, from the higher strata; he comes from out of the midst of the crowd. When the crowd was in the ghetto, Moses had to identify himself. Moses, culturally, psychologically, was a different person; he was an Egyptian. You see, when he came to Midian, and he helped the daughters of Yitro, and they came home, and the father asked them, why did you come home so quickly? So they said, Ish Mitzri, an Egyptian, helped us – so he looked like an Egyptian. Moses was completely assimilated at that time. He was in the palace of Pharaoh. What dragged him to the Jews, to the poor, dirty Jews and the slaves in the ghetto in Goshen? What dragged him? I don’t know what dragged him. The covenant hadn’t been established yet, but apparently what was to be established later, Moses already experienced intuitively before. [What] dragged him [was] the feeling of common destiny, identification.

[audience member:] While in the palace, wasn’t Moses aware of the Jews, of the stories of his mother?

[ther Rav:] Yes, stories of his mother, correct, when she nursed him; but don’t forget, I mean, nursing, basically, the mother nursed him; basically, as much as we know now, we can know pretty well about it through Talmudic sources, the nursing period – it means that he was nursed by the breast, probably – it took about 24 months. So it means – and then it says that the mother brought him back to Pharaoh, after completing the period of nursing. So, I mean, Moses, when he came out, a two-year-old child, was returned to the palace; I don’t believe he had any memories of his mother. And let us assume that his mother was in touch with him, although I cannot imagine whether it was possible or not, because the difference between the king of Egypt and a poor Hebrew woman, a slave; I don’t know [that] there could be much intercourse, I mean, between the palace and the ghetto. So, but, he was reared in Egyptian culture. What dragged him out of there? I don’t know, it’s hard to say. We just have fragments, but this is apparently the covenant.

[An] interesting [thing] is, Maimonides, in enumerating those to whom a share in the hereafter, in the future world, will be denied, because of grave offenses, writes of the Jew who is indifferent to the suffering and the travail of his people, as follows. I am quoting him verbatim. Of course, I translate into English, and if you want to have the source, I can give you; the Laws Pertaining to Conversion, Teshuvah, chapter 3, paragraph 20 [See 3:6,11 – ed.]:

“One who separates himself from the community, he will never share the bliss of the world to come” – in Judaism, it is the severest punishment – “even if he does not commit a transgression,” and even if he is pious – pious, observes all laws of the Torah, “only holds himself aloof from the congregation,” – “holds himself aloof from the congregation of Israel, does not fulfill religious precepts in common with his people” – he fulfills all religious precepts, but not in common with his people – “shows himself indifferent when they are in distress, does not observe their fasts” – a fast is an expression of solidarity, an expression of sympathy with the persecuted – “but goes his own way, as if he were one of the Gentiles and did not belong to the Jewish people; such a person has no portion in the world to come.”

It’s interesting; even an Orthodox Jew, an Orthodox Jew, even a fanatic, belonging to the lunatic fringe – I don’t care how Orthodox he is – if he lacks this covenantal experience of togetherness, in the story, with regard to the story of destiny – is not considered a good Jew.

Community of shared emotional involvement

Now – now, this sharing of interests, community of interests, leads to something else –community of feeling, emotional involvement; emotional involvement. The community – yes, excuse me – it means he should not only, so to say, intellectually see himself a part of the Jewish community, but simply experience, both at the passional and eudaimonic level, all the travail, pain, sufferings, and distress of other parts of the community. Compassion or co-suffering with others is basic in our commitment. The experience of the Jew, whether tragic or joyful, must be keenly shared and perceived, entered into and shared by all. To suffer with the oppressed and rejoice with the free is a part of our commitment.

This is – first it was at the intellectual level, to consider himself a part of the community, not to think that I can escape; I am different because I am more cultured, I am richer, I am more prominent; what happened to the poor Jew cannot happen to me. Secondly, I should simply feel it. This commitment should not only be thought out in intellectual terms, but felt.

Community of shared responsibilities

But here we come to the third and perhaps the most important aspect of this common destiny, knowledge and experience. This is a community of responsibilities. It’s very important. Judaism has stressed time and again this community. This awareness of community of interests and experiences leads to a community, to a third community, of responsibilities.

And community of responsibilities again can be seen at two levels. First of all, we are morally accountable for each other. This is a Judaic concept – Kol Yisroel aveivim zeh lazeh; all Jews are morally accountable, answerable before the Almighty for the errors of their fellow man or their fellow brothers. We must answer for the conduct of our brother to a degree that no other national group experiences.

