Unpacking the Iggerot: Animal Cruelty
Read more about “Unpacking the Iggerot” and see the archive of all past columns.
Animal Cruelty / Iggerot Moshe, E.H., vol. 4, #92
Summarizing the Iggerot
R. Dr. Moshe D. Tendler asked his father in law, R. Moshe Feinstein, to opine on the kashrut status of veal. Veal is the meat of a calf and is particularly infamous for the extreme conditions the animals are subjected to, especially at the time of this 1982 responsum. R. Feinstein identifies three core issues with the consumption of veal.
First, there is an immediate kashrut complication. Generally, a cow is statistically presumed to be healthy and able to live beyond a year (without such a presumption the animal is potentially a tereifa). Yet, because of the notable risk of adhesions on the lungs, the Sages prescribed a mandatory check. However, after consulting with various butchers (and presumably with R. Tendler), R. Feinstein uncovered two glaring statistics. According to the more stringent estimation, only 15 percent of calves used for veal were not treifot, while the more lenient assessment put it at around 44 or 45 percent. Either way, we are left with the majority of veal being not kosher; they would possess a presumptive forbidden status rather than standard cows which are presumed to be permissible. Accordingly, R. Feinstein ruled that such meat would require a more thorough examination to ascertain their kashrut on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, he advises the religiously meticulous to refrain from partaking in veal altogether.
The second, and perhaps most iconic issue, is the proscription against animal cruelty, in Hebrew known as tza’ar ba’alei hayyim. While the consumption of meat is permissible, and at times even mandated, the halakhic literature has understood there to be a distinction between genuine human benefit, which licenses animal slaughter, versus gratuitous cruelty (see Terumat ha-Deshen, Rulings and Writings, no. 105). R. Feinstein viewed the striking conditions that these calves were subjected to as constituting the latter, and did not accept the potential for additional financial benefit to the meat producer, nor the enjoyment of eating veal, as reasonable justifications. He likens this to a case in which someone is offered compensation to torture an animal because it displeased its master. (We may add dog, cock, or bull fighting as similar examples.) Such forms of harm toward animals depart from acceptable human necessity thereby rendering them forbidden acts of cruelty.
R. Feinstein’s final objection had less to do with the condition of the animal and more to do with the potential consumer. It is certainly within fair market practice to give the animals nutrients that will enhance the flavor and texture of its meat. What is unacceptable is to give them chemicals that only grant the appearance of robustness, only altering the color to deceive the buyer who is willing to pay a premium for the supposedly superior product. Such duplicitous practices would constitute ona’ah, and carry the associated monetary ramifications.
While this latter issue appears to have less to do with the kashrut or condition of the animal, R. Feinstein notes that in the process of loading the calves with chemical enhancements they become more susceptible to illness and needless suffering. To do so just to enhance their appearance does not qualify as a reasonable human need, and is in violation of tza’ar ba’alei hayyim on a Biblical level.
Connecting the Iggerot
About two years earlier, R. Feinstein was asked (H.M., vol. 2, #47) about a more common issue: May one kill flies, mosquitoes and the like? In contrast to his treatment of veal, he quickly and easily reaches the conclusion that killing these insects is fully within the bounds of reasonable harm. The desire to eliminate bugs from one’s home does not constitute some form of gratuitous harm or cruelty. If the Torah permitted the unprovoked slaughtering animals for food, it stands to reason that it would be permissible to kill animals or bugs which actively seek to do us harm—or even mere annoyance. However, the Talmud appears to caution against the killing of even animals that find themselves within our quarters:
One day, the maidservant of Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] was sweeping his house. There were young weasels lying about], and she was sweeping them out. He said to her: Let them be, as it is written: [“The Lord is good to all] and His mercies are over all His works” (Psalms 145:9). They said in Heaven: Since he was compassionate, we shall be compassionate on him [and he was relieved of his suffering] (Baba Metzia, 85a).
R. Feinstein explains that this anecdote is only teaching us about holy men like R. Yehuda HaNasi who would go beyond the baseline expectations of the halakha. Additionally, in the case of an insect or animal which is actively inflicting distress upon a human being there would not even be an element of piety to refrain from eliminating it.
