Unpacking the Iggerot: The Manhattan Eruv
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Unpacking the Iggerot: The Manhattan Eruv / Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 1, #138-139
Summarizing the Iggerot
In the early 20th century, R. Yehoshua Seigal spearheaded the creation of a limited eruv encompassing Manhattan’s Lower East Side. However, by the mid-20th century a rabbinic coalition known as the Va’ad ha-Rabbanim le-ma’an Tikkun Eruvin be-Manhattan were actively attempting to win the approval of the preeminent poskim of the day, such as R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, R. Yonason Shteif, and R. Moshe Feinstein, to construct an eruv that would service the entire island of Manhattan. In 1952, R. Feinstein composed an extensive analysis, responding to R. Tzvi Eisenstadt, a member of the va’ad, in which he disapproved of both an eruv in Brooklyn and, more forcefully, one in Manhattan. Due to the sheer volume of pages contained within this responsum, we will prioritize the most salient points.
The key question is whether Manhattan constitutes a reshut ha-rabim, a public domain, in which it is forbidden to carry more than four amot on Shabbat. Determining whether Manhattan is actually a reshut ha-rabim on a Biblical level or merely on a rabbinical level (known as a karmelit) is the difference between whether the construction of an eruv would be effective. The most straightforward explanation for this distinction is that the very Sages who introduced the notion of a rabbinical public domain, naturally have the power to limit their proscription in the manner of their choosing, such as through the implementation of an eruv. Shulhan Arukh (O.H. 345:7) describes the different characteristics of what would constitute a Biblical reshut ha-rabim:
What is the public domain? Roads or markets that are sixteen amot wide and have no ceiling and no wall. Even if they have a wall, they can still be public domain if they are open at both sides (and the doors are not closed at night [Tur]). And some say that if 600,000 people do not pass through it daily, it is not a public domain.
Strikingly, R. Feinstein claims that Shulhan Arukh was imprecise. The criterion for 600,000 people to constitute a public domain is not determined on a street-by-street basis, but is rather assessed by the city as a whole. It is challenging to identify many streets that 600,000 pedestrians traverse on a daily basis. However, if one were to look at the island of Manhattan as a single unit, reaching this quota is not just feasible, but a certain fact (the borough numbered nearly 2 million residents in 1950).
R. Feinstein’s reasoning for this is that the thirty-nine melakhot (prohibitive categories) of Shabbat are modeled based on the activities involved in the construction of the Tabernacle; and there were 600,000 men of fighting age within the Jewish encampment (fourteen mil by fourteen mil). These 600,000 were not presumed to have all traversed the same street on any given day, but rather their number was based on the entire encampment as a collective unit. R. Feinstein even entertains the idea that those who were homebound within their tents (or apartment buildings) could also be included in such a census. While this detail was more speculative, he does assert that commuters, not just residents, would be included in the population count. One might tongue-in-cheek observe that in the spirit of egalitarianism and humanism, he also benevolently included women and non-Jews in reaching the 600,000 figure, despite the original 600,000 being limited to adult Jewish males. (He explained that all melakhot have toladot, subcategories equally forbidden by Biblical force; while the paradigm of 600,000 was derived from Jewish males, its toalda would include women and non-Jews as well.)
There are other noteworthy arguments that he rejects, such as those who reasoned that drivers should be excluded from the count, since their cars constitute a reshut ha-yahid, a private domain. While there are many technical aspects to explore, perhaps R. Feinstein tipped his hand toward the very end of the responsum in which he argues that constructing an eruv should be forbidden even if one were to concede that Manhattan does not qualify as a Biblical public domain. He posits that historically the general practice was not to construct an eruv in Jerusalem. He surmises that this was due to the concern that when visitors to Jerusalem return home they would falsely assume it should be permitted to carry, irrespective of whether there was an eruv. Manhattan would be similar in the sense that many people travel to it from surrounding areas, and should they be enabled to carry in Manhattan, they may lose their awareness of eruvin when they return home.
While R. Feinstein objected to an eruv in Manhattan on technical grounds, he also approached this matter not as a theoretical halakhic issue within a vacuum, but also assessed its implications for the welfare of Jewish communal observance as a whole.