Basically, I am not speaking now from a halakhic viewpoint, [but] from a historical viewpoint. Somehow – I don’t know why it is so; why it is so, I don’t know; I cannot explain. Perhaps it is due to some anomalous thinking on the part of the Gentile world, but it is a fact that the world places upon us collective liability and answerability. In – it is a historical paradox, yet the paradoxality does not diminish our togetherness in the eyes of the non-Jewish society with regard to our moral responsibility. This is the most important thing.

Let me illustrate this paradox with an example from current events. We all know too well – and I happen to know it very well because I went through it – what the name Marx or the name Trotsky or Zinoviev meant to the anti-Semitic bigot. That’s what I want to emphasize. There are certain – for instance, I’ll give you an example with Israel. We know that some Gentiles attack us for double loyalties, for divided loyalties, for divided commitment with regard to Israel, and, I must tell you, I myself am a member of the Zionist party, the religious Zionist wing; but it is a problem for the American Jew; it’s not like people in the Theodor Herzl Institute want to do away with this problem; it’s a problem; it’s got to be thought out properly, and if the question is posed to us, and it’s posed to me very often, we should know what answer. What about the Catholic? There’s no answer about the Catholic, because the Catholic is not as committed to Ireland as we are committed to Israel. […], and if you think we know that, I can tell you that the intelligent Gentiles know it well. But, however, what troubles me is not some literature published by Herbert Gerald Smith; this is a crackpot; what troubles me is that decent Gentiles, people who have no prejudice against the Jew, keep on asking me the same question when I meet them, the same question. So apparently, you see, the person who is somehow the hateful person says it aloud; the person who is not hateful, a normal person, with understanding, the intelligent Gentile, asks a question. When the question is asked, never try to put the question in the wastebasket, but try to answer it. I mean, it’s a different problem; I’m not – I’ll go – later, I’ll perhaps analyze this problem. We should know this problem, how to encounter [it] if we are challenged. But even with communism, it raises questions in the minds of the Gentiles. Even a decent non-Jew remarked to me the other day when he read about the arrest of a Jew as a communist spy, agitator. Of course, it’s very bad. Of course, it’s very bad, but he said, it seems to me, of course, he spoke – he’s a sociologist by profession, so he can afford the luxury of speaking in impersonal terms; I mean, science is also a license for sin, you see; it’s very well to be a scientist; you can do anything you want, as religion sometimes is a license for sin – so, it seems to me, he said to me, very nicely, very slowly, as if the Jew willy-nilly sympathizes with these revolutionary ideas, and it’s, of course, due to their historical experiences, he said to me – of course, it’s not an indictment of the Jew; never mind indictment or no indictment, but he said it to me – historical experience; somehow, because the Jew is questing for justice, for equality, he thinks that he can find justice and equality in a communist order. That’s what he told me, very nicely phrased; I cannot say anything against it. So, all right. But it means the problem bothers him.

Why is it? It’s a sense of collective responsibility. On the other hand, however, gentlemen, none, not even the craziest person, someone, an inmate of Bellevue Hospital, who will blame the Chinese in America, or even the Chinese on Formosa, for Mao Zedong and Chu Lin [identity unclear -ed.], and the powerful communization of Asia, carried out by the Chinese people. Imagine, gentlemen, if Israel would go communist. Imagine. And it’s also possible; everything is possible. [If] Israel went communist, imagine our lot here. You know what we – I don’t know what the world would say to us; and a communist Israel would not be dangerous to society. Who cares? Two more million people communist, poor, actually, people without security, safety; and here is a great empire, of 600 million people coming, no one is blaming a Chinese man in America, for [a] simple reason; the Chinese in America is either an American resident, or an American citizen; he’s not to be blamed for Mao Zedong, of course. Collective responsibility is a primitive way of thinking. This is the scapegoat psychology, to put all these things on the scapegoat, on this innocent goat. Yes, but somehow it works with regard to us. I don’t know why it is so. I’m not a psychologist; I’m not an anthropologist. It’s hard for me to explain, but it’s a fact. Yes, Mr. […].

[audience member:] Yes, I’m worried about it this way; take the case of the communists. How many countries are communists and active in revolution, other than in China itself?