While R. Feinstein concedes that he did not find any such recommendations made elsewhere, he finds it advisable to avoid exterminating insects directly with one’s hands, when possible. This has less to do with the insect than the preservation of our personal character refinement. Every act of killing, even justifiable, further desensitizes an individual to the point that he becomes susceptible to committing actual acts of cruelty. (He intriguingly cites the Or ha-Hayyim on Deuteronomy 13:18, a decidedly non-halakhic source, as his prooftext. From a search on my end, I have only identified one other instance [Iggerot Moshe, E.H. vol. 1, #38], where he incorporates this Torah commentary in his analysis.)
While R. Feinstein was compassionate to the needs of others suffering from insects, there are several independent reports which indicate that he was almost impervious to them. R. Avraham Kamenetsky recalls a Kol Nidre sermon, while everyone was shifting around desperately attempting to ward off the mosquitoes, R. Feinstein proceeded to deliver his speech without regard to bugs flying on and off of his forehead (Darkhei Moshe, vol. 2, pp. 304-305). When a similar scenario played out during his summer excursions, R. Feinstein replied in jest that he must have merited the blessing of the prophet Elisha, that no fly was found passing over his table (based on Berkahot 10b). A similar account is recorded in R. Shimon Finkelman’s Reb Moshe biography (ArtScroll, pp. 164-165).
Indeed, this was not limited to insects; he seemed to generally manage discomfort very well. R. Ephraim Greenblatt reports that when the air conditioning broke in the yeshiva he persevered to wear the standard attire of a rosh yeshiva, out of respect for the dignity of Torah learning (Rivevot Ephraim, vol. 5, Introduction #3, p. 21). When asked about this, he responded, “If you get too used to learning with the air conditioning, how will you learn without it?” (Darkhei Moshe, vol. 1, p. 18). While he clearly exhibited a heightened resilience to the discomforts of weather or insects, it did not prevent him from issuing the license to kill bugs as well as guidelines for having the temperature adjusted on Shabbat by a non-Jew under certain circumstances. (In Orah Hayyim, vol. 3, #42, he is more amenable to having a non-Jew deactivate the air conditioner due to the extreme cold. However, see Yoreh De’ah, vol. 3, #47:2, where he appears less flexible regarding relief from extreme heat.)
Reception of the Iggerot
While not veal, R. Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, Y.D., vol. 9, #3) addressed the permissibility of foie gras derived from geese that were force-fed to fatten and enrich their livers. Similar to R. Feinstein, he is concerned for a kashrut disqualification. If due to the repeated force-feeding, the geese reach a point in which they can no longer eat independently, they will categorically be rendered treifot, as they would certainly perish within a year absent external intervention. Also similar to R. Feinstein, he expressed concern for how birds were handled and believed it could constitute a Biblical-level infraction of tza’ar ba’alei hayyim. He further invokes “[The Torah’s] ways are pleasant, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17) to drive the point home.
Turning back toward R. Feinstein’s responsum, Rabbi J. David Bleich (Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. VI, ch. 10, “Formula Fed Veal”) contends that R. Feinstein may have downplayed the benefits of the color-altering formula being fed to the calves:
Iggerot Mosheh’s halakhic points are certainly well-considered. However, he seems to have been provided with less than complete information. Some consumers do indeed prefer formula-fed veal because of its whiteness. However, feeding calves formula rather than grass or grain also significantly reduces the cost of producing veal. Moreover, there is no gainsaying the fact that the taste is entirely different. The taste of grass- or grain-fed veal is similar to mild beef; formula-fed veal has a much blander taste. Some consumers have a marked preference for one over the other…
R. Bleich further contends that should these animals be fed only non-kosher sustenance, then according to Rema (60:1), they would be rendered non-kosher, notwithstanding the treifot issue. (See his article for citations of other scholars who address this concern.)
At the beginning of this column we noted the identity of the inquirer as R. Tendler. This was not done simply for biographical purposes, but because over thirty years later, on April 23, 2015, the Baltimore Jewish Life paper published an article titled “Rabbi Dr. Moshe Dovid Tendler Revisits the Question of Kosher Veal”:
Today, in many cases calves are nursed by their mother after birth (which also addresses the issue of Nisgadel al yedei Issurei Hana’ah), live in clean, group housing, often are fed grain when they get old enough, in addition to formula, and in general are much healthier than in the past. These changes are not yet universal but by 2017 the American Veal Association has committed that they will be an industry standard across the board.