Connecting the Iggerot
Just because R. Feinstein did not approve of an eruv in Manhattan or Brooklyn does not mean he opposed doing so in New York City as a whole. For instance, in 1974 (O.H., vol. 4, #86) he gave his blessings to the construction of an eruv in the Queens neighborhood of Kew Gardens Hills, noting it did not have the same population density and therefore its construction would save many from otherwise unwittingly carrying on Shabbat.
Reception of the Iggerot
Returning to the mid-20th century, in 1956 R. Yosef Dov Moskowitz published his aptly named Kuntres Tikkun Eruvin be-Ir Manhattan New York, which was among several works composed around that time to analyze and advocate for its construction. Contained therein are approbations from several prominent New York rabbis, such as R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, whose praise for R. Moskowitz’s scholarship also served as a back-handed critique of the many rabbis who were inadequately conversant in the relevant laws of eruvin.
In a 1961 letter (Kitvei HaGaon Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Teshuvot Ibra, pp. 32-33), he acknowledges R. Moskowitz, R. Eisenstadt (the inquirer from our earlier Iggerot Moshe responsum), and R. Menachem Mendel Kasher (author of Divrei Menachem, which includes his own kuntres advocating for an eruv in Manhattan) for leading the charge to create a Manhattan-wide eruv. However, he was only willing to grant his full blessings in the event that a consensus could be achieved. He notes the difficulty of accomplishing this as, unlike in the small towns of Europe, Manhattan was comprised of a wide range of Jewish immigrant communities with no unanimously recognized rabbinic authority. However, he concedes that in extenuating circumstances halakha would permit relying even on a minority opinion in the absence of consensus. Therefore, the eruv would still be productive for (1) people who might unwittingly carry on Shabbat, (2) women and children who would find it unbearable to remain confined to their homes for the entirety of Shabbat, (3) observant medical professionals who would hesitate in the event of carrying equipment for someone who is not deathly ill, and (4) for transferring between the home and sukka on the Shabbat of the holiday.
R. Moshe Bunim Pirutinsky, a member of the va’ad’s leadership, shared in the HaPardes journal (33:9 [1959], p. 13; appears also in Divrei Menahem, vol. 2, “Introduction to Tikkun Eruvin be-Manhattan,” p. 14) an eye-opening letter that R. Feinstein had sent him which is notably absent from the Iggerot Moshe. R. Feinstein writes, “I do not wish to join those who are permitting [the eruv], even though I will not object to them” and references his 1952 responsum adding two further arguments. First, he posits that unlike in Europe where an eruv was necessitated for basic life functions like retrieving water, “here we have everything in our homes, and even in our synagogues there plenty of siddurim and humashim.” Secondly, he contends that while the construction of this dubious eruv would be better than no eruv vis-a-vis the sinners who will be carrying in any event, it presents a stumbling block for the God-fearing Jews who would never opt to rely on such an eruv if they were aware of its shaky halakhic foundation. R. Feinstein concludes that “if after all this the permitters reason that it is needed for the sake of the children and inadvertent sinners, I will not object but I [also] will not join [them either].” (Fun fact: Later in the same issue of HaPardes, there is a letter of congratulations to R. Feinstein upon publishing the first volume of Iggerot Moshe.)
R. Yosef Dov Moskowitz, in his aforementioned Kuntres Tikkun Eruvin be-Ir Manhattan New York (pp. 161-164), dedicates several pages to an attempted refutation of R. Feinstein’s arguments. He questions R. Feinstein’s extrapolation from Jerusalem to Manhattan, arguing that Jerusalem did in fact frequently have its own eruv. Also, why should we be concerned that God-fearing Jews will infer from the fact that they could carry in Jerusalem that carrying elsewhere (without and eruv) would be permissible?