[the Rav:] You mean who, the Chinaman? Or the whole Asia? You know, China now is the greatest danger. Russia is no danger now. China is communist. There is a communization of Asia. We didn’t lose the Cold War in Europe; we lost the Cold War in Asia, because there is steady communization of Asia, and you’ll see – I don’t want to be a prophet of doom – I’m afraid that Asia will go communist, including India, because there is no force which can resist communism in Asia – and still no one blames the Chinaman.

[audience member:] The fact is that historically, so far, people have attributed Jews with liberalism, with radicalism, and I think historically it has been true.

[the Rav:] How many Jews were active in the liberal movement? I happen to know very well the Russian history. How many Jews? – here and there; here and there; during the revolution there were a few Jews, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky – alright, but there are more Russians. I mean, there is something which I cannot understand. Yes?

[audience member:] Well, isn’t there a story, maybe it’s apocryphal, about your own father with relation to a Russian Jewish revolutionary?

[the Rav:] About my grandfather, yes.

[audience member:] Is that true?

[the Rav:] It’s true, true story.

[audience member:] All right, so there is an example of the…

[the Rav:] No, this has nothing to do [with it]. I know the story about my grandfather; he was the rabbi in Brisk, the famous Reb Chaim. The social revolutionaries, they believed in terror. Social democracy in Russia did not believe in terror. They thought to bring it about through an educational campaign, [not] in terror. So when the governor general of Warsaw – the district of Poland at the time was a part of Russia – was killed by a bomb, a boy from Brisk, from the town he was Rabbi, was involved. And of course it meant a court martial and death. My grandfather, whether he didn’t believe in his guilt, or, he believed in his guilt, but he thought, still, for killing the governor general in Warsaw, a Jewish boy should not die on the gallows – anyway, what his opinion was, I don’t know; I can’t tell you that. So he got the news about it; it was Erev Yom Kippur, before he went to shul. This is true. And he knew in Russia, I mean, bribes worked wonders, wonders. Still it – it worked wonders in Russia. The Jews couldn’t survive all the persecution in Russia if you didn’t have this magical, how to say, tendency of bribing the officials. So he thought that if he’ll bribe the spravnik – the spravnik was the head of police – he believed, if the spravnik will give testimony about the character of the boy – the boy was a nice boy; he might have been involved or not – so he’ll save the boy. The trial was to take place Yom Kippur morning in Warsaw. It’s a nice – it’s about 7 hours travel, 7-8 hours travel. So, but you needed at least 10,000 rubles; 10,000 rubles at the time was a lot of money. It was 1906. So he closed all shuls – Yom Kippur, you know what Kippur is, [what it] meant in Brisk 50 years ago – so he closed all shuls. He opened only one shul, the so-called “The Cold Shul,” the big shul, and he told all Jews of Brisk to come to that shul. No one knew for what purpose. All shuls – there were about 25 of them, sure, [it was a] tremendous community – all shuls were closed. All Jews had to stream to that shul. He came to that shul for Kol Nidre, you know, for the service. Everything was ready and he went up on [the] pulpit, and he said, gentlemen, I want you to go home, open your safes; [if] not safes, your drawers; take all the money you need – you have – [and] bring the money to shul. We would not say Kol Nidre tonight; we’ll collect money. I mean, people thought that the rabbi is out of his mind; he was out of his mind. You know what it meant 50 years ago in Brisk, Yom Kippur Kol Nidre, to tell people to go home and handle money and carry money? It’s a true story. I mean, I’m not adding one word. I mean, I don’t know how you know about it. How did you get…?

[audience member:] My father-in-law […] there and told me about it.

[the Rav:] My father was present there. So when he and the members of the rabbinate of Brisk, it was a great community, went up the platform, instead of saying Kol Nidre, everybody – since the rabbi said [it], an order is an order – [whether] the rabbi is crazy or in his right sense, it’s a different problem – but an order even from a crazy rabbi is an order. So it was carried out; it was carried out, and the people began to bring money. Bekitzur, in no time, the amount of 10,000 rubles was raised. So instead of saying Kol Nidre, he told the people to wait with the service, and he, with a group of prominent laymen of the community, went to the so-called spravnik, the police commissioner of Brisk, and they talked to him, and they gave him – I don’t know how they gave him; this is a different story – but they skillfully gave him the money, and the spravnik, the commissioner of police, asked my grandfather to sign an affidavit on behalf of this boy; to sign Yom Kippur an affidavit, you know, the night of Yom Kippur, and my grandfather signed the affidavit right away. The spravnik took the train the same night, he came to Warsaw [in the] morning, to the trial, and as police commissioner, as a Russian police commissioner, he testified that he is convinced in the innocence of the boy, and he was acquitted.

