Unpacking the Iggerot: Power and Parameters of Human Dignity

Read more about “Unpacking the Iggerot” and see the archive of all past columns.

The Power and Parameters of Human Dignity / Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., vol. 1, #196

Summarizing the Iggerot

Before the advent of Evite and other now-ubiquitous digital innovations, mailing out a formal letter of invitation was a more common and costly method that left little room for error. R. Moshe Feinstein was asked about whether a family that apparently mis-scheduled their son’s pidyon ha-ben for what would have been the late afternoon of the thirtieth day (rather than the thirty-first) should be forced to shift the date and consequently issue a correction letter to their entire guest list. The question was sent by R. Nochum Dovid Herman (d. 1984), who was the son of the renowned tzaddik R. Yaakov Yosef Herman (of All For The Boss fame), and served as the rabbi of Burlington, VT, which once boasted a thriving Orthodox community.

A pidyon ha-ben or redemption of the firstborn, is a ceremony that takes place a full month following the birth of a firstborn boy. The ambiguity in Jewish law is whether we assess a month based on the typical definition of a halakhic day, in which day 31 is immediately eligible for the pidyon ha-ben, or whether the month is based on the full cycle of the moon which is 29 days, 12 hours, and 793 halakim (a little over 44 minutes). While Shakh (Y.D. 305:19) adopts this latter position, we generally follow Magen Avraham (O.H. 339:8) who holds that we must wait until the onset of day 31.

In the case brought before R. Feinstein, there was a unique circumstance in which the child was born right before sunset, resulting in halakhic day 31 occurring before the 29 days, 12 hours and 793 halakim had actually elapsed. R. Feinstein ruled that in such a scenario the family would not need to reschedule the pidyon ha-ben based on two following considerations:

First, is the principle of halakhic consistency (or, ruling le-shitato). If we truly subscribe to Magen Avraham’s position, then the same way we generally have to inconvenience ourselves to wait longer until day 31 when it is stringent we should be able to reap the benefit of this position when it occasionally serves to our advantage as a leniency, and disregarding that the entire duration of a lunar cycle has not yet elapsed.

The second consideration R. Feinstein raises is the principle of kavod ha-beriyot, concern for human dignity. He cites the Rema (O.H. 339:4) who rules that despite normative practice dictating that one may not arrange for a wedding to take place on Shabbat, nevertheless…

We can rely on [the lenient position] in a pressing situation, for the additional consideration of human dignity is important. It regularly occurs that they do not work out the dowry on Friday until nightfall, and in that case, they do the betrothal and wedding on Friday night, because they already have the wedding meal ready and it would be humiliating for the bride and groom to not marry then…

Coupled with the concept of halakhic consistency, R. Feinstein adds that the principle of kavod ha-beriyot would provide ample basis to rely on Magen Avraham and permit this family to avoid issuing a correction letter to their entire guest list, thereby preventing undue humiliation.

Connecting the Iggerot

R. Feinstein applies a similar method of analysis in a seemingly unrelated topic: Coeducation. In a responsum (Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., vol. 2, #104) worthy of its own analysis, he suggests again that Magen Avraham, who is usually regarded as the stringent position demanding a higher standard of hinukh, could result in a leniency vis-a-vis mixing pre-adolescent boys and girls in the same classroom.

Unlike other authorities such as Ra’avan (cited in Mishna Berura, O.H. 658:28), Magen Avraham (O.H. 658:8) holds that it is not sufficient to merely accustom a child to taking the Four Species on Sukkot, but his father must ensure that the child is the actual owner of a fully kosher set to the extent that he would fulfill the mitzva as if he was an adult at this very moment. R. Feinstein infers that regarding coeducation, Ra’avan would likely demand that even prepubescent children be segregated so that they become accustomed to an adult life of limited interaction between the genders. In contrast, Magen Avraham would hold that we view the children as if they are currently adults—albeit adults who do not possess sexual temptation—and would therefore not be required to segregate. Once again, R. Feinstein argues that following a generally “stringent” position of Magen Avraham to its logical conclusion can at times result in a lenient outcome.