He further contends that it is unfair for the conscientious Jews to lose out because of their less observant counterparts. He applies the verse “the ways of the Lord are right, and the just do walk in them, but the transgressors shall stumble in them” (Hosea 14:10) to mean that the righteous should be enabled to walk in God’s ways despite the fact that transgressors shall inevitably stumble in them. Moreover, not every person can be classified as either God-fearing and contentious or wholly wicked. There are many typical Jews who are generally observant, but are not fluent in the detailed demands of halakha and would stand to benefit spiritually from an eruv that would save them from their inadvertent transgressions. He further advances an argument on emotional grounds:
The entire week men and women are occupied with their work, and on Shabbat Kodesh when they get to rest from their hard labors and they wish to stroll, get some fresh air, or visit relatives, they are forced to remain imprisoned and locked up in their homes, for it is impossible to bring the young children. This is a great affliction and not oneg Shabbat. One woman who heard about my efforts to erect an eruv told me that I was performing a great favor to enable her going out for a walk with her young son and experience oneg Shabbat.
R. Moskowitz drives home the point that people like this woman are not sinners, but upstanding observant Jews whose entire Shabbat experience has become the antithesis of joy in the absence of an eruv.
Remarkably, R. Moskowitz’s opposition to R. Feinstein’s position did not prevent the latter from honoring him with an approbation that was prominently displayed in the front of the very work that had attempted to refute R. Feinstein. In this 1959 letter, R. Feinstein not only approves of R. Moskowitz’s scholarship as an example of “the way of Torah” to debate and seek truth, but even writes that there is an obligation upon all who value the Torah and its expositors to aid R. Moskowitz with the printing of this book. (This is vintage R. Moshe Feinstein and is in line with what we discussed in our previous column about the many instances involving R. Feinstein “arguing for the sake of Heaven.”)
Following the paper trail to the late 1960s, R. Feinstein demonstrated a similarly tolerant approach in his letter to R. Leo Jung, of Manhattan’s Jewish Center (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 4, #89). He writes that “I have already stated that it is not within our purview to object to the lenient ones, for they are establishing it in a way that is permitted according to some opinions. For they are also great rabbis, and on what basis should one object, since they reason according to their determination that they are able to establish it—for they are worthy of issuing halakhic rulings.” However, just two years later, in 1962 (re-printed in HaPardes, 1966), the following proclamation appeared:
In the counsel of the Agudath HaRabbonim that took place on Wednesday, Parashat Beha’alotekha, 18th of Sivan 5722, it was decided to inform the public about an earlier ruling of the Agudath HaRabbonim that it is impossible in any manner to establish an eruv in Manhattan, and it is forbidden to carry in Manhattan even after that which was implemented or will be implemented by some rabbis. And anyone who relies upon the Manhattan eruv shall be considered a mehallel Shabbat (desecrator of Shabbat).
This was signed by R. Aharon Kotler, R. Yaakov Kamenetsky, R. Chaim Bick, R. Gedaliah Shor, and, most notably R. Moshe Feinstein. Assuming he had approved of the language, the formulation of calling those who rely upon the Manhattan eruv to be Sabbath violators is a striking departure from his more tolerant approach expressed just a few years prior. This would not be the only instance within the annals of New York City eruvin that his opinion appears to have hardened with time. As we shall explore in our following column, a similar trajectory can be identified with respect to the Borough Park eruv as well.
Reflecting on the Iggerot
Perceptive readers, such as R. Dr. Harel Gordin (Hanhaga Hilkhatit be-Olam Mishtane, p. 258), have observed how R. Feinstein’s responsum on the Manhattan eruv serves as a quintessential example of his daring manner of halakhic analysis. Not only was he unflinching in identifying what he believed to be a misrepresentation by the Shulhan Arukh, but in doing so he was also willing to go beyond the medieval commentaries and draw his own halakhic conclusions directly from the Torah’s description of the ancient Israelite encampment. R. Feinstein’s dialectic of respecting precedent while not remaining bound to it was a hallmark of his independent thinking which we have observed time and time again throughout this series.