What does it show? It shows only greatness on part of my grandfather, yes. I mean, I’ll come, when I’ll speak about loving kindness, I have many stories like that. But what does it show, I mean, with regard to that?

[audience member:] But even in that instance, though…

[the Rav:] He felt collectively responsible, of course; collective responsibility, collective responsibility. It’s not only that he felt [that] if the boy had been found guilty, the guilt would be shared by the community, but there were two reasons. First of all, the sharing, because if the boy had been found guilty, the guilt would have been shared by the community; secondly, simply an act of mercy and sympathy and compassion to the boy. Yes.

And, actually, I mean, the idea of collective moral accountability is mentioned in the Bible. You know, I’m a rabbi, I go back to the Bible. It’s mentioned in the Bible. If you’ll open the Bible, Numbers 16; just a moment; yes, Numbers 16, verse 22; verse 21; 20, 21, 22; Numbers 16, verse 20, 21, 22:

“And the Lord spoke unto Moses and unto Aaron, saying: ‘Separate yourself from the among this congregation, that I may consume them in a moment’” – they think – it was the story with Korach – “And they fell upon their faces and said, ‘O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh, shall one man sin, and wilt Thou be wroth with all the congregation?” – it was a question mark: ha’ish echad yechate, one man sins, and Your wrath will avenge itself upon the whole congregation? – it’s a question mark, and God did not say no; apparently it’s a fact; it’s more of a rehtorical question.

This is already collective responsibility. One was involved; the community paid the price.

And of course the Jewish law – yes, just a minute – the Jewish law, of kol Yisrael arevim zeh lazeh, every Jew halakhically is responsible for the commitments of his other fellow man. Yes, and what do you want to ask, Dr. Eisenberg?

[audience member:] I want to ask you a […] question, about an idea. This charisma, this idea of covenant, and it’s an experience, from childhood on…

[the Rav:] It’s implanted, yes.

[audience member:] Do you think there’s any possibility of transmitting it to young adults?

[the Rav:] I’ll tell you, Dr. Eisenberg, you as an educator are interested in this problem. I’m also interested, we’ll come to this problem, how practically to develop it. But let us limit ourselves now to theory. Of course I know you’re interested in that as an educator.

Yes, this is the idea of collective responsibility for individual culpability. It reflects unfavorably upon the community as such. They may be blamed for the errors of the one. They share the blame which logically should be confined to the evildoer. It’s a strange form of ethical solidarity that comes to the fore. That is why our sages said – and this is important for modern Jews very much, that the Jew involved in a public scandal, or in any transgression, or in any indecent deed, or something – and not only when this particular deed is morally culpable, morally or juridically culpable; [even] when there is no element of culpability; you know, there are many things we do, we are on the line, as we say, of course, on the line; but many things we do – I told once a lawyer in Boston, he says he’s on the line;  so if he is on the line – but you can do many things which are –  although, I mean, you can’t put one in jail for that, but they are very – I wouldn’t even say they’re immoral; if they are ever even judged by formal standards, they are moral too, but it’s still, I don’t know how to – I didn’t know an adjective how to describe it, but it doesn’t belong in Torah; I don’t – a Jew should not practice that. Something wrong is vulgar. Vulgarity is not a moral norm. I mean, there is no injunction against vulgarity. There is no injunction against bad manners. One can display bad manners in the streetcar, or in a restaurant, or on the street. I mean, there is no moral norm against exhibitionism, when Jews begin to exhibit their wealth, or whatever they are, whatever they have, they possess, and their paintings, or their jewelry, or their mink coats; I mean, of course, mink coats are only women; I mean, men, I don’t know what men exhibit; or, and there’s something else; I mean, there is no moral law, but it’s vulgar. Even anything in public vulgar – or insolence, arrogance is a part of the Jew, even though no moral wrong is being committed – if [it was] the Jew [he] had perpetrated a double crime. First of all, if the act is culpable, it’s bad in itself, and, secondly, the crime, his deed, reflects unfavorably upon the Jewish community.