Regarding R. Feinstein’s utilization of kavod ha-beriyot, it is instructive to contrast it with a responsum (Y.D., vol., #77) he penned regarding the strictures of nidda (menstruant women). The standard ruling of the Shulhan Arukh (Y.D. 195:2) is that a husband and wife may not pass items directly to each other while she is a nidda. This prompted a woman to express the concern that these laws create an awkward situation in which she will feel embarrassed when her friends take note of the tell-tale sign during that time of month. Interestingly, in this case, R. Feinstein rejects the rationale of kavod ha-beriyot, arguing that everyone knows that women menstruate, implicitly that there’s nothing to be embarrassed of, and that in ancient times women even wore special garments when they were a nidda.

It would seem that while R. Feinstein felt that kavod ha-beriyot was a legitimate concern in the scenario of a mis-scheduled pidyon ha-ben, he used this concept with reservation even when the inquirer claimed to experience some degree of personal embarrassment.

Challenges to the Iggerot

The Ma’aneh le-Iggrot (#155), however, argued that R. Feinstein’s application of kavod ha–beriyot to the case of a mis-scheduled pidyon ha-ben was not warranted. In the precedent that R. Feinstein cited from the Rema, should the couple not get married Friday night they would incur a significant financial loss on the meal expenses and possibly jeopardize the entire marriage. While in the case of a mis-scheduled pidyon haben, there is ostensibly no relationship at stake. Moreover, the embarrassment of mis-scheduling a pidyon ha-ben may not even be justified as the guests could assume that there was simply a printing or communication error. In the words of R. Matisyahu Kagan (Responsa Matat Yadi, #67), “perhaps there is some inconvenience here, but no [issue of] humiliation or kavod ha-beriyot.”

(See also Ma’aneh le-Iggrot, ibid., which further challenges R. Feinstein’s assumption that Magen Avraham can be applied in the lenient direction. He argues that Magen Avraham actually held that one must satisfy both interpretations that the pidyon ha-ben may not be performed until the 31st day and after 29 days, 12 hours, and 793 halakim have elapsed.)

Reflecting on the Iggerot

There are two main lessons we can glean from this responsum. First, is the value and imperative of consistency in both halakhic pesak and practice. Perhaps a goal in halakhic observance should be to neither aim for stringency or for leniency but to adopt a position and accept its ramifications both when it leads to convenience and inconvenience, to kula and to humra alike. (This, of course, would need to be squared with several responsa in which R. Feinstein concludes that “Nevertheless, a God-fearing person should be stringent” and, alternatively, the many instances that he does not recommend erring on the side of caution.)

R. Feinstein is also selective in where he deems kavod ha-beriyot an appropriate factor in his halakhic deliberations. In general, kavod ha-beriyot is not the halakhic trump-card that some have made it out to be. The Talmud (Berakhot 19b) clearly circumscribes its power to only superseding Rabbinic mandates. Even though pidyon ha-ben is a Biblical commandment, R. Feinstein merely uses it as a factor to tip the scales in the direction of leniency, rather than suggesting that kavod ha-beriyot should take priority over the mitzva should they be in direct conflict, as would have been the case if the pidyon ha-ben had been scheduled several days earlier.

What is particularly noteworthy is how in the case of pidyon ha-ben R. Feinstein found kavod ha-beriyot to be a reasonable factor, but he did not accept an analogous rationale in the case of a nidda. In Iggerot Moshe (E.H. 2:1), he similarly dismisses an older brother’s perceived slight at his younger brother getting married first as another instance of unjustified humiliation (the older bachelor could not prevent his younger sibling from marrying). This leaves us to contemplate how one ought to determine the threshold for assessing what constitutes a breach of human dignity in the halakhic decision-making process. In future explorations of Iggerot Moshe we will continue to reckon with the experiential element of R. Feinstein’s halakhic rulings and how he balanced both the halachic and human facets of the scenario presented to him.

Endnote: See Otzar Pidyon HaBen for an extensive collection of laws related to the topic discussed here. In chapter 15 (fn. 18) he notes that R. Feinstein could have attempted to cover his bases by advising the family to employ Maharshal’s method of performing the act of redemption for the firstborn while stipulating that it only take effect after a full month has elapsed according to both opinions. While Maharshal is generally not accepted, it would seemingly have offered a further mitigating factor in a less than ideal situation.

Moshe Kurtz serves as the Assistant Rabbi of Agudath Sholom in Stamford, CT, is the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later podcast.

Prepare ahead: Our next column (May 23) will examine how R. Feinstein and his contemporaries addressed the growing ubiquity of support and service animals within the synagogue—and our tradition: Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 1, #45.