While we generally regard the Iggerot Moshe as a legal work, R. Moshe Mordechai Schlesinger (Kuntres Zikhru Toras Moshe Avdi, p. 23) also claims that it serves as a paradigm of musar, lessons in character refinement. R. Feinstein’s initial two-in-one responsa on the Brooklyn and Manhattan eruvin (O.H., vol. 1, #138-139) span pages 229-242. There is no fluff or filler—just page after page of intensive, mind-bending Talmudic analysis in which only one who is truly conversant in the intricacies of eruvin can begin to comprehend. R. Schlesinger remarks that when he noticed that these responsa were dated to Erev Shavuot, he had just assumed that R. Feinstein must have completed it at some point later. But upon reaching the end in which R. Feinstein signed off by wishing a “happy holiday for accepting the Torah with a complete heart, and to merit with the upcoming holiday to fulfill the the commandments of offering the re’iya and hagiga and gladness in the Temple, may it be rebuilt speedily by the Righteous Redeemer” it dawned upon him how R. Feinstein had apparently composed this feat of halakhic scholarship within the short span of time he was granted between the dismissal of his yeshiva for the holiday and the actual onset of Shavuot. It is a testament to how he salvaged every moment for Torah and how much one can accomplish if they value every moment God grants them.
Endnote: Many more responses to R. Feinstein’s eruvin rulings are anthologized in Petihat ha-Iggerot (pp. 108-125). See also R. Chaim Jachter’s treatment of R. Feinstein’s eruv-related rulings in Walking the Line (pp. 13-18, 69-69, 168-169).
R. Dr. Adam Mintz’s dissertation Halakhah in America: The History of City Eruvin, 1894-1962 (NYU, 2011) is an incredibly helpful resource in charting the history of the New York City eruvin saga, among other such instances.
[Read Moshe D. Sherman’s review of Mintz’s Building Communities: A History of the Eruv in America, TRADITION (Fall 2023).]
Mintz observes, as we referenced above, that prominent figures such as R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, as well as the advocates of the Va’ad ha-Rabbanim lemaan Tikkun Eruvin be-Manhattan were all seeking a consensus. Why could they not accommodate different policies on the matter and declare “these and these are the words of the Living God”? Mintz offers several suggestions as to the perceived necessity to achieve consensus on the matter:
First, in the years following World War II, the Jewish community and especially the rabbinic community felt vulnerable and weakened. There was a desire to create rabbinic unity rather than rabbinic strife….Second, in Manhattan at that time, Rabbis Feinstein and Henkin were the two leading halakhic authorities. If the eruv was going to gain acceptance, it was critical that these two rabbis be included in the process and hopefully to receive, if not their approval, their acceptance of the eruv….Finally, the Manhattan eruv was the first North American eruv that affected so many different sub-communities. Rabbi Schwab wrote in strong opposition to the Manhattan eruv not as an outsider but as the rabbi of a community [Washington Heights] that would be included within this eruv. The eruv also included the Lower East Side, the community of Rabbis Feinstein, Henkin and Moskowitz and the Upper West Side, with its combination of Modern Orthodox rabbis and a Hasidic community of which Rabbi Kasher was a leading member. Each of these communities interacted with one another in multiple ways and a consensus of rabbinic support would prevent tension and controversy. However, the most important difference between the Manhattan eruv and the previous North American eruvin lied in the fact that the Manhattan eruv was the first eruv that relied heavily on the precedent of an earlier North American eruv, in this case, the 1905 eruv created by Rabbi Seigel on the East Side of Manhattan…. The recognition that Rabbi Seigel’s eruv began the process that led to the creation of the Manhattan eruv reflects a turning point in the history of American Orthodoxy. Following World War II, the American Orthodox rabbinate began to recognize the existence of a history of American Orthodoxy…in the second half of the century, although these rabbis were generally still not born and educated in America, they recognized that they were building on a preexisting history of Orthodoxy in America. Therefore, even though the rabbis involved in the Manhattan did not rely on Rabbi Seigel for his halakhic expertise, these same rabbis felt that it was important to trace the history of the Manhattan eruv…. The realization that earlier eruvin in the history of American Orthodoxy were not merely isolated events but were the beginning of a pattern of eruvin in communities in North America helped to create the self-confidence and self-awareness that allowed for the explosion of community eruvin in the last quarter of the twentieth century (pp. 400-405).
Moshe Kurtz is the incoming rabbi of Cong. Sons of Israel in Allentown, PA, the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later.