It’s exactly what we call in the halakha, chilul Hashem, and, on the contrary, if a Jew reflects credit upon the Jewish community, that’s what we call kiddush Hashem. It’s a central norm. If you’ll open the books, you’ll find this norm. It is Leviticus, it is Leviticus 60. Leviticus, no, excuse me, Leviticus 22. Leviticus 22, verse 32:

“And ye shall keep My commandments, and do them; I am the Lord; and ye shall not profane My holy name, but I will be hallowed (or sanctified) among the children of Israel.”

How can one sanctify God? – by not reflecting discredit upon the Jewish community, because God and the community are one.

[audience member:] I’m sorry; this kind of interdependence of this extreme form of interdependence can also create a great deal of intolerance, because if your life is so interdependent on other people, and you share in this kind of responsibility…

[the Rav:] You are right. There is an element of risk, there. You are right. But – about tolerance, that is a different problem; I’ll come to tolerance yet. Basically, I mean, we don’t preach; we try to educate, and of course, there is an element, because I am personally involved, so I get angry. For instance, I saw, for instance – for instance, within the Jewish society – you’ll take, for instance, certain groups – I don’t want to mention names – who are more on the fringe; I mean [by] on the fringe [that] they are easily scared by a public scandal about a Jew, so they sometimes engage in certain absurd, I would say, campaigns, which actually  are not constructive; but let’s first just describe it.

And Maimonides says – and I’m reading Maimonides – there are other things that are a profanation of the name of God. See, Maimonides says it; I’m quoting.

“When a man does things which cause people to talk about him, even if the acts do not express violations, he profanes the name of God. For example, if a person makes a purchase and does not pay promptly, provided that he has the means and the creditors ask for the payment, and he puts them off” – there is no more culpability in that – “or, if he indulges in immoderately ingesting, eating or drinking, or when his mode of addressing people is not gentle, or he does not receive people affably, but he is quarrelsome and irritable. The greater the man is, the more scrupulous should he be in all such things, and do more than the strict letter of the law requires. If a man has been scrupulous in his conduct, gentleness, conversation, pleasant to all his fellow men, affable in manner when receiving them, not retorting even when affronted, but showing courtesy to all, conducting his commercial affairs with integrity, devoting himself to the study of the Torah, and doing more than his duty in all things, avoiding extremes and exaggerations, such a man has sanctified God. And concerning him the scripture says, ‘And he said unto me, thou art my servant, O Israel, in whom I take pride, and by whom I am glorified.’”

This is Maimonides. This is collective responsibility, gentlemen. If you want the source, I can give you. It is Deot, D-E-O-T-H, 49, column 3; chapter 49, paragraph 3 [The cited passage is in fact from Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:11. The Rav must have been using a mislabeled source. – ed.]. Yes. In a word, a Jew must always be conscious of his moral responsibility toward his fellow man – fellow Jew. The guilt of an individual is also shared collectively, and others are accountable for his deeds, which reflect either credit or disgrace upon his people. This is moral togetherness, and this is very important. This is im, together.

But responsibility expresses itself in something else, and here I come to the concept of tzedakah. This is the moral covenant. Yes, sir?

[audience member:] I would like to raise a question as to how do we account for a Jew espousing unpopular causes…

[the Rav:] What do you call unpopular causes? Sometimes an unpopular cause is a very good cause.

[audience member:] Yes, but if the concern is that a Jew will reflect the concern of the community, the Jewish community, this one individual…

[the Rav:] I’ll tell you frankly, it does not mean that I have to follow the line laid down by The Daily News and The Daily Mirror.

[audience member:] […]