Rabbi Dr. Tendler has been considering for a while whether the issues raised in the 80’s were still relevant, and wanted to see this with his own eyes. This Chol Hamoed Pesach, Rabbi Dr. Tendler visited STAR-K certified Bierig Brothers Shechita in Vineland, NJ to see for himself. Rabbi Dr. Tendler was impressed with the health of the animals and the STAR-K Kashrus requirements. The fact that the calves nurse from their mothers after birth, are group housed instead of caged and in many cases eat grain as they get older, are very different than the veal of the past, he explained. He said that if these changes could be confirmed industry-wide the issues that drove Rav Moshe’s Psak may possibly be alleviated.
As the article indicates, the updated conditions obviate the concern R. Bleich posed based on the Rema. And it further raised the possibility that R. Feinstein’s 1982 ruling, may no longer apply in practice due to the improved conditions.
Reflecting on the Iggerot
One of my goals in our “Unpacking the Iggerot” series is to use the Iggerot as a springboard for understanding R. Feinstein in a more holistic fashion. It is noteworthy that he also elaborates on the concept of tza’ar ba’alei hayyim both in his Talmudic discourses, the Dibberot Moshe, as well as his homilies, the Darash Moshe.
To take one example from the Dibberot Moshe (Bava Metiza, vol. 1, pp. 301-303), he examines the imperative to help unload another person’s beast of burden. One option is that it is simply a gezeirat ha-katuv, a declaration of the Torah, without an explicit rationale appended to it. He offers two other frameworks—one that is rooted in the obligation to feed one’s animal as a paradigm for providing all of the animal’s basic needs. The other model is based on tza’ar ba’alei hayyim, since if a person overloads an animal they have violated the prohibition, and are thereby obliged to rectify it. Interestingly, whether the obligation stems from the owner’s responsibility to feed his animal, as it were, or to reverse the direct act of cruelty, the Torah expands his obligation to include a fellow Jew, who would otherwise be an unrelated third party. These different frameworks have implications for an animal owned by a gentile, owned by a Jew but cared for by a gentile, or simply ownerless. An interesting takeaway from this general topic is the responsibility of how aiding the suffering animal extends from the individual to the society on a collective level.
In Darash Moshe (vol. 1, pp. 260-262), based on Avot (6:11), R. Feinstein articulates how the purpose of creation is to serve God. The resources that God provides us, such as the creatures of the world, are only at our disposal so long as we are using them in the pursuit of living a Godly life. To abstain from utilizing these animals for our sustenance, clothing, and other necessities would actually deny them their purpose in this world. On the other hand, he cautions against an approach which is rooted in entitlement. He warned against subscribing to the philosophy that “might is right” and that human beings are entitled to these animals by virtue of our superiority. Such a way of thinking ultimately leads one to rationalize asserting dominion over what he deems to be weaker in all areas—even over an “inferior” human being. R. Feinstein further laments that much war and violence has resulted from such a mentality (no doubt he witnessed that during his time in Russia and later learning of the horrors of Nazi Germany).
This sermon echoes what he wrote in the responsum about exterminating bugs. In that responsum, R. Feinstein argued that even when we are permitted to kill them, it should be done in a way that does not desensitize us to acts of violence and cruelty. For once one has been desensitized believes he is entitled to cause harm to another living being, he becomes that much closer to applying the same outlook vis-a-vis his fellow human beings.
Endnote: My brother-in-law, Mr. Gideon Pollack, Esq., pointed out that R. Yaakov Kamenetsky made a similar observation to the Darash Moshe, found in his Emet le-Yaakov al Massekhet Avot (p. 128). The same theme is also presented by R. Shlomo Fishelis in Kol Ram, Yamim Noraim ve-Sukkot (pp. 339-342) and Ma’amarei Bein ha-Metzarim (pp. 301-302). For further treatments of tza’ar ba’alei hayyim in Dibberot Moshe, see Bava Metzia (vol. 1, p. 347 and 354), Avoda Zara (p. 195), and Hullin (p. 262).
Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later.
Prepare ahead for the next column (February 27) on smoking in halakha: Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., vol. 2, #49.