[the Rav:] I don’t really; oh no. I spoke about the prophetic load. We’ll come to concepts of social justice later, what the covenant requires of us in our dealings with the outside society. Oh no; oh no. A Jew, Abraham, was one Jew, I mean, the whole world was against him. But what’s objectively wrong? I’m not speaking of it; there is a criterion yet – I’ll give you an example. I had a case during this McCarthy period, this crazy McCarthy period. Some teacher, he was a teacher of French in a high school. He was, in his youth, he was a student at the Yeshiva University. So he was called before the State Committee on Un-American Activities. I mean, of course, and the chairman of the American, what do you call it, the chairman of the State Education Committee – he’s a Jew now – Silver; you know, he’s in servitude to the, I may say in public, in servitude to the Archbishop, to Spellman, you see; he does what Spellman wants him to do. You see, I know, I had my experience with him. So he was called – of course, McCarthy, I mean – he [the teacher – ed.] was a communist, they discovered, in the 30’s – and when – I’ll come to the concept of teshuva, of conversion, of repentance – so McCarthy did not have the concept of teshuva – anyway, so, and they wanted him to disclose the names of his associates, and they were teachers, actually, they were teachers in the public school system. So instead of quoting the Fifth Amendment, which was the usual procedure, he said that the Jew, Jewish law, prohibits squealing, informing, and he’s a Jew who is committed to a set of moral principles, and he cannot violate them. So the American Jewish Committee got scared; they are easily scared, the American Jewish Committee. So, I don’t want to tell you the names, so they had an attorney for the American Jewish Committee call me, and [he] said, public scandal. What’s the public scandal? So he tells me the story; the whole Jewish community is involved; you know how the papers will come out, Judaism protects, Jewish religion protects communists. So I said to him, I’ll tell you, Mr. So-and-so, listen, you want me to give you an answer? I’ll give it in writing, and I don’t care if this answer will be published in the press. You just address your inquiry to the law commission of the Rabbinic Council of America, for which I am the chairman, and then it will be my duty, I mean, to answer; if no official inquiry is addressed to me, I’m not supposed to answer. So a letter came in. It was a letter that came in from the chairman of the commission. I don’t remember his name now; a gentle fellow; and then it was turned over to me, and we had a fight at the Rabbinic Council of America. Most rabbis said, we cannot now, in such a climate of prejudice and hatred and bigotry, we cannot defend an individual who does not want to disclose the names of his associates, and you saw – I mean, it’s very easy to become patriotic and employ pseudo-patriotism – “They are menace to society!” A menace to society – the man, the man [who] teaches French is a “menace to society,” and the other teacher about whom he was supposed to squeal taught physics, you see – “menace to society;” and he quit the Communist Party in the 30’s; this was in the 40’s; it was about 1950 or 1951, I don’t remember exactly; my memory is not so good. So finally I wrote a brief. They never published this brief; and I said, I prohibit. He’s a member of the Rabbinic Council; we made him a member of the Rabbinic Council of America; he joined, I mean, a few months ago; whether he joined it because he knew it’s coming up, I don’t know; he was actually ordained, and he’s a member of the Rabbinic Council of America, and he’s subject to decisions of the law commission. I prohibited; I enjoined him, on my decision, from disclosing any names. And then they asked, and then I said why, because, first of all, first of all, squealing is prohibited. We have to inform the authorities if the person in question is a public menace. But however, I don’t see any public menace. Even if an associate of his who teaches physics or chemistry or biochemistry was a member of the Communist Party ten years before, and quit because he didn’t like their policies, because he simply has contempt for them now; and then – the trouble is, with all these inquiries, is that you don’t know a basic law in the Bible, the law of repentance, that man can sin and come back to God, and that’s why I don’t dare tell him to inform. And they took the letter, and he was not cited for contempt. He was not cited for contempt. The letter was not published by anybody. I don’t know where it is now. I’ll probably find it in a file somewhere. I mean, I don’t say that, but I mean culpability at a higher level.

Tzedaka as justice

Now, collective responsibility, gentlemen, manifests itself also at the level of tzedakah. What is the idea of tzedakah? You know what tzedakah means in Jewish life, in Jewish law. What is it? Why so much importance? People say because Jews are good. I don’t know whether Jews by nature are tender; I don’t know; I have still questions; I have questions. It’s very simple. Since compassion in total involvement in the destiny of the thou, at all levels – at the intellectual level, at the emotional level, at the level of moral culpability – is the first aspect of the am covenant, this existential identification expresses itself in halakhic terms of tzedakah. I must extend assistance to my brother who is in need and cannot help himself. I must share the burden which unfriendly circumstances placed upon his failed shoulders, and help him carry this burden.

There is something very interesting, something very interesting about tzedakah, which I want you to understand. Basically, what’s the equivalent in English? It’s not in English; it’s in Latin. What’s the equivalent in Latin which was anglicized and incorporated into our English vernacular for tzedakah? What is it? Charity – it comes from the Latin caritas. What caritas means is love; it’s basically what the Greek agape means, love, love, deep love, very deep love, deep love, profound love, yes, love; love expressed in deeds, that’s what it means, love expressed in deeds. But, basically this translation is very wrong, and I’ll explain [to] you why. This translation distorts the whole concept of tzedakah. Caritas, in Latin, is rather the equivalent for the Hebrew term of chessed. Chessed you know means lovingkindness. This is basically – caritas is the equivalent – means lovingkindness; semantically it’s almost the most exact translation of lovingkindness, not of tzedakah – while tzedakah, whoever knows Hebrew, tzedakah and tzedek are the same words. What does tzedek mean in Hebrew? – iūstitia, justice, righteousness. Why the heh was added, this is a different problem; what is tzedek and tzedakah? – the same; why this noun has the feminine form, it’s a problem, it’s a problem; Maimonides tries to solve this problem. What it means, it’s iūstitia. It is justice, righteousness.

Let us see, what’s the difference between caritas – philosophically, what’s the difference between caritas and iūstitia? They are both Latin terms, iūstitia and caritas; or between charity, loving-kindness, and righteousness, justice. There is one difference. Iūstitia is a juridic idea; it’s a legalistic term. Caritas is not a legalistic term, not a juridic term. Caritas is a moral term. Law doesn’t know anything about caritas. Even in courts of equity, there is no caritas. Equity is also based on iūstitia, but there are the two kinds of iūstitia; the plain, simple iūstitia – you loan money, you have to pay – and there is equity, a higher form of iūstitia. But even courts of equity have nothing to do with caritas. A court cannot decree caritas, cannot tell me what to do, because caritas itself, basically, means voluntary, free, uncommitted, self-imposed, flowing out of a free choice, love – you can’t compel one to give you love; you can compel him to live according to the law, but not to give you love. If he refuses to give you love, there is no way to compel; not even a husband can compel his wife; not even a father can compel his children to give him love. So caritas is – of course, love is a moral value. Justice is not only a moral value; it’s a juridic value, it’s a juridic concept, you understand. The ethos, caritas – caritas is a question of the ethos. Justice is a concept of the law, of the law and order.

If you’ll take Maimonides – just one moment – Maimonides in the last chapter; I cannot read it completely, because with me it’s more – chapter 65, 65 last section, third section. He says, Maimonides, not 65, excuse me, not 65, but 59. No, no, 53. 53. 53. Part three [Guide of the Perplexed III:53]. He says,

“[We have explained the expression] chesed [as] denoting an excess. It is especially used of extraordinary kindness. Loving-kindness […] to those who have no claim whatever upon us” – this is Maimonides’ definition; third section, chapter 53 – “who have no claim whatever upon us.” Now tzedek – “The term tzedakah derived from tzedek means righteousness; it denotes the act of giving everyone his due, and of showing kindness to every being according as he deserves.” This is – law always demands, give the other fellow what is due to him; morality demands from us, give every fellow even what is not due to him.

So now, gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, so the term tzedakah, if we translate it with caritas, what does it mean? What does it mean, gentlemen? Ladies and gentlemen, what does it mean? If it is caritas, then it means – so it’s an act of loving kindness. You see, the man, for instance – it’s interesting – the man, for instance, who gives tzedakah, what do you call? – baal tzedakah, baal tzedakah. What does it mean? Baal tzedakah means a man of justice, correct. In English, what will you say? How will you say? You’ll use the Greek equivalent of philanthrop. What does it mean? Philanthrop means a lover of people. It’s love.

You see, however you maneuver, when you want to express the idea of tzedakah in English, you take refuge, so to say, in the Greek-Roman world view. They didn’t know anything of charity – I mean of, I’ll use tzedakah. I should give him? I owe anything to the poor man? I don’t owe him anything. The Greek, with their disdain, with their supercilious attitude toward the poor classes, with their disdainful approach – I owe him? I owe something to the slave? I don’t owe anything. If I’m a philanthrop, a lover of people, it’s a luxury, basically. Of course, I can be very generous, that’s all; very generous. Basically, if you’ll study Greek history, Roman history, you wouldn’t find a single incident of tzedakah. They don’t know anything. Tzedakah was not enumerated among the virtues formulated by Plato and Aristotle. They don’t know anything about tzedakah. Charity? All right, it’s a luxury. One likes the arts, the sculpture, and another one likes to play around with human beings and shower love upon them.

And, for instance, because of that, no system, no Western system, no system of law in Western society has ever said that tzedakah, that charity can be collected, compulsorily collected from people. That you can sit down, assess a man, his financial circumstances, fix an amount which he’s supposed to give, must give, according to the financial report, and collect the amount from him. I mean, if such a bill should be introduced in Congress, or in any legislature, general assembly, in any of the 48 states, people would say that the senator or the Congress or the member of the House who introduces such legislation that he is not in his right senses, because the basic idea of charity means freedom, because it is not a juridic category; it’s not a juridic norm – for instance, thou shalt not steal is a juridic norm – but thou shalt help the poor is not a juridic norm, gentlemen. It’s a moral norm; morality. What’s the difference between law and morality? Law is enforceable morality is in-enforceable; we cannot enforce morality. Morality is the element of freedom. While the moral norm can be enforced; a man can be compelled to comply with the moral law – thou shalt not murder; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt pay your debts, and so forth. This is exactly what is the Roman-Greek concept that was adopted by Western society.

[audience member:] I’m just wondering about, in contemporary times, this whole struggle in the Supreme Court, in terms of the desegregation, in some respects, reflects what I would think a kind of moral law as well as a legalistic law.

[the Rav:] A legalistic law because the Constitution, as it was enacted, it seems – I mean, equality is a constitutional term, so it becomes law.

But now, now, the new concept of tzedakah, which is alien completely to any system of law adopted by civilized society, is different. The Jewish law says that tzedakah is a juridic term. And tzedakah, you know what was? This is the law; this was the practice throughout the generations. There was assessment. Like now there is an assessment of taxes, there was assessment for tzedakah. Beit din, or whoever it is, the community or the court, used to sit down, simply, I mean, appraise objectively the circumstances of a member of the community, assessing – not only with taxes, with regard to taxes; this was a different assessment – how much tzedakah he must give.

[audience member:] Some form of self-government…

[the Rav:] What difference it is, whatever it is; whatever it is; of course, if we have no self-government, we couldn’t assess; because in the Middle Ages we had self-government; in Babylonia we had self-government; but it goes back to the Second Commonwealth, as a matter of fact. They used to assess individuals, and [if] the individual refused to pay, so then you simply take away his property, sell it – the method of foreclosure – and collect the amount which was fixed, and raised upon this particular individual.

And the famous statement in Bava Batra, which Maimonides quotes in his famous chapter on tzedakah: memashkenin al hatzedakah – you can sell property in order to collect tzedakah, which was assessed and fixed with regard to one individual – afilu be’arvei shabbatot – even on Friday afternoon, when all courts are closed. So you open the court for this session, for this particular act, you give an edict, of collection, whatever you call it, and you collect tzedakah.

Why is it so? It’s strange. Why is it so? Why is it so? – because tzedakah depends upon our experience, upon the existential community, the awareness of togetherness, which manifests itself in social responsibility, in sympathy, requiring welfare action. It places a duty, not a moral duty, but a legalistic duty, a juridic duty. This is not an act of charity, but an act of compliance with a legal duty enforceable by the courts.

This goes back to the covenant in Egypt – am, together. Basically it means that our property rights are not parochial; there are community property rights. Otherwise – that the poor man has a right to my property, and if I refuse to give him his share, it’s like, it is simply, it is a violation in contravention of a juridic norm, of the law, like, as if I had loaned money and refused to pay the creditor.

This is basically the community of responsibilities; it finally results in a community of property. Of course, the community of property has to restricted, but this is basically –basically private property which is nonexistent in Judaism. I’ll come to it later, this. First of all, all Jews may share your property – of course, the Jew who needs; if there’s no need, I must – and of course, sharing does not mean by unilateral action on the part of the poor, should just come into the house and take away; it must be enforced, I mean, it must have, so to say, it must employ legal procedure, but this legal procedure, I think – a poor man can come, according to the law – it’s a funny law – a poor man can come and sit and say, this man is rich and I am starving, I want him to support me. The court will, upon request, will assess possibilities, of course, inquire, assess possibilities, whether the man can make a living, and if the court should find out that this poor man cannot make a living, he’s helpless, and he is the only one who can support him – there’s no one else in the community – so [the] court can write an edict of collection, and by writing an edict of collection, it means it becomes a debt. This is the Jewish law, this is the Halakhah, this is not my philosophy, my experience, and this is based upon the covenant of am, together, together at all levels, at the level of destiny, interests, feelings, experiences, moral responsibilities, and welfare responsibilities, and finally, together in property, in ownership. Alright.

End of lecture 